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Abstract 
Policy interest in the not-for-profit (NFP) sector has grown in step with government’s 
interest in leveraging the capacity of non-state players to perform service delivery 
functions. Once consigned to the periphery of policy-making, the NFP sector is now 
widely accepted as an essential player in a mixed economy of service provision. 
Increasingly, the achievement of public policy objectives requires working 
collaboratively across sector boundaries. 
Government’s engagement with NFP service providers has, on many occasions, been 
found wanting. The use of competitive tendering and contracting for the purpose of 
leveraging greater economic and technical efficiency, choice, responsiveness and 
innovation in the delivery of selected statutory public services has introduced a range of 
tensions, contradictions and externalities including failures to fund the full cost of 
service delivery, the uncertainty of year-to-year contracts, burdensome reporting and 
compliance requirements, and the substitution of competitive behaviours for collegiality 
among NFP providers. In the process, the role of NFP organisations as sources of policy 
advice and legitimacy were devalued. 
Governments around the world have attempted to regularise relations with the NFP 
sector through the adoption of formal cross-sector policy frameworks – or ‘compacts’. 
Compacts serve a number of purposes, some explicit, others implicit. Explicit purposes 
include the regularisation of relations between the public and third sectors by 
establishing agreed rules of engagement; creating pathways for investment in sector 
capacity and capability; and enunciating the values and behaviours required for 
effective cross-sector working. Implicit purposes include a desire by governments to 
better manage the politics of their relationships with the third sector, and a desire by the 
sector to re-weight its policy influence within a strongly asymmetric relationship with 
government.  
This research takes the form of a comparative multi-case study and relies upon a rich 
primary and secondary literature, supplemented by interviews with elite policy actors in 
Australia and New Zealand. It aims for a deep contextual understanding of the range of 
factors contributing to the spread of compacts amongst Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. 
Employing Kingdon’s (1995) process streams analysis as a heuristic framework for 
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analysis, this thesis seeks to understand why cross-sector policy frameworks have 
entered onto the public policy agenda in the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  
In Kingdon’s schema, ‘policy windows’ open when three ‘process streams’ converge: 
the problem stream, the policy stream and the politics stream. The prospect of any 
solution attaining high ‘agenda status’ can be enhanced by the efforts of ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ capable of recognising and exploiting those ‘policy windows’.  
This study finds that in each of the jurisdictions examined, formal proposals for 
compacts or similar frameworks have: (a) been preceded by a broad recognition that 
aspects of the relationship between government and the NFP sector have become 
problematic; (b) been promoted within various policy communities as a feasible 
solution to acknowledged problems; and (c) entered onto the public policy agenda at 
politically propitious moments. The study found that the implementation and impact of 
cross-sector policy frameworks is highly variable. Nevertheless, political and policy 
attachment to compacts and similar frameworks appears to be on-going.  
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Prologue: North and South – A metaphor for new 
policy directions 
In her 1855 novel, North and South, Elizabeth Gaskell offers a powerful portrayal of 
social and labour relations in the newly industrialised North of England in the late 19th 
Century. Gaskell’s protagonists, Mr Thornton, a hard-nosed mill owner, and Margaret 
Hale, the genteel daughter of a country clergyman, offer a study in contrasts: Thornton 
stands resolutely by his rights as an owner and employer of labour whilst Margaret 
cultivates a keen appreciation of the privations of the working classes. As might be 
expected, the two reach a rapprochement in the end. Thornton has an epiphany, of sorts, 
which he articulates in a soliloquy near the end of the book: 
… I have arrived at the conviction that no mere institutions, however 
wise, and however much thought may have been required to organise and 
arrange them, can attach class to class as they should be attached, unless 
the working out of such institutions bring the individuals of the different 
classes into actual personal contact. Such intercourse is the very breath of 
life … I would take an idea, the working out of which would necessitate 
personal intercourse; it might not go well at first, but at every hitch 
interest would be felt by an increasing number of men, and at last its 
success in working come to be desired by all, as all had borne a part in the 
formation of the plan; and even then I am sure that it would lose its 
vitality, cease to be living, as soon as it was no longer carried on by that 
sort of common interest which invariably makes people find means and 
ways of seeing each other, and becoming acquainted with each others' 
characters and persons, and even tricks of temper and modes of speech. 
We should understand each other better, and I'll venture to say we should 
like each other more.  
(Mr Thornton to Mr Colthurst, In Elizabeth Gaskell’s North and South, 
Chapman & Hall, London, 1855, Vol. II, Chapter XXVI, pp. 353-54) 
In a literal sense, this dissertation is concerned to examine the transmission to the 
Southern hemisphere of policy precepts originating in the Northern hemisphere. This 
dissertation will argue that formal cross-sector policy frameworks designed to facilitate 
constructive engagement between government and the not-for-profit (NFP) sector have 
their wellspring in the ‘Third Way’ policy discourses of the first Blair Labour 
government in the United Kingdom (UK). Key components of the ‘Third Way’ policy 
agenda have all been taken up by Australian and New Zealand governments: these 
include horizontalism, joined-up government, a focus on social inclusion, engagement 
with citizens via civil society and formal bilateral framework agreements with the NFP 
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sector. Moreover, it would appear that centre-left political parties were particularly 
receptive to these policy discourses, at least initially. 
In a metaphorical sense, the sentiments contained in the above passage might also be 
applied to the very character of relations between government and the NFP sectors. For 
instance, take ‘North’ might be taken to embody the instrumental logic of the market 
and the contract, and ‘South’ to represent Arcadian notions of reciprocity, trust and 
noblesse oblige. Thus in the context of the following discussion ‘North’ can be taken to 
stand for government, whilst ‘South’ is the NFP sector.  
The ‘personal intercourse’ through which Thornton would engage his workforce in the 
formation of a plan, might in a contemporary context have an analogue in deliberate 
formal policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation – or Compacts as they are so 
often known. The analogy gains power and relevance when one reflects on Thornton’s 
warning that such devices lose vitality and ‘cease to be living’ when the parties no 
longer reflect on their ‘common interest’ – an oft-cited hazard of compacts and similar 
policy instruments.
  1 
PART ONE – INTRODUCTION, THEORY AND 
METHODS 
  
  2 
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Chapter One – Understanding formal frameworks 
for cross-sector cooperation 
Research Problem 
Over the last three decades governments in developed countries have pursued 
successive waves of public management reform that have profoundly reshaped the 
landscape of public service delivery (Seidle, 1995, Rhodes, 1996, Alford and O'Flynn, 
2012:5). The increasing reliance by governments upon external organisations to perform 
some of the work of delivering public services is one result of these reforms – a 
phenomenon Alford and O’Flynn refer to as ‘externalization’ (2012). The external 
providers upon which governments rely include other government agencies, other levels 
of government, private for-profit firms and NFP organisations (Carey, 2008, Alford and 
O'Flynn, 2012:10-12). Although government’s role as a direct provider of public 
services has reduced, this has been inversely matched by a growing need to interact with 
external service providers in order to elicit their productive contributions (Ryan, 2002, 
O'Flynn and Wanna, 2008, Alford and O'Flynn, 2012).  
This dissertation focuses on one manifestation of the externalisation phenomenon: 
formal policy frameworks designed to govern the interaction between government and 
the NFP sector. Over the last fifteen years national and sub-national governments in the 
United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Australia and New Zealand have implemented (and in 
some cases discarded) formal policy framework documents for government/ NFP sector 
interaction (Butcher, 2006, 2011, 2012, Butcher et al., 2012). Most often referred to in 
the literature by the generic term ‘compacts’ these framework documents exist to 
‘regularise’ the relationship between the public and NFP sectors, and are often 
accompanied by complementary policy initiatives centred on the practical and 
operational aspects of the relationship (Liiv, 2001, Lyons, 2002, Bullain and Toftisova, 
2005, Reuter et al., 2012).  
Compacts most often take the form of a ‘framework agreement’ that sets out mutually 
agreed values, principles, priorities and expected standards of conduct. The aim of this 
thesis is to chart the diffusion and variety of framework agreements implemented by 
national and sub-national governments in selected countries in an attempt to understand 
how they arrived on the policy agenda, assess the extent to which they fulfilled their 
  4 
policy aims, and draw conclusions about the factors contributing to their success or 
failure.1  
The first national framework agreement was the 1998 Compact on Relations between 
Government and the Voluntary and Community Sector in England (usually referred to 
simply as the ‘English’ Compact). This was followed in 2001 by the Canadian Accord 
Between the Government of Canada and the Voluntary Sector. A decade later, the 
Australian government launched the National Compact and in 2011 the New Zealand 
government released Kia Tūtahi: An Accord between the Communities of Aotearoa New 
Zealand and the Government of New Zealand.  
Over this same period a number sub-national governments have also implemented 
framework agreements and in some jurisdictions new framework agreements are under 
active consideration at the time of writing. Formal policy frameworks for 
government/NFP sector cooperation have at some point been considered in all 
Australian states and territories (the Australian Capital Territory was the first in 2001). 
A number of Canadian provinces have also initiated formal policy frameworks for 
cross-sector cooperation in recent years (see Elson, 2011a, and Elson, 2012). In the UK 
compacts are in place at the local government level throughout England, while in the 
devolved jurisdictions of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland there is strong evidence 
of robust – and evolving – relationships between government and the NFP and social 
economy sectors.  
Cross-sector policy frameworks in each of these jurisdictions can trace their provenance 
to the original ‘English’ Compact. In the UK where New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ 
provided an important philosophical underpinning for the devolution of power to the 
constituent countries of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland the historical and 
institutional link between the English Compact and local cross-sector policy 
frameworks is more explicit. And, to varying degrees compacts in the non-Anglo-Saxon 
world have also looked to the English Compact for inspiration (Bullain and Toftisova, 
2005, White, 2006, Reuter et al., 2012).  
Research aims and questions 
This research investigates the emergence of formal policy frameworks for cross-sector 
cooperation in the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. For each jurisdiction 
studied, answers are sought for the following broad research questions (RQs): 
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RQ1. How and why did the policy framework for cross-sector cooperation come into 
being? To answer this question, the ‘process streams’ framework articulated by 
Kingdon (1995) is employed as a heuristic framework. The process streams 
framework hypothesises the existence of three nominally independent process 
streams, a problem stream, a policy stream and a politics stream. Under certain 
circumstances, the three streams converge and create a time-limited ‘policy 
window’ that can allow particular problems and preferred solutions to those 
problems to be elevated onto the formal policy agenda. One accounts for a 
preferred solution – such as a compact – being accorded policy salience by 
seeking answers to the following questions in relation to each of the three process 
streams:  
• Problem stream: What aspects of the relationship between government and 
the NFP sector were acknowledged by either sector as being problems 
requiring a policy response?  
• Policy Stream: How did policy actors and policy communities converge on a 
formal cross-sector policy framework as a preferred policy response and to 
what extent were influential policy actors instrumental in elevating awareness 
of the problems affecting the government/NFP sector relationship and the 
preferred policy response? 
• Politics stream: What were the prevailing political factors that allowed for the 
problems and preferred policy response to be elevated to the formal policy 
agenda and/or conversely, what political factors have allowed particular 
policy responses to lose policy salience?  
Further, in order to address the three process streams outlined above, it will be 
necessary to contextualise the circumstances of each jurisdiction. This will 
require investigation of the following matters: 
• The history of government/NFP sector relations and the key policy 
drivers/policy constraints affecting the choices available to and made by state 
and non-state policy actors. 
• The nature of policy frameworks that have existed in the past, exist now, or are 
being developed for the purpose of governing the relationship between 
government and the NFP sector. 
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• The broader institutional and political context within which policy decisions 
affecting the government/NFP sector relationship have been/are being played 
out, including consideration of factors such as capacity constraints, the 
economic environment, and/or the electoral cycle. 
As well as asking how cross-sector policy frameworks came about in each jurisdiction, 
this thesis asks the following questions: 
RQ2. How were the policy frameworks implemented; what issues arose from the 
implementation process (e.g. was it done well or poorly), and what were the 
observed impacts (if any) of the frameworks (e.g. to what extent were the stated 
policy objectives fulfilled)?  
The research takes the form of a qualitative multi-case study and is sub-divided into two 
parts:  
1. The first part involves a comprehensive documentary study of cross-sector policy 
frameworks in England, Canada, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The English 
and Canadian compacts, in particular, are the wellspring for almost all subsequent 
policy framework documents in the UK, Australia and New Zealand. Each of these 
cases is explored via a comprehensive review of available primary documentation 
and the secondary academic literature.  
2. The second part focuses on cross-sector policy frameworks implemented/or in 
prospect in Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions. This involves a 
comprehensive review of the primary and secondary literature and is complemented 
by empirical field research in the form of ‘elite’ interviews with key informants 
from the government and NFP sectors in each jurisdiction (see Chapter Three for a 
more detailed discussion of the research methodology). 
Scope of the research 
In framing this research a deliberate choice was made to draw cases from within the 
Anglo-Saxon sphere. Formal policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation do exist 
elsewhere, however the political dynamics, policy rationale, governance regimes and 
institutional arrangements are not strictly comparable to those in Anglo-Saxon countries 
(Bullain and Toftisova, 2005, White, 2006). Each of the jurisdictions examined in this 
study is typical of a ‘liberal’ welfare regime type characterised by a relatively large NFP 
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sector, comparatively low levels of social welfare expenditure, and a strong reliance on 
market mechanisms to provide public goods (Esping-Anderson, 1990, Salamon and 
Anheier, 1998b, Goodin et al., 1999, Anheier and Salamon, 2006, Ferragina and 
Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011).  
This thesis examines the proposition (made by Casey et al., 2010, and Reuter et al., 
2012) that compacts in the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have arisen 
primarily as a response to a range of externalities associated with NPM-inspired social 
policy settings. Notably, NPM, with its emphasis on the utilisation of market 
mechanisms as an instrument of public policy delivery, is also held to be congruent with 
‘liberal’ governance regimes (Esping-Anderson, 1990). Although NPM is not an 
exclusively Anglo-Saxon phenomenon (Cheung, 2011, Foss Hansen, 2011) there seems 
to be a broad acceptance that NPM has had its purest expression in Anglo-Saxon 
jurisdictions (Halligan, 2011).  
The foregoing observations suggest that the dynamics of the relationship between 
government and the NFP sectors in different Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions will exhibit 
strong similarities given their shared cultural, political and institutional origins. These 
similarities offer the potential to generalise and transfer research findings across cases 
and settings. One would not, however, expect the dynamics, form, implementation and 
impact of compacts to be identical in each jurisdiction owing to the influence of unique 
contextual factors. It is entirely possible that the experience of any two jurisdictions 
might be quite different, notwithstanding superficial similarities in modes of 
governance, operational norms and institutional arrangements. It is also possible, if not 
probable, that the administrative histories, political and policy actors and endogenous 
and exogenous drivers within each of the cases will combine in ways that are quite 
distinctive. This research aims to provide a plausible account of observed similarities 
and differences. 
A comparative analysis of cross-sector policy frameworks in Anglo-Saxon and non-
Anglo-Saxon (e.g. Western European or Scandinavian) jurisdictions would be an 
interesting avenue for future research. However, this would not be feasible within the 
limited confines of this thesis, both because of the sheer scale of the task and the lack of 
access to primary policy documentation in the English language. Although there is an 
abundant literature addressing the challenges confronting European welfare states (see, 
for example, Fink et al., 2001, Taylor-Gooby, 2004, Cousins, 2005, Palier, 2010, 
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Hemerijck, 2012), the subject of compacts is a narrow field of inquiry. A research 
endeavour of this nature might be better suited to a larger scale collaborative effort 
involving researchers from a variety of countries able to interrogate and triangulate a 
wider variety of sources. 
Research relevance 
Over the last three decades policy interest in the NFP sector has grown significantly 
across the developed world. Policy-makers increasingly look to the NFP sector to play a 
role in responding to perceived crises of welfare systems and addressing problems of 
social and economic exclusion (Kendall and Almond, 1999, OECD, 2003). 
Governments in a number of countries acknowledge the NFP sector as a third force 
between the market and the state and have looked to it as a potential partner in the 
achievement of public policy outcomes, thereby prompting the pursuit of variegated 
policy initiatives towards the sector, ranging from reviews of current policies to entirely 
new comprehensive policy frameworks (Gidron and Bar, 2010).  
Where once the NFP sector might have been consigned to the periphery of policy-
making, it is now regarded as an essential element in a mixed economy of service 
provision (Kendall and Almond, 1999). Despite its policy salience, scholarly attention 
on policy towards the NFP sector has tended to focus on the contents of policies and 
their consequences (Gidron and Bar, 2010). Less attention has been given to the 
processes through which the policies were initiated and only a handful of researchers 
have studied policies towards the NFP sector comparatively (Gidron and Bar, 2010). 
Governments in a number of countries have elected to pursue formal, deliberate and 
structured engagement with their respective NFP sectors (Bullain and Toftisova, 2005, 
Carter and Speevak Sladowski, 2008, Casey et al., 2010, Reuter et al., 2012). At the 
heart of structured engagement is the framework document, often referred to as a 
‘compact’ (after the first ever such framework document, the 1998 ‘English’ Compact). 
Compacts serve a number of purposes, some explicit, others implicit.  
Explicit purposes include the regularisation of relations between the public and NFP 
sectors by establishing agreed rules of engagement; creating pathways for investment in 
sector capacity and capability; and enunciating the values and behaviours required for 
effective cross-sector working. Implicit purposes include a desire by governments to 
better manage the politics of its relationship with the NFP sector, and a desire by the 
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sector to re-weight its policy influence within a strongly asymmetric relationship with 
government.  
An Anglo-Saxon phenomenon? 
Compacts are generally treated in the ‘nonprofit literature’ as an Anglo-Saxon 
phenomenon, in part owing to their origins in the Blair government’s ‘Third Way’ 
policy discourse and in part because they have been embraced by governments in other 
British Commonwealth nations such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Reuter et 
al., 2012, Smith, 2012). In Anglo-Saxon countries compacts have been presented as a 
means for ‘remedying’ the range of externalities associated with the ‘contract state’ 
(Kendall, 2003, Casey and Dalton, 2006, Butcher et al., 2012).  
Formal cross-sector policy frameworks have even been adopted outside the Anglo-
Saxon context where they first took root, and have been re-fashioned and adapted to 
accord with local traditions of governance, institutional frameworks and policy 
priorities (Bullain and Toftisova, 2005, White, 2006, Johansson and Johansson, 2012, 
Reuter et al., 2012). In formerly socialist central European nations, for example, formal 
cross-sector policy frameworks have provided a pathway for re-establishing civil 
society institutions that had previously been banned or compromised by their close 
association with the state. This has enabled NFP organisations in those countries to 
contribute to the process of democratisation and economic transition (Liiv, 2001, 
Bullain and Toftisova, 2005, Toftisova, 2005).  
More recently, in Sweden a formalised cross-sector agreement inspired by the English 
Compact – the Spelregelsavtalet or ‘agreement about the rules of the game’ – seeks to 
involve a greater number of actors in delivering and producing welfare services to 
citizens and to encourage community service organisations to fill a democratic function 
in society and express the voice of citizens (Johansson and Johansson, 2012, Reuter et 
al., 2012).  
Compacts and neoliberalism 
Wherever technically and politically feasible contemporary governments in the UK, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand exhibit a preference for delivering mandated – or 
statutory – public services via non-state service providers (Aulich and O'Flynn, 2007a, 
Funnell et al., 2009, Wanna et al., 2010). As a result, the role of the public sector has 
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been gradually transformed from that of a direct provider of public services to that of a 
commissioner and purchaser of services provided by third parties. This has resulted in: 
• diminished public sector capacity and capability in relation to service provision  
• increased public sector dependence upon non-state service providers, and 
• the re-direction of financial resources from the public sector to the private NFP and 
for-profit sectors. 
As parts of the NFP sector have become more and more enmeshed in the design and 
delivery of publicly- mandated programs and services, the size, complexity, influence 
and economic contribution of the sector as a whole has grown. Here it should be noted 
that outsourcing service delivery to the NFP sector is not exclusively concerned with 
leveraging presumed lower cost structures in the hopes of increasing economic 
efficiency. NFP organisations are not just service agents; they are civil society actors in 
their own right, with constituencies and reputations that are independent of government. 
Governments often look to the sector to bring legitimacy to government-initiated and 
funded programs based on assumptions about high public trust in NFP organisations 
(see Casey, 2004:253).2 Not unreasonably, NFP organisations expect to be treated as 
valued partners to government in addressing social and community needs.  
A centre-left phenomenon? 
Compacts and similar framework documents are often cast within a ‘Third Way’ 
political framing and presented as a necessary correction of the excesses of the contract 
culture engendered by neoliberal approaches to governance (White, 2006) – what Fyfe 
refers to as ‘neo-communitarianism’ (Fyfe, 2005).3 As will be discussed at greater 
length in this thesis, the majority of formal, deliberate policy frameworks for cross-
sector cooperation in Australia (and New Zealand) have come about under centre-left 
governments (see Figure 1.1). The same is true for the United Kingdom (under Blair) 
and Canada (under Chrétien).  
Because the constituencies of centre-left political parties tend to overlap with those of 
the union movement, social movement organisations and the broad social welfare 
sector, one might expect a natural alliance to exist between government and the NFP 
sector around core social policy issues such as housing, workforce participation, 
education, health, social security and community services. However, the reality might 
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be more accurately characterised as an uncomfortable symbiosis. NFP sector 
organisations might be junior partners in terms of their influence and market power, but 
they are not inclined towards subservience to government and are highly protective of 
their core values. Parts of the NFP sector define their mission in terms of ‘speaking 
truth to power’ and in so doing tend to cast government and the public sector in the role 
of adversaries.  
Finally, as with the purchaser-provider relationship at the service level, compacts or 
similar policy instruments at the level the sector or industry require trust to be effective: 
trust that the parties will say what they mean, and do what they say. However, given the 
turbulent nature of politics and public administration, the foundations of trust often rest 
on shifting sands. As a government’s priorities shift in response to political events; as 
new problems arise; as the influence exerted by interest groups waxes and wanes; or as 
the public mood changes, electoral survival can figure more powerfully than policy 
purity in a government’s decision-making. Policy changes, administrative 
reorganisations and failures to honour commitments can have corrosive effects on trust 
– particularly for values-based NFP organisations (Alford, 2002). As Alford observes, 
‘environmental turbulence’ can constrain and damage the development of trust between 
a government and its NFP sector partners (Alford, 2002). 
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Thesis structure 
This thesis is comprised of nine chapters. The remaining chapters are organised as 
follows: 
CHAPTER TWO brings together relevant strands of the two principal theoretical 
literatures that inform the analysis set out in this thesis. The first, social origins theory 
(Salamon, 1987, Salamon and Anheier, 1998a, b), is an important strand of nonprofit 
studies which emphasises the importance of contextuality in the analysis of NFP 
regimes. The second, historical institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996, Thelen, 1999, 
March and Olsen, 2006) is an important and influential intellectual tradition that shares 
in common with social origins theory a strong emphasis on historical, institutional and 
political context. Bridging these two literatures is process streams analysis (Kingdon, 
1995), which provides the analytic framework for understanding the emergence in 
formal cross-sector policy frameworks. To assist in contextualising the analysis, that 
strand of the public administration literature concerned with the succession of 
governance paradigms in the recent era is also considered: the state-interventionist 
paradigm; the neoliberal, or new public management (NPM) paradigm; and the 
emerging post-NPM or relational governance paradigm (Rhodes, 2000, Hill and Hupe, 
2002, Bevir et al., 2003, Wanna and Weller, 2003, Halligan, 2007, O'Flynn, 2007, 
Rhodes, 2007, Wanna, 2008, Wanna et al., 2010, Butcher, 2011).  
CHAPTER THREE describes the research design for the empirical component of this 
study and provides a rationale for the selected research method. This study can best be 
described as inductive qualitative research. It is a multi-case study and employs an 
historical-comparative method. Through a process of triangulation, interviews with key 
stakeholders in the public and NFP sectors are used to corroborate and amplify core 
policy narratives drawn initially from primary documents and secondary literatures. The 
rationale for the selection of case studies is explained, and a description of the overall 
research design and field methodology and research implementation is provided. 
CHAPTER FOUR discusses the nature and purpose of cross-sector policy frameworks 
and documents the history of the seminal national cross-sector framework agreements 
in England and Canada that have provided the impetus and the broad template for 
similar policy instruments in other jurisdictions. This chapter relies on a critical 
examination of a diverse primary and secondary literature chronicling the origins, 
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institutional form, and fortunes of the ‘English’ Compact (Morison, 2000, Plowden, 
2003, Craig et al., 2005, Kendall, 2009) and the Canadian Accord (Phillips, 2003a, 
Brock, 2004b, a). These and all remaining cases are examined along the following 
dimensions: the historical and political context in which the policy framework came 
into being; the characteristics of the problem, process and policy streams; policy 
implementation, any issues arising, and impact on policy objectives; and, the future 
implications for NFP sector policy. 
CHAPTER FIVE presents case studies of cross-sector policy frameworks in the 
devolved jurisdictions of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (Alcock, 2009, 2012). 
Each of these jurisdictions inherited a compact developed in Whitehall and based upon 
the English template. Over a decade since devolution the policy frameworks in these 
jurisdictions have followed different trajectories. These cases provide useful insights 
into the range of historical, social institutional and political factors that serve to shape 
policy towards the NFP sector.  
CHAPTER SIX considers the experience of cross-sector agreements in Australian states 
and territories. As with the previous chapter, the analysis rests on an extensive review of 
relevant primary and secondary literature, together with interviews with elite policy 
actors from the public and NFP sectors. The experience of Australian states and 
territories in this policy space is instructive because of what it reveals about how and 
why compacts come into being and, perhaps more importantly, why they sometimes fall 
short of stakeholders’ expectations.  
CHAPTER SEVEN presents a detailed case study of the Australian National Compact. 
The analysis relies on a wide variety of primary documents and secondary literature and 
draws upon interviews with a number of elite policy actors from the public and NFP 
sectors. The chapter asks how and why the National Compact and the suite of measures 
included in the Labor government’s NFP sector reform agenda came into being, and 
concludes with a prospective assessment of the government’s reform agenda in light of 
on-going political ‘turbulence’ at the national level.  
CHAPTER EIGHT looks across the Tasman Sea to New Zealand’s Relationship 
Accord. As with other areas of public policy, New Zealand offers an interesting 
comparator for other jurisdictions in the NFP policy space. New Zealand’s unitary 
system of government, its unicameral parliament and its multi-member proportional 
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representation electoral system, coupled with its own turbulent history of often radical 
micro-economic and public sector management reforms, sets it apart in many respects 
from other jurisdictions examined in this thesis. The analysis rests on a review of an 
extensive primary and secondary literature, complemented by interviews with key 
stakeholders and policy actors in New Zealand’s public service and NFP sector.  
CHAPTER NINE sets out the overall conclusions of the study in the form of key 
findings. The chapter recaps the extent to which the research problem and the research 
questions have been addressed, and the theoretical and policy implications of the study 
are discussed. The chapter also reflects on the utility of Kingdon’s process streams 
model as an analytic framework for explaining the diffusion of compacts amongst 
Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. Also considered are major themes emerging from the case 
studies themselves, including the range of factors influencing the extent to which 
compacts are capable of achieving their stated aims. The chapter concludes with and 
account of the practical limitations of the research design and proposes areas for future 
research. 
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Chapter Two – Understanding the relationship 
between government and the not-for-profit sector 
As discussed in Chapter One, this study examines formal, deliberate policy frameworks 
(compacts) designed to provide a platform for engagement and cooperation between 
government (and their instrumentalities) and the NFP sector. This dissertation accepts 
as a fundamental premise that compacts have emerged in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions as 
one response to perceived excesses of NPM-inspired contractual governance (Casey et 
al., 2010). This chapter sets out to ‘make sense’ of compacts in the light of theoretical 
explanations of the NFP sector and a review of successive (and prospective) traditions 
of public sector governance. It is argued that one expression of NPM in particular – the 
marketisation of public services – has done most to shape the policy and operational 
frontier sectors. Therefore, this thesis considers the principal effects on the NFP sector 
of their engagement in new service markets. Finally, a rationale is provided for adopting 
historical institutionalism as an organising perspective for the analysis of compacts, and 
for the use of Kingdon’s process streams model as an analytical frame for 
understanding: (1) how compacts enter onto the policy agenda, and (2) the range of 
factors that might affect the ‘agenda status’ of compacts, and how this might affect their 
impact and longevity. 
The government/NFP sector – an evolving frontier 
In recent decades governments have confronted the challenges of meeting the rising 
costs delivering statutory programs and services to their publics, and responding to 
consumers’ demands for greater choice, flexibility and responsiveness in relation to 
service delivery. These challenges, whilst not intractable, have proved difficult to 
address within the traditional post-war ‘state interventionist’ paradigm in which the 
state owns the primary means of social production, and deploys the resources at its 
command via vertically-structured bureaucratic organisations.  
Public services – especially in health and human services industries – are often labour 
intensive. When provided by highly unionised public sector employees they can also be 
relatively expensive, and the only realistic avenue to reduce costs is to reduce staffing 
levels and/or services (which are often the same thing). Also, public sector working 
conditions and the application of internal controls on the production and delivery of 
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directly-provided services (factors which emphasise standardisation and uniformity) 
place constraints on the capacity to offer ‘choice’ to consumers. 
As a result, governments in the Anglo-Saxon world have, wherever feasible (both 
politically and practically), moved away from direct service provision by government-
owned (virtual) monopolies by substituting non-state service providers drawn from the 
commercial and the NFP sectors. In support of this shift, governments have cited the 
lower cost structures that have traditionally prevailed in the non-state sectors as well as 
their (putative) superior capacity for greater flexibility and responsiveness. 
Governments have also argued that replacing bureaucratic monopoly providers with a 
system of service delivery predicated on multiple providers operating within contestable 
markets (albeit one dominated by a monopsonistic government buyer) serves to control 
costs, stimulate innovation and leads to a greater variety of service offerings. 
State dominance in human services4 markets over the last half-century, together with an 
incapacity to pay on the part of many service recipients (resulting in a relatively low 
potential for profit), has dampened the development of mature private markets. Policy-
makers thus turned their attentions to the NFP sector which had continued throughout 
the development of the welfare state to work alongside the state sector, servicing the 
gaps created by eligibility regimes and/or failures to achieve an equitable distribution of 
public resources and/or failures to provide services commensurate with people’s needs 
and preferences. Non-state, NFP service providers are routinely portrayed as nimble, 
adaptable and efficient. They are believed by policy-makers to have grass-roots 
legitimacy within the communities in which they operate and, owing to their reliance on 
voluntary effort and their fundamentally altruistic ‘mission’, are valued as repositories 
of locally-generated social capital. 
The advent of NPM as one response to the economic and technical inefficiencies 
perceived to be inherent in the state-centric tradition, gave rise to the ‘contract state’ and 
the application of ‘contractualism’ under which the purchase-of-service contract 
(POSC) became the primary mechanism for both delivering certain types of services 
and for governing the relationship between government and the NFP sector. Many 
organisations welcomed the opportunity to compete for government contracts because it 
enabled them to extend the reach of their mission, whether that is about helping the 
homeless, alleviating poverty, caring for the elderly, promoting inclusion of people with 
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disabilities, undertaking conservation work, or providing opportunities for people to act 
as volunteers. 
However, the primacy of the contract in the government-sector relationship – reinforced 
by new public management (NPM) mantras and coupled with an overlay of red-tape and 
bureaucratic micromanagement – have seldom allowed the relationship to rise above 
that of principal and agent. And although contracts represent a significant share of 
income in parts of the sector, NFP organisations have never been entirely comfortable 
with the subordination of their mission or values to the letter of the contract (see Van 
Slyke, 2007).5 This has proved especially problematic when governments have sought 
to curb sector autonomy, supplant organisational identity, or constrain their ability to 
engage in advocacy. 
On the other side of the coin, government dependence on the sector for the delivery of 
public policy has certainly never been higher. The same might be said of the sector’s 
impact on the lives of citizens. If the sector suddenly withdrew from the delivery of 
public policy, many programs would simply cease. Government agencies would not be 
able to lift its internal capacity to provide services in-house and it is doubtful whether 
the capacity exists in the private sector to fill the breach.  
But whilst NFP organisations might act as agents, their true role is defined by their 
values and their ‘mission’. Governments and the NFP sector are both engaged in the 
promotion of social and behavioural change: government through the instruments of 
policy, legislation and regulation, and the NFP sector through various forms of direct 
and indirect action; sometimes in concert with policy, and sometimes in spite of it (see 
Moore, 2000). To the extent that they recognise that they are engaged in a common 
endeavour, governments and the NFP sector in various jurisdictions have explored 
options to a arrive at a new settlement that explicitly recognises their shared and 
respective roles. Formal policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation – in short, 
compacts – offer one means for setting out the terms of engagement.  
Making sense of compacts 
To answer the core research questions posed in Chapter one, this dissertation attempts 
to construct at a plausible account of why and how formal cross-sector policy 
frameworks come into being, and the extent to which they fulfil the expectations of their 
proponents (or their detractors, as the case may be). This study is an exercise in ‘sense-
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making’: in constructing an analytic frame capable of allowing the researcher to 
retrospectively construct a plausible account of events and actions, and in so doing 
reconcile the often ambiguous nature of identity, motivation, and meaning attributed by 
the participants in those events (Weick et al., 2005).  
Anheier and Salamon (2006) observe that public policy and associated administrative 
policy frameworks in the NFP space are the products of a complex legacy of historical, 
institutional and political factors. Moreover, it is readily apparent from the diverse 
literature focussing on NFP organisations, voluntarism, the social economy and civil 
society that non-profit/third sector research is a pluralist field in which scholarship 
draws upon a wide spectrum of disciplines, including economics, sociology, political 
science, public administration or management studies. Moreover, each discipline carries 
its own theoretical and methodological ‘baggage’. The primary purpose of this thesis to 
understand compacts and not to resolve theoretical differences, therefore, this research 
relies upon an inductive analysis, and employs ‘sensitising concepts’ to assist 
interpretation and understanding. 
Sensitising concepts provide a framework for organising and analysing empirical 
observations and, ultimately, arriving at a deep understanding of social phenomena 
(Ragin, 1994:87-88, Bowen, 2006:7-8). The notion of sensitising concepts has a long 
history and originated with Blumer (1954:3) who railed against what he then saw as the 
‘divorcement’ between theory and the ‘empirical world’. For Blumer sensitising 
concepts provide a ‘general sense of reference and guidance’ when approaching 
empirical questions in the ‘natural social world of everyday experience’ (Blumer, 
1954:7). As described by Bowen, sensitising concepts ‘draw attention to important 
features of social interaction and provide guidelines for research in specific settings’ 
(Bowen, 2006:2-3). 
The sensitising concepts for this study are drawn from existing bodies of theory 
concerning: (1) the nature of the NFP sector itself, why it exists, and how it relates to 
the state; (2) paradigms of governance, past and emerging, and their implications for the 
reach and modus operandi of the state and, ergo, the state’s relationship with the NFP 
sector; (3) notions of institutions and institutional actors – subject to historical legacies 
and political contingencies – that sometimes act to enable or constrain political or policy 
choices; and (4) theories of policy change that seek to explain how particular policy 
problems and preferred solutions arrive on the public policy agenda in a given polity 
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(i.e. why have compacts been so widely adopted?). These sensitising concepts allow us 
to critically reflect-upon, thematically organise and draw insights from the range of 
information available to us about the phenomena of interest (see Figure 2.1 below). 
 
 
 
 
Explanations of the not-for-profit sector 
NFP research occurs in a complex and contested arena and over the last 30 years the 
field has yielded a broad and diverse body of scholarly and applied literature (Anheier 
and Salamon, 2006, Heyse, 2006). There is, however, little consensus about what the 
field contains and what it should be called, let alone about the scope, nature and 
composition of the set of institutions that comprises the NFP sector cross-nationally 
(Anheier and Salamon, 2006:90). The literature is strongly influenced by the work of 
scholars from the United States and Western Europe, although there is a re-balancing 
under way through a growing body of research focussing on the role played by civil 
society organisations in the developing world and in newly democratic societies in the 
former Eastern Bloc (Dekker and van den Broek, 1998, Putnam, 2000).6  
Researchers have long sought the ‘holy grail’ of a unified theory of the NFP sector 
(Corbin, 1999). However, this has proved elusive and the field is beset with multiple 
and competing terminology, definitions, concepts and theories – all seeking to explain 
Figure 2.1 – Key sensitising concepts 
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the existence, behaviour and motivations of NFP organisations and those who work for 
them (Corbin, 1999, Dollery and Wallis, 2003, Anheier and Salamon, 2006:89-90). 
That no one discipline, or theoretical framework, dominates in this space is not 
necessarily problematic. The NFP sector is a complex institutional and organisational 
space and a multi-dimensional analysis might best provide the range of insights of 
greatest use to policy-makers (Dollery and Wallis, 2003:165-172).  
Intellectual and theoretical contestation, taken together with uneven data coverage, 
means that our understanding of the role of the NFP sector is still limited. The 
‘prevailing theoretical baggage’ is being continually challenged by new empirical 
research and a more nuanced and realistic portrayal of the sector is emerging (Anheier 
and Salamon, 2006:89-90, 109). 
Heyse (2006) identifies four core topics addressed in the NFP literature. These are: 
1) explanations of why NFP organisations exist in the first place (e.g. because they are 
believed to perform better than the state or the market, or because they complement 
the state and the market, or because they provide a vehicle for the collective 
expression of strongly-held values) 
2) explanations for the expansion of the NFP sector in recent decades (e.g. expansion 
might be explained by successful performance, or by the parallel expansion of third-
party service delivery) 
3) explorations of problems in relation to NFP performance through the examination of 
NGO characteristics and behaviour (e.g. the promise of superior performance is not 
universally upheld), and 
4) studies of the diversity within the NFP community to explore the cause of variety in 
NFP behaviour and performance (e.g. in recognition of the that one cannot assume 
that NFP organisations can be treated as a coherent set of actors) (Heyse, 2006:17). 
In addition, the theoretical literature can be subdivided into three broad analytic 
frameworks: 
1) the demand/supply model (also referred to as the three failures theory) which 
conceives of NFPs as being akin to firms and which posits that NFPs and 
governments complement and compensate for one another’s weaknesses in meeting 
the need for particular types of goods or services, 
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2) the civil society/social movement model which focuses on the multidimensional 
character of government-NFP relations and places greater emphasis on the 
mobilisation of interests in a political marketplace, and 
3) the regime/neo-institutional model, which is explicitly comparative in nature and 
which considers the processes through which social structures such as NFPs become 
institutionalised and the conditions under which governmental structures take on 
particular forms (Smith and Grønbjerg, 2006:222). 
Although cognisant of the different strands of theory, for the purposes of this study the 
regime/neo-institutional framework is most amenable to conceptualising the 
relationship of the NFP sector to the state and explaining the emergence of particular 
policy responses in given jurisdictions. The cases selected for this study exhibit similar 
traditions of governance, institutional/administrative histories, and patterns of NFP 
sector engagement with the state. Whereas the demand/supply model lends itself to 
research focussing on the intrinsic properties of organisations engaged in particular 
industry sectors or markets, and the civil society/social movement model is an 
appropriate analytic framework for research into the mobilisation of interests around 
defined issues, regime/neo-institutional model best supports research that has as its 
focus the meta-political relationship between government and the NFP sector in which 
the foregoing are embedded.  
Importantly, non-profit/third sector scholars do acknowledge distinct national histories, 
cultures and political traditions of nonprofit and voluntaristic endeavour, even amongst 
countries with similar levels of economic development (Anheier and Mertens, 2003, 
Anheier and Salamon, 2006:90-91). And, despite differences with regard to 
categorisations of the major regime types that characterise state/NFP sector relations, 
and to which regime-types individual countries or groups of countries belong, there is 
sufficient commonality between categorisations to render them useful for inductive 
analysis (Blumer, 1954). 
The policy relevance of the NFP sector 
Where in the past, public policy studies might have been somewhat ‘agnostic’ about the 
NFP sector, scholarly interest has also grown in that discipline as the sector has 
gradually moved nearer the centre of contemporary policy debates (OECD, 2003, 
Anheier and Salamon, 2006:92, Henman and Fenger, 2006:258-260). The heightened 
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level of public policy interest in the NFP sector has a number of drivers, including the 
relatively recent advent of social capital discourses and the impact of globalisation on 
the transmission of ideas about alternative models of governance and public 
administration (Anheier and Salamon, 2006). In the process, the NFP sector has been 
‘enveloped’ the in a ‘heavy ideological overlay’ and, according to Anheier and 
Salamon, ‘The sector is regularly invoked as an abstract idea intended to justify policies 
being pursued for other purposes rather than as a concrete reality to be measured and 
assessed.’ (2006:109).  
The NFP sector and government have long been engaged along a ‘moving frontier’ and 
their respective roles and influence have waxed and waned in response to changing 
expectations about the role of the state (Finlayson, 1990, Lewis, 1999).7 Rathgeb Smith 
and Grønbjerg (2006:222) underscore the centrality of the NFP sector in contemporary 
social policy with the following observation: 
... government-nonprofit relations are deeply immersed in political 
ideologies about the proper role of government, preference for market 
structures, and priorities accorded to values of fairness, equity, equality, 
choice and/or opportunities (Op. cit.). 
If one accepts this proposition, it follows that political ideology also shapes the 
prevailing governance discourse, which in turn shapes approaches to public policy and 
public administration. Understandably, the ideological foundations for the state/NFP 
sector relationship vary between national traditions and/or regime archetypes. In the 
Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions with which this study is concerned, neoliberal policy 
doctrines have provided the intellectual foundations for enlisting non-state organisations 
in the delivery of public services once provided directly by the state and, as a 
consequence leading to increased policy interest in the NFP sector (Anheier and 
Salamon, 2006:92-93, Minkoff and Powell, 2006:593).  
Rathgeb Smith and Grønbjerg also point to Smith and Lipsky’s observation (1993) that 
the relationship between government and NFP social welfare agencies constitutes a 
‘contracting regime’ characterised by ‘regularised interactions and governed by norms 
regulating behaviour’ (Smith and Grønbjerg, 2006:237). This study seeks to address the 
extent to which the ‘norms regulating behaviour’ within contracting regimes have come 
to be regarded as maladaptive by both sectors and whether compacts are a viable means 
for correcting the perceived deficiencies of the contracting regime. 
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A ‘regime theory’ of the not-for-profit sector 
Social origins theory emerged from work associated with the Johns Hopkins 
Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project – the largest international comparative study of 
the NFP sector (Salamon and Anheier, 1998b). Salamon and Anheier noted the ‘striking 
reality of significant variations in the scope, scale, composition, and revenue base’ of 
the NFP sector in different countries and concluded that decisions about whether to rely 
on the market, the state or the NFP sector to provide key services is ‘heavily constrained 
by prior patterns of historical development and by the relative power of various social 
groupings that have significant stakes in the outcomes of these decisions’ (Anheier and 
Salamon, 2006:106). They concluded that the size and character of the NFP sector in 
any society is ‘path dependent’ insofar as it reflects not only present day pressures, but 
also historical social and economic factors (Anheier and Salamon, 2006:106). 
In social origins theory Salamon and Anheier sought to address the limitations of (then) 
dominant neoclassical economic theories that sought to explain the existence of the NFP 
sector purely in terms of government/state failure and market failure (Donoghue, 2010). 
According to Donoghue (2010) this: 
... marked a major development in nonprofit scholarship and is one of the 
most important theories on nonprofit organisations to emerge in the past 
decade (Donoghue, 2010:37).  
Salamon and Anheier posit a four-fold division of idealised nonprofit regime types 
characterised by a particular combination of state-nonprofit roles, structure, composition 
and financing, and each having a particular set of social and historical antecedents 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1998b, Anheier and Salamon, 2006). These are:  
1) the liberal model – Australia, US, UK: characterised by a relatively low level of 
social welfare spending and a relatively large NFP sector,8 
2) the social democratic model – Sweden, Norway, Finland: characterised by extensive 
state sponsored and delivered social welfare protections and a relatively limited 
service-providing NFP sector, 
3) the corporatist model – France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands: characterised by 
sizable government social welfare spending and a sizable NFP sector, and 
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4) the statist model – Japan, Brazil & much of the developing world: characterised by 
both limited social welfare protections and limited NFP sector development 
(Anheier and Salamon, 2006:106-107). 
These four ‘archetypes’ are presented as ‘heuristic devices intended to demarcate broad 
tendencies’: Salamon and Anheier acknowledge that many ‘actual cases’ will be hybrids 
that exhibit features from more than one pattern (Anheier and Salamon, 2006:106). As 
might be expected, other scholars have sought to articulate alternative regime 
typologies. For example, Sarasa (cited in Blumer, 1954:245, 1995) identifies the 
Scandinavian (Sweden, Norway), Rhineland (Germany, Holland, Belgium, Austria), 
Mediterranean (France, Italy, Spain) and North American (US) regime types. Despite 
some differences in the groupings (and notable gaps) there is nevertheless considerable 
overlap between the two regime typologies. 
Welfare state regime types 
Regime theories of the NFP sector have analogues in other disciplines. For example, 
Salamon and Anheier’s conceptualisation of non-profit regime types is congruent with 
the typology of regimes in advanced welfare states proposed by theorists such as 
Esping-Andersen (1990) and Scharpf and Schmidt (2002). Over the years, according to 
Goodin et al. (1999) and Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011) a virtually standard 
nomenclature has emerged to distinguish between:  
• ‘liberal’ regimes rooted in capitalist economics and emphasising market dominance 
and private social provision, in which the state is confined to a predominantly 
residual social welfare role and benefits are tightly targeted (the United States is 
generally regarded as the epitome of a liberal welfare regime), 
• ‘conservative’ or ‘corporatist’ regimes based on the principles of subsidiarity and 
mutualism, rooted in communitarian ‘social market’ economics, and in which the 
state is primarily a facilitator of group-based mutual aid and risk pooling (Germany 
is often cited as a country with deep corporatist roots), and  
• ‘social democratic’ regimes based on the principles of social equality and 
universalism in which the state is assigned a powerful redistributive role (the 
Scandinavian countries are often identified as exemplar social democratic regimes).  
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Scharpf and Schmidt (2002) employ similar categorisations in their two volume study, 
based on Esping-Andersen’s (1990) ‘three families’ of welfare state regimes: the 
Scandinavian or social democratic model (represented by Sweden and Denmark); the 
Continental or Christian Democratic model (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands); and the Anglo-Saxon or Liberal model (Australia, New Zealand 
and the UK). This is effectively the same tripartite classification used by Hemerijck 
(2002). 
Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011) point to a number of scholars who have identified 
additional regime types, as do Arts and Gelissen (2006), such as the ‘radical’ regime 
proposed by Castles and Mitchell (1992) which is based on a reversed means-testing 
logic and largely excludes the upper-middle and upper classes from social provisions, as 
well as regime typologies based on geographical clusters. For example, Ferragina and 
Seeleib-Kaiser note that Leibfried (1992) and Ferrera (1993) have argued that 
Mediterranean countries constitute a separate regime. It should be noted that the welfare 
regimes literature exhibits an Anglo-European bias, and it has been argued by scholars 
such as Jones (1993) and Goodman and Peng (1996) that East-Asian welfare states are 
similarly deserving of their own categories.  
Importantly, while the nomenclature and the number of categories might vary from 
scholar to scholar, and the weight assigned to particular variables or the placement of 
countries in given categories might also differ, there appears to be greater agreement 
than disagreement about the core concepts underpinning the classification of regime 
types. There will of course be some differences of interpretation and the range of 
variables to be considered when assigning countries to one category or the other: about, 
for example, whether Australia is a liberal welfare regime (Esping-Anderson, 1990) or a 
radical welfare regime (Castles and Mitchell, 1992). But contestation of this nature 
serves to enlarge rather than diminish the utility of the concept. 
There is a high level of agreement between the categorisation of welfare regimes and 
nonprofit regimes, which gives us some confidence about the heuristic value of this 
kind of analysis. Both stress the salience of historical, institutional and political legacies 
as determinants of the form of the welfare regime in a given society and of the nature of 
the relationship between government and non-state actors, including the NFP sector. 
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Institutional relations in different service sectors 
Although this study does not seek to examine in detail the nature of cross-sector 
arrangements at the service domain level, it is necessary to be cognisant of the 
possibility that public/NFP sector interactions might differ substantially from one sub-
sector to the next. Grønbjerg (1987), for example, suggests that public and NFP sector 
relations might differ significantly in different service fields.9 This is an important 
consideration when taking onto account that in some jurisdictions compacts purport to 
be ‘whole-of-government’ or ‘whole-of-sector’ in their application while in others 
compacts are demarcated according to service domain boundaries. Public and NFP 
sector actors working in service or policy domains characterised by cordial and 
effective relationships might regard compact activities as inconsequential or, at worst, 
as irritants. 
Critiques of social origins theory 
Although social origins theory has been praised as a major step forward in thinking 
about the origins of the NFP sector, Donoghue (2010) draws attention to a number of 
important critiques. In the main, these suggest that the theory is constrained by 
limitations in measurement variables and the limited number of cases upon which the 
theory had originally drawn. The principal shortcomings of the model have to do with 
its potential to reveal the sector in sufficient depth and nuance. Rathgeb Smith and 
Grønbjerg, for example, describe Salamon and Anheier’s ‘social origins model’ as 
essentially an ex post facto explanation and posit that there is little clear understanding 
about the historical paths that give rise to particular configurations of government-sector 
relationships (Smith and Grønbjerg, 2006:238). They suggest that failure theories and 
the social origins theory treat the government and NFP sectors as separate and distinct 
whereas the boundaries between the two are often blurred – what is public and what is 
private is not always apparent and relations between the two transcend sectoral 
boundaries (Smith and Grønbjerg, 2006:237).  
Wagner argues that social origins theory ‘does not adequately consider the historical 
evolution and the “embeddedness” of public and nonprofit institutions in social space’ 
(Wagner, 2000:552). Even so, he does not reject social origins so much as make a case 
for a ‘categorical adjustment’ which better fits the reality, as he sees it, of Western 
European nations (Wagner, 2000).10  
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Rather than invalidating social origins theory, these critiques can be interpreted as an 
argument in favour of further refinement, adjustment and re-categorisation. Donoghue, 
for one, suggests that a social origins approach might be usefully augmented by the 
adoption of multiple perspectives and more qualitative approaches (Donoghue, 
2010:45-47). 
Social origins theory offers us a useful heuristic device for understanding and 
differentiating the observed form of the NFP sector across place and time. For the 
purposes of this study, debates about Salamon and Anheier’s conceptualisation of social 
origins are of less importance than the foundational observation that social, political, 
cultural, and historical contexts matter in any analysis of institutional relations in a 
given country, polity or jurisdiction.  
A succession of governance paradigms 
The jurisdictions that comprise the cases for this study all fall within the rubric of what 
Salamon and Anheier’s ‘liberal model’ – a category that also coincides with what others 
refer to as the Anglo-Saxon (or Anglo-American) tradition (Halligan, 2011). 
Governments in each of the subject jurisdictions have to varying degrees pursued public 
administration reforms aimed at making government more transparent and accountable 
for public expenditure and performance (Day, 2009b, Grossi et al., 2009).  
Our immediate task is to make sense of government-NFP interactions in the context of 
broad paradigmic shifts in governance. The past three decades the have witnessed a 
transition from a state-interventionist model of governance, steeped in the precepts of 
Keynesian planning and demand management, to one premised upon the notion of an 
interdependent polity in which the public sector, civil society and private sector actors 
work across traditional sector boundaries (Osborne, 2006, Rhodes, 2007:1246, Barraket, 
2008:3-4, Shergold, 2008b:18-19, Wanna, 2008:5-6, Osborne, 2010, 2011) (see Figure 
2.2). 
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(Butcher, 2011:41). 
The state interventionist paradigm 
Many of the core elements of what is commonly understood as the ‘welfare state’ have 
origins that date to the late 19th century: an early example being the introduction of 
social insurance legislation in Germany in the 1880s (Therborn, 1984). However, the 
major institutions of the welfare state evolved unevenly (and uneasily). Prior to the First 
World War the minimalist classical liberal state was the norm amongst the developed 
nations of the world. The state existed to fulfil the core functions of raising public 
revenue, maintaining public order, facilitating trade, defending national sovereignty and 
protecting strategic interests. The state did not generally concern itself with the social, 
educational or cultural advancement of its people: this was properly the role of the 
churches, private philanthropy and other non-state institutions (Wanna et al., 2010:19-
24).  
The governance paradigm that took the place of the classical liberal state was, by 
contrast, interventionist, centralised, and highly vertically integrated (Wanna et al., 
2010:19-24). This ‘protective statism’ (Brett, 2007) had a rather jaded view of the self-
 
Figure 2.2 - Changing governance paradigms11 2.2 - Changing governance paradigms12 
Statist/Interventionist Neoliberal/NPM Post-NPM/Relational 
The state as primary source of 
policy legitimacy, funds and 
service-provision. 
Role of the state evolves as a 
response to ‘voluntary failure’. 
Charitable & philanthropic 
organisations ‘co-exist’ alongside 
state apparatus. 
The state delivers ‘standard 
products’, little choice in service-
delivery model. 
The NFP sector responds to 
‘government failure’ with non-
standard products in parallel with 
state provision. 
State financial support to the NFP 
sector in form of grants: 
effectively a ‘donation’ based on 
broad alignment with policy. 
The state as primary source of 
policy legitimacy, funds and 
accountability. 
Service-delivery ‘contestable’ 
within competitive market 
frameworks, including creation of 
quasi-markets. 
The NFP sector as alternative 
locus of service-delivery 
(government failure). 
Emphases on ‘choice’, 
accountability, contractual 
compliance and ‘value-for- 
money’. 
State–NFP sector ‘symbiosis’: the 
state ‘hollows’, the NFP sector 
grows in both size and 
dependence on earning ‘market 
share’. 
State financial support to the NFP 
sector is governed by principal–
agent model and relies on 
performance- based contracts. 
The state increasingly ‘co-
produces’ policy with relevant 
sectors. 
The state as principal source of 
financial resources, but the NFP 
sector ‘co-invests’ capital and ‘in-
kind’. 
State–NFP sector relationship 
less about ‘command and 
control’, less ‘black- letter law’, 
and with more explicitly 
‘relational’ elements. 
Emphases on collaboration, 
managing within networks, 
capacity-building, industry sector 
development, inter- dependence, 
importance of skills and 
knowledge transfers and ‘doing 
what works’. 
Relational contracts consistent 
with values and principles set out 
in instruments for cooperation. 
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organising capacities of non-state institutions and business, and was inspired by an 
appreciation of the potential for government to mobilise the financial, legislative and 
technical resources at its disposal to leverage social and economic outcomes. It was also 
a system that relied heavily on hierarchy and rules (Wanna and Weller, 2003:69). 
Vigorous state interventionism was a response to the new world order of the post-war 
era. Post-war governments confronted new challenges such as the need to re-build a 
peacetime economy and to re-integrate demobilised service-men women into a society 
made restive by the privations of the Great Depression and the tumult of war. It was the 
statist paradigm that drove the development of the welfare state in response to the 
incapacity of communities or charitable institutions (voluntary failure), and the inability 
of the private sector (market failure) to provide for social needs.  
However, for all that the contemporary affluence of the West was built upon 
foundations laid by statist traditions of governance, the organs of state policy and 
service delivery could also be ‘monolithic, authoritarian, paternalistic, inflexible and 
slow’ (Wanna et al., 2010:24). Spreading affluence, education, and the politics of social 
movements raised societal expectations about social entitlement, public sector 
responsiveness, and the availability of choice – expectations the autarkic state struggled 
to address to the satisfaction of a citizenry increasingly distrustful of ‘big government’ 
(Wright (1994), cited in Bevir et al. (2003)). 
The neoliberal/NPM paradigm 
It was in the Anglo-Saxon countries (and their sub-national jurisdictions) that NPM 
really took hold (Halligan, 2011). As a body of ideas, NPM largely serves to codify a 
set of policy precepts whose intellectual foundations have their provenance in the 
neoliberal policy prescriptions of the Thatcher (UK) and Reagan (US) administrations: 
policies predicated on reducing the size of government by engaging the private sector in 
the solution of public problems through a combination of outsourcing and market-based 
incentives (Minkoff and Powell, 2006, MacDermott, 2008, Wanna, 2008).  
NPM provided a policy rationale for the indirect delivery of publicly-financed public 
services by non-state agencies. ‘Third party government’, according to Anheier and 
Salamon, resulted in NFP organisations becoming ‘essential partners in making the new 
public management work’ (2006:92). In order to give effect to this ‘new dispensation’, 
governments have experimented with new contracting models, ‘constructed markets’ 
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(quasi-markets), ‘managed competition’ and efforts to ‘systematise the terms of 
engagement between the nonprofit sector and the state’, thereby moving the NFP sector 
to the centre of policy debate ‘as central instruments of development and welfare state 
reform’ (Anheier and Salamon, 2006:92-93).13  
A post-NPM/relational governance paradigm? 
Although faith in the capacity of markets to leverage maximal economic and technical 
efficiency in the delivery of public policy still endures, there is growing scholarly and 
practitioner interest in the potential for new approaches to governance based on 
something more than the reductive logic of the contract (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000, 
Osborne, 2006, Halligan, 2007, Wanna, 2008, Simms, 2009). Hill and Hupe (2002) 
suggest that the West has emerged from an era of ‘market and corporate government’ to 
enter a phase marked by pragmatism and ‘mixed agendas’ (Hill and Hupe, 2002:85-
99).2 Similarly, Cavaye (2004) believes that Australia is witnessing a transition to a new 
politics of ‘engagement governance’ in which government is more than a provider or a 
purchaser of public services, and is increasingly an ‘enabler’ of community capacity. 
This, Cavaye contends, requires the rethinking of old assumptions, cultural change and 
new structures for the creation of relationships of trust (Cavaye, 2004:100). 
The process of ‘de-governmentalisation’ has led policymakers to recognise new 
dependencies and to flirt with ideas about decentred governance based on 
interdependence, negotiation and trust (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005:195, Wanna, 2008). 
Government interest in vertical and horizontal collaboration, cross-portfolio integration 
and ‘joined-up’ solutions has grown apace over recent yerars, leading policy-makers to 
explore various formulations of cross-sector partnership as a means for unlocking the 
specialist knowledge and skills, and market access of a range of non-state actors in 
order to deliver effective outcomes (Wanna, 2008).  
Managing relationships to achieve collaborative aims implies a capability on the part of 
public sector organisations to act with a degree of autonomy from executive 
government, to act entrepreneurially within prescribed policy boundaries, to take risks, 
to engage creatively and constructively with network ‘partners’ (Bourgon, 2008). 
Partnering also entails a degree of transfer of control over decision-making from 
government to other parties in order to promote engagement or inclusion (Althaus et al., 
2007).  
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Working within and through networks of organisations with complementary aims, 
priorities and values is often touted as the most effective way to tackle so-called 
‘wicked problems’ (Provan and Kenis, 2008, Ferlie et al., 2011). Bourgon notes that, 
‘[n]o government can claim to have all the tools, nor all the powers necessary to affect 
[sic] a complex and effective policy outcome’ (Bourgon, 2008:398). However, the 
system of delegated authorities within which public sector organisations are obliged to 
act often constrains their capability for flexibility and innovation (Bourgon, 2008:397). 
And, as Shergold observes, in the pursuit of collaborative aims, public sector 
organisations ‘exercise their persuasive talents in an environment characterised by 
asymmetrical power’ (Shergold, 2008c:197-198).  
Compacts as a response to complexity 
Relational governance has been proposed as one response to complex or ‘wicked’ 
problems requiring cross-cutting or joined-up approaches. Cross-sector policy 
frameworks complement relational approaches to governance by addressing operational 
plurality (in which state and non-state actors are expected to work synergistically across 
domain boundaries) and sources of policy failure inherent in the contracting regime 
(involving inter alia asymmetries of information and authority as well as the 
misalignment of goals and means). 
Despite the official ‘partnership’ rhetorics of cross-sector policy frameworks, a common 
complaint amongst government’s NFP sector partners is the persistence of the very 
behaviours and attitudes that the framework was intended to address. This, in turn, feeds 
a perception that despite their noble rhetoric, framework documents are really about 
managing the ‘politics’ of cross-sector working and are incapable of driving structural 
or systemic change. If one considers that collaboration across organisational and sector 
boundaries itself comprises a set of ‘wicked problems’, one might obtain a new 
appreciation of the scale of the challenge compacts attempt to address. 
The inherent difficulty of effective cross-sector working ought not be underestimated. 
Although proponents of relational or network governance argue the advantages of 
greater nimbleness and adaptability, a countervailing view holds that governing through 
networks has made already difficult policy problems even harder to address (McGuire 
and O'Neill, 2008:239-240, Wanna, 2008:9-10). For example, it is often observed that 
public policy aims can be difficult to achieve even within organisational and domain 
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boundaries despite governance structures that exhibit strong vertical integration and 
mature systems for internal control. Consider, therefore, the difficulty inherent in 
managing multiple relationships within and between networked systems in which there 
are strong asymmetries of knowledge, power and authority, as well as variegated 
cultures, values, business systems and capabilities. 
Marketisation 
From the mid-late 1980s onwards governments throughout the Anglo-Saxon world have 
displayed a preference for harnessing the ‘animal spirits’14 of the market to leverage 
greater technical and economic efficiency in the delivery of services (for deeper insight 
into the Australian case see Aulich, 2000, Aulich and O'Flynn, 2007a, and 2007b). In 
policy domains where government’s historical dominance had crowded out the NFP and 
for-profit sectors, new ‘quasi-markets’ were established to introduce contestability into 
the delivery of statutory services by non-state service providers (and Thomas, 2007, 
Australia is a world leader in this regard, see Productivity Commission, 2010a:303). 
Whilst the marketisation of public services is frequently cast as the villain of the piece 
in critiques of the contract state, Rhodes argues that marketisation in fact contributed – 
albeit unintentionally – to the pervasiveness of networks by increasing the extent of 
functional differentiation in public service delivery systems (Rhodes, 1997:51). He 
acknowledges that ‘by eroding trust in local networks’ marketisation ‘corrodes 
networks and prompts protective behaviour’ (Rhodes, 1997:48). Thus, markets and 
networks co-exist in an uneasy and complex symbiosis and governments are obliged to 
employ a mix of hierarchy (instructions from the government), markets (contracting), 
and networks (which government can only imperfectly steer) (Rhodes, 1997:40, 51).  
An ‘institutionalist’ perspective 
To sensibly address the questions posed in this study an appropriate ‘organising 
perspective’ is required within which to frame the research. The next section considers 
the potential of an ‘institutionalist’ perspective to elucidate the historical, political and 
institutional factors that might have predisposed Australian and other Anglo-Saxon 
governments to look to compacts as means of rationalising and normalising their 
relationships with the NFP sector.  
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Wagner (2000) advocates for the application of institutional analysis in comparative 
research into the role of NFP organisations in the public sphere. He argues public-goods 
or government-failure approaches lack a comparative dimension and do not adequately 
account for cross-national variations in the size and character of the NFP sector, or the 
structural transformation of the public sphere (Wagner, 2000). It is therefore 
unsurprising that scholarly interest in comparative analyses of the socio-political 
antecedents of voluntary action in different countries has contributed to the growing 
influence of new institutionalism in the field non-profit and voluntary sector studies 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1998b, Lewis, 1999:257). 
What is new institutionalism? 
In the early 1980s March and Olsen drew attention to a resurgent interest, across a range 
of disciplines, in the importance of social, political and economic institutions to 
collective life (March and Olsen, 1984). They were part of an intellectual vanguard 
awakened to the importance of institutions as ‘central and potent social systems’ (Scott, 
1994:56) and as ‘carriers of identities and roles’, and ‘markers of a polity’s character, 
history and visions’ (March and Olsen, 2006:4).  
The ‘old institutionalism’ tended to assume that whereas politics was affected by 
society, society was not significantly affected by politics. By contrast, the ‘new 
institutionalism’ posits an interdependent relationship between the society and the 
polity, (March and Olsen, 1984:735). This is, of course an oversimplification, but it is 
not necessary here to present a detailed account of the new institutionalist critique of 
‘old’ or ‘traditional’ institutionalism – this is capably and comprehensively addressed 
by others (March and Olsen, 1984, 1989, Hall and Taylor, 1996, Peters, 1999, March 
and Olsen, 2006, Amenta and Ramsey, 2010).  
A key strength of new institutionalism is its multi-theoretic character (Lowndes, 
2010:78-79). Multi-theoretic approaches are indicated in inductive, grounded research 
(such as ours) where the phenomena under investigation are characterised by contextual 
contingency, complexity, and value multiplicity (Greene, 2007:23). Multi-theoretic 
approaches support multiple verification of phenomena: they privilege convergent truths 
through triangulation while providing space for difference and divergence, thus 
accepting the legitimacy of multiple and diverse ways of knowing (Greene, 2007:22-
24).  
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New institutionalism represents a ‘sprawling literature characterised by tremendous 
internal diversity’ (Thelen, 1999:370). New institutionalism does not constitute a 
coherent or unified body of thought (March and Olsen, 1984, Hall and Taylor, 1996), 
rather it provides an epistemological perspective that leads away from a somewhat 
deterministic understanding of the relationship between society and polity towards a 
more nuanced appreciation of the complexity, dynamism and interdependence of 
institutions, society and polity and an expanded idea of the nature of institutions 
themselves (March and Olsen, 1984, 1989, Lowndes, 2010). It is not one 
institutionalism, but many (Hall and Taylor, 1996, Peters, 1999, Amenta and Ramsey, 
2010). As Lowndes (citing Gamble and Rhodes) observes: 
… it is misleading to describe new institutionalism as ‘a theory’. New 
institutionalism is better understood as what Gamble (1990:405) describes 
as an ‘organising perspective’. It is not a causal theory in the behavioural 
sense; instead ‘it provides a map of the subject and signposts to its central 
question’ (Rhodes, 1995:49, cited in Lowndes, 2002:107). 
Of the various strands of new institutionalist thought, three stand out: sociological 
institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism. 
Although there are significant differences between the three schools, it is also difficult 
to draw hard and fast boundaries between them because of the extent to which each 
freely adapts analytic approaches from the others and from related disciplines (Peters, 
1999:140-149, Thelen, 2004:369-370).  
Each has particular analytic strengths: sociological institutionalism offers important 
insights into the formation and transmission of institutional values and culture (see 
Figure 2.4); rational choice institutionalism helps us to understand the contribution to 
political life of the utility-maximising behaviours of institutional actors (See Figure 
2.5); and historical institutionalism gives us a deep appreciation of the manner in which 
normative values and utility maximising behaviour are shaped by social, cultural and 
historical context. 
Although one might well question whether new institutionalism is indeed still ‘new’ – 
Lowndes recently (2010) proclaimed that institutions were ‘back in fashion’ over two 
decades after March and Olsen heralded their re-discovery (March and Olsen, 1989), 
while John (2003:483) suggests that the ‘old’ versus ‘new’ dichotomy is passé – it is 
nevertheless clear that new institutionalism has thrown open the doors for renewed 
empirical and theoretical inquiry into the formation, evolution, role and logics of 
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institutions, especially in the area of comparative politics (March and Olsen, 1984, 
Thelen, 1999, 2004, Lowndes, 2010). 
Sociological institutionalism arose from the sub-field of organisation theory towards the end of the 1970s 
and regards institutions not merely as formal rules, procedures or norms, but also in terms of their 
cognitive dimensions and cultural practises. Beliefs, attitudes and values provide ‘frames of meaning’ to 
guide human action (Hall and Taylor, 1996:946-947) and these can even take the form of organisational 
myths and ceremonies through which the culture of institutions can be transmitted, reproduced or 
transformed, with consequential effect on the institutions themselves and, ultimately the polity (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1991, Hall and Taylor, 1996). Essentially a ‘cultural theory’, sociological institutionalism focuses on 
the social constitution of ‘rational action’ within institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996:949), as well as the 
diffusion of ideas, and cultural forms in seeking to explain similarities among institutional forms and 
policies (Amenta and Ramsey, 2010:32). Sociological institutionalist studies tend to attribute instances of 
policy diffusion to single theorised institutional causes in preference to the consideration of alternative 
explanations for policy convergence (Amenta and Ramsey, 2010:20).This research posits multiple 
pathways for the diffusion of compacts as well as processes of policy convergence. Whilst acknowledging 
the influence of institutional cultures in shaping actors’ perceptions of compacts, this research is less 
interested in the epistemics or institutional logics (intellectually worthy as they might be) than the broader 
historical and political dynamics within which compacts emerged. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 – Rational choice institutionalism 
Rational choice institutionalism takes its inspiration from rational economics, and tends to assume that 
institutional actors exercise a ‘strategic calculus’ and behave so as to maximise the attainment of their 
preferences, even if the attainment of their preferences is likely to result in an outcome that is collectively 
sub-optimal (collective action dilemma) (Hall and Taylor, 1996:944-945). Institutional factors neither 
produce behaviour nor shape individual’s preferences – as implied in ‘old’ or traditional institutionalism – 
rather, they provide a context in which individuals are able to select strategies for the pursuit of their 
preferences (Lowndes, 2010:66). Rational choice institutionalists consider that most political life occurs 
within institutions (such as legislatures, cabinets and bureaucracies, for example) and involve individuals 
making utility-maximising decisions (Peters, 1999:43-44). It is the incentives and constraints built into the 
institution and their effects on the behaviour of institutional actors that are of primary interest, while the 
past history of the institution is of little concern (Peters, 1999:46-47). Although individual utility 
maximisation might explain the choices made by policy entrepreneurs, historical path dependence and 
institutional persistence are also important factors affecting institutional acceptance of, and attachment to 
compacts and their underlying logic. 
 
Historical institutionalism 
Thelen notes the predominance of historical intstitutionalist approaches in comparative 
historical studies – such as this dissertation. One strength of the approach lies in its 
capacity to examine political and economic developments in historical context, and to 
account for the potential for developments in one realm to impinge on and shape 
developments in others (Thelen, 1999:390). Another is its ability to account for 
enduring differences in institutional regimes despite the ‘somewhat rather breathless 
Figure 2.3 – Sociological institutionalism 
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predictions’ of a trend towards convergence in institutional arrangements (Thelen, 
1999:398, Thelen, 2004:1-2).  
Historical institutionalism has developed, in part, as a response to rational choice 
theory. It is an approach that typically asks ‘big questions’ and highlights the 
importance of institutions in explaining political phenomena while rejecting 
functionalist explanations for their emergence (Amenta and Ramsey, 2010:15-16). 
Historical institutionalist explanations emphasise contextuality in seeking to explain 
how the institutional organisation of the polity and the economy operates to privilege 
some interests and demobilise others (Hall and Taylor, 1996:937, 941).  
Elson’s comparative work on deliberate cross-sector policy frameworks in Canadian 
provinces (Elson, 2007, 2010, 2011a, and 2012) explicitly adopts an historical 
institutionalist research framework. Elson argues that historical institutionalism is:  
... particularly suited to the process of identifying critical junctures in 
voluntary sector-government relations and the positive feedback loops 
that keep a particular policy in place over time … historical 
institutionalism makes it possible to link and compare government as well 
as voluntary sector institutional structures to policy agendas and 
subsequent policy outcomes (Elson, 2011a:138). 
Historical institutionalist analysis emphasises the importance of ‘path dependency’ in 
explaining how institutions emerge from and are sustained by the historical, social and 
political context in which they are embedded (Peters, 1999:63, Thelen, 1999:384, 
Lowndes, 2010:70). This does not imply a deterministic outlook on institutional form 
and behaviour, rather it acknowledges that the legacy of past political choices exerts a 
constraining influence on institutional actors (who might be either individual or 
‘composite’ actors), while accepting the possibility for incremental or even dramatic 
change under certain circumstances (Thelen, 1999:377-378, 384, March and Olsen, 
2006:12-13, Amenta and Ramsey, 2010:22).  
Although often criticised by rational choice theorists for inattention to theory and for 
‘merely telling stories’ (Thelen, 1999:372), historical institutionalism is far from being 
‘atheoretical’ and can be characterised by its ‘theoretical eclecticism’. Accepting as a 
basic premise Rhodes’ (1995:56) contention that, ‘No theory is ever true, it is only more 
or less instructive’, historical institutionalism sets no boundaries on theoretical thinking 
and is not tied to any one method of analysis (Hall and Taylor, 1996:940, Amenta and 
Ramsey, 2010:22-24). Historical institutionalists frequently begin with ‘empirical 
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puzzles’ in which behaviour appears to deviate from what the general theory predicts, 
and in which institutional contexts appear to have shaped both political preferences and 
available choices (Thelen, 1999:373-376).  
Moreover, historical institutionalism is concerned to integrate into institutional analysis 
the consideration of a variety of other factors – such as the diffusion of ideas – that 
might affect political outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996:938-942). Although the 
‘regularities of politics over time’ are of interest to historical institutionalists, it is the 
emergence of ‘choice points’ through historical disequilibrium and asynchronous 
temporal processes that most attract their attention (Thelen, 1999:374-384). 
This research seeks to explain the emergence and diffusion of formal policy frameworks 
for cross-sector collaboration over time and in multiple jurisdictions. It is considered 
that an approach founded on historical and contextual analysis best suits the research 
aims, taking into account the following propositions: 
1. the government/NFP sector relationship is shaped by a range of institutional factors 
(2006),  
2. accounting for the social, historical and economic antecedents of policy formulation 
is important in any comparative analysis of the NFP sector (1994, 1997, 1998a, b, 
2000), 
3. a multi-theoretic approach is indicated where the phenomenon of interest has 
attributes of contextual contingency, complexity, and value multiplicity (Greene, 
2007:23), and 
4. a strength of historical institutionalism lies in its capacity to integrate analytic 
perspectives from other disciplines (1999, 2004).  
On this basis, it is considered that a prima facie case has been established for adopting 
historical institutionalism as the preferred organising perspective. 
Key approaches to understanding the policy process  
Sabatier et al. (2007) discuss seven conceptual frameworks used to elucidate the policy 
process, each of which satisfies four essential criteria (albeit to differing degrees): 
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• each must satisfy the criteria of scientific theory insofar as concepts and 
propositions must be relatively clear and internally consistent, identify clear causal 
drivers, give rise to falsifiable hypotheses and be fairly broad in scope, 
• each must be the subject of recent conceptual development and empirical testing, 
and be viewed by currently active policy scholars as representing a viable means for 
understanding the policy process, 
• each may contain some explicitly normative elements, but each must be a positive 
theory seeking to explain much of the policy process, and 
• each must address broad sets of factors ‘traditionally’ deemed important to the study 
of policy-making, such as conflicting values and interests, information flows, 
institutional arrangements, and variations in the socio-economic environment 
(Sabatier, 2007:8). 
The seven frameworks are: 
1. The Policy Stages Heuristic examines the policy process in terms of logical stages, 
such as agenda setting, policy formation, legitimation, implementation and 
evaluation (Jones, 1970, Lasswell, 1971, Anderson, 1975, Peters, 1986). 
2. Institutional Rational Choice focuses on how institutional rules alter the behaviour 
of ‘intendedly’ rational and strategic actors motivated by material self-interest 
(Coleman, 1990, Abell, 1991, 1996).  
3. Punctuated-Equilibrium was inspired by theories of evolutionary biology (see 
Gould and Eldredge, 1977) and posits that long periods of policy stasis or 
equilibrium are occasionally punctuated by periods of major policy change 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). 
4. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) focuses on the interaction within policy 
sub-systems of ‘advocacy coalitions’ made up of actors who share a set of policy 
beliefs (Sabatier, 1988, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) in an effort to ‘bring a 
more explicit historical and contextualised dimension to the explanation of policy 
change’ (Burton, 2006). The ACF holds that stakeholders seek to convert their 
beliefs into policy through the formation advocacy coalitions comprised of actors 
with similar beliefs (Weible, 2007) and seeks to explain belief change and policy 
change over long periods (Sarasa, 1995:208).  
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5. The Policy Diffusion Framework holds that the preferred policy responses in one 
polity are often systematically conditioned by prior problem definition and choices 
made in others (Simmons et al., 2006). Based upon seminal work by Rogers (1962), 
and building upon the work of Mohr (1969), Walker (Walker, 1969), Gray (1973) 
and Grupp and Edwards (1975), Berry and Berry (1990, 1992) hypothesised a 
‘unified theory of the causes of state innovation’ to explain variation in the adoption 
of specific policy innovations across political jurisdictions. The spread of public 
administration ‘doctrines’ such as NPM has been ascribed to processes of policy 
diffusion (Hood, 1991, Common, 1998, Common, 2010).  
6. The Funnel of Causality and other Frameworks in Large-N Comparative Studies, 
describes a variety of frameworks drawn from studies that seek to explain variation 
in policy outcomes across a large number of jurisdictions. Usually expressed in 
terms of budgetary expenditures, the approach gained popularity as a means for 
comparing the performance of OECD countries, especially for explaining variation 
in social welfare programs. 
7. The Process-Streams Framework, argues that opportunities for policy change occur 
when three notionally independent process streams intersect: these being the 
problem stream; the policy stream; and the politics stream. The process streams 
framework is also intellectually accommodating in that it explicitly recognises the 
existence of satisficing behaviour in the face of uncertainty, as well as the influence 
of path dependence, policy diffusion and the possibility for critical junctures 
(punctuated equilibrium). 
Each of these frameworks is capable of offering insight into the policy process. Each 
also has its limitations in terms of how well it captures the complexity of the process, 
including the behaviour and motivations of policy actors, including institutional actors.  
The policy stages heuristic framework offers an idealised model of a rational policy 
process, however, as Sabatier (1991, 1999, 2007), Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994) 
and John (2003) observe, the sheer heterogeneity or the institutions under study and the 
complexity of the networks that connect them precludes a simple formulaic map of the 
policy process. Institutional rational choice enables us to understand the effects of the 
opportunities and constraints embedded in formal institutional rules and the interest-
maximising behaviours of rational strategic actors, however, scholars such as Bourdieu 
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(2005) John (2003) and Kahneman (2003) have questioned its underlying assumptions 
as reductionist and unrealistic.  
The process streams, punctuated equilibrium and advocacy coalition frameworks – 
which Hansén (2007:98) refers to as the ‘policy change’ strand of the policy analysis 
literature offer a more nuanced account of the policy process. These are also what John 
(1998, 2003) refers to as ‘synthetic’ accounts of the policy process, for the reason that 
they bring together a range of research on institutions, networks, socio-economic 
process, choices and ideas. Hansén (2007) notes that many scholars see commonalities 
in the three approaches and often treat them together. He further observes that process 
streams, ACF and punctuated equilibrium are to some extent overlapping analyses that 
are for the most part complementary (Hansén, 2007:116). 
The policy diffusion and the funnel of causality and frameworks are more quantitative in 
their approaches and are well suited to comparative case studies across multiple sites or 
jurisdictions using large sample sizes. Although both approaches are no doubt capable 
of revealing broad patterns in the prevalence of policy choices and of mapping these 
with statistical confidence against a range of variables, it is doubtful that these 
approaches are capable of revealing much about the either the pathways for the 
transmission of ideas or the beliefs and motivations of policy actors. 
The case for the process streams framework 
The process streams framework set out by Kingdon (1995) offers an appropriate and 
serviceable heuristic for the purposes of this thesis. Kingdon’s focus on ‘agenda setting’ 
is particularly pertinent to the study’s core concern with the question of how formal, 
deliberate cross-sector policy frameworks have come into being; why they endure in 
some cases; and why they lose policy relevance in others. Although process streams 
analysis is usually used to explain how policies are made by national governments there 
is no compelling reason why it cannot be extended the process of policy making at 
various levels of government (Zaharidis, 2007). 
One strength of the process streams framework is its emphasis on the roles played by 
individual and collective policy actors in mobilising consensus about ‘problems’ that 
require a policy solution; articulating and promoting possible solutions to those 
problems; and acting entrepreneurially to exploit windows of opportunity that open 
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during political propitious times to ‘couple’ problems and preferred solutions. Zaharidis 
points out that the process streams framework:  
… subscribes to the notion that institutions make things possible, but 
people make things happen. It points to the importance of policy 
entrepreneurs and human cognition and emotion as the bases of political 
manipulation (Zaharidis, 2007:84).  
Moreover, he adds, the process streams framework accepts that ‘institutions matter … 
but their importance is tempered considerably by individuals, timing, and context’ 
(Zaharidis, 2007:84). 
Another strength of the process streams framework is its consonance with historical 
institutionalism, especially in terms of its emphasis on locating decision-making in a 
broader historical, social and political context. Like historical institutionalism, process 
streams analysis is multi-theoretic and integrative in its very nature. It encompasses 
aspects of other ‘synthetic’ accounts of the policy process, the punctuated equilibrium 
and advocacy coalition frameworks, and is capable of accommodating concepts of 
policy transfer or policy diffusion. Process streams analysis also accepts the importance 
of institutions and acknowledges the existence of multiple ‘institutional venues’ within 
which ‘policy advocates can push their proposals’ (Kingdon, 1995:229-230). Above all, 
it takes as its starting premise that the processes through which public policies are 
formed are dynamic, fluid and ‘exceedingly complex’ (Kingdon, 1995: 230). 
The process streams framework allows us to make sense of cross-sector policy 
frameworks in that it supports the articulation of a structured policy narrative (see Kay, 
2006:59-74).15 Although often criticised for being ‘always true’ and, therefore, difficult 
to falsify, Sabatier (2007) notes that process streams analysis is both widely applicable 
and widely applied. Zahariadis (2007:83) contends that process streams offers a fruitful 
means for explaining policy-making in a messy, complex world in which ambiguity is 
the norm and serendipity plays a major role. Zahariadis also recommends process 
streams as a useful lens on the policy process whether in a single case or across time, 
countries, issues and policy domains (2007:83).  
The essence of the process streams framework 
In his seminal book Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (first published in 1984), 
Kingdon posed the questions: ‘what makes an idea’s time come?’ and ‘what makes 
people in and around government attend, at any given time, to some subjects and not to 
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others?’ (Kingdon, 1995:1). Kingdon’s book drew upon interviews with people ‘in and 
around the United States the federal government who deal with health and 
transportation policy’ (Kingdon, 1995:xi). These included ‘congressional staffers, 
administratrion appointees, civil servants, lobbyists, journalists, researchers and 
consultants’ and occurred over several years (Kingdon, 1995:xi). 
Kingdon observed that in the volatile marketplace of ideas and solutions – which he 
refers to as the ‘policy primeval soup’ – some ideas never gain traction, others become 
prominent and then fade, and some ‘achieve lasting high agenda status’ (Kingdon, 
1995:116). Kingdon posits that the ascendancy of policy ideas sometimes depends on 
the opening of ‘policy windows’ and on the actions of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ who 
exploit these time-limited opportunities to ‘couple’ preferred solutions with existing 
policy problems (Kingdon, 1995:166-69; 181-82). 
Thelen observes that institutions rest on ‘a set of ideational and material foundations 
that, ‘if shaken, open possibilities for change’ (Thelen, 1999:398). Kingdon’s account 
of agenda setting sets out a plausible mechanism for just such a shaking. According to 
Kingdon political, institutional and policy continuity/discontinuity depend on the 
interplay of three ‘process streams’: the problem stream, the policy stream, and the 
politics stream. Although the three streams largely operate independently of one 
another, and each has its own dynamics and its own rules, they can converge at critical 
times. When this happens, a situation arises in which: ‘[a] problem is recognised, a 
solution is available, the political climate makes the time right for change, and the 
constraints do not prohibit action’ (Kingdon, 1995:86-88). This creates a ‘policy 
window’ which, when opened, presents a time-limited opportunity for ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ to ‘couple’ preferred solutions with existing policy problems (Kingdon, 
1995:166-69;181-82).  
Let us now expand on the nature of each of Kingdon’s process streams and consider 
their relevance to this study. 
The problem stream 
The first element of Kingdon’s model is the problem stream. At any given time 
governments are confronted with a long list of diverse problems across a wide range of 
policy domains. Some problems receive attention while other potential problems are 
ignored. A steady state is generally considered less problematic than a change of state in 
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an indicator. Problems sometimes need a ‘push’ to get the attention of decision-makers. 
This might take the form of a ‘focussing event’ such as a crisis or a disaster.  
Problems can drop from the public agenda because governments believe the problem is 
solved, or conversely because the problem is considered to be so intractable that further 
expenditure of political capital is considered pointless. Budgets can have a constraining 
effect: inexpensive programs come to the fore in times of severe budgetary constraint 
while others are ignored because of perceived prohibitive costs. Some problems fade 
simply because they cease to be seen as problems, or they cease to be problems 
(Kingdon, 1995:90-115).  
The policy stream 
The second element of Kingdon’s model, the policy stream, is comprised of 
communities of specialist researchers, policy professionals, academics or interest group 
analysts. Members of these policy communities concentrate on generating and testing 
ideas, some of which come to policy prominence and then fade while others endure. 
Whilst sensitive to political events, the community of policy specialists is not subject to 
the same forces that drive the political stream. Some policy communities are closed and 
tightly knit while others are more diverse and fragmented: the former exhibit a common 
paradigm and a lingua franca around a stable agenda while the latter exhibit fewer 
agreed-upon paradigms, and an agenda subject to abrupt shifts.16  
In any policy community one might find ‘policy entrepreneurs’ who advocate for 
particular policy proposals or for the prominence of ideas. Their ‘defining 
characteristic’ is their willingness to invest their time, reputation, energy and sometimes 
money in the hopes of a future return in the form of the adoption of policies of which 
they approve, satisfaction from participation, or even career advantage.  
This kind of policy advocacy can be prompted by a number of things. Often, policy 
entrepreneurs advocate solutions to solve agreed upon problems. Sometimes, they 
become advocates for particular solutions and look for problems to which their ‘pet 
solution’ might be attached. Others might advocate proposals that embody particular 
values or ideologies, and some – who Kingdon refers to as ‘policy groupies’ – simply 
enjoy the ‘solidarity’ benefits that flow from participation (Kingdon, 1995:116-124).  
As Kingdon observes, ‘Good ideas lie fallow for lack of an advocate’ (Kingdon, 
1995:182). But for the actions of policy entrepreneurs the ‘coupling’ of the previously 
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separate streams might not occur. Although the generation of policy alternatives occurs 
within loosely knit communities of specialists, policy entrepreneurs, as brokers of 
people and ideas, are a critical component of this process and, in the end, are more 
important than the originators of the ideas because of their role in recombining 
proposals for coupling with emergent problems (Kingdon, 1995:199-201).  
The politics stream 
The third element of Kingdon’s model is the politics stream, which is composed of such 
things as the public mood or public opinion, interest group campaigns, election results, 
and day-to-day partisan political exchanges. Kingdon uses the term ‘political’ in its 
narrower sense of electoral, partisan or pressure group politics, rather than in the 
broader sense of the authoritative allocation of values commonly invoked by political 
scientists (Kingdon, 1995:148). Developments in the politics stream can have profound 
effects on agendas, making possible policy options that were impossible previously, or 
relegating other proposals to the shelf (Kingdon, 1995:148).  
Events such as the election of a new government or the emergence of a powerful 
interest group can create moments of political opportunity that allow policy 
entrepreneurs to push their favoured solutions to the centre of policy debate (Béland, 
2005:10). Whereas in the policy stream, consensus occurs largely through processes of 
persuasion and diffusion, in the political stream consensus-building is governed by 
bargaining with affected interests and building coalitions of support for policy proposals 
(Kingdon, 1995:159-160). Oftentimes, participants in the bargaining process will stake 
out rigid positions, perhaps as part of an ideological framing contest (Béland, 2005:11-
12) or to obtain a perceived political advantage. At other times, participants might 
choose to make compromises in order to ‘stay in the game’ (Kingdon, 1995:162). In 
government, changes in the balance of power in elected legislatures, the intervention of 
powerful committees, changes in the machinery of government, or even the turnover of 
key personnel can markedly affect the prospects of policy initiatives.  
Policy windows 
‘Policy windows’ open when the three process streams align and converge, thus 
providing, in Kingdon’s words, ‘an opportunity for policy advocates to push their pet 
solutions, or to push attention to their special problems’ (Kingdon, 1995:165). 
Sometimes windows open predictably (linked to pre-determined events, such as a fixed 
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term election), and at other times they can open quite unpredictably – in either case, 
social entrepreneurs need to be prepared ‘lest the opportunity pass them by’ (Kingdon, 
1995:165). Kingdon also observes that some policy proposals are constantly in the 
policy stream ‘searching for problems to which to become attached’ (Kingdon, 
1995:172-173).  
The capacity of the policy agenda to process multiple agenda items is finite and subject 
to expansion and contraction – issues can get crowded ‘down’, or even ‘off’ the policy 
agenda (Kingdon, 1995:184-186). Policy windows open infrequently, and they do not 
stay open for long (Kingdon, 1995:166-167). Policy windows close for a number of 
reasons, including a failure to exploit policy opportunities due to a lack of preparedness, 
or because of exogenous events that fundamentally alter the political landscape, or even 
because of changes in key personnel. And once closed, they might not re-open for some 
time (Kingdon, 1995:168-170). s 
Further justification for a process streams approach 
Kingdon’s process streams model has proved to be an influential and enduring construct 
in political analysis.17 In the preface to the second edition of his book Kingdon 
commented that in the intervening decade ‘the picture of agenda-setting, alternative 
specification and policy formation presented in the first edition remains accurate and 
useful’ (Kingdon, 1995). Process streams analysis is widely applied in comparative 
political research and in scholarly analyses of precursor compacts in the UK (2003) and 
Canada (2003a, 2008, 2011a). 
Béland (2005:6-15) sees Kingdon’s work as a means to redress a lack of attention to the 
role of ‘ideas’ as drivers of policy change. Kingdon’s work brings together a 
recognition of the constraints of path dependence and the possibilities associated with 
critical junctures with other strands of neoinstitutionalist theory, including normative 
(institutional logics), rational choice (bounded rationality) and historical (path 
dependency) perspectives in a compelling synthesis (Béland, 2005, Peters et al., 2005). 
Kingdon recognises that policy-making is not a linear process in which events proceed 
neatly in logically ordered steps: rather, policy-making occurs in a ‘labyrinth’ and the 
‘policy formulation world’ is rife with ‘considerable doses of messiness, accident, 
fortuitous coupling, and dumb luck’ (Kingdon, 1995:205-206). He tells us that an 
essentially ‘probabilistic’ model – such as the process streams model – is ultimately 
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‘more satisfying’ than a deterministic model (Kingdon, 1995:225) and suggests. that the 
essential complexity and dynamism of policy phenomena lead us to ‘prefer fluid 
metaphors to mechanical ones’ (Kingdon, 1995:223). Indeed, any model of a world 
characterised by complexity and fluidity ought to capture that complexity (Kingdon, 
1995:225). 
Kingdon argues that his model: finds pattern and structure in complicated, fluid and 
seemingly unpredictable phenomena; accommodates the residual randomness left after 
one identifies as much structure as one can; accepts the historically contingent nature of 
agenda-setting; and accounts for the propensity of policy agents to continually 
anticipate and adapt to changing environmental conditions (Kingdon, 1995:224). He 
acknowledges that the process streams he describes might seem to some observers to be 
highly fluid and loosely coupled (Kingdon, 1995:xiii). Whilst accepting that the 
scholarly literature offers a number of ‘plausible alternative models … each with 
intelligent and energetic adherents’ Kingdon concludes that these ‘don’t seem to fit real 
events’ as well as the process streams model (Kingdon, 1995:225). Competing theories 
of the policy process, while containing elements of truth, are in his view incomplete 
(Kingdon, 1995:205-206).  
Conclusions 
This thesis asks why compacts emerge at particular political junctures in different 
jurisdictions. This chapter has examined various perspectives on the relationship 
between government and the NFP sector and argues that two organising perspectives in 
particular – social origins theory and historical institutionalism – provide relevant, 
complementary frameworks for analyses of this relationship. Moreover, both 
frameworks have been applied persuasively in previous analyses of the 
government/NFP sector relationship in the UK (Kendall, 2003) and Canada (Elson, 
2011b) (Phillips, 2003a, b).   
Social origins theory – originated by Salamon and Anheier (1998b) – offers a cogent 
theoretical framing of the relationship between state regime types and the characteristics 
of the NFP sector. Historical institutionalism enables the researcher to enlarge upon 
their analysis by taking into account a range of contextual factors, such as historical, 
political and institutional legacies (Thelen, 1999). Both approaches acknowledge the 
constraining influence of path dependence upon institutional adaptation and upon the 
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decision-making of institutional actors in government, the bureaucracy and in the NFP 
sector itself.  
As for the core research question posed by this thesis - How and why did the policy 
framework for cross-sector cooperation come into being? – it is argued that Kingdon’s 
process streams analysis (Kingdon, 1995) is capable of generating a plausible account 
of the circumstances that have allowed formal frameworks for cross-sector cooperation 
to achieve high agenda status in different jurisdictions. Here too, social origins theory 
and historical institutionalism contribute to the application of Kingdon’s framework by 
sustaining a comparative analysis of the regime characteristics of the jurisdictions under 
study as well as the historical and institutional antecedents of their embrace of formal 
cross sector policy frameworks. 
Governments and the NFP sector have long been engaged along a shifting frontier, the 
location of which varies through time and across policy domains in accordance with the 
dominant paradigm of governance, approaches to public administration and influenced 
by a variety of historical and environmental factors (Finlayson, 1990, Lewis, 1999). 
Formal, deliberate policy frameworks – often referred to generically as ‘compacts’ have 
arisen in a number of jurisdictions ostensibly to resolve tensions and contradictions 
prevailing between government and an NFP sector that sees itself as both a pillar of 
civil society and as a potential partner in the formulation and delivery of public policy.  
Compacts have arisen predominantly in Anglo-Saxon countries that exhibit 
characteristics of what Salamon and Anheier refer to as ‘liberal’ non-profit regimes. The 
regime types proposed by Salamon and Anheier demonstrate considerable congruence 
with ‘governance regimes’ theorised by Esping-Andersen and others (Esping-Anderson, 
1990, Goodin et al., 1999).  
As observed by Halligan, it is the ‘liberal’ Anglo-Saxon countries that have most fully 
embraced neoliberal approaches to governance as informed by the tenets of NPM 
(Halligan, 2011). It has also been observed that particular tensions have emerged in the 
government-NFP sector relationship as a consequence of the prior adoption in these 
countries of NPM and the implementation of policy mixes based on the marketisation of 
services and the commissioning of public services through the use of competitive 
tendering and contracting.  
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It has been widely argued that the emergence of what is sometimes referred to as the 
‘contract state’ (Alford and O'Neill, 1994, Hoatson et al., 1996) resulted in governments 
adopting a predominantly ‘instrumentalist’ view of the NFP sector as a preferred agent 
of service delivery (Lewis, 1999). It is also widely argued that the contracting regimes 
deployed by governments – particularly in the social policy space – have often had 
adverse effects on NFP mission and operations (Lewis, 1999). It has also been observed 
that governments have come under pressure to depart from the classic market paradigm 
in the form of investment in capacity-building with respect to NFP capability and 
governance (Smith and Smyth, 2010).  
Compacts are one response to the putative shortcomings of contractualism. They seek to 
establish new terms of engagement between government (and the public sector) and the 
NFP sector (or at least those elements of the NFP sector engaged with government) that 
reinforce shared values and expectations, and accord respect and assign value to their 
respective sources of knowledge, expertise and legitimacy (Morison, 2000, Lyons, 
2001a, Fyfe, 2005, Reuter et al., 2012). This study examines how and why existing 
formal policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation have come into being. It also 
considers how these frameworks have performed against the expectations of their 
proponents (and critics) and speculates about their future in the light of political 
developments in the respective jurisdictions. 
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Chapter Three – Investigating cross-sector policy 
frameworks 
Most contemporary formal cross-sector policy frameworks can trace their provenance to 
the ‘English’ Compact (1998) and the Canadian Accord (2001). Although a number of 
researchers have given scholarly attention to these seminal national policy frameworks, 
there have been few comparative analyses at the sub-national level (Elson, 2011a:137). 
Even less attention has been given to precedents closer to home. A handful of scholars 
have examined the development of formal cross-sector policy frameworks in Australian 
states and territories (for example Baulderstone, 2008, Melville, 2008, Casey et al., 
2010, Edgar and Lockie, 2010). Yet, the experiences of Australian sub-national 
jurisdictions over the past decade (and on-going) offer potentially potent lessons for 
jurisdictions contemplating the development of formal framework agreements.  
The Australian Capital Territory, for example, was the first jurisdiction outside the 
United Kingdom to initiate a compact in 2001 (preceding even the Canadian Accord). 
Other state and territory jurisdictions also pursued similar policy frameworks over the 
previous decade, with Tasmania being the most recent to embrace a compact-like 
framework in 2012. Also near to home, New Zealand governments have sustained a 
protracted policy discussion about government-NFP sector relations for over a decade, 
culminating in the Kia Tūtahi Relationship Accord in 2011.  
This study adopts as a foundation premise that those jurisdictions in which formal 
cross-sector policy frameworks have been proposed will exhibit certain historical, 
political, institutional and structural characteristics that are held in common, as well as 
characteristics that are relatively unique to each. A collective case study methodology 
was adopted as the approach best able to disclose the complex political, institutional and 
structural dynamics giving rise to formal cross-sector policy frameworks in each 
jurisdiction and for the identification of possible signposts – or ‘lessons learned’ – for 
successful policy implementation. Because the adoption of the policy frameworks under 
study occurs against a backdrop of historical antecedents, it was also considered prudent 
to adopt an historical approach as an ancillary methodology. This chapter sets out the 
justification for the methodological approach and the selection of the cases studies. 
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Inductive qualitative research 
Researchers in the social sciences typically choose between quantitative or qualitative 
approaches, or some combination of the two, to address their research objectives 
(McNabb, 2010b:40-56). Quantitative approaches are typically concerned to identify the 
characteristics of a population and/or test the significance of relationships between 
variables, usually in order to test hypotheses (McNabb, 2010a:xix). Researchers 
adopting a quantitative approach can choose between three basic categories of research 
design: exploratory designs (sometimes referred to as ‘pilot studies’) through which the 
researcher seeks to gain insights and ideas about research problems; descriptive designs 
used to develop a snapshot of the phenomenon of interest; or causal designs which seek 
to identify the cause or causes of change in a variable or event (McNabb, 2010b:40-44).  
Qualitative approaches aim to go beyond the measurement of the events, circumstances 
or phenomena under study to arrive at an understanding of the meaning invested in 
them by social and political actors. As with quantitative research, qualitative approaches 
also offer the researcher a choice of three basic research designs: explanatory design 
which seeks to address why phenomena occur; interpretive design which is about 
‘sense-making’ and focuses on standards, norms, rules and values held, and how these 
interact to influence behaviour; and critical designs which seek to influence the beliefs 
and actions of actors in the direction of adaptive change (McNabb, 2010b:40-47). 
Whereas quantitative research employs deductive reasoning (in simple terms, 
developing theory and formulating hypotheses to be tested through observation) 
qualitative research tends to employ inductive reasoning (inferring patterns from 
observation and subsequently developing hypotheses and, ultimately, theory) (McNabb, 
2010b:63).  
Qualitative inductive approaches are appropriate to understanding the complexities of 
the ‘social world’ (Read and Marsh, 2002) and are capable of supporting the holistic 
analysis of phenomena ‘in context’ (Hopkin, 2002). Heyse observes, for example, that 
quantitative approaches to the study of decision-making – particularly those relying on 
large(r) case sample sizes – give ‘hardly any attention to the organisational setting they 
take place in’ (Heyse, 2006:30-31). Making sense of formal cross-sector policy 
frameworks in different jurisdictions, negotiated between different sets of actors 
responding to unique combinations of political and environmental factors, requires an 
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account of the motives and expectations of policy actors as well as an explication of the 
institutional values, norms, and logics underpinning decision-making. 
It is, therefore, appropriate to adopt in this thesis a qualitative and inductive approach 
that accommodates first person accounts from a range of elite policy actors – actors 
offering a privileged account of the policy-making process – and from these accounts 
construct a plausible explanation of ‘what’ happened and ‘why’. The case study method 
is just such an approach, insofar as it allows the researcher to open what Heyse calls 
‘the black box of decision-making’ (Heyse, 2006:31) and thereby access the meaning 
behind observed events.  
The case study method 
The case study is an empirical approach for the investigation of contemporary 
phenomena within their ‘real-life context’ (Yin, 1984:13 , cited in McNabb, 
2010b:237). Although deriving from a narrative tradition and typically incorporating 
strong descriptive elements, cases are also capable of both stimulating the formulation 
of hypotheses and generating data with which to validate or invalidate hypotheses 
(Fesler, 1962:80-81).  
Yin (2009) states that the case study relies on many of the same methods as historical 
analysis. However, the case study has available to it two sources of evidence not usually 
included in the historian’s repertoire: direct observations of the events in question and 
the ability to interview persons directly involved in those events. Yin also posits as a 
unique strength of the case study its ability to deal with a wider range of sources of 
evidence than might be available in a conventional historical study and, for this reason, 
it is particularly suited to the study of contemporary phenomena within their real-life 
context (Yin, 2009:11, 18).  
McNabb (McNabb, 2010b) contends that the great appeal of the case study approach 
lies in its flexibility and its capacity to offer insight into, and guide, decision-making in 
relation to public policy or public administration (McNabb, 2010b:236). The use of the 
case study method in studies of public policy and public administration has a long 
history and a distinguished provenance. In his 1952 book, Public Administration and 
Policy Development: A Casebook, Harold Stein was an early advocate of the case study 
approach to public administration research. In a review of Stein’s book, published the 
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same year in The Yale Law Journal, James W. Fesler observed that it is ‘the task of the 
case writer’: 
… to uncover the realistic factors of individual motivations, political 
considerations, interest group pressures, breakdowns of procedures, 
guildism of ‘experts,’ bureaucratic concern with status and self-
preservation, and personal congenialities and antagonisms as they help to 
explain the [administrative] decision, its timing, and its results (Fesler, 
1952:1238). 
Fesler went on to say of the case study that it: 
… is typically a narrative account of what occurred over several months 
or years in the evolution of a situation culminating in a decision or other 
denouement. The culmination often lacks dramatic satisfaction, for the 
concern of the writer is with establishing the mood, developing his 
characters, and revealing their interaction. The spotlight is cast on the 
process and the politics of decision-making, rather than on the decision 
itself (Fesler, 1952:1239).  
So described, the case study method shares many of the strengths of the ‘literary 
reportage’ genre, of which Linda Grant, winner of the 2006 Lettre Ulysses prize for 
literary reportage, said: 
The value of reportage is that it requires the writer to leave the house, to 
observe and to listen. It is an empirical trade. The ‘truth’ turns out to be 
messy, complex and contradictory (Grant, 2007). 
Much the same might be said of the practice of the case study method. Just as literary 
reportage seeks to reveal basic truths about the human condition, the narrative element 
of case studies ought to go beyond the mere description of events in order to arrive at a 
deeper understanding of, and explanation for actors’ motivations and decisions and their 
consequences. Bonoma, for example, defines the case study as: 
… a description, directly obtained, of a management situation based on 
interview, archival, naturalistic observation, and other data, constructed to 
be sensitive to the context in which management behaviour takes place 
and to its temporal restraints’ (Bonoma, 1985).  
Bevir et al. (2003), in considering the contribution of interpretive approaches to 
research on public policy and governance, offer the following view: 
In an interpretive approach, to generalise means to diagnose and make 
informed conjecture. We cast conjecture in the form of narratives or 
stories. Policy analysis is a form of storytelling. So, for an interpretive 
approach to produce policy advice, we must tell stories. What stories do 
we tell? What is the plot of our story? Who are the leading characters? 
What are the informing metaphors? What proverbs do we use? (Bevir et 
al., 2003:201)  
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Bevir et al. conclude that interpretive approaches add new dimensions to the knowledge 
and understanding of policy and governance by providing ‘thick descriptions’ 
comprised of ‘distinct and distinctive’ accounts of events, ‘proverbs’ and stories that 
have relevance and meaning for practitioners, and critical reflections that ‘can provide 
normative evaluative criteria for judging both the stories we tell and the outcomes of 
policies’ (Bevir et al., 2003:208-209). 
In a not dissimilar vein Fesler, writing in 1962, likens the case study to an historical 
novel that sets public administration as its scene. He observes that the effective case 
study is ‘a blend of fact and inference, of research and <<creative writing>>’ (original 
punctuation): 
The scholarly case writer starts with documents, moves on to interviews, 
and in the end brings his creative talents to bear on the re-creation of the 
reality of a course of administrative events in which human beings as well 
as rational ideas were moving parts (Fesler, 1962:71).  
The case method is concerned with the researcher’s perceptions and interpretations of 
the signification and ‘meanings’ attributed by actors to events and information. 
Although case studies typically rely heavily on qualitative data, Bonoma notes that 
‘[u]nlike some other qualitative methods’ good case studies are often corroborated by 
quantitative data sources, such as archival records, performance data or financial data in 
order to triangulate ‘perceptions’ and ‘significations’ within a broader context (Bonoma, 
1985). Yin suggests that in real-life situations the phenomena being studied are not 
always readily distinguishable from their context, thus requiring multiple sources of 
evidence which can be triangulated and converged to address theoretical propositions 
(Yin, 2009:18). The process of triangulation allows the validity of study findings to be 
substantiated by a mix of data collection techniques and sources (McNabb, 2010b:242).  
Yin (2009:19) confirms that case studies ‘have a distinctive place in evaluation 
research.’ One would want to use the case study method where it was considered 
necessary to obtain an in-depth understanding of a real life phenomenon in such as a 
way as to encompass important contextual conditions that are highly pertinent to the 
phenomenon of study (Yin, 2009:20). According to Yin, the principal strengths of the 
method, skilfully applied, lie in its capacity to: explain the presumed causal links in 
real-life policy or programmatic interventions that are too complex to be revealed 
through surveys or experimental strategies; describe the real-life context within which 
the intervention occurred; illustrate certain topics within the intervention ‘in descriptive 
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mode’; and enlighten situations in which there is no clear or single set of outcomes as a 
result of the intervention (Yin, 2009:19-20). 
Collective case studies 
The case study approach is disdained by some (Yin, 2009:14-16) and is often 
misunderstood (Flyvbjerg, 2011).  However, case studies also tell us much of what we 
know about the empirical world (George and Bennett, 2005, Flyvbjerg, 2011) and are 
‘uniquely predisposed to taking into account and broad and diverse set of explanatory 
factors’ (Blatter and Haverland, 2012:5). 
Good case studies draw out features of the case – or cases – that are uniform and 
generalisable (especially in management science and policy analysis) as well as those 
that have the appearance of being relatively unique (Bailey 1994:192) and generally 
conform to one of three basic types:  
(i) intrinsic case studies in which case itself is of intrinsic interest to the researcher 
and the generalisability of findings to other cases is not of primary concern;  
(ii) instrumental case studies where the focus cases are selected, not for their 
intrinsic interest, but because of their capacity to shed light on a particular 
phenomenon (the case is simply the locus of research); and  
(iii) collective case studies in which a group of similar cases is studied in order better 
understand a particular phenomenon and assess its wider relevance (Stake, 
1995:2-4).  
McNabb (2010b:237) describes the collective case study as ‘one of the major research 
approaches taken in comparative political studies’. It should be noted that the method is 
also known by several names, including multiple case and cross-case study approach or 
multi-site qualitative research (McNabb, 2010b:237) – a function, perhaps of earlier 
failures to recognise or to codify the case study as a distinctive research method (Yin, 
2009:17). Although case studies can be either practitioner-focussed or ‘esoteric 
scholarly studies’, those sited within the domain of public administration will, ideally, 
have relevance for both practitioners and academics (Bailey, 1994:189). Stake (1995:6) 
argues that when selecting cases for a collective case study, priority should be given to 
‘balance’ and ‘variety’ because these attributes greatly enhance the potential to learn 
from the cases. 
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An historical-comparative perspective 
Political history is ‘the recorded story of politics, political institutions, and the actors in 
the political world’ (McNabb, 2010b:246) (McNabb 2010b: 246). Because ‘politics are 
social phenomena’, political history is effectively ‘social history’ (McNabb, 
2010b:2476) (McNabb 2010b: 247). All social and political events and associated 
processes have temporal and, therefore, historical dimensions (Hancké, 2010:242). An 
important, and recent, tradition in historical political research is the ‘critical approach’, 
which views political phenomena and historical events as ‘continually changing systems 
of social relationships and dependencies’ (McNabb, 2010b:245). Critical social science, 
observes McNabb, does not simply ‘narrate’ but attempts to discover pathways towards 
positive change (McNabb, 2010b:245). To this end, it is an aim of this dissertation to 
reflect on issues of praxis as well as theory.  
The study of political history is not necessarily concerned with the examination of 
events from the distant past. History is happening now, and emergent political and 
policy phenomena can be fully comprehended only if their social and political 
antecedents are understood. The policy and political phenomena at the heart of this 
dissertation are, for the most part, ‘live’ issues in each of the jurisdictions subject to 
examination. Some jurisdictions, it is true, appear to exist in a kind of ‘policy doldrums’ 
either because the principal stakeholders have reached a point of ‘stalemate’ or because 
political or economic uncertainty has acted to distract attention away from the 
government-NFP sector relationship. Other jurisdictions, in contrast, appear to exhibit 
‘policy dynamism’ wherein the principal stakeholders are engaged in policy 
contestation and co-production. In each of the cases, the phenomena subject to study 
have arisen within, and cannot be fully understood without express reference to, their 
particular historical and institutional milieus. 
An historical-comparative perspective is well suited to a comparative analysis of the 
emergence, and form, of policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation. Not only is it 
compatible with the case study method generally (and collective case studies in 
particular), it is capable of accommodating explorations of both administrative history 
and public administration. Where the former is concerned with decision-making within 
organisations over a period of time the latter is ‘decision-centred’ and focuses on the 
process by which a decision or closely grouped set of decisions are made (Fesler, 
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1962:70). Fesler remarks of the two approaches that, ‘both seek to communicate an 
analytical understanding of the decisional process, the organisational and political 
framework, and the substantive policy problem’ (Fesler, 1962:70). 
Historical-comparative analysis permits the researcher to address big questions, such as 
those concerning major societal change; why social and institutional arrangements take 
different forms in different polities; and discerning the range and combinations of 
factors that combine to produce particular social, political or institutional outcomes; 
comparing commonalities and differences across societies and polities (Neuman, 
2011:466). Historical comparative analysis is particularly useful for the analysis of 
policy, political or social phenomena across different countries, legal jurisdictions, 
institutions, industry sectors or organisations (Neuman, 2011:466-469). Examples 
include comparisons of taxation regimes (Morgan and Prasad, 2009), rates of 
imprisonment (Sutton, 2004), or gender earning gaps (Mandel and Shalev, 2009).  
Selection of cases 
This section describes the rationale for the selection of cases in this study. Any 
comparative analysis of formal cross-sector policy frameworks necessarily entails the 
examination of national and/or sub-national government jurisdictions where such policy 
frameworks occur. These policy frameworks occur in a relatively small number of 
jurisdictions globally. Although the total number of potential cases is ultimately 
‘knowable’ not all are equally amenable to study. For example, policy frameworks for 
government-civil society cooperation occur in a number of countries where the lack of 
primary or secondary literature in the English language makes their inclusion this study 
impracticable. 
Policy frameworks for cooperation in the English-speaking world are better known, 
particularly the seminal agreements in the UK and Canada, for which there are 
comprehensive, and readily available, primary and secondary literatures. Because the 
UK and Canadian policy frameworks have been subject to extensive scholarly research, 
it was not considered necessary to undertake empirical research in these jurisdictions 
(logistical and resource considerations have also come into play in this decision). The 
experiences of formal cross-sector policy frameworks in these jurisdictions do, 
however, provide invaluable points of reference for this research, both historically and 
theoretically. An understanding of past and current developments in the UK and Canada 
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is, therefore, essential to the analysis of the Australian experience and for this reason, 
this dissertation includes a thorough review of the primary and secondary literature on 
the national policy frameworks in these countries (see Chapters Four and Five). 
Although various Australian jurisdictions have been active in this policy space for a 
number of years, policy frameworks for government-NFP cooperation in Australia’s 
states and territories have not been extensively studied to date. Indeed, only a handful of 
scholars have been active in this field (Butcher, 2006, Casey and Dalton, 2006, 
Baulderstone, 2008, Melville, 2008, Casey et al., 2010, Edgar and Lockie, 2010, 
Butcher, 2011, Lyons and Dalton, 2011, Butcher et al., 2012). The same can be said of 
Australia’s near neighbour, New Zealand, where both the trajectory of public sector 
reform and the dynamics associated with the interface between government and the 
NFP sector have closely paralleled developments in Australia. Indeed, it is the very 
paucity of scholarly research on Australian and New Zealand attempts at formal cross-
sector policy frameworks that cries out for comparative empirical research.  
In all, nine government jurisdictions were selected for empirical study. These comprise 
the Australian government (also known as the Commonwealth or federal government); 
the six Australian state governments of New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, 
Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia; the government of the Australian Capital 
Territory; and the New Zealand government. Although it would have been possible to 
select fewer cases, in the end it was considered to be highly desirable to cast a wider net 
to ensure consideration of the variety of contexts, forms, perspectives and mix of policy 
actors found in this policy space. Unlike other collective case studies where the 
researcher is constrained to select a limited number of cases owing to the 
impracticability of studying the entire population, it has been possible in this case to 
conduct fieldwork in each Australian jurisdiction where cross-sector policy frameworks 
are in evidence. With the addition of New Zealand, the selected cases offer the 
considerable benefit of comprehensive coverage and the opportunity to compare the 
experiences of both national and sub-national governments.  
It should be noted that it was decided not to conduct fieldwork in the Northern 
Territory, one of two self-governing territories in Australia. The reasons for this include 
an apparent absence of significant policy effort in relation to formal frameworks for 
cross-sector cooperation; the relative absence of primary documents or secondary 
literature describing the actions by government or the NFP sector in that jurisdiction; 
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the failure of government and NFP sector officials to respond to preliminary written 
inquiries about activity in this area; demographic and political factors unique to the 
Territory that make it less useful as a comparator; and the expense of conducting 
fieldwork in the Territory capital, Darwin. Although the Northern Territory was not 
selected as a case for this study, an account of the known activity pertaining to 
government-NFP sector cooperation – as established by the limited documentary record 
– is included in this dissertation.  
Because each of the selected jurisdictions exists as a separate, constitutionally defined 
legal entity and the relationship between government and the NFP sector in each 
exhibits particular legal, economic, administrative and systemic characteristics, each is 
therefore ‘bounded’ and clearly identifiable. Each jurisdiction exhibits factors that are 
common to all (for example, in each jurisdiction governments acknowledge a degree of 
dependence upon third party service provision via NFP organisations), as well as factors 
that are unique (such as the ambit and form of their policy frameworks for government-
NFP cooperation). The balance of commonality and difference among the selected cases 
enhances the potential to advance understanding about the factors that provide the 
impetus for inter-sector policy frameworks and contribute to their success or failure. 
Research implementation 
This section describes the research design used for this study and sets out the protocol 
for contacting the selected jurisdictions and the research instruments used. The Human 
Ethics Protocol for this research (Protocol: 2010/245) received approval by the Chair of 
the Humanities and Social Sciences Delegated Ethics Review Committee (DERC) on 5 
August 2010.  
The paucity of published, peer-reviewed scholarly and empirical research in relation to 
policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation at the sub-national level has been 
mentioned previously. Nevertheless, there exists within each of the jurisdictions 
selected for this collective case study a sizeable body of primary documentation in the 
form of policy statements, formal announcements, reports, commissioned studies, 
media statements, press articles, submissions and the like from both governments and 
NFP peak organisations. And while this documentation is an invaluable aid in re-
constructing the chronology of events and decisions, and it enables triangulation, it 
offers limited insight into the motivation, expectations, frustration or indeed the 
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satisfaction of those engaged in the framing, design and implementation of the policies 
in question.  
In this regard, an observation made by Fesler some 60 years ago rings true today. He 
said: 
…decision-making analysis has failed to take adequate account of the 
degree to which our decision-making processes yield merely paper 
decisions rather than clear and operationally effective decisions (Fesler, 
1962:74). 
He went on to say: 
…victory is not the end of the story if the decision is worded so 
ambiguously that it cannot be executed, or if no one knows who is to 
execute it, or if the overseer of execution lacks sufficient power (Fesler, 
1962:74). 
Compacts and similar policy frameworks are often derided by their detractors – and 
sometimes even by their one-time proponents – as mere pieces of paper without force or 
effect. As will be discussed later in this dissertation, a number of informants 
interviewed for this study admitted harbouring feelings of cynicism about the 
preparedness of governments and public sector entities to honour the letter and spirit of 
cross-sector agreements to which they are signatories, or to deal effectively with the 
policy and operational complexities they reveal. And, indeed, an important object of this 
study is to take account of the degree to which the decision-making process leading to a 
compact or similar framework is capable of being something more than a ‘paper 
decision’ – an aspirational statement with symbolic as opposed to practical effects. 
Field methodology 
A core concern of this dissertation is not just whether policy frameworks for cross-
sector cooperation come into existence, but whether they are operationalised in any 
meaningful way. Given the possibility that even the most comprehensive review of the 
available primary documentation might not alone yield a substantive understanding of 
the social, historical, institutional and political dynamics of the NFP policy space, and 
given the paucity of the secondary literature, it was determined that the research would 
need to be augmented with empirical work in each of the case jurisdictions. 
A semi-structured interview format was selected as the most appropriate for this study. 
The interviews were intended to generate narrative accounts of events, impressions, the 
motivations of actors, as well as personal opinion or reflection on issues, retrospection 
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and/or future directions. In this regard, the indicative schedule of questions provided to 
interviewees served as a set of themes to be explored in an informal ‘guided 
conversation’ with respondents. The questions were framed so as to elicit or initiate 
discussion about the core themes without constraining or limiting either the capacity of 
the interviewee to enlarge upon matters they deemed important or noteworthy, or the 
capacity of the interviewer to address new topics or pursue matters arising in the context 
of the interview. The semi-structured interview format was considered to be more 
appropriate to the research purpose – focussed as it was upon ‘explanation-building’ –
than either structured interviews in which a set of specific questions is replicated at each 
interview with little scope for flexibility or variation, or unstructured interviews, which 
might have frustrated interviewees and the interviewer alike through a lack of thematic 
order and contextuality.  
According to Soss (2006) (2006), the semi-structured or unstructured ‘in-depth’ 
interview, like a conversation, ‘must be navigated as it unfolds’ (Soss, 2006:135). This 
mode of questioning provides the freedom to probe or follow-up questions in ways that 
are not permitted by ‘fixed-format’ interviews that ‘forbid researchers from digging in 
areas that emerge as promising during the course of the interview’. Accordingly, the 
interview can sometimes seem ‘like an interrogation, an amiable chat between friends, 
or an instructional session in which the interviewees hold privileged knowledge and 
researchers play the role of the untutored student’ (Soss, 2006:135). Even so, Soss 
points out that while semi/unstructured interviews are more ‘conversational’ than the 
fixed-format variety, they are quite unlike everyday conversations in so far as their 
purpose is to encourage the interviewee to elaborate in order to obtain a more nuanced 
understanding of the phenomena subject to study – what is called ‘thick description’ 
(Soss, 2006:136). 
Soss describes in-depth interviewing, centred on discursive and dialectical 
conversations with interviewees, as a ‘dynamic method’ that ‘offers flexibility in the 
interview itself and shifting standpoints over time’ (Soss, 2006:137). 
… it is an evolving dialogue between fieldwork and framework, mediated 
by concrete activities of transcription, memo writing, purposive reading 
of literatures, and the like (Soss, 2006:137)  
In-depth interviewing ‘entails simultaneous data collection and analysis’, but is 
‘incomplete’ without more systematic analysis after leaving the field (Soss 2006:137). 
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This involves the process of transcription which offers the opportunity to note and 
reflect on the interviewees’ choice of language and their organisation of the narrative. 
Transcription also provides occasions for insight and conjecture; to detect problems 
with interview technique; to reconsider the phrasing of questions; and to reassess the 
mix of topics covered in the interview (Soss, 2006:136). 
Evidence gathering – interviews 
In September 2010 a letter was sent to the chief executive officers of the following 
classes of organisation inviting them to nominate persons with relevant knowledge and 
responsibility who would be able to represent their organisation in an interview: 
• central agencies (such as the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet or 
Department of Premier and Cabinet) 
• public sector agencies having a policy ‘lead’ in relation to government-NFP sector 
cooperation and/or a significant funding relationship with the NFP sector (such as 
Commonwealth, State/Territory and New Zealand departments of human services 
and/or communities and offices for the NFP sector), and 
• ‘peak’ non-government organisations responsible for advocacy, policy research and 
analysis, and the aggregation and representation of NFP sector views to government 
(such as the national and state/territory Councils of Social Service and their 
counterparts in New Zealand). 
The letter attached an overview of the scope and purpose of the research, a request for 
written consent setting out assurances in relation to the confidentiality of interviewees, 
and a set of indicative questions to be used in a semi-structured interview with the 
organisation’s nominee(s). This correspondence is reproduced at Appendix 1. Follow-
up with organisations and nominated contact persons occurred both by email and 
telephone. 
The intention of this approach was to allow chief executives to identify those persons 
within the organisation who are most familiar with the subject matter (government-NFP 
sector cooperation) and who have explicit authorisation (by virtue of their nomination 
by the chief executive and their position in the organisation) to speak on behalf of their 
organisation. This approach assisted in overcoming the bureaucratic opacity of many 
public sector organisations by leveraging the knowledge of the chief executive to 
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identify the most appropriate – and most knowledgeable – point of contact. The same 
can be said of the peak organisations approached for an interview, although in many 
cases the organisation’s chief executive offered themselves for interview. 
Interviews began in late 2010 and concluded in late 2011. For the most part, the 
organisations approached responded with alacrity to the request for an interview. In 
most cases, interviews were conducted with a single individual from each organisation. 
In a number of cases, ‘round-table’ interviews were conducted with two or more 
individuals, sometimes from the same organisation and sometimes representing 
different organisations. With the exception of two telephone interviews, all interviews 
were conducted face-to-face at a location chosen by the interviewee. Field notes were 
taken during each interview and an MP3 voice recording was made. 
Interviewees were provided with an overview of the research together with a list of 
indicative questions to be addressed prior to each interview. Interviewees were assured 
that their participation was completely voluntary and they were asked to provide written 
consent both to the interview and to the making of a voice recording for use as an aide 
memoire in preparing a written record of the interview. Most interviews required 
between 60 to 90 minutes. Each interviewee was afterwards provided with a written 
record of their interview for the purposes of confirmation, and if necessary, correction. 
The records of interview did not take the form of verbatim transcripts – rather, they 
sought to distil the content of the interview according to key themes. 
Empirical analysis 
In all, 43 persons participated in 34 interviews, yielding over 40 hours of discussion and 
220 pages of interview text (amounting to over 99,000 words). The interviews elicited 
information about: 
• the rationale for and policy drivers underpinning formal cross-sector policy 
frameworks 
• the political and process dimensions of the framework and its implementation  
• the respective roles, priorities and perceptions of the parties to the framework 
• the expectations and experiences of those with a stake in the implementation of the 
policy 
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• the process(es) through which frameworks for cooperation were developed and 
ratified  
• the range of resources allocated and administrative arrangements established for 
implementation, and 
• observed effects of the framework on the relationship between government and the 
NFP sector. 
The detailed observations and findings from this study are presented in Chapters Six, 
Seven and Eight. 
It should be emphasised that this study does not rely exclusively on the content of these 
interviews. Whilst important in gaining a deeper insight into the motivations, actions, 
decisions and expectations of key institutional actors engaged in bringing about the 
policy frameworks with which this dissertation is concerned, it must be borne in mind 
that the record is replete with voluminous primary documentation in the form of formal 
publications, records of consultations, discussions and decisions, media statements and 
articles from both governmental and sector perspectives. This study relies heavily on 
primary documents to establish the sequence of events as well as to establish the 
‘official’ story behind the policy frameworks in question. The interviews offer an 
essential corroboration of the official chronology of events, but more importantly, they 
lift the veil on these official accounts and offer a deep insight into the meaning of these 
events for the policy actors themselves. By triangulating of the accounts of elite policy 
actors – most of whom participated in the formulation of the policy frameworks in 
question – with the primary and the secondary documentation (included in this latter 
category are commissioned reports, submissions, and academic articles) it is possible to 
arrive at a coherent, and defensible, narrative of these events.  
The primary analytic technique upon which this dissertation relies is ‘explanation 
building’, through which critical insights will be offered into the political and policy 
processes underpinning the formulation and implementation of compacts. It is hoped 
that, if correct, these insights can lead to recommendations for future policy actions 
(Yin, 2009:141). For a multiple case study such as this one, the goal will be to build a 
general explanation that fits each case. Because the cases will vary in their details, it 
might be expected that the general explanation for a given site will be satisfactory for 
the others. However, it might be possible through the application of an iterative process 
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of explanation-building to identify common themes that will provide the basis for an 
overall explanation (Yin, 2009:142-143). According to Yin, building an explanation ‘is 
similar to refining a set of ideas, in which an important aspect is again to entertain other 
plausible or rival explanations’ (Yin, 2009:145, original emphasis). 
Conclusions 
This chapter has presented a rationale for taking a comparative case study approach 
informed by an historical comparative perspective. The long tradition of using the 
comparative case study approach to build explanations about context-dependent 
phenomena such as public policy, public administration practice and the real-life 
antecedents and effects of policy implementation has been noted. Also noted is Yin’s 
observation that while some researchers disdain case studies, the potential shortcomings 
of the method can be overcome. This dissertation examines a policy phenomenon – 
compacts between governments and/or public sector entities and the NFP sector (or 
parts thereof) – that has arisen in a social and political environment characterised by 
complexity and contested meanings. It has been concluded that the case study method 
offers the potential to reveal the depth of that complexity, whereas other more 
‘quantitative’ approaches might constrain our capacity to understand the ‘meanings’ 
attributed to events and their consequences by policy actors. 
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Chapter Four – The emergence of compacts 
Although compacts have existed for over 20 years, and have been implemented in some 
form in a number of national and sub-national jurisdictions, they are often poorly, or 
imperfectly understood – even within government and the NFP sector. This chapter 
establishes the essential nature of cross-sector policy frameworks/compacts.18 It 
describes their rationale; the purposes they serve; their legal status; the range of matters 
they seek to address; the parties to the framework document; processes for 
formalisation; and the thorny question of what is in and what is out. In so doing, it is 
hoped to establish in the reader’s mind a baseline understanding of the nature of the 
policy frameworks that are the focus of this dissertation.  
This chapter also summarises the history of two seminal compacts: the so-called 
‘English’ compact and the Canadian ‘Accord’. Each of these framework documents has 
already been the subject of extensive scholarly investigation: As concerns the English 
compact, British scholars such as Kendall (2000, 2003, 2009, 2010), Alcock (2010b, 
2011), Taylor (2012b), Zimmeck (2011, 2011), and Carmel and Harlock (2009) – 
among others – have offered cogent accounts of its origins, impacts and evolution over 
time. Similarly, Canadian scholars such as Elson (2006, 2007, 2009, 2011a, 2012), 
Phillips (2003b, a, 2009) and Brock (2000, 2002, 2004b, a, 2008) have not only closely 
examined the impact of Canada’s Accord and the associated Voluntary Sector Initiative 
(VSI), but they have done so in comparative terms with respect to the English compact 
that preceded it.  
Hence, it is to the aforementioned authors that any reader seeking a deeper 
understanding of the English or Canadian compacts might be commended. It is also 
important to draw to the reader’s attention that the present chapter is an abbreviated 
version of a much more comprehensive account of each of these agreements. It was 
decided to offer a less detailed account of the English and Canadian policy frameworks 
because each has been so comprehensively addressed by others and to contain the 
overall length of the dissertation. However, this is in no way intended to suggest that the 
English and Canadian policy frameworks are not important – or indeed essential – to 
this analysis.  
The English compact, in particular, is absolutely foundational and its imprint can be 
read in every formal cross-sector that has followed in the Anglo Saxon world and even 
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beyond (Bullain and Toftisova, 2005, Johansson and Johansson, 2012, Reuter et al., 
2012). The Canadian Accord was itself informed by the English compact, and by virtue 
of being the first national compact to follow the English example, also shares the special 
honour of being considered a pioneering initiative. The Accord also offers a salutary 
tale about the ways in which framework documents, if they are not institutionally 
embedded, might be susceptible policy or political changes. Even the English compact – 
still in place 15 years after its inception in 1998 – has undergone changes in its contents, 
institutional arrangements and its emphases that reflect broader changes in the political 
environment within which it is situated.  
The rationale for compacts 
Historically, the NFP sector in Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand existed in a 
complementary, even symbiotic relationship to the state (Nowland-Foreman, 1997, 
Lewis, 1999, Lyons, 2001b, Lewis, 2005, Elson, 2007, Tennant et al., 2008). The steady 
growth of contracted service provision through the 1990s wrought profound changes in 
the relationship between government and the NFP sector. For those NFP service 
providers that elected to participate in the new social services markets, contracting 
redefined their relationship with government from a subsidiary role (e.g. in which they 
filled in the gaps left by standardised forms of state service delivery) to a subservient 
role in which they effectively became ‘agents’ of government and subject to the 
discipline of the contract. 
The first compact was put into place by the Blair ‘New Labour’ government in the UK 
in 1998. It was a signature policy initiative of Blair’s ‘Third Way’ and was portrayed as 
a constructive response to a range of externalities associated with neo-liberal 
approaches to public policy; in particular, the delivery of statutory public services by 
non-state providers under the terms of POSCs (Casey et al., 2008b). As this thesis will 
demonstrate, the foregoing is a recurring theme with all succeeding cross-sector policy 
frameworks. 
Purposes served by compacts 
The broad purpose of a compact is to ‘normalise’ or ‘regularise’ the government-NFP 
sector relationship and, in doing so, they serve the broad strategic purposes of both 
government and the NFP sector. For government, the benefits of a compact might be 
more cordial, predictable and constructive relations with the NFP sector via 
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intermediary organisations acting as partners in a shared endeavour. For the sector, a 
compact might offer a formal and non-confrontational avenue for addressing structural 
and systemic issues affecting the efficient operations and capacity of NFP organisations.  
Two ineluctable facts drive the initiation of compacts: government is increasingly 
dependent upon non-government agents for the performance of a wide range of service 
delivery and policy functions; and parts of the NFP sector are dependent upon 
government for a major share of their income. At its worst, the relationship between 
government and the NFP sector, is analogous to the psychological concept of 
codependency in a relationship: in this case government exerts asymmetric power and 
control within the relationship and the NFP sector responds with compliance and by 
assigning a lower priority to its own needs. Proponents within government and the NFP 
sector have looked to compacts to ‘heal’ the relationship – effectively replacing 
codependent behaviours with new behaviours based upon trust and mutual respect.  
Critics of compacts sometimes point to their ‘aspirational’ nature and their tendency to 
express their purposes at a high level of generality. However, compacts seldom exist in 
isolation from accompanying initiatives aimed at giving practical effect to desired 
values, principles and behaviours. These might include formal policy guidance, funding 
rules, consultation protocols, action plans and sector development initiatives. Joint 
governance arrangements might also be put into place for the purposes of providing 
oversight for implementation and communication strategies devised to offer assurance 
to stakeholders about action flowing from the framework document. 
Legal status 
Compacts often take the form of a bilateral ‘agreement’ between government and 
intermediary organisations representing the collective interests of the NFP sector. In 
some cases, however, the formal policy framework takes the form of a unilateral policy 
statement by government, albeit one that might have been extensively co-produced with 
and endorsed by apex organisations in the NFP sector. In either case, the framework 
documents considered by this study generally have no statutory basis or legal force (an 
exception is the Welsh Voluntary Sector Scheme, which has a statutory basis in the 
Government of Wales Act 2006 and is discussed in Chapter Five there seems to be a 
broad acceptance that NPM has had its purest expression in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions 
(Halligan, 2011).  
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In some respects compacts are more akin to (and indeed sometimes take the form of) a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) in which the shared intent and understandings of 
the parties are expressed but without the binding force of a contract. It is sometimes 
argued, therefore, that no matter how laudable their intentions, compacts do not offer 
sufficient means to bring about their desired ends. This absence of enforceability 
troubles many in the NFP sector where calls for the inclusion in compacts of binding 
dispute mechanisms are often heard. 
Government’s NFP sector partners tend to expect that framework agreements should be 
binding upon government. At the same time they sometimes acknowledge the 
impracticability of binding the sector itself. This is the conundrum of framework 
agreements with a sector whose member organisations exist in part to compensate for 
democratic deficits in society but have no capacity (except at the organisational level) to 
formally or democratically delegate authority to their key interlocutors with 
government.  
Legal and constitutional scholar, John Morison, has said of compacts: 
To the lawyer approaching them for the first time, the compacts may 
appear as genuinely baffling documents. They seem to be made up mainly 
of warm words, platitudes, and generalities (Morison, 2000:113). 
Although Morison acknowledges that there is ‘nothing to make either party adhere to 
the very general aspirations that the documents set out’ (Morison, 2000:119), he 
believes the key to their significance lies in the ‘language of recognition’ in which 
compacts are framed: language that embodies an empowerment and legitimation of the 
NFP sector as a collective actor (Morison, 2000:113-114, White, 2006:67). Morison 
contends that such recognition marks a ‘a first stage in a much wider process involving 
bigger changes in the state and a new configuration of the relationship of government 
and civil society’ (Morison, 2000:119). Similarly, White regards compacts as ‘a strategy 
for rebuilding the capacity of the welfare state after the neoliberal attack of the 1980s 
and 1990s,’ and suggests that they embody partnership discourses that, in a number of 
jurisdictions, have worked to construct a coherent identity for the NFP sector that did 
not exist previously (White, 2006:46-47).  
Matters addressed by compacts 
Among the range of matters that might be addressed in a compact are the following: 
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• the respective roles of the parties to the agreement 
• mechanisms and processes for implementation of the agreement 
• objectives, strategies and actions to be taken to further the aims of the compact 
• strategies for the dissemination and promotion of the compact, including education 
strategies targeting the public and NFP sector employees 
• a timetable for implementation and processes for periodic review and evaluation, and 
• processes for the resolution of any contentious issues that might arise (Liiv, 2001, 
Bullain and Toftisova, 2005, Toftisova, 2005). 
White (2006) observes numerous similarities in the contents of ‘partnership agreements’ 
in the United Kingdom, Canada, France and the Canadian province of Québec:  
• each contains a statement of shared ideals, values and principles followed by a set of 
reciprocal commitments 
• all recognise the independence of the sector, including its diversity, its right to 
dissent, the importance of volunteering, and the sector’s unique contributions to 
society (as distinct from the market or the state) 
• all include a commitment on the part of NFP sector organisations to accountability 
and good governance, and usually, a commitment to participate (in accordance with 
their means) in consultative processes with government 
• most include a commitment on the part of government to consult with the NFP 
sector in relation to policy formulation, program design and implementation, and to 
consider the impact of other policies and programs on the NFP sector, and 
• most also contain commitments to review funding practices, recognise the costs 
associated with volunteering and sector capacity-building, and to promote public 
awareness of the contributions of the NFP sector (White, 2006:50-51). 
Although there are few material differences in the ‘texts’ of compacts across different 
jurisdictions, they do differ significantly in terms of their scope; institutional 
arrangements; degree of institutional and policy embeddedness; the level of resources 
attached to their implementation; and the extent of commitments to monitor 
performance and evaluate impact. 
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Because the scholarly literature tends to focus on compacts that have been initiated by 
national governments, there is often an implicit presumption that these agreements will 
tend to cascade, or transfer to subsidiary levels of government, either by coercive or 
other, more organic processes. Certainly, in the United Kingdom and Canada national-
level agreements preceded those occurring sub-nationally (more will be said about this 
in Chapters Four and Five). In contrast, the Australian National Compact was preceded 
by agreements between state and territory governments and their respective NFP 
sectors. In truth, only the English Compact mandated the adoption of compacts by 
lower levels of government – a requirement since revoked by the Cameron government.  
Parties to the framework document 
Many of the framework documents examined in this thesis are jointly signed by 
representatives of the government (usually by the head of the government and relevant 
ministers) and by NFP sector representatives (sometimes the CEO of a relevant peak 
organisation, or the CEOs of a coalition of organisations).19  
Although outwardly a straightforward matter, decisions about who signs a framework 
document on behalf of government depend in large part on the nature, intent and 
application of the policy framework. When signed by an elected representative, such as 
a head of government or a minister, framework documents might be said to represent 
the policy positions of the government of the day. This has implications for the agenda 
status accorded to the policy framework in the event of change in leadership, the 
ministry or the governing party. 
Some framework documents – particularly those that take the form of an MoU – are 
signed on behalf of government by a chief executive of a government entity. It can be 
argued that this implies a greater potential for stability and continuity. The framework 
becomes an administrative as opposed to a political document – one that can be adapted 
and amended in response to machinery of government changes or changes in the 
operational or regulatory environment without recourse to the political realm. 
Also problematic is the question of who has the authority to engage with government on 
behalf of the NFP sector. This can be problematic when dealing with a social institution 
as amorphous, variegated and fragmented as the NFP sector. Whereas government is 
often portrayed as having a unitary structure in which departments and agencies are 
organised hierarchically within a chain of command, the NFP sector is, by contrast, a 
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fragmented institutional and political space comprised of organisations that highly prize 
their autonomy.  
Various intermediary organisations20 exist to represent the views and interests of 
member organisations within particular sub-sectors or industry groupings, and from 
time-to-time coalitions of organisations might form around particular issues. In general, 
however, no one organisation or coalition of organisations can credibly claim to 
represent the views of the NFP sector as a whole, let alone claim delegated authority to 
negotiate or make binding commitments on the sector’s behalf.21  
Although governments might have cordial relationships with some NFP organisations 
or sub-sectors these might not be regarded as capable of representing the interests of the 
sector as a whole. Government might need to look beyond cordiality to identify 
organisations and groupings that command legitimacy, credibility and trust within the 
sector. Although altruism is often held to be a hallmark of the NFP sector, gaming 
behaviours are not unknown and the policy agenda is at risk of capture by elite interests. 
Government therefore needs to appraise the capacity of its compact partners to provide 
opportunities for less well-connected and under-represented organisations to participate 
in the process. 
Processes for formalisation 
As has already been observed, compacts are not legal documents and are therefore not 
legally enforceable. Nevertheless, the parties to compacts and similar framework 
documents often find it desirable to publicly endorse or affirm their support for the 
framework. Often this involves a public ceremony, media events and an awareness 
campaign. However such endorsement has more moral and symbolic than formal or 
substantive authority. Understandably, governments look to such events as a source of 
political capital, as do their NFP sector interlocutors. But political capital quickly loses 
value if the investment fails to generate returns. 
Value accrues to compacts when they demonstrate a capacity to generate changes in 
behaviour. This might be more easily said than done. In government, where one might 
suppose the authority exists to mandate adherence to across-portfolio policy 
frameworks, it can be difficult to compel line agencies to adhere to compacts. This is 
especially so when the policy-lead for the compact is assigned to a line agency. Even in 
the NFP sector where intermediary organisations are effectively granted a ‘social 
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license’22 to negotiate a compact on behalf of the broader sector, the absence of formal 
representative structures means that at best their endorsement of any resultant 
framework commends, rather than compels adherence. 
Who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ 
Questions often arise about which agencies and industry sub-sectors are covered by 
compacts. Compacts in some jurisdictions purport to be both ‘whole of government’ 
and ‘whole of sector’ in scope. In practice, however, compacts tend to privilege those 
organisations and industry groupings on which government depends for service 
delivery. To the extent that compacts are promoted as a means to remedy problems in 
the purchaser-provider relationship, there is a corresponding tendency to focus attention 
on policy domains such as health and/or human services in which there is a greater 
concentration of contracted service provision. As a consequence, NFP sub-sectors 
active in other policy domains such as the arts, sport and recreation or the environment 
might not perceive any direct benefit from a compact. 
In addition, sustained and substantive engagement with government favours NFP 
organisations that are professionalised, well-resourced and well-connected – qualities 
that confer a superior capability to pursue their own interests. Conversely, smaller, less 
well-endowed and less influential organisations might perceive their interests as being 
substantially different from those of ‘elite’ organisations (Dalton et al., 2008). Despite 
occasional calls by government commissioners and purchasers of services for NFP 
sector service providers to collaborate in the interests of efficiency (Isbell, 2012), their 
own contracting practices often act to militate against broad sector engagement by 
reinforcing both the dominance of larger providers and policy domain boundaries 
(Casey, 2004:252). 
The first national compacts 
The 1998 ‘Compact on Relations Between the Government and the Voluntary and 
Community Sector in England’ (the English Compact) was a product of the first Blair 
Labour government (1997-2001). Often claimed to be the ‘world’s first’ compact 
(Casey et al., 2010, Zimmeck et al., 2011:12, fn5), the English Compact has inspired 
many subsequent cross-sector frameworks (Reuter et al., 2012). It has also proved to be 
the most durable so far (Zimmeck et al., 2011, Zimmeck and Rochester, 2011, Taylor, 
2012b). 
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The English Compact was followed in close succession by the 2001 ‘Accord Between 
the Government of Canada and the Voluntary Sector’ (the Accord). The Accord (2001) 
was notable for being the first national cross-sector policy framework outside the UK 
based upon the English Compact (Brock, 2000). However, unlike the English Compact, 
the Accord did not endure. Nevertheless, the story of the Accord is a source of salutary 
reflection on the perils of cross-sector policy frameworks.  
In some respects, an examination of English Compact and the Accord is a study in 
contrasts. For example, in the UK, the British Labour Party led by Tony Blair proposed 
a compact while in opposition. In Canada, a second term Liberal government led by 
Jean Chrétien proposed a compact as part of its re-election platform. In both countries, 
commitments to improved processes for government-NFP sector engagement had as 
much to do with political ‘re-branding’ as with good public policy. In the UK Labour’s 
embrace of a ‘Third Way’ policy discourse marked a break with ‘old Labour’s’ statist 
traditions (Kendall, 2003). In Canada, the Chrétien government’s overtures to the NFP 
sector represented a search for political redemption after a first term marked by an 
aggressive expenditure reduction program (Brock, 2000, 2004a).  
However, the underlying circumstances of each framework also bore similarities. In 
both countries, formal reviews initiated by the NFP sector were instrumental in drawing 
attention to the structural and systemic deficiencies inherent in the government-sector 
relationship. In the UK, for example, the ‘Deakin Commission’ first proposed a 
‘concordat’ between central government and the NFP sector (Deakin, 1996). In Canada 
the ‘Broadbent Panel’ recommended that the Canadian federal and provincial 
governments negotiate compacts with the NFP sector along the lines of those then in 
place in the UK (PAGVS, 1999). The central government in each country consulted 
extensively with the NFP sector to identify reform priorities and pathways for 
constructive engagement; formal structures were established for the purpose of guiding 
implementation, developing policy and providing practical assistance to the NFP sector; 
and a range of resources were made available to strengthen sector capacity. 
The Blair government came to power having also made commitments in relation to 
devolving self-government to the constituent jurisdictions of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland (Birrell, 2009, Lodge et al., 2010). In accordance with that 
commitment, separate compacts crafted in Whitehall were bequeathed to the constituent 
countries of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as a prelude to devolution (Good, 
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2001, Kendall, 2003, Lyons, 2003, Acheson et al., 2007, Alcock, 2009). These have not 
been much studied to date (Zimmeck et al., 2011:12, fn5) and will be examined in detail 
in Chapter Five.  
In Canada no mechanism exists through which the federal government might require 
provincial or territory governments to adopt cross-sector policy frameworks. In that 
country, sub-national frameworks emerged independently of the Accord (Carter and 
Speevak Sladowski, 2008). Cross-sector policy frameworks in Canada’s provinces have 
been extensively studied by Elson (2010, 2011a, 2012) and will not be addressed in this 
dissertation. 
The English Compact in context 
At the turn of the 20th century, the financing and administration of social provision was 
largely a local matter and rested with either voluntary organisations or local authorities. 
Central government provided a regulatory framework and set the rules within which 
society could ‘run itself’ (Lewis, 1999). Over time, as the apparatus of the modern 
welfare state was laid down, a mixed economy of social provision emerged in which 
voluntary action played a supplementary role to that of the state.  
By the 1970s, as critiques of the welfare state began to take hold, more explicit 
encouragement was given to ‘pluralist provision’ (Lewis, 1999). The Conservative 
governments of Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) and John Major (1990-1997) sought to 
extricate the state from the direct provision of public services in favour of a mixed 
economy of social welfare in which the sector would once again become a primary 
social provider whilst the state retained control of the fiscal and policy levers (citing 
Hood, 1991, Lewis, 1999:258-261, and McLaughlin, 2002, Kendall, 2003:54, 
McLaughlin and Osborne, 2003:8, Plowden, 2003).  
The English Compact, launched in 1998 by the Blair Labour government, sought to 
bring the NFP sector in from the cold. Prime Minister, Tony Blair proclaimed that the 
Compact as ‘a document of both practical and symbolic importance’ that would provide 
a framework to guide the relationship ‘at every level’ (Home Office, 1998). Blair added 
that the Compact (see Appendix 2, Figure A2.1) would ‘make a crucial contribution to 
our shared aim of a just and inclusive society’ (Home Office, 1998). The government 
recognised the necessity of establishing an appropriate institutional architecture to 
sustain the policy momentum (McLaughlin and Osborne, 2003:11, Plowden, 2003, 
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Zimmeck et al., 2011, Taylor, 2012b). Working groups were established to develop five 
Codes of Good Practice for the purpose of providing detailed guidance on a range of 
practical matters (see Appendix 2, Figure A2.2) and over the course of the decade key 
elements of the institutional architecture were put into place.23  
British Labour’s emphasis on cross-sector and cross-jurisdictional coordination was a 
clear departure from both the neoliberal market-centred policy settings of previous 
Conservative governments and from the statist traditions of Old Labour (Kendall, 
2000:542, Kendall, 2003:54-55, Kendall, 2010:244). As such the Compact and the 
institutions created to give effect to it represented a ‘broadening and deepening of the 
policy space’ (Kendall, 2003:12-13).  
It is important to recognise that The ‘English’ Compact was precisely that – its remit 
extended only to England and to those NFP sector entities with which central 
government had a direct relationship.24 It is estimated that relationships between English 
local government bodies and the NFP sector account for the vast majority of 
government-sector interactions (Plowden, 2003, Zimmeck and Rochester, 2011). For 
this reason, the 1998 English Compact actively encouraged the development of 
compacts at the local government level (Home Office, 1998). Indeed, the extension of 
the Compact to the local level is cited by some as one of its great successes, 
notwithstanding considerable variability in their content and implementation (Zimmeck 
and Rochester, 2011, Taylor, 2012b: see Appendix 2, Figure A2.3). 
The English Compact – the problem stream 
Through the 1980 and 1990s the NFP sector endured a disjointed, abrasive and 
adversarial relationship with Conservative governments (Kendall, 2003:54). Many in 
the sector felt that the government did not understand either its interests or its needs 
(Plowden, 2003). Although the government expected the NFP sector to take on a larger 
share of statutory service provision, it was unwilling to ‘support and nourish’ the sector 
in order to assist it to take on its augmented role (Hudson, 1998:456, 462). According to 
Kendall ‘neither in words nor actions did the Conservative administrations of 1979-97 
offer sustained commitment to the voluntary sector’ (Kendall, 2003:54).25  
The malaise afflicting the government-sector relationship can be traced to the 
Conservative government led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990). 
Thatcher, who presided over a re-conceptualisation of the role of the state (Ware and 
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Todd, 2002), launched sweeping public sector reforms that included the application of 
market incentives to the achievement of public policy aims and an expanded role for the 
private sector in delivering public services under contract (Hudson, 1998, Lewis, 
1999:260-261, Lewis, 2005:121, Fenger, 2006:82-83).26  
Thatcher’s reforms marked a ‘sea change’ in the character of the voluntary sector-state 
relationship: the state would continue to finance service provision whilst encouraging 
greater diversity, choice and efficiency by enlisting non-state service providers in the 
NFP and for-profit sectors (Lewis, 1999). Thus the introduction of quasi-markets and a 
growing use of cross-sector partnerships redefined the respective roles of the state and 
the sector in largely instrumentalist terms (Taylor, 2012b).  
Policies intended to reduce the role of the state presaged the emergence of a ‘contract 
culture’ that would have a significant impact on public administration and on the NFP 
sector (6 and Kendall, 1997, Lewis, 1999, Lyons, 2003:12, Plowden, 2003, Taylor, 
2012b). Government retained control of the policy-making process while the NFP 
sector was relegated to the role of ‘service agent’ with minimal input into policy-
making (McLaughlin and Osborne, 2003:8-9).  
The opening up of new markets for the delivery of statutory services increased both the 
profile and the size of the NFP sector.27 However, resource dependence on government 
rendered the NFP sector vulnerable to capricious bureaucracy, inappropriate regulation, 
goal distortion and loss of autonomy (Lewis, 1999, Kendall, 2003, Taylor, 2012b). NFP 
organisations regularly complained about uncertainties inherent in government funding 
practices, failures to consult on policy changes, and pressures to refrain from criticising 
government policies (Plowden, 2003:417). 
The Conservative government’s attachment to market-based solutions to public policy 
problems continued through the 1990s (Morison, 2000:103). Thatcher resigned in 1990, 
and although her successor, John Major (1990-1997), offered a sharp contrast to her 
abrasive and opinionated style, he nevertheless advanced the substance of 
‘Thatcherism’, but more gently (Reitan, 2003:237:117-118). Although tensions 
persisted in the government’s relationship with the NFP sector (Morison, 2000:103) 
there was a growing interest in accommodating sources of power or legitimacy beyond 
the formal state in order to overcome the democratic insufficiencies introduced by a 
‘rather distorted idea of market efficiency’ (Morison, 2000:101-103). 
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The English Compact – the policy stream 
The idea of a compact was, in 1998, ‘completely without precedent’ and represented an 
‘unparalleled step change in the positioning of the voluntary sector in public policy’ 
(Kendall, 2003:46). Although the notion of ‘partnership’ had formed part of the policy 
lexicon of the previous Conservative government, policy towards the sector was ‘low-
key, piecemeal and ad hoc’, whereas the opportunity for systematic institutional re-
design implied by the Compact offered greater opportunity to embrace more meaningful 
patterns of partnership (Kendall, 2003:46).  
Despite demands from intermediary bodies throughout the 1990s, Conservative 
governments had been unwilling to review the nature of the NFP sector’s relationship 
with the state (Kendall, 2000:550, Kendall, 2003:54-55, Taylor, 2012b). Nevertheless, 
from the mid-1990s there was an awakening of interest in voluntary activity within 
various policy communities together a nascent awareness of the potential for a formal 
agreement between the NFP sector and government (Plowden, 2003:417). 
In opposition the Labour Party, under the leadership of Tony Blair, was in search of a 
‘post-Thatcherite’ political ideology that would differentiate it from the incumbent 
Conservative government and from Labour’s past ideological attachment to the state 
(Kendall, 2003:54-56, Taylor, 2012b). The Party was re-branded as ‘New’ Labour and 
adopted a new policy mantra that purported to represent an alternative to either market-
based or state-centric approaches – the ‘Third Way’ (Morison, 2000:104-105). Thus, by 
the time of Labour’s landslide election win in May 1997 the intellectual foundations for 
the Compact had already been laid in Labour policy. 
The ‘Third Way’ embraced the notion of an active civil society working in partnership 
with government to renew civic culture and work towards the social and material 
refurbishment of society (Morison, 2000:104-105). It assigned a special place to the 
voluntary sector, as evidenced in remarks made by Tony Blair in 1996: 
... we want to restore a proper respect for the independence of the 
voluntary sector. I do not favour simply a contract relationship with the 
voluntary sector, I favour something more profound: working together to 
pursue common objectives in the public interest (Labour Party, 1996, 
cited in Morison, 2000:108)28 
These ideas took shape against the backdrop of vigorous debate occurring within a 
number of policy communities about how best to resolve the tensions and contradictions 
arising from the application of neoliberal market logics to the delivery of social policy.  
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Between 1993 and 1996 three major policy reviews were undertaken examining the 
relationship between government and the voluntary sector/civil society (Lewis, 1999, 
Kendall, 2003). The first of these was the CENTRIS report (Knight, 1993), 
commissioned initially by the Home Office and co-funded by a coalition of charitable 
trusts (Lewis, 1999, Kendall, 2003). Although the Home office sought to distance itself 
from the report and none of its recommendations were adopted (Lewis, 1999) the 
CENTRIS report was nevertheless at the leading edge of an intellectual focus on the 
interface between government and the sector (Kendall, 2003:51-52).  
A second review undertaken by a relatively new ‘think tank’ with close ties to New 
Labour resulted in the report ‘The other invisible hand: Remaking charity for the 21st 
century’ (Mulgan and Landry, 1995) – the so-called ‘Demos Report’. The report was 
co-authored by a co-founder and director of Demos, Geoff Mulgan (who later went on 
to become Tony Blair’s Director of Policy). Although none of the report’s 
recommendations were adopted in the short term, its reflections on the need for a ‘new 
settlement’ in the form of a modernised legal and fiscal framework for voluntary action 
significantly broadened the policy discourse in the NFP space (Mulgan and Landry, 
1995). 
The third, and ultimately the most influential review, was the Commission on the Future 
of the Voluntary Sector (the Deakin Commission). Set up by the National Council for 
Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) and chaired by respected social policy academic 
Nicholas Deakin, the Commission would seek to ‘provide a clear vision for the role of 
the voluntary sector in England over the next decade’ and consider how best to promote 
‘constructive relationships with public and private sectors’(Deakin, 1996). 
A key message contained in the Deakin report was that ‘voluntary organisations are not 
just contractors, but are embedded in civil society with goals of their own’ (Lewis, 
1999:264). Deakin recommended the establishment in Whitehall of a ‘strengthened, 
single source of coherent thought and expertise … about voluntary sector issues and 
activities’ for the purpose of ‘raising the voltage on voluntary sector interests within 
government at all levels’ (Deakin, 1996:93). Significantly, Deakin also recommended 
the drawing up of a renegotiable ‘concordat between central government and 
representatives of the sector … as a code of good practice, for future relations’ to be 
endorsed by the Ministerial Group on Volunteering and the Voluntary Sector (Deakin, 
1996:93, 133, 135).  
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The Conservative government rejected this proposal in its formal response to Deakin’s 
report: 
The government does not believe that, given the diverse nature of 
voluntary organisations and activity, a formal concordat is a sensible or 
usefully achievable objective (Department of National Heritage, 1996, 
cited in Kendall, 2003:53). 
At any other time this might have been the end of the matter. However, the Deakin 
report was framed not only in the context of the sector’s relationship with the incumbent 
Conservative government but also in the knowledge that an election was looming and 
that Labour might well form government (Kendall, 2003:53). At it happened, Labour 
did not demur and in its pre-election policy statement ‘Building the Future Together: 
Labour's Policies for Partnership Between Government and the Voluntary Sector’ 
published in March 1997, Labour made a commitment to ‘establish a compact with the 
Voluntary Sector as a simple statement of the broad principles which will underpin the 
way every department and Agency of Government will work with Voluntary 
Organisations’ (Labour Party, 1997, cited in Plowden, 2003:419-420 ). 
The breaking of new policy ground in the UK did not go unnoticed by Australian third 
sector scholars. Lyons, for one, observed:  
There is no doubt that the United Kingdom is currently the most 
innovative relationship between government and the social economy of 
any country and that, to a large extent, this is a consequence of the 
Compact, a Compact between the whole of government and a large part 
of the social economy (Lyons, 2002:6). 
The English Compact – the politics stream 
The author of ‘Building the Future Together’, Labour MP Alun Michael, played a 
‘catalytic’ role in developing Labour’s voluntary sector policy in opposition (Kendall, 
2003:61). Michael continued to drive NFP sector policy after Labour’s election victory 
when he was appointed Minister of State with lead responsibilities for policy 
concerning the voluntary sector (he would later be appointed Secretary of State for 
Wales and in 1999 became the inaugural First Secretary for Wales). In government, 
Michael enjoyed an ‘unprecedented degree of “prime ministerial backing”’ and was 
able to marshal significant levels of financial and political resources (Kendall, 2003:61). 
It was no accident that Michael’s framing of Labour’s commitment to a Compact 
matched Deakin’s recommendation in all but name. Not only did Michael’s own 
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background in community work play a part in shaping his perspectives on the 
government-sector relationship, but between 1994 and 1997 he led a consultation 
process as part of Labour’s review of relations with the voluntary sector and these 
overlapped consultations conducted by the Deakin Commission (1995-1996) (Kendall, 
2003:61-62, Plowden, 2003:418). Moreover, the two met frequently during the life of 
the Deakin Commission and were engaged in what Kendall refers to as ‘deliberate 
syncopation’ within a ‘unique combination of propitious political conditions’ (Kendall, 
2003:62-63). 
Deakin and Michael29 were able to propel the idea of a compact to the centre stage of 
public policy owing to convergent developments in the policy and political spaces. On 
the policy front was the (then) relatively new notion of an identifiable NFP sector that 
was neither state nor market with which government might partner in order to deliver 
public policy more efficiently and effectively (Kendall, 2000, Kendall, 2003:47-48, 62). 
The recognition – some say the ‘invention’ (6 and Leat, 1997) – of a discrete ‘sector’ 
enabled a once ‘small community of low visibility voluntary sector intermediary bodies’ 
to be brought to the ‘periphery of power’ (Kendall, 2003:63) where they proved capable 
of mobilising policy momentum in favour of a new settlement with government.30  
On the politics side was an 18-year-old Conservative administration facing an election 
in a contest with a resurgent Labour Party – a party successfully mounting a revisionist 
political strategy aimed at persuading the electorate that it had something genuinely new 
to offer (Kendall, 2003:63). Furthermore, a large proportion of the NFP sector had 
never accepted the role cast for it by the ‘minimalist state’ (Hudson, 1998:463). Kendall 
(2000, 2003) emphasises the significance of rhetoric and persuasion in the NFP policy 
space, and both were deployed with considerable effect by advocates for a new 
settlement between government an the NFP sector. In the lead-up to the 1997 UK 
general election the problem, policy and politics streams converged in such a way as to 
create a policy and political environment that was, in Kendall’s words, ‘permeable to 
new thinking’ (Kendall, 2003:63-64). 
Implementation, issues and impact 
Evidence that the Compact ignited action and debate in the NFP policy space can be 
found in the steady stream of policy documents emanating from the Home Office, HM 
Treasury and the Cabinet Office over its first seven years (Alcock, 2010b:271). 
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However, as Lewis observes, a number of factors worked against the full realisation of a 
partnership culture: 
The partnership culture promoted since the introduction of the Compact 
has aimed at a more equal statutory/voluntary relationship. But it is 
difficult to promote a new form of governance founded on partnership 
when the voluntary sector is so fragmented, when the funding streams for 
voluntary organisations are very complicated and take an enormous 
amount of staff time to handle, and when the government’s agenda is 
dictated by the electoral cycle. Above all, there is no political will to re-
think the market-driven mixed economy of welfare that mitigates against 
the kind of local, partnership-based decision-making that is found in some 
continental European countries (Lewis, 2005:128).  
Lewis concludes that: ‘“mainstreaming” voluntary organisations such that they become 
equal partners, shaping the policy agenda as well as implementation, is not a likely 
prospect in the British welfare state’ (Lewis, 2005:128). 
Over the life of the compact tensions have arisen between Compact ‘enthusiasts’ and 
Compact ‘sceptics’ (Kendall, 2003:72). These tensions have been compounded at times 
by ‘consultation fatigue’ in the sector and by over-optimism on the part of a government 
that was too quick to assume that the views of ‘lead’ or ‘intermediary’ organisations 
were ‘representative’ of the sector as a whole when, in reality, there was a lack of policy 
engagement outside this immediate core network (Kendall, 2003:72, 82-84).  
There were early signs that the Compact might occasionally fall short of expectations. A 
‘Cross Cutting Review’31 conducted by HM Treasury in 2002 identified a number of 
failings with respect to Compact implementation and performance (Kendall, 2003:70-
71). The review questioned whether the ideal of ‘co-governance’ was still being pursued 
by the Labour government as a policy objective or whether ‘service agency’ had 
regained a foothold in government policy towards the sector (McLaughlin and Osborne, 
2003:15). Then, in 2008 the House of Commons Public Administration Select 
Committee observed that ‘The Compact, agreed in 1998, is now in need of a revision to 
ensure continued relevance and impact’ (House of Commons Public Administration 
Select Committee, 2008a:11) (see Appendix 2, Figure A2.4).  
The Compact was never intended to be a static document (see Appendix 2, Figure A2.5) 
and in December 2009 it was ‘refreshed’ by the Brown Labour government following 
‘extensive debate and consultation’ (Holt, 2009, Insight, 2010).32 In part, this was a 
response to shortcomings identified in previous reviews and, according to Kendall, it 
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was in part a matter of political necessity to restore the political credibility of the 
Compact in the face ‘practical errors and unrealistic misjudgements over timing and 
resource allocation’ (2010:249). 
The refreshed Compact was publicly endorsed by third sector leaders (Commission for 
the Compact, 2009, Insight, 2010:1,4). However, following the formation in May 2010 
of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government, the Commission for the 
Compact foreshadowed the likelihood of ‘changes both to the Compact agreement and 
to its supporting architecture’ to reflect the incoming government’s ‘Big Society’ 
agenda as well as ‘other policy developments and recent legislation’ (Commission for 
the Compact, 2010:20-21). 
Although the Conservatives had for much of its time in opposition exhibited political 
and policy ambivalence towards the Compact, the process of ‘political decontestation’ 
alluded to by Kendall (2010) enabled the Party, under David Cameron’s leadership, to 
embrace it, thereby effecting a ‘U-turn from its position when in power’ (Kendall, 
2009:19 fn6, 2010). This allowed the Conservative Party to incorporate into its policy 
program re-branded elements of Blair’s ‘Third Way’. By actively endorsing the 
principles of the Compact; emphatically adopting the ‘three sector model’; and retaining 
an Office for Civil Society (formerly the Office for the Third Sector) within the Cabinet 
Office, the Conservative-led government has signalled the importance of the NFP sector 
to its policy agenda (Kendall, 2010:255).  
In September 2010 the Coalition-led government announced its intention to ‘renew’ the 
Compact. When published in December 2010 the new Minister for Civil Society, Nick 
Hurd, announced: 
The renewed Compact is more relevant to current priorities, it’s shorter, 
clearer and is backed by full Parliamentary accountability. Charities, 
voluntary groups and social enterprises have a critical role to play in 
public service reform, community empowerment and social action - the 
three streams of the Big Society (HM Cabinet Office, 2010a). 
The renewed Compact would be ‘backed by a set of accountability and transparency 
measures’, including a study into the operation of the Compact across government 
conducted by the National Audit Office and reported to Parliament (See Appendix 2, 
Figure A2.8). According to Hurd this would provide an ‘unprecedented level of scrutiny 
... to enhance adherence to the Compact and provide a strong platform for the Cabinet 
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Office and Compact Voice to work together to embed the agreement in day to day 
relations between government and civil society’ (HM Cabinet Office, 2010a). 
The Minister went on to say: 
It is more important than ever that the public sector and civil society act 
with respect for each other as we tackle social challenges together (HM 
Cabinet Office, 2010a).  
It was also announced that the Commission for the Compact, established in April 2007 
by the Blair government, would be abolished as a result of a government review of non-
departmental public bodies and responsibility for promoting the Compact would shared 
by the Cabinet Office and Compact Voice – established in 2007 to act as the ‘voice’ of 
the voluntary sector on the Compact (HM Cabinet Office, 2010a). Said the Chair of 
Compact Voice33, Simon Blake: 
The sector has wanted a Compact with teeth for a long time. This new 
Compact with greater accountability provides just that. With major 
changes in relationships and funding across the country, more than ever 
both parties need to know, and stick by, the 'rules of the game'. I call on 
the voluntary and community sector, and government to get behind and 
use this Compact now as a compass for effective partnership (HM 
Cabinet Office, 2010a).  
The renewed Compact bears the sub-title ‘The Coalition Government and civil society 
organisations working effectively in partnership for the benefit of communities and 
citizens in England’ (italics added) and in his foreword, Cameron portrays the Compact 
as the principal means for enlisting the sector in the task of ‘building the Big Society’ 
(HM Government, 2010). However, it is difficult at this juncture to reliably assess the 
implications for the Compact of the Big Society agenda (see Appendix 2, Figure A2.6). 
In his own foreword, Simon Blake, Chair of Compact Voice, cautiously acknowledged 
the essential transience of political events. Observing that the Compact is now in its 
twelfth year – ‘an achievement given the pace of policy change, and one which 
demonstrates its value and impact’ – he nevertheless reminded us that at its best, the 
Compact ‘is a platform which the two sectors can build on to form a powerful 
relationship which goes far beyond one document’ and, in so saying, he leaves open the 
possibility of a return to the principles of co-governance that once inspired the original 
1998 Compact (HM Government, 2010:5). 
What does seem clear is the government’s expectation that the Compact will be an 
important lever for reforms aimed at achieving a ‘power shift’ away from central 
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government towards an even greater reliance on charities, social enterprises, mutuals 
and cooperatives in public service delivery. By ‘modernising’ the commissioning of 
public services, the government hopes to drive ‘transformative improvements in public 
service quality and efficiency’ and thereby ‘enable commissioners to drive and 
implement public spending cuts in fully informed ways, removing unnecessary 
duplications and responding to local priorities’ (HM Cabinet Office, 2010b:6). 
The government’ intentions, set out in a 2010 Green Paper, are to ‘encourage a 
flourishing civil society, increasing community involvement in activities which were 
previously the almost exclusive domain of the state’ and in so doing enhance ‘the 
responsiveness of local authorities and other local commissioning bodies to the 
community’s needs and priorities; reaching some of the most disadvantaged groups in 
society; and supporting local economic growth (HM Cabinet Office, 2010b:5).  
Implications 
During its first decade various commentators situated the Compact in the vanguard of a 
purported shift from a ‘contract culture’ to new ‘paradigm of partnership’ (Acheson et 
al., 2006:23). Others have been less sanguine about the prospects for a genuine 
partnership of equals between government and the sector (Alcock, 2010a, Macmillan, 
2010:5-6). Carmel and Harlock (2009) for example, regard the Compact as part of a 
broader strategy for extending a ‘governable terrain’ to agencies previously outside state 
governance, while Milbourne and Cushman (2013:487) point to New Labour’s 
‘courage’ in substantially increasing government’s investment in Britain’s NFP sector 
(while at the same time criticising New Labour for its ‘timidity’ in trusting NFP 
organisations to use resources wisely).  
Carmel and Harlock (2009:156) contend that the emergence under New Labour of a 
‘third sector’ discourse was ‘designed to demarcate and impose an institutional and 
normative order as a whole onto an otherwise privately organised and variably 
regulated group of organisations’. This, in their view amounted to a form of 
colonisation of the NFP sector as ‘technocratic and generic service providers’ thereby 
rendering ‘their specific social origins, ethos and goals absent, as if these are politically 
and socially irrelevant to their activities and role in relation to the state creation of 
markets for public service delivery’ (Carmel and Harlock, 2009:156).  
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Kendall rejects parts of Carmel and Harlock’s analysis, arguing that the Compact served 
a broader ideological purpose to politically ‘decontest’ the role of the third sector within 
a demarcated policy space capable of accommodating a range of politically ‘feasible’ 
formulations of the state-sector relationship (Kendall, 2010:246-249). Within this policy 
space a spectrum of policy responses is possible ranging from a more prescriptive 
regulatory regime that countenances a significant steering role for the state at one end 
(Labour), to a less prescriptive regime which envisages greater devolution of 
responsibility to non-state actors at the other (Conservative) (Kendall, 2010).  
Elsewhere, Kendall has argued that criticising the ‘aspirational’ nature of the Compact 
‘misses the basic point’ by neglecting the ‘symbolic importance’ of the ideological 
differentiation between New Labour’s ‘modernisation’ agenda and the ‘narrow neo-
liberal’, ‘market fundamentalist tenets’ of the Conservative Party (Kendall, 2003:7-8).34 
Despite its ‘limitations and failures’ the Compact had enormous ‘mobilisation value’ as 
a vehicle for ‘politically decontesting’ the centrality of the NFP sector ion a healthy 
democratic society (Kendall, 2010:246). Owing to its ‘deliberately permissive’ 
language, the Compact created a ‘big tent’ capable of accommodating ‘otherwise 
oppositional constituencies’ and appealing to nascent constituencies beyond the 
traditional boundaries of the policy space (Kendall, 2010:245-246).35 
Any return to some form of ‘plenipotentiary statism’, or to neoliberal ‘market 
fundamentalism’, or to the ‘fatalistic’ policy passivity that pre-dated the welfare state 
are effectively ruled-out as ‘politically infeasible’ (Kendall, 2010:243-249). In this 
Kendall seems to echo the view expressed by former Blair government advisor, Tom 
Bentley36 that:  
Blair and Brown have decisively moved the ‘operating framework’ of 
British Politics away from the axis of issues and methods on which 
Conservative dominance was based during the second half of the last 
century (Bentley, 2007:112). 
The essentially ‘liberal’ underpinnings of this policy framing had the effect of 
persuading the Conservative Party to commit to the ideas embodied in the Compact – 
even to the point of proclaiming itself better placed to promote a healthy third sector 
(Kendall, 2009:14, Kendall, 2010:246) (see Appendix 2, Figure A2.7). As with Blair’s 
New Labour this is at least partly about ideological differentiation between Cameron’s 
Conservative Party and the Conservative Party of his predecessors (Kendall, 2009:8).  
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The coalition government has differentiated itself its predecessors by: replacing the 
‘Labour’ term ‘third sector’ with the term ‘civil society’; signalling a general hostility to 
‘Big Government’ through an espousal of ‘Big Society’; ‘demonising’ the previous 
government’s efforts to foster infrastructure as ‘grotesquely over-bureaucratic and 
smacking of dysfunctional “command and control”’; signalling a greater comfort with 
market-based approaches by creating a greater space for the involvement of commercial 
operators on the supply-side (Kendall, 2010:255-256).37 Even this does not satisfy the 
right wing of Britain’s Conservative movement, which has criticised the Cameron 
government for simply continuing what it regards as ‘bankrupt politics of the Third 
Way’ (Harris-Quinney, 2012).38 
 
Kendall portrays the ideological re-positioning of the Coalition government as ‘an 
attempt to situate the centre of gravity for pro-third sector arguments unambiguously at 
the low-regulation part of the policy space’ (Kendall, 2010:255). He also speculates that 
the new government might go ‘further and quicker’ than the Labour administration in 
embracing quasi-market approaches: 
A range of floated policies, involving greater space for commercial 
operators on the supply side, and the potential embrace of voucher 
schemes on the demand side, all signify a greater degree of comfort with 
market-style ideas in a third sector context … (Kendall, 2010:256). 
Apparent confirmation of Kendall’s prediction can be found in the Open Public Service 
manifesto in which the Cameron government sets out an ambitious reform agenda: 
This means replacing top-down monopolies with open networks in which 
diverse and innovative providers compete to provide the best and most 
efficient services for the public. It means re-thinking the role of 
government – so that governments at all levels become increasingly 
funders, regulators and commissioners, whose task it is to secure quality 
and guarantee fair access for all, instead of attempting to run the public 
services from a desk in Whitehall, city hall or county hall.(HM 
Government, 2012:3). 
However, Alcock (2012) cautions against leaping to conclusions about the depth of 
policy discontinuity in the UK. Whilst the Conservative-led coalition government has 
assiduously re-branded programs and policies to eliminate the taint of the previous 
Labour government, many of its policy approaches are similar to those of New Labour. 
Measures for which policy analogues existed under Labour include strategies to make it 
easier for NFP organisations to work with the state; making it easier to run NFP 
organisations and directing new resources to the sector; establishing new sources of 
NFP sector finance (Big Society Capital); reforms of public sector commissioning and 
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establishing a ‘right to provide’ for public sector workers; supporting small 
organisations to promote civic engagement; and encouraging volunteering and 
philanthropy (Alcock, 2012:233). Alcock argues that despite differences in ‘tone and 
emphasis’, and taking into account a far more straitened fiscal context, there has been 
less change than is generally supposed (Alcock, 2012:233). 
The Canadian Accord in context 
Like the English Compact, the policy environment of the 1980s and 1990s helped pave 
the way for the Canadian Accord. During this time NFP organisations were increasingly 
called upon to fill the gaps left by a retreating statutory sector, or enlisted as a third 
party provider of statutory public services (Brock, 2000). Fiscal pressures arising from 
government austerity measures, together with a crisis in public confidence as a result of 
widely publicised scandals involving NFP organisations, forced a fragmented and 
beleaguered NFP sector to take stock (Brock, 2000:3-4, Elson, 2007:53-54, Graham, 
2009, Voluntary Sector Initiative, 2012).  
In 1995 an informal coalition of 13 national umbrella organisations formed the 
Voluntary Sector Roundtable (VSR) as a vehicle for collaboration on issues of common 
concern to the NFP sector (Phillips, 2009:12). Although the Canadian NFP sector had a 
long history of working collaboratively within particular policy domains, this was the 
first time an across-sector group had been formed to address broadly shared issues 
(Voluntary Sector Initiative, 2012). 
The formation of the VSR marked the beginning of a long deliberative process both 
within the sector and between the sector and government. The VSR was also an 
important precursor to the Voluntary Sector Initiative (VSI), launched in June 2000 by 
the Government of Canada. Foreshadowed in the 1999 Speech from the Throne, the VSI 
was accompanied by a commitment to develop an Accord ‘to provide visible and 
concrete recognition’ of the importance of a more collaborative relationship between 
government and the NFP sector. 
As with the English Compact, the Canadian Accord was largely aspirational: it provided 
an ‘enabling framework’ for the relationship between the voluntary sector and the 
Government of Canada and set out the values and principles that would govern that 
relationship (Canada, 2001:4). Whilst acknowledging the importance of relationships 
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with other levels of government, private sector entities and labour unions, these 
relationships were unaffected by the Accord (Canada, 2001).  
Then Prime Minister Jean Chrétien spoke of the ‘special value’ of a voluntary sector 
that is essential to the nation’s well-being (Canada, 2001). The language of the Accord 
was measured and positive, and the document was portrayed as the starting point of a 
journey, rather than the end result of a process. In addition to describing the context 
within which it was developed; identifying the parties to the agreement; setting out its 
scope and rationale; and outlining the processes through which it was developed, the 
Accord also enunciated the following matters: 
• Purpose – to strengthen the ability of the voluntary sector and the Government of 
Canada to better serve Canadians (Figure 4.1); 
• Values – such as a commitment to democracy, active citizenship, equality, 
diversity, inclusion and social justice; 
• Principles – relating to independence, interdependence, dialogue, cooperation and 
collaboration and accountability; 
• Commitments to Action – including shared commitments such as ‘act in a manner 
consistent with the values and principles in this Accord’ and ‘Work together as 
appropriate to achieve shared goals and objectives’ as well as respective 
commitments for government and the NFP sector; and 
• Taking the Accord forward – commitments to implement a range of measures 
including, inter alia, appropriate organisational structures to give effect to the 
provisions of the Accord, processes for monitoring and codes or standards of good 
practice (Canada, 2001). 
Taken at face value the Accord might have appeared to to be peripheral to the core 
concerns of many Canadian NFP organisations whose primary funding and policy 
relationship was with provincial or territorial governments.39 However, two factors 
commended a central role for the federal government in policy debates about the 
relationship between government and the NFP sector: the first had to do with its 
regulatory monopoly over the taxation treatment of registered charities and federally 
incorporated non-profit organisations (Elson, 2011a:136); and the second concerned its 
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capacity to use financial levers to encourage the adoption by provinces and territories of 
innovative policies and practices (Thériault, 2009:66).40 
 
It is important to bear in mind that the Canadian federal government had no power to 
compel the adoption of compacts by sub-national governments. It could not, for 
example, require local government authorities to enter into ‘accords’ with the NFP 
sector as occurred in the UK.41 Formal bilateral ‘collaboration agreements’ have been 
implemented in four provinces, and two provinces have made unilateral declarative 
policy statements concerning the relationship between the sector and government 
(Elson, 2010, 2011a, 2012). However, these have been developed independently of the 
earlier federal initiative and of one another (Carter and Speevak Sladowski, 2008:9).  
Nevertheless, the Accord indirectly contributed the later emergence of sub-national 
framework documents by transforming the policy discourse – at least in English-
speaking Canada (Phillips, 13 July 2012). The transformation is not complete: for, as 
Mulholland et al. observe, the capacity and sustainability of Canadian NFP 
organisations is still impeded by a lack of institutional and policy coherence at the 
‘federal and provincial-territorial (FPT) levels’: 
With no designated ministers or departments assigned clear leadership for 
non-profit sector issues, and no process or forum for FPT governments to 
collaboratively engage on sector issues, charities and non-profits are left 
shuttling from minster to minister, and government to government, in an 
effort to bring some measure of coherence and shared purpose to the 
policy and regulatory regimes in which they operate (Mulholland et al., 
2011:2). 
Here it should be noted that the situation in the French-speaking province of Québec is 
quite different. There, inherited political and institutional frameworks founded on a 
Figure 4.1 – Purpose of the Canadian Accord 
The purpose of the Accord is to strengthen the ability of both the voluntary sector and the Government of 
Canada to better serve Canadians. 
The strength of this Accord derives from the joint work that produced it. While the Accord is not a legal 
document, it is designed to guide the evolution of the relationship by identifying the common values, 
principles and commitments that will shape future practices. It focuses on what unites the two sectors, 
honours the contributions of both, and respects their unique strengths and different ways of working. 
The Accord represents a public commitment to more open, transparent, consistent and collaborative ways 
of working together. When working together, the Government of Canada and the voluntary sector seek to 
fulfil the commitments set out in the Accord and in so doing enhance the quality of life of all Canadians. 
(Canada, 2001) 
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history of militant social activism and emphasising a quasi-corporatist l’économie 
sociale (social economy), have moderated the influences of neoliberal policy agendas 
and NPM-inspired approaches to public sector management (Laforest, 2006, White, 
2006, Elson, 2011a, Laforest and Acheson, 2012). 
The Canadian Accord – the problem stream 
By the end of the 1990s Canada’s NFP sector was becoming increasingly embedded in 
the policy process, thereby revealing a variety of new tensions and frustrations (Brock, 
2000). This development was in many ways driven by forces similar to those observed 
in the UK: fiscal restraint, a neoliberal-inspired re-definition of the role of the state, the 
retrenchment of government programs, and the emergence of third party contracting for 
statutory public services (Brock, 2000, Elson, 2007).42  
The challenges confronting Canada’s NFP sector in the 1980s and 1990s were many. 
Stimulated by the emergence of ‘social citizenship’ discourses and fuelled by the 
provision of government funding, the number of charitable and voluntary sector 
organisations in Canada more than doubled between 1967 and 2000 (Elson, 2007:48, 
Phillips, 2009). Meanwhile Canadian federal and provincial governments, faced with a 
worsening fiscal environment, looked to the sector as an alternative site for the delivery 
of statutory social services (Elson, 2007:49-53). Taking a lead from reforms 
implemented by the Thatcher government in the UK and the Reagan administration in 
the US, Canadian governments increasingly favoured the purchase of prescribed 
services from NFP organisations while at the same time reducing the availability of 
grant funding (Butcher, 1986). This had significant destabilising effects upon Canada’s 
NFP sector (Phillips, 2009:10-11). 
There was in Canada no national umbrella organisation (e.g. comparable to the NCVO 
in the UK) able to speak on behalf of the sector and having the ‘clout’ necessary to 
initiate a review along the lines of the Deakin Commission (Elson, 2007:15-16). 
Nevertheless, in 1995 the Coalition of National Voluntary Organizations (NVO) – a 
loose affiliation of national community services organisations formed to represent the 
views of the voluntary sector to government – joined with the Canadian Centre on 
Philanthropy and Volunteering Canada as well as peak organisations from other sectors 
to form the Voluntary Sector Roundtable (VSR) to identify the cross-cutting themes and 
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shared interests of a diverse and fragmented NFP sector (Brock, 2000:15-17, Lyons, 
2003:15, Phillips, 2009:10). The VSR would later be described as:  
… a creature born of the knowledge within the sector that organizations 
are facing increasing demands for accountability, as well as services: that 
more is being expected from them precisely at the time when their 
available resources have been reduced (PAGVS, 1999:1). 
In 1997, with support and encouragement from the J.W. McConnell Family 
Foundation,43 the VSR established the Panel on Accountability and Governance in the 
Voluntary Sector (PAGVS) ‘to strengthen the voluntary sector by helping the sector 
articulate its challenges relating to governance and accountability, and developing some 
approaches to meeting them’ (PAGVS, 1999). Chaired by respected former Leader of 
the federal New Democratic Party, Ed Broadbent, the panel of six eminent Canadians 
would review and make recommendations concerning effective governance and 
accountability in the voluntary sector (PAGVS, 1999:1). The ‘Broadbent Panel’, as it 
came to be known, consulted widely with NFP organisations across the country and 
sought the advice of a wide range of officials and experts. Importantly, the Panel noted, 
approvingly, the introduction of compacts by the new Labour administration in the UK 
(PAGVS, 1999:16-17). 
In its final report, the Panel summed up the situation facing the voluntary sector in the 
following terms: 
In recent years, the voluntary sector’s infrastructure has been significantly 
weakened for a number of reasons. As a result of government cuts to 
funding, often combined with downloading onto the sector of services 
once provided by governments, there is intense competition for funds, not 
only within the sector but often with governments directly. The pressure 
to deliver more and more sophisticated services has stretched the financial 
and human resources of many organizations (PAGVS, 1999:14). 
The Canadian Accord – the policy stream 
The Broadbent Panel’s final report contained over 40 recommendations addressing 
issues of governance, accountability and capacity, and were ‘directed to a variety of 
audiences, including voluntary organizations, the sector as a whole, foundations, 
corporations, and federal and provincial governments’ (PAGVS, 1999:ii).44 These 
included a recommendation for:  
…both the federal and provincial governments enter into discussions with 
the sector to establish mechanisms, such as compacts or other on-going 
forums, for promoting understanding and agreement on appropriate 
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conduct and the future of the relationships between the sector and 
governments’ (PAGVS, 1999:17). 
For the federal government, at the time contemplating a third term in office, the idea of 
a compact had considerable political appeal in that it was potent with symbolism, 
relatively inexpensive and did not require passage by Parliament (Phillips, 2003b:30, 
Phillips, 2003a:30-31, Brock, 2004a, Phillips, 2009:23).45  
In June 1998 the government set up a Voluntary Sector Task Force (VSTF) ‘with a 
mandate to coordinate the preparation of advice to Cabinet on the relationship of the 
government with the voluntary sector’ (VSTF, 2003). Situated within the Privy Council 
Office, the VSTF was comprised of high-ranking officials from a number of 
departments and its job was to give effect to the commitments made by the Liberal 
Party in the 1997 general election (Lyons, 2003:15). The Party’s broad undertakings 
were set out in its policy manifesto ‘Securing Our Future’ (also known as the ‘Red 
Book’) under the heading ‘Engaging the Voluntary Sector’. Although a compact or 
accord was not directly canvassed in the policy platform, the Liberal Party 
acknowledged that: 
Alongside the public and private sectors, the voluntary sector constitutes 
the third pillar of Canadian society and its economy. Despite its 
importance, policy- makers are not sufficiently aware of the actual size 
and nature of the sector, how it functions, the value it adds, and the 
challenges it faces. 
Consequently, opportunities to develop fruitful and effective partnerships 
with the sector are often overlooked (Liberal Party of Canada, 1997:67). 
These measures were concurrent with the deliberations of the Broadbent Panel, and 
(together with the government’s preparedness to contribute towards the costs of printing 
and disseminating the Broadbent Panel’s discussion paper) suggested a convergence of 
the government’s and the NFP sector’ views around a need to place their relationship on 
a better footing as well as the federal government’s willingness to take relations with 
the sector to another level (Phillips, 2003a:25, Brock, 2004a, Elson, 2007:55).46 
According to Laforest (2011:74-75), the VSTF was instrumental in opening channels of 
communication between the NFP sector leadership and senior government officials. The 
Broadbent Panel, recognising the political opportunity presented by the commitments 
made by the Liberal Party in the ‘Red Book’, shared its draft recommendations with the 
VSTF as it was preparing its final report to Cabinet (Laforest, 2011:74). This was more 
than a mere matter of fortuitous timing: the capability of the Broadbent Panel to 
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influence the direction and content of policy was built upon a foundation of political 
and institutional alliances assiduously built up by the VSR (Laforest, 2011:71-72).47 
The Canadian Accord – the politics stream 
Canadian NFP organisations – like their counterparts in Australia – have a larger direct 
interface with sub-national governments (the provinces and territories) than with the 
federal government. Nevertheless, it was to the federal government that the Canadian 
NFP sector first turned in their efforts to forge a new settlement with government. That 
the sector looked principally to the federal government to take the lead – despite earlier, 
largely unfulfilled overtures towards NFP sector-government cooperative frameworks at 
the provincial level – owed as much to the connection between issues of NFP sector 
capacity and the taxation treatment of charitable giving as it did to issues of subsidiarity 
(PAGVS, 1999:14-15). It might also have been hoped by the NFP sector that a closer 
relationship with the federal government would help to leverage improved relations 
with provincial and territorial governments.48  
When first elected in 1993 the Liberal government led by Jean Chrétien inherited a high 
national debt and a large annual deficit. The government’s immediate priority was to 
take advantage of its parliamentary majority49 to bring down the deficit and eliminate 
debt. Early in its second term the government, re-elected with a reduced majority in 
1997, delivered the first federal Budget surplus for 25 years by scaling back or 
eliminating government programs and reducing transfers to provinces (Canadian 
Encyclopedia, 2012).  
It has been suggested that the Chrétien government’s embrace of the Accord was, in 
part, an attempt to signal a return to its centre-left traditions of investment in social 
policy before returning to the polls in the northern autumn of 2000 (Phillips, 2003a:25). 
The VSI and the Accord presented an ideal opportunity for the government to affirm its 
support for the voluntary sector in a manner that was highly symbolic, relatively 
inexpensive and did not require passage by Parliament (Phillips, 2003a:30-31, Phillips, 
2003b:30). Whatever its motivations, the Liberal government was returned for a third 
consecutive term with an increased majority. 
Implementation, issues and impact 
In March 1999 the Voluntary Sector Task Force joined forces with the Voluntary Sector 
Roundtable to establish three ‘joint tables’ to address, respectively, the relationship 
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between government and the voluntary sector; strengthening voluntary sector capacity; 
and improving the regulatory framework (Lyons, 2003:15). Each Joint Table was co-
chaired by a representative from the voluntary sector and a deputy head of a 
government department.  
The Joint Tables were self-described by the co-chairs as a unique process in which 
participants were challenged to think creatively and without constraint ‘in terms of 
identifying the key policy issues and potential solutions’ (Report of the Joint Tables, 
1999). Their report, presented in August 1999, included among its 26 recommendations 
a proposal to establish ‘an accord between the government and [the] sector to guide the 
evolving relationship’ as well as a range of initiatives to address capacity-building, 
funding arrangements and regulatory issues (Report of the Joint Tables, 1999:10, Good, 
2001:47, Lyons, 2003:15-16). The Report asserted that: 
An official accord or agreement that articulates a shared vision and 
agreed-upon principles would help to shape and guide the relationship. 
The accord should be ‘evergreen,’ that is, capable of evolving as the 
relationship matures, and be flexible enough to embrace other 
stakeholders, both within the sector and beyond. The parties also need to 
agree on a means to signal their commitment to abide by the accord 
(Report of the Joint Tables, 1999:25)  
The Canadian government accepted the Joint Tables’ recommendations and in June 
2000 committed CA$94.6 million over five years to a Voluntary Sector Initiative (VSI) 
with the following broad objectives: 
• To improve the relationship between the Sector and the federal government;  
• To build Sector capacity in areas of finance, human resources, policy and 
knowledge and information management; and  
• To improve the regulatory and legal framework under which the Sector operates. 
(Canada, 2009:iii)  
A centrepiece of the VSI was a commitment to develop an Accord intended to ‘provide 
visible and concrete recognition of the importance of the new relationship’ (VSTF, 
2000, Phillips, 2003a:32). The Accord would: 
... state, for the first time, a clear and compelling vision for a new, more 
collaborative relationship in the service of Canadians. It will articulate 
principles to shape and guide the relationship in the years ahead, and will 
clearly set out the mutual obligations and benefits of the government and 
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the voluntary sector in all areas of joint endeavour. It will signal 
intentions and have a moral rather than legal basis (VSTF, 2000:2). 
A statement issued by the VSTF in June 2000 announced the formation of a fourteen 
member Joint Accord Table (JAT) – comprising an equal number of government 
officials and NFP sector representatives – tasked with the development of a consultation 
document, a consultation strategy and an implementation plan. The latter would 
‘identify how to give effect to the terms of the Accord and … set out a process for 
monitoring and reporting on its implementation’ (VSTF, 2000). The statement also 
committed to the development of a voluntary sector ‘lens’ for the purpose of 
encouraging departments to examine ‘every policy and program development from the 
point of view of the objectives of the Accord’ (VSTF, 2000). 
Initially the VSI and the Accord appeared to be pursued with some vigour: the VSI in 
particular generated abundant information resources for the sector.50 The five years 
immediately following the signing of the Accord was a period of intensive research, 
policy development and regulatory reform (Phillips, 2003a:31, Hall et al., 2005:24, 
Carter and Speevak Sladowski, 2008:34-35). Despite such auspicious beginnings the 
VSI ‘quickly moved from being policy oriented to being operational’ (Phillips, 
2009:22-23). 
Carter draws attention to the fact that the bulk of the practical work undertaken during 
the period from 2000 to 2005 occurred under the auspices of the VSI and is only 
indirectly attributable to the Accord itself (Carter and Speevak Sladowski, 2008:35). 
There is only anecdotal evidence that the Accord itself led to genuine institutional 
change (Elson, 2006:45) and formal relationships established to give effect to the VSI 
have ‘not endured to any degree beyond the five years of the building period’ (Carter 
and Speevak Sladowski, 2008:35).  
By 2005, the VSI had run its course: its funding was not renewed and machinery of 
government changes under the Martin (Liberal) and Harper (Conservative) governments 
saw the core secretariat functions relocated from the centre of government to a 
succession of line agencies, thereby compromising the capacity for horizontal policy 
and programmatic co-ordination (Phillips, 2003b:45, Elson, 2007:56, Brock, 2008:21, 
Lindquist, 2008:157). 
Although the Accord remains technically in effect it is widely regarded by the sector as 
a ‘dead letter’ (see Appendix 2, Figure A2.9). On the one hand, this could be 
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characterised – charitably – as a sign of ‘mainstreaming’ or a ‘normalisation’ of the 
precepts, values and behaviours embodied in the Accord (see Appendix 2, Figure 
A2.10). On the other hand, as suggested by Lindquist, it could be said that the same 
policy dynamics that put the sector ‘on the federal radar screen’ (Phillips, 2003b:25) 
ultimately crowded out both the Accord and the VSI and resulted in their relegation 
further down the policy agenda (Lindquist, 2008:163).  
An evaluation of the VSI published in 2009, describes the initiative as ‘unique’ in its 
scope, scale and the joint nature of the work (Canada, 2009:iii).51 Indeed,  
Lindquist reminds us that the institutional reform agenda set by government and the 
sector was ambitious and that ‘much was accomplished’: 
A coherent view developed of what a well-functioning non-profit and 
voluntary sector was, including how a good relationship with government 
might work. The Voluntary Sector Accord and the codes of practice were 
negotiated and foundational research was sponsored and completed to 
provide a good sense of the size, diversity, financial dimensions and 
economic impact of the sector across the country (Lindquist, 2008:157). 
According to Brock, the VSI represented a ‘coming of age’ for the Canadian NFP sector 
which, she suggests, now has ‘a stronger and more unified voice ... and is a more 
formidable ally and antagonist to government’ (Brock, 2008:21). That the VSI helped to 
forge connections between actors in ‘most parts of the sector in most parts of the 
country’ is cited as one of its ‘most enduring legacies’ (Carter and Speevak Sladowski, 
2008:35).  
Implications 
The VSI and the Accord were brought about by a ‘serendipitous’ confluence of policy 
entrepreneurialism, political opportunism and political exigency (Phillips, 2003a, 
Lindquist, 2008:163). According to Lindquist: 
Adroit agenda setting, combined with fortuitous timing with respect to 
national politics and the emergence of a coherent international exemplar 
[the English Compact], led to a significant process and commitment from 
government (Lindquist, 2008:152). 
Were the Accord and the VSI successful policy initiatives or did they fail? The fact that 
Canadian third sector scholars and NFP sector actors consider the Accord to be a dead 
letter suggests the latter. Lindquist, however, points to the inherent difficulty of 
evaluating the Accord and the VSI when the standard against which success is judged 
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embodies binding agreements, substantial institutions inside and outside government to 
buttress those agreements, and a sector characterised by a strong associational structure 
(Lindquist, 2008:157).  
Lindquist is clearly referring to the English Compact in this succinct enunciation of the 
core institutional and structural differences between Canada and the UK in this policy 
space. There is little doubt that the Canadians looked upon the English Compact as a 
model when crafting the Accord. Neither should it be doubted that the underlying 
political and institutional conditions upon which the Compact rests were quite different 
to those of the Accord (Phillips, 2003a:29).  
Comparisons with the English Compact 
Phillips (2003a) suggests that a closer examination of the differences between the UK 
and Canadian situations is instructive. Firstly, unlike the UK where Blair’s New Labour 
embraced a communitarian ‘Third Way’ that emphasised the creation of a strong civil 
society, in Canada the project of relationship-building between the government and the 
NFP sector was not closely tied to the political ideology of the governing Liberal Party. 
Of the Chrétien government’s initial attitude towards the prospect of a new relational 
framework Phillips observed: 
It cannot be said that the federal government shared the sector’s analysis 
or deep concern about the problematic nature of the relationship, nor the 
solutions as to how to improve it, although it was now publicly 
committed to the vague notion of helping the sector to realise its potential 
as the ‘third pillar’ of Canadian society.52 (Phillips 2003: 25) 
Phillips (2009:18-20) contends that there is no real history in Canada of coherent third 
sector discourses: there is no Canadian corollary to Blair’s ‘Third Way’ or Cameron’s 
‘compassionate conservatism’. She argues that the involvement of the NFP sector in the 
political system is ‘tolerated’, but is neither theorised or advocated by any political 
party as ‘part of a healthy functioning democracy’ (Phillips, 2009:20). As a 
consequence the Accord did not enjoy the same enthusiastic and sustained support 
given to the Compact by Prime Minister Blair and his successors (Phillips, 2003a:27).  
This absence of a coherent political narrative for NFP sector engagement enabled the 
Chrétien government to effectively delegate the task of constructing a better relationship 
between government and the NFP sector to the public service – a role for which the 
latter is ill-equipped, according to Phillips, owing to its inherent risk-aversion and 
overriding preoccupation with accountability (Phillips, 2009:23). The public service, 
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she suggests, is good at ‘turning values into instrumentalities’, but it is ‘not going the 
take the lead on pushing innovative, bold ideas’ about constructing a fundamentally 
different relationship between the NFP sector and government (Phillips, 2009:23).  
Secondly, unlike the UK Canada did not have a powerful peak umbrella organisation – 
such as the NCVO – capable of prosecuting the collective interests of the NFP sector 
with government (Phillips, 2003a:30). Thirdly, no permanent administrative machinery 
had been created to support and pursue the cause of relationship-building between the 
government and the sector and, fourthly, the fact that relations between the sector and 
the federal government were underdeveloped in comparison to provincial and local 
government militated against promoting and encouraging the development of local 
relationship agreements as occurred in the UK (Phillips, 2003a:29-30, 37, Phillips, 
2003b:18).53 This meant that the Accord would have to be judged largely on its own 
merits, without the promise of cascading frameworks capable of bringing compact 
deliverables to the government-NFP sector coalface (Phillips, 2003b:35). 
Surviving in a crowded policy marketplace 
Phillips concludes that while the VSI represented a major step forward in relationship-
building, the very intensity and scale of the initiative might have led policy-makers to 
conclude that ‘the voluntary sector file’ could now be closed (Phillips, 2003a:47).54 This 
view is echoed by Brock, who noted that following its re-election in 2000, the Liberal 
government: 
... largely adopted the attitude that it ‘had been there, done that.’ The 
voluntary sector agenda had been addressed successfully in the 
intervening period between the election and throne speech in the eyes of 
government with the creation of the $94.6 million VSI. Less than one 
year into its five year mandate and the policy window for the VSI seemed 
to be closing (Brock, 2008:11). 
NFP sector policy was also competing for attention in a much more crowded political 
agenda and, in reality the policy window might already have closed – not least because 
of a heightened concern about issues of domestic security in the wake of the 11 
September 2001 attacks in the United States (Phillips, 2003a:47).55  
Phillips suggests that the Accord lacked political commitment and direction ‘because it 
was never clear to government exactly what it wanted to achieve’ (Phillips, 2009:23). In 
any case, Phillips notes that ‘spending’ is easier than tackling institutional change: for a 
government reluctant to make significant changes in the machinery of government, the 
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short term politics of symbolic and incremental policy gestures ultimately won out over 
the long term politics of major structural reform (Phillips, 2003b:59).  
Mulholland (Mulholland, 2011) offers an alternative perspective from the privileged 
vantage point of a Senior Advisor on Social Development in Chrétien’s Office from 
1996-2000: 
[Phillips (2009)] is right in pointing out that the VSI failed to live up to 
many of our expectations – those of both government and the voluntary 
sector. However, one of the primary flaws of the VSI was the failure of 
all parties to connect with grassroots voluntary organisations and to 
ensure that their issues were front and centre in the process. Instead, the 
process was dominated by the preoccupations of national organisations, 
some of which were linked to the interests of the vast majority of 
organisations but many of which had little resonance outside the Ottawa 
‘beltway.’ In federal Cabinet discussions of the VSI, I was often struck 
that Ministers seemed to be more attuned to the needs of grassroots 
organisations in their ridings than the VSI was. Not surprisingly, 
Ministerial interest in the VSI – and support for it – faded as Ministers 
realised these needs were not being addressed (Mulholland, 2011). 
Enter the Harper government 
The election of the Harper Conservative government in 2006 closed the window on the 
VSI and the Accord. Johnston (2013:27) informs us that the NFP sector in Canada made 
‘little effort to apprise members of the opposition parties about the mandate and 
progress of the VSI’, and thus allowed the new government to distance itself from any 
initiatives bearing the ‘taint’ of the former Chretién and Martin Liberal governments. 
The Harper government – currently in its third term having been re-elected with an 
absolute majority in 2011 – has shown little inclination to articulate a consistent 
philosophy about the voluntary sector (Graham, 2009, Phillips, 2009). Nevertheless, the 
government’s thinking about the sector can be deduced from its discourses and actions 
to date (Graham, 2009:42) such as the ‘large and very surgical’ funding cuts made 
during the government’s first two terms which, according to Phillips (2009:8, 27) 
telegraphed a clear message to the sector: ‘deliver services efficiently and be quiet’.  
Graham reminds us that ‘[t]his is a Conservative government’ with a strong belief in 
individual choice and no intentions of establishing programs to support the sector 
(Graham, 2009). There is, he says, a clear thread running through the government’s 
philosophy: 
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… there is a need for a voluntary sector, distanced from and not perceived 
as an arm of government, that can involve itself directly with people and 
their communities (Graham, 2009:42). 
The Harper government has taken positive steps to reform the operation of grant and 
contribution programs. In 2008 the government launched its ‘Action Plan to Reform the 
Administration of Grant and Contribution Programs’ which ‘commits the government to 
reduce the administrative and reporting burden placed on recipient individuals and 
organisations’ by using a ‘risk-based approach’ that will allow a reduction in 
‘unnecessary red tape’ and a ‘move towards a more risk-tolerant culture’ (Treasury 
Board of Canada, 2008).56 Although measures such as these are a welcome development 
(Graham, 2009) they also tend to reinforce Phillips’ view that the federal agenda for the 
NFP sector ‘is formulated and played out at the level of instrumentalities, not big ideas’ 
(Phillips, 2009:9).57 
In a similar vein, Mulholland and Mendelsohn (2011) point out that ‘Canadian 
governments have made significant efforts over the past two decades to strengthen the 
Canadian economic union, as well as the social union’ but ‘have not expended similar 
effort on the non-profit sector’. They also draw attention to the absence of a federal 
minister – or department – responsible for leadership on NFP sector issues, apart from 
the Canada Revenue Agency whose role is primarily concerned with compliance with 
‘no institutional mandate to be concerned about the sustainability of charities’ (in 
contrast to the creation in some Canadian provinces of a minister responsible for the 
NFP sector) (Mulholland and Mendelsohn, 2011).  
Although there has been no explicit re-framing of the policy discourse around the NFP 
sector in Canada, the Conservative government’s use of language sends clear signals 
about its changed priorities: buzzwords such as ‘capacity building’, ‘voluntary sector’ 
and ‘social economy’ have fallen from grace, possibly owing to associations with the 
policy rhetoric of the previous Liberal administration (Thériault, 2009:76-77). Thériault 
(2009). Others (Graham, 2009, Phillips, 2009) observe an antipathy for ‘advocacy’ – 
especially when undertaken by NFP organisations in receipt of federal government 
funding.  
Laforest observes a tendency in the research literature to look back on the years of the 
VSI and the Accord as a ‘golden age’ for the sector, marked by the re-examination and 
purposeful re-design of the government-NFP sector relationship (Laforest, 2009:155). 
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However, she and others remind us that the drift towards policy indifference had 
already begun before the election of the Harper government (Graham, 2009, Laforest, 
2009, Phillips, 2009). In many respects, ‘the Conservatives have simply picked up 
where the Liberals left off, drifting along the same policy currents (Laforest, 2009:156).  
However, Laforest concludes that a closer consideration of the broad governance 
dynamics that unfolded through the 1990s, from the initial overtures of government to 
the sector (and vice versa), through the VSI and the Accord, have left a lasting imprint 
on the relationship between the state and the voluntary sector (Laforest, 2011:1-4). The 
framework for collaborative action established by the VSI, says Laforest, opened up a 
discourse on policy-making that had material consequences for the empowerment of the 
sector ‘as a legitimate political constituency’ and reaffirmed the validity of its role in 
the policy process (Laforest, 2011:1-4). 
Conclusions 
This chapter reviewed the core features of cross-sector policy frameworks – or 
compacts – and have examined the trajectories of two policy frameworks developed 
ostensibly to put government and the NFP sector on a more even footing – the English 
Compact and the Canadian Accord. These foundational framework agreements 
acknowledged the respective missions, strengths, roles and obligations of government 
and the NFP sector; emphasised their mutual interdependence; and enunciated agreed 
principles, shared values and desired behaviours. It must also be said that the parties to 
these two framework agreements were mindful of the significant asymmetries of 
authority, resources and influence brought to the relationship by each party.  
The English and Canadian frameworks 
The seminal English Compact gave tangible expression to New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ 
policy narrative of joined-up government, horizontal governance and cross-sector 
working – a narrative fashioned in the mid-1990s as a policy counterpoint to the 
neoliberal policy preferences of the Thatcher and Major governments. The English 
Compact was a unique policy innovation whose ‘time had come’, to borrow from 
Kingdon, in that it occurred at the confluence of three process streams in the form of:  
• a growing consensus within influential policy communities (the Demos, Centris and 
Deakin reports) that the neoliberal policy project had reached a point of diminishing 
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returns and a new settlement between the state and the NFP sector would be 
required (the problem stream);  
• a propitious convergence of opinion amongst influential policy entrepreneurs 
(especially Nicholas Deakin and Alun Michael) that a memorandum of 
understanding in the form of concordat or a compact might offer the best way 
forward (the policy stream); and  
• a resurgent Labour Party under Tony Blair that had successfully re-branded itself as 
an attractive alternative to the incumbent Conservative government in the approach 
to the 1997 general election (the politics stream). 
In Canada too the Accord arose out of the confluence of process streams, albeit under 
circumstances that were quite different to those that prevailed in the UK and which set it 
on a different trajectory to the Compact. In Canada, the three process streams took the 
following paths: 
• a fragmented and disjointed NFP sector found itself confronting significant capacity 
deficits in the face of rising demands brought on by large-scale government 
retrenchment, a shift from operational to project-based funding and, a loss of public 
confidence (and an increasing accountability burden) resulting from high-profile 
scandals involving NFP organisations (the problem stream); 
• a loose coalition of national representative organisations, backed by private 
foundation funding, established an eminent panel (the Broadbent Panel) that was 
able to unite a diverse sector around a set of shared issues: the Panel, observing the 
nascence of the English Compact, recommended consideration of similar framework 
agreements in the Canadian context (the policy stream); and 
• a second term Liberal government, having drastically cut spending to eliminate a 
massive structural deficit in its first term and sensing a positive turn in the country’s 
economy, initiated a complementary process (the VSTF) to leverage the momentum 
built by the Broadbent Panel and seized on the notion of an Accord as a centrepiece 
of a broader voluntary sector initiative (the VSI) in the approach to the 2000 general 
election – which it went on to win (the politics stream). 
So, a prima facie case can be made for using Kingdon’s ‘process streams’ to explain the 
emergence of cross-sector framework agreements in the UK and Canada. But how does 
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one account for their quite different trajectories? In the case of the UK, a Compact still 
exists after over a decade, although it is much altered. In Canada, the Accord, while 
nominally still in effect, is a dead letter. Part of the explanation lies in the diligence with 
which each government sought to institutionalise their respective agreements.  
In the UK the Compact formed a centrepiece of a coherent political and policy narrative 
– the ‘Third Way’. In Canada there was really no corresponding narrative. The Accord 
was a ‘quick deliverable’ for the government (Phillips, 2009:23) and a symbolic gesture 
(Brock, 2004a) the implementation of which was substantially delegated to the 
bureaucracy where it quickly went from being policy-oriented to being purely 
operational (Phillips, 2009:22-23). The Canadian Liberal government established no 
equivalent institutional architecture to that created by the Blair Labour government in 
the UK: no Charity Commission, no dedicated Minister for the third sector, no Office 
for the Compact, no Commission for the Compact, no Compact Voice and no 
framework for promoting compacts at other levels of government. Although some of 
these have undergone transformation, or have been disestablished (the Commission for 
the Compact was abolished in 2011), they were nevertheless important to winning 
cross-party acceptance of a place for the NFP sector near the policy centre. 
Johnston explains that the inability of the Canadian NFP sector to become 
institutionally embedded was in part attributable to a failure on the part of the sector to 
engage across party lines with elected officials who often have a superior understand of 
the NFP sector than do professional public servants (Johnston, 2013:24-25). In addition, 
Johnston – who served as Co-Chair of the Joint Co-ordinating Committee of the 
Voluntary Sector Initiative – comments that voluntary sector participants in the VSI 
were always the ‘junior partners’ to their colleagues in the federal bureaucracy. He goes 
on to say that ‘federal VSI participants often felt and acted like junior partners to 
Finance’ to who they ‘almost always deferred’ in any difference of opinion (Johnston, 
2013:26). 
In a manner reminiscent of ‘garbage can decision-making’, the Accord might be seen as 
a ‘solution looking for a problem’. The Liberal governments under Chrétien and Martin 
had neither mapped out a coherent political narrative, nor established the institutional 
architecture to accommodate the NFP sector nearer the centre of policy discourse – a 
practice continued under the Harper Conservative government (Graham, 2009, Laforest, 
2009, Phillips, 2009). In this respect the Canadian experience was quite unlike that of 
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the UK where the NFP sector has been ‘decontested’ and ‘mainstreamed’ (to use 
Kendall’s terms (2000)) to the point that even Labour’s Conservative successors are 
obliged to recognise it as a pillar in the British polity, albeit in the service of a new 
overarching Big Society narrative (Phillips, 2009, Kendall, 2010).  
Canadian Conservatives meanwhile cleave to a more laissez-faire regime that, whilst 
mindful of the role played by the NFP sector in achieving the Conservative vision of 
smaller, decentralised and more distributed government, nevertheless does not 
acknowledge any role for government in assuring the sustainability of the sector 
(Graham, 2009). It might be added that Conservative governments in both Britain and 
Canada have engaged in quite deliberate re-branding through a substitution of the policy 
rhetorics employed by previous regimes (Thériault, 2009, Taylor, 2012b).  
The illusion of NFP sector coherence 
It is important to note that in both countries sustaining a discourse around a framework 
agreement required broad acceptance of the notion that a coherent NFP sector exists. 
Observers of Britain and Canada remark that the notion of an NFP, voluntary or ‘third’ 
sector is both relatively new (Kendall, 2000, Phillips, 2009) and highly contested 
(Mulholland, 2011). Diversity is a defining characteristic of the NFP sector and claims 
by peak or umbrella organisations to represent the views of the sector as a whole are 
rightly treated with caution (Casey and Dalton, 2006:33). The sector is not monolithic: 
it is comprised of thousands of autonomous organisations carrying out a wide variety of 
functions and serving multiple constituencies. The sector is horizontally segmented (by 
function, operational model, location and industry grouping) and vertically segmented 
(by size, capacity, dependence on volunteers, geographic reach and/or legal status). 
Governments cannot, of course, engage directly with every NFP organisation and must 
therefore rely on intermediary organisations to serve as interlocutors for the sector as a 
whole. The absence of formal representative structures in the NFP sectors in Anglo-
Saxon countries means that, in general, intermediary organisations might have authority 
to speak on behalf of a member base representing only a fraction of a much larger 
sector. There is a risk, therefore, that large parts of a notional ‘NFP sector’ might 
perceive compacts as the projects of policy elites in government and the sector with 
which they have little sense of connection or attachment (Casey et al., 2008a:3). 
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Furthermore, the greater the distance between the ‘coalface’ and the compact, the more 
tenuous might be any sense of connection with the policy framework. 
Still, it must be acknowledged that however disparate the actors, organisations, causes 
and values the perception of the NFP sector as a ‘decontested’ institutional space for the 
purpose of policy-making has been an important by-product of the discourses around 
compacts (Kendall, 2010). The reconceptualisation of the sector as a ‘policy space’ 
empowered and galvanised the NFP sectors in the UK and in Canada. However, while 
the sector in England has secured a place ‘in the [policy] tent’ (Kendall, 2010), national 
intermediary organisations in Canada appear to have struggled to achieve political 
‘standing’ with government (Phillips, 2009). Furthermore, as Johnston observes, the 
fault lines in Canada’s ‘voluntary sector’ impeded the articulation of a compelling 
‘unifying narrative’ (Johnston, 2013:27). 
Compacts and cross-boundary governance 
Compacts are but one response to changing relations between state and civil society. In 
Anglo-Saxon countries such as the UK and Canada they have been advanced as one 
means for resolving a range of externalities broadly associated with aspects of ‘new 
public management’. The delegation by governments of statutory service delivery 
functions via contracts to non-state actors has led to demands for cross-boundary 
management through heterogeneous and diffuse forms of governance (Stewart, 
2007:75). It can be argued that the emergence of the ‘contract state’ has acted as a 
catalyst for cooperative and collegial endeavour on the part of state and non-state actors 
(Stewart, 2007:75, 82). However, it is also widely acknowledged that conflict over 
values, norms, practices, expectations and operating logics is also a defining feature of 
cross-boundary governance (Heyse, 2006, Stewart, 2007, Brock, 2008). Furthermore, 
path-dependent policy legacies have not only accentuated the potential for conflict over 
values and priorities, their isomorphic effects have served to blunt reform and constrain 
policy actors (Kendall, 2003, Brock, 2008).  
Phillips observes that government-NFP sector relationships in a number of countries 
exhibit ‘considerable consistency’ (Phillips, 2003b:18), however, this ‘does not imply 
an inevitable convergence of institutional forms, processes or regulatory regimes’: 
... the specific configuration of existing relationships in any given 
jurisdiction depends on the structure and strategies of both government 
and the voluntary sector and the historical patterns of relationships 
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between the two. An experiment transplanted from one country to another 
cannot be necessarily be expected to take root, nor to produce positive 
results (Phillips, 2003b:18-19).  
Also, as both the UK and Canadian examples suggest, one cannot underestimate the 
complexity and difficulty of giving practical effect to framework agreements that are 
substantially ‘aspirational’ and ‘normative’ in nature (Plowden, 2003). And as Lindquist 
observes, it is one thing to design and launch new regimes for NFP sector-government 
cooperation/collaboration – it is quite another to work under them (Lindquist, 
2008:164). Lindquist goes on to suggest that we need to know how such frameworks 
mature ‘over a decade or two’ and how long it takes for demonstrable cultural change to 
occur within the public and NFP sectors (Lindquist, 2008:164).  
Brock for one, considers that the Canadian Accord and the VSI fell well short of 
achieving a genuine paradigm shift in the relationship between the federal government 
and the Canadian NFP sector. She concedes nevertheless that attitudinal and 
behavioural shifts have occurred, and these will provide the foundation for ‘inexorable’ 
albeit unpredictable change. Although Brock (2004b, a, 2008) maintains that change has 
occurred only at the margins of policy and more substantive – but politically and 
institutionally difficult – reform options were avoided, she concludes that: 
... smaller changes may be important in effecting real change in the longer 
term – it may just not be as the original policy entrepreneurs had hoped 
and expected. The state rolls on, transforming itself and its partners in the 
process. (Brock, 2008:22)  
As Laforest (2011) suggests, anyone scanning the Canadian institutional landscape for 
tangible evidence that the VSI or the Accord left a lasting mark might be tempted to 
conclude that these initiatives made little long-term impact. The Accord has been all but 
forgotten and the attitude of government towards the sector appears to hover somewhere 
between laissez-faire paternalism and neoliberal instrumentalism. However, the lasting 
impact of the VSI and the Accord, says Laforest, has been to drive cultural 
transformation of the sector through the institutionalisation of norms and practices that 
affect the sector’s capacity to exercise political agency (Laforest, 2011:71-72). While 
the Canadian NFP sector is at something of a stand-off with the current federal 
government, the realisation of its political agency – awakened by the VSI – is much in 
evidence at the sub-national level where governments appear to be alive to their own 
dependence upon the social economy (Graham, 2009, Thériault, 2009, Elson, 2012).58 
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Compacts as a centre-left policy project 
As will be discussed at greater length in this thesis, the majority of formal, deliberate 
policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation in Australia (and New Zealand) have 
come about under centre-left governments (see Figure 4.1). The same is true for the 
United Kingdom (under Blair) and Canada (under Chrétien).59 Compacts and similar 
framework documents are often cast within a ‘Third Way’ political framing and 
presented as a necessary correction of the excesses of the contract culture engendered 
by neoliberal approaches to governance (White, 2006) – what Fyfe refers to as ‘neo-
communitarianism’ (Fyfe, 2005).60  
Although social democratic political narratives often rail against the excesses of 
neoliberalism, parties of the left have themselves been progressively ‘neoliberalised’ 
through their acceptance of the constraints of economic globalisation and their embrace 
of ‘market friendly’ policy mixes (Mudge, 2008:721-722, Mudge, 2011:340). The 
perceived gaps between the policy rhetoric and the realpolitik of policy implementation 
can, therefore, give rise to tensions between government and its NFP sector partners 
even when their intentions and priorities are in broad alignment. 
Because the constituencies of centre-left political parties tend to overlap with those of 
the union movement, social movement organisations and the broad social welfare 
sector, one might expect a natural alliance to exist between government and the NFP 
sector around core social policy issues such as housing, workforce participation, 
education, health, social security and community services. However, the reality might 
be more accurately characterised as an uncomfortable symbiosis. NFP sector 
organisations might be junior partners in terms of their influence and market power, but 
they are not inclined towards subservience to government and are highly protective of 
their core values. Parts of the NFP sector define their mission in terms of ‘speaking 
truth to power’ and in so doing tend to cast government and the public sector in the role 
of adversaries.  
Moreover, in ideological terms NFP organisations span the political spectrum, and it 
cannot be assumed that all necessarily share in the reformist social democratic project 
championed by centre-left political parties. Neither might socially conservative 
charitable organisations wholly share the ‘progressive’ rights-based agendas of social 
movement organisations, for example (a potent example is the issue of same-sex 
marriage) and the values of their members might be more aligned to the ‘traditional’ 
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values of conservative centre-right parties. In addition, more conservative, established 
organisations – particularly service providing organisations – might resent government 
intrusion in the form of greater regulation, or policies that make it easier for unions to 
organise their labour force.  
These are the kinds of tensions that might be exploited by centre-right political parties 
to re-vision framework agreements in the service of a conservative social policy agenda. 
As has been seen in England with the Cameron coalition government’s ‘Big Society’ 
agenda (see Chapter Four) the direction of reform under a conservative government 
might be away from an enhanced integration of the state and the NFP sectors back 
towards a settlement that emphasises the separate functions of the state and the sector. 
Such a formulation might reinforce the role of the state as a commissioner and funder of 
prescribed public services, and the role of the NFP sector as a front-line provider in a 
contestable mixed economy of service delivery that favours non-state actors. 
Framework agreements can still set out rules of engagement, but the rhetorics of 
partnership might be significantly diminished. 
Finally, as with the purchaser-provider relationship at the service level, compacts or 
similar policy instruments at the industry or sector level require trust to be effective: 
trust that the parties will say what they mean, and do what they say. However, given the 
turbulent nature of politics and public administration, the foundations of trust often rest 
on shifting sands. Alford notes that ‘environmental turbulence’ can constrain and 
damage the development of trust between government and its NFP sector partners 
(Alford, 2002). As a government’s priorities shift in response to political events; as new 
problems arise; as the influence exerted by interest groups waxes and wanes; or as the 
public mood changes, electoral survival figures more powerfully than policy purity in a 
government’s decision-making. Policy changes, administrative reorganisations and 
failures to honour commitments can have corrosive effects on trust – particularly for 
values-based NFP organisations (Alford, 2002). 
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Chapter Five – Sub-national Compacts in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland  
Devolving the ‘Third Way’ 
The devolution of governance by Westminster through the establishment of elected 
‘national’ assemblies in the constituent countries of Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland was an important component of the Blair government’s ‘horizontalist’ agenda. 
Jeffrey et al. describe devolution as ‘one of the most radical and important set of 
reforms undertaken by the 1997 Labour government’ and neatly encapsulate the 
government’s motivations as follows: 
The creation of the Northern Ireland Assembly, Scottish Parliament and 
National Assembly for Wales amounted to a decentralisation of power 
unlikely to be overturned by any future UK government. Devolution had 
multiple rationales. On the one hand it was an expression of Scottish and 
Welsh identity, creating elected institutions to embody the difference of 
those nations and to recognise them formally as components of the UK’s 
multi-national state. On the other it was a sort of insurance policy, 
providing protection against rule by a Westminster government with little 
mandate in those nations. In Northern Ireland the narrative was one of 
building a sustainable peace through locally accountable, cross-
community institutions (Jeffery et al., 2010:9). 
Devolution of formal political and legislative power was also accompanied by the 
devolution of the Blair government’s ‘Third Way’ policy approach to cross-sector 
cooperation. Accordingly, separate compact documents were developed by the central 
government bodies that, prior to devolution, were responsible for administering affairs 
in the devolved jurisdictions – the former Scottish and Welsh Offices61 and the Northern 
Ireland Office (Morison, 2000, Murdock, 2005, Alcock, 2009, 2012).  
These foundation policy documents were imbued with the ethos of New Labour politics 
and policy with their emphasis on horizontalism and engagement with civil society 
(Alcock, 2009:2-3). It was expected that they would initiate the ‘beginning of a process 
of sustained dialogue between government and voluntary and community organisations’ 
which, it was hoped, would lead to ‘the opening up of a new space between the state 
and civil society’ (Morison, 2000:119).  
Devolution presented an historic opportunity for devolved governments and legislatures 
to forge new relationships with their respective NFP sectors – relationships shaped less 
by ‘received policy’ from Westminster, and more by accommodations between new and 
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evolving traditions of governance, the challenge of ‘nation building’, and the legacy of 
associational and voluntary action in the three jurisdictions (Acheson, 2009, Burt and 
Taylor, 2009, Day, 2009a).62  
Whereas Westminster would retain responsibility for defence, foreign policy and social 
security, responsibility for significant areas of social policy development were devolved 
to the new Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland governments, including responsibility 
for NFP sector development and support (Alcock, 2012:219-220). Not only has NFP 
sector policy been developing independently of Westminster in each devolved 
jurisdiction since 2000 (excepting for periods of direct rule in Northern Ireland), the 
policy regimes in each jurisdiction have also been shaped by distinct historical legacies 
that pre-date formal political devolution (Alcock, 2012:220).  
Intermediary organisations have long represented the interests of the NFP sector and its 
many constituencies to central and local government in each of the four constituent 
countries of the UK. Just as the NCVO has since 1919 represented the interests of the 
voluntary sector in England, its sister organisations, the Scottish Council of Voluntary 
Organisations (SCVO, founded in 1943), the Welsh Council of Voluntary Action 
(WCVA, founded in 1934) and the Northern Ireland Council of Voluntary Action 
(NICVA established in 1938), along with other diverse representative organisations, 
have performed an important intermediary role.  
The size and composition of the NFP sectors in each of the devolved jurisdictions differ 
in absolute and per capita terms.63 Also, dependence on statutory income as a share of 
total income is on average higher for NFP organisations in in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland than for the UK as a whole.64 Although one cannot assume that the 
politics and the policies concerning the NFP sector prevailing in England extend to 
Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland (Alcock, 2012:219-220), common issues/themes 
arise in all four countries: financial resources, service delivery contracts, charity law, 
social enterprise/social economy, support for umbrella organisations, work with hard-to-
reach groups, specialist and innovative practice and volunteering (Birrell, 2009:75-76).  
The Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland compacts were not replicas of the English 
Compact (Good, 2001, Birrell, 2009:75). To some degree each reflected the territorial 
and administrative differentiation that existed prior to devolution and the cultures of the 
Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Offices which had exercised a degree of policy 
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autonomy (Jeffery and Wincott, 2006, Mitchell, 2006).65 As Mitchell observes, ‘The 
state was centralized but not uniform’: 
Each territorial department operated in much the same way as other 
spending departments of central government, arguing the case for its 
clients, but the clients were the component nations of the state in the case 
of the territorial departments. A degree of policy consistency was ensured 
through the system of party government, but this was attenuated where 
policy was articulated through distinct institutions operating within 
distinct policy communities. (Mitchell, 2006:158).  
This policy autonomy is reflected in the compacts themselves (see Appendix 3, Figure 
A3.1), which were developed through consultative processes unique to each jurisdiction 
and involving representatives of sub-national intermediary organisations and officials 
from the Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Ireland offices (there is no equivalent territorial 
department for England). 
In their first iteration While the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland compacts were 
effectively agreements between the NFP sector and central government represented by 
the Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. At their inception in 
1998 devolution had yet to be approved at a referendum and the character of the 
relationship between any devolved administrations and the sector was as yet unknown. 
They were always intended to be transitional: they were not binding statutory 
instruments and were intended to be submitted for ratification by the elected assemblies 
in each jurisdiction once formed. 
Like the English Compact, the compacts in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland took 
the form of a memorandum of understanding about the nature of relations between 
government and the voluntary and community sector, intended to provide ‘a general 
framework and an enabling mechanism to enhance the relationship between 
Government and the sector’ (Home Department, 2009). It was expected that the four 
compacts would collectively provide ‘a framework for national government/ voluntary 
sector relationships across the UK’ (Scottish Executive, 2003b).  
It is useful to reflect on the importance assigned to the NFP sector in the policy 
narratives of the governing parties and coalitions in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. Scotland and Wales, for example, have elected Labour-led minority 
governments (and, it must be noted, for much of the last decade Northern Ireland was 
under the direct administration of a Labour government in Westminster) (Alcock, 
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2012:228,230). It might be expected, therefore, that the ‘received’ policy prescriptions 
from a Labour national government would have fallen on fertile ground. 
It can be argued that devolution has accentuated the territorial differentiation that 
already existed in the devolved jurisdictions. The influence of ‘nationalist’ political 
parties in Scotland (where the SNP leads a majority government) and in Wales (where 
the 2007 elections saw nationalist parties enter government for the first time) has 
increased the likelihood of policy divergence (Jeffery et al., 2010:6). According to 
Jeffery et al. both countries display a strong attachment to the idea of state intervention 
– a direct contrast with the ‘political class in England [which] appears to favour market-
based approaches in public services’ (Jeffery et al., 2010:24), an observation echoed by 
Alcock (2012:232) and by Morison (2001)in the case of Northern Ireland. Jeffrey et al. 
suggest that the potential for policy divergence from Westminster will be even greater 
under a Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government (Jeffery et al., 2010:6).  
In Northern Ireland progress towards devolved government has been complicated by the 
often bitter divide between Unionist and Republican movements. A fully elected 
Northern Ireland Assembly has been in place only since 2007 and the last two Assembly 
elections have delivered a governing Executive containing an interesting blend of 
political parties spanning the width of the political spectrum. Although Northern Ireland 
has tended, historically, to align its policies with those of Westminster (Jeffery et al., 
2010:25), the new Assembly government has begun to chart its own path and has made 
efforts to reach out to the voluntary sector as a valued partner for peace and 
reconstruction (Acheson et al., 2006, 2007, Jeffery et al., 2010). 
As a final note, there has been little in the way of systematic comparative research on 
the impacts of devolution on the development of social policy in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland (Vincent and Harrow, 2005, Murdock, 2006, Zimmeck et al., 2011:12, 
Alcock, 2012:220). The following discussion examines each case through a ‘process 
streams lens’. However, this is not so much to cast light on why each jurisdiction had a 
compact – the reasons for that are known inasmuch as the English, Scottish, Welsh and 
Northern Ireland compacts all originate in the Blair government’s ‘Third Way’ 
discourse. Rather, a process streams analysis offers some insight into the different  
directions taken by the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. 
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Figure 5.1 – Territorial governance under the Conservatives – 1979-1997 
Scotland Wales Northern Ireland (NI) 
Although governed centrally, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland exhibit territorial differentiation of 
policy and administration within the UK.  
Wales is governed within an interlocking ’England and Wales’ framework, hence exhibits less policy and 
administrative differentiation than either Scotland or Northern Ireland.  
Under Conservative governments, the NFP sectors throughout the UK are called upon to engage in 
frontline service delivery. Government policy is portrayed as ‘rolling back the state’ and NFP organisations 
are expected to delivery services under contract within contestable markets. NFP sectors in all three 
jurisdictions have a strong associational basis. 
There is little investment in sector capability or capacity-building, little commitment to regulatory reform, 
and few opportunities for sector input into social policy development or service delivery design. 
Government dependence on NFP service providers increases, as does sector dependence on income 
from contracting. However, stringent funding rules impose burdensome overheads on NFP providers and 
short-term contracts offer little in the way of certainty.  
A 1979 referendum falls just 
short of approving the 
establishment of a devolved 
deliberative assembly for 
Scotland.  
The Scottish Office (est. 1885) is 
the main sub-state institution for 
the delivery of policy and 
services.  
Scottish NFP sector suffers both 
from a lack of political salience 
and an inadequate, confusing 
and burdensome regulatory 
regime. 
Central government is 
geographically remote from the 
concerns of the sector and 
communities. 
A 1979 referendum fails to gain 
support for the establishment of 
a Welsh Assembly (79.4% 
against). 
The Welsh Office (est. 1964) is 
the main sub-state institution for 
the delivery of policy and 
services.  
NFP sector in Wales faces 
similar issues to counterparts in 
Scotland and England 
(externalities associated with 
contracting, lack of policy 
engagement, government 
paternalism, etc.).  
A Northern Ireland Assembly is 
established in 1982, but 
collapses in 1986, with ‘direct 
rule’ imposed by Westminster. 
The Northern Ireland Office 
(NIO, est. 1972) is the main sub-
state institution for the delivery 
of policy and services utilising a 
separate civil service structure 
(est. 1921).  
NFP sector in Northern Ireland is 
not as involved in service 
delivery as is the case in 
England, Scotland or Wales. 
Inter-communal conflict (‘the 
troubles’) divides the community 
along religious/political lines. 
Although socially conservative 
values predominate, Northern 
Ireland has a history of 
extensive state provision. 
Although there is already in place a degree of administrative 
devolution in the form of the Scottish and Welsh offices, the Labour 
opposition promises Scotland and Wales a referendum on 
devolution. 
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Figure 5.2 – Devolution & consolidation under Blair’s ‘Third Way’ – 1997-2003 
Scotland Wales Northern Ireland (NI) 
Devolution approved in 1997 
referendum by a large majority 
(74.3%). 
Scotland Act 1998 establishes a 
devolved Scottish Parliament 
with primary law-making powers.  
1998 Scottish Compact issued 
by The Scottish Office. 
A revised 2003 Scottish 
Compact endorsed by the 
Scottish Executive. 
Devolution approved in 1997 
referendum by a bare majority 
(50.3%).  
Government of Wales Act 1998 
establishes a National Assembly 
for Wales, but without primary 
law-making powers.  
1998 Welsh Compact issued by 
the Secretary of State for Wales. 
Voluntary Sector Scheme (VSS) 
adopted in 2000 as required by 
the Government of Wales Act 
1998. 
1998 Belfast Agreement (Good 
Friday Agreement) approved at 
referendum, provides basis for 
power-sharing by an elected NI 
Assembly 
1998 ‘Northern Ireland’ Compact 
issued by the Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland. 
Government departments are 
established in 1998 to administer 
devolved or transferred matters. 
Full powers devolved to NI 
Assembly in December 1999, 
but Assembly suspended from 
February-May 2000. 
Northern Ireland Office (NIO) 
resumes administrative and 
policy responsibility in the 
province, but working through 
new departmental structures. 
Social policy and social services predominate among devolved 
responsibilities, and new policy and service delivery structures are 
established. Westminster retains responsibility for a range of 
‘reserved matters’. 
New administrative structures are initially lacking in policy capacity 
and capability, but there is gradual progress towards more ‘joined-up’ 
and adaptive governance.  
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Figure 5.3 – Post devolution settlement & ‘home grown’ governance – 2003-present66 
Scotland Wales Northern Ireland (NI) 
Emergence of distinctive social 
policy and underpinning 
narratives, particularly around 
social enterprise approaches. 
Increased proximity of 
government brings the NFP 
sector closer to the centre of 
decision-making. 
The Scottish Compact is de-
emphasised as a primary policy 
framework in favour of an 
enhanced emphasis on the 
social economy and a 2009 
‘Joint Statement on the 
Relationship at Local level 
between Government and the 
Third Sector’. 
Since devolution Scotland has 
consistently elected centre-left 
Labour or Scottish National Party 
(SNP) dominated governments 
and in 2011 the SNP became 
the first party to govern with an 
absolute majority. 
Scottish government initiates a 
review of public sector in 
response to budget cuts 
imposed by the Cameron 
Coalition UK government 
(elected in 2010). 
The SNP government 
announces its intention to hold a 
referendum on Scottish 
Independence in 2014. 
Government of Wales Act 2006 
provides for separation of 
executive and legislature.  
VSS continues to be the primary 
vehicle for third sector-
government engagement and 
Wales continues to be the only 
jurisdiction whose cross-sector 
policy framework has a statutory 
basis.  
Evidence of increased scope 
and extent of social policy 
initiatives together with 
imaginative use of instruments to 
compensate for lack of primary 
powers.  
The NFP sector continues to be 
a valued ‘social partner’ and also 
plays a role in promoting Welsh 
identity. 
A 2011 referendum approves 
primary law-making powers for 
the Welsh Assembly. 
Since devolution Wales has 
consistently elected Labour 
dominated governments. 
Welsh government and the 
sector acknowledge challenges 
presented by budgetary cuts 
imposed by the Cameron 
Coalition UK government 
(elected in 2010). 
NI Assembly suspended and its 
functions revert to the NIO from 
October 2002 – May 2007. 
Transitional Assembly 
established in 2006 as provided 
for under Northern Ireland Act 
2006. 
Between 2002-2007 the primary 
relationship between the NFP 
sector and the state is with the 
Labour central government via 
the NIO. 
The NIO and the Department of 
Social Development pursue a 
number of practical measures to 
improve sector-government 
coordination.  
In 2011, the NI government 
approves a ‘Concordat’ with the 
sector to replace the 1998 
compact. 
The first Concordat Annual 
Report (2012) recommits 
government and the sector 
working together as a strategic 
social partnership. 
The NFP sector is not regarded 
primarily as an alternative 
service provider, but also plays a 
valued role in the overall peace 
initiative by bridging 
communities. 
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The Scottish Compact in context 
As with the English Compact and other ‘national’ compacts in Wales and Northern 
Ireland, the Scottish Compact (Scottish Executive, 2003b) came about as a result of 
commitments made by the Labour Party when in opposition (Scottish Executive, 
2003c:16). The Scottish Compact commenced in 1998, prior to the establishment in 
1999 of the devolved Scottish Parliament under the terms of the Scotland Act 1998.  
Like the English Compact, it was a non-legislative policy document and took the form 
of an agreement between all government departments, non-departmental public bodies 
(NDPBs) and government agencies in Scotland (Scottish Executive, 2003c:16). An 
initial assessment of the Scottish Compact was undertaken in 2001 followed by a formal 
review in 2002, ‘with a particular focus on identifying ways in which it might be more 
effectively implemented by both the Executive and the voluntary sector’ (Scottish 
Executive, 2004b:5). The Scottish Compact, revised in 2003, enunciated principles 
similar to those contained in the English Compact (Figure 5.4).  
 
The Scottish Compact was also supported by the publication of four Good Practice 
Guides on funding, consultation, partnership and ‘proofing’ the impact of policies and 
procedures on voluntary and community organisation and volunteering.67 However, a 
‘Scottish Compact Baseline Review’ commissioned in 2003 (Scottish Executive, 2003c) 
Figure 5.4 – The Aims of the 2004 Scottish Compact 
The Scottish Compact, revised in 2004, aims to:  
• strengthen the relationship between the Executive and the voluntary sector 
• extend opportunities for the voluntary sector’s members, supporters and users to contribute 
their experience and ideas to the development and implementation of public the commission 
responded 
• make the policies and practice developed by the Scottish Executive, its Agencies and NDPBs, 
including NHS Boards, more responsive to the potential and needs of the voluntary sector 
• enable voluntary organisations to communicate more effectively to the Executive, the needs of 
their users and wider constituencies 
• extend the opportunities to mobilise the voluntary sector behind Executive programmes when 
these coincide with the objectives of voluntary organisations 
• increase understanding of how the Executive and the voluntary sector work 
• generate evidence and information on the value and impact of the work of the Executive and 
of the voluntary sector, and inform longer-term planning and strategic thinking (Scottish 
Executive, 2003b) 
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observed that, despite the considerable detail contained in the Guides, they were 
‘addressed solely to the Executive’:  
There is no mention of what the obligations of the sector in delivering, 
what is theoretically, a partnership agreement involving commitments on 
both sides, are to be. Unlike the Compact document therefore the Guides 
are asymmetrical (Scottish Executive, 2003c:17). 
A Compact Review Group established in 2004 to consider the ‘continued relevance’ of 
the Scottish Compact found ‘little support for the abolition or wholesale replacement of 
the Compact’ (Scottish Executive, 2004b:9). The review concluded that the compact 
‘identified a valuable set of principles to guide the Executive and voluntary sector 
relationship’ but recommended against ‘turning the principles it contained into a rigid 
rulebook governing the behaviours of both parties’ (Scottish Executive, 2004b:9). The 
review did recommend ‘some strengthening and updating of the text to reflect renewed 
commitment to achieving an open and participative working relationship between the 
Executive and the voluntary sector in Scotland and to demonstrate the current climate 
since devolution’ (Scottish Executive, 2004b:9).  
The Review Group concluded that, over the longer term, ‘the aim should be for 
Compact principles and practice to be adopted as part of the accepted everyday culture 
within the Executive and the voluntary sector’, noting that this would ‘require regular 
profiling, promotion of benefits and the sharing of best practice’ (Scottish Executive, 
2004b:9). In furtherance of this aim the Compact Review Group proposed a three-year 
‘plan of action’ (see Appendix 3, Figure A3.2) (Scottish Executive, 2004b:9). 
The Scottish Compact – the problem stream 
In pre-devolution Scotland relations between the Scottish NFP sector and central 
government were infrequent and distant. In part, this was a consequence of geographical 
distance between Scotland and seat of decision-making in Westminster (Fyfe et al., 
2006, Osborne and Super, 2010). It was also a consequence of the political and social 
distance between Scotland and England, which was accentuated during the period of the 
Thatcher government (McCrone, 2001). 
As in England, where the Commission on the Future of the Voluntary Sector (the 
Deakin Commission) provided the early intellectual and policy rationale for a new 
settlement with government (Deakin, 1996), in Scotland an independent ‘Commission 
on the Future of the Voluntary Sector in Scotland’ (the Kemp Commission) was 
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established in November 1995. Its task was to review public policy options in relation to 
the Scottish voluntary sector (Bamford, 1997:19, Dacombe and Bach, 2009).68  
The Kemp Commission identified and made recommendations in relation to a number 
of structural and systemic problems affecting the voluntary sector in Scotland, such as:  
• insecurity of funding, underfunding, funding that is too short-term and the difficulty 
of attracting core funding;  
• the shift from public sector providers to NFP and private sector providers, the 
sector’s growing dependence on contracts and the sector’s concerns about the 
implications of contracting for traditional sector qualities of responsiveness, 
independence and innovation;  
• the absence of avenues for the sector to ‘punch its weight’ with central government;  
• the need to harmonise the statutory framework concerning the legal status, taxation 
and accountability obligations of charities; and  
• a framework of relations between government and representative bodies that was 
‘confused and illogical’ (Bamford, 1997).  
The Kemp Commission also noted that despite its pervasive and growing role in 
Scottish society, the sector suffered from ‘low political saliency’, ‘little political 
leverage’, and ‘imperfect’ public confidence (Kemp, 1997:3). In addition, the regulatory 
regime in which it operated was ‘inadequate, confusing and burdensome’ (Kemp, 
1997:3-4). Although the shift towards purchase-of-service contracting presented the 
sector with major opportunities, Kemp considered that NFP organisations were being 
offered ‘a deteriorating bargain’ (Kemp, 1997:4). 
Because the commission’s report was written before either the election of the Blair 
Labour government or the 1997 referendum vote in favour of the establishment of a 
devolved Scottish assembly, it was challenged to devise recommendations that could be 
acted upon whatever constitutional arrangements might prevail (Bamford, 1997): 
Its recommendations on charity regulation, for example, could be 
legislated for either by a Westminster parliament or by a Scottish one. 
This position seemed the most logical one to take: despite opinion poll 
findings, no-one wished to take a change of government, or the setting up 
of a Scottish parliament, for granted. It also made it easier for the 
commission to agree matters, since its membership included supporters 
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and opponents of constitutional change, with varying degrees of 
confidence in a Labour Government's ability to deliver (Bamford, 1997). 
Unlike the Deakin Commission, however, the report produced by the Scottish 
commission did not propose a compact: rather, it proposed structures that would accord 
the Scottish voluntary sector a role in policy-making commensurate with its 
contribution to Scottish society, and ensure full consultation by the (then) Scottish 
Office in the development and implementation of new policies (Bamford, 1997).  
It was in fact the commission’s chief interlocutor with central government, the former 
Scottish Office, that responded with a commitment to draw up an agreement in the form 
of a compact to ‘set out the respective roles and responsibilities of the government and 
voluntary organisations’ (Bamford, 1997). Taking into account the fact that the Deakin 
Commission reported before its Scottish counterpart, and noting that Nicholas Deakin 
and Labour MP Alun Michael had canvassed the idea of a ‘concordat’ prior to the 
election of the Blair Labour government, it seems likely that the response of the Scottish 
Office was predicated on an expectation that Labour had already formed the intention to 
apply the compact formula in the devolved jurisdictions. 
Many commentators consider that the relationship between the Scottish NFP sector and 
the Scottish government has improved noticeably since devolution; however, it has not 
been plain sailing (Birrell, 2009, Burt and Taylor, 2009, Alcock, 2012). Historically, the 
NFP sector in Scotland had been hampered by geographical distance from central 
government and by the dominant position of the public sector (Birrell, 2009:76, Alcock, 
2012:227). Although devolution has given rise to a new discourse of cross-sector 
cooperation (Burt and Taylor, 2009, Alcock, 2012) new tensions have emerged around 
issues of sector independence, the fitness for purpose of NFP sector service providers, 
and the representativeness of intermediary organisations (Birrell, 2009, Burt and Taylor, 
2009). The sector is also challenged to keep pace with major public sector reform 
initiatives and manage the impacts of economic austerity measures originating in 
Westminster. 
The Scottish Compact – the policy stream 
The Scottish Compact was initially a product of the UK central government and, like 
the English Compact, was designed to remedy problems associated with past 
Conservative administrations. As has been observed, the Kemp Commission was very 
mindful of the Deakin Commission’s deliberations. And while Kemp enunciated a set of 
  124 
problems pertaining to the relationship between the sector and central government, his 
report stopped short of recommending a concordat because, of course, the political 
future of Scotland was as yet unknown. Relations between the sector and any future 
Scottish administration would need to be worked out post-devolution.  
That the Scottish Office proposed a compact for Scotland (as indeed did the Welsh and 
Northern Ireland Offices for their respective jurisdictions) is suggestive of the Blair 
government’s determination to foster cross-sector engagement across the UK. The 
Scottish Compact was not a home-grown ‘Scottish’ solution, although it was hoped that 
the framework would be endorsed by a future Scottish administration.  
Although the Scottish Compact provided a viable platform for the initiation of relations 
between the NFP sector and the new Scottish Executive, its true value resided in the 
process of compact-implementation and the attendant opportunities for mutual 
understanding, building trust and gaining mutual respect (Burt and Taylor, 2009:91). 
With the seat of government now residing in Edinburgh (as opposed to Whitehall) 
access to decision-makers by intermediary organisations such as the SCVO was 
substantially enhanced.69 Fyfe et al. (2006:638) have suggested that ‘the third sector is 
clearly back in the political limelight’ – a view supported by Osborne and Super (2010) 
who cite evidence that the sector enjoys far better relations with the Scottish 
government than existed pre-devolution with Westminster.  
From around 2006 references to the Scottish Compact disappeared from government 
policy documents.70 In its place was a new emphasis on ‘social enterprise’ and strategies 
aimed at ‘opening markets for the third sector, especially those key markets in the 
public sector’ (Scottish Government, 2008b).71 This reflected policy thinking that had 
been in train since 2003 when the Scottish Executive clearly signalled its desire to 
realise a social return on the government’s investment in the voluntary sector (Scottish 
Executive, 2003a). Moreover, it was a policy direction developed in concert with local 
government and intermediary organisations in the NFP sector. 
The Scottish Compact – the politics stream  
Hearn describes the character of Scottish political culture as ‘a unique conjunction of a 
strong, quasi-state-like civil society and strong, intertwined public traditions of 
socialism, liberal reformism and politico-religious resistance to the state’ (Hearn, 
2000:132). The Scottish polity is a ‘negotiated order’ in which policy networks are able 
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to influence bargaining and policy outcomes (Moore and Booth, 1989, McCrone, 
2001:117). As for formal political structures, the diversity of parties in the Scottish 
Parliament, coupled with mixed member proportional representation72, means that it is 
difficult for one political party to achieve an outright majority of seats, thus 
necessitating the formation of governing coalitions (Murdock, 2005:5-6).  
Centre-left parties, governing either in coalition or as a minority government, have 
dominated the four sessions of the Scottish Parliament since devolution in 1999. In the 
two Parliamentary sessions from 1999-2003 and 2003-2007 government was formed by 
a Labour/Liberal Democrat coalition and, from 2007-2011, by the minority Scottish 
National Party (SNP) governing under the terms of a ‘cooperation agreement’73 with the 
Scottish Green Party (BBC, 2007b). In the Scottish parliamentary election held on 5 
May 2011, however, the SNP obtained an outright majority, winning 69 out of 129 seats 
in the Scottish (House of Commons Library, 2011c).74  
Devolution saw the Scottish NFP sector go from ‘poor relation’ to trusted and valued 
partner (Bamford, 1997). The immediate post-devolution political climate – in which 
New Labour governed nationally and Scottish Labour led in the Scottish Parliament – 
favoured a more politically active NFP sector (Burt and Taylor, 2002:92-93). The SNP, 
modernised and repositioned in the early 1990s as a centre-left social democratic party 
(Black, 2012), has given every indication that it intends to bring a ‘social partnership 
approach’ to the task of governing (Scottish National Party, 2011). To appreciate the 
significance of this development, it is necessary to consider the position occupied by the 
Scottish NFP sector within the polity before devolution.  
Prior to devolution, three factors placed the Scottish NFP sector on the fringes of 
political influence: geographical distance from the seat of power in Westminster; 
philosophical distance from the entrenched right-wing conservatism that dominated 
national politics in the 1980s and 1990s; and the very diversity of the sector that 
impaired its ability to speak with one voice (Burt and Taylor, 2002:85). Furthermore, 
Scottish charities operated under ‘hybrid’ rules that generated legal uncertainty and 
received public funding on a separate legislative basis to that prevailing in England and 
Wales.  
Devolution was a watershed moment for the NFP sector in Scotland (Burt and Taylor, 
2002:93). There is a rich history of voluntary activity in Scotland (Bamford, 1997, 
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Dacombe and Bach, 2009) and Scottish governments have focused policy attention on 
the NFP sector since devolution (Burt and Taylor, 2002, Fyfe et al., 2006). The Scottish 
NFP sector now enjoys a ‘grown-up’ relationship with government as an essential 
partner in delivering public policy and addressing social problems that ‘fall between the 
interstices of public and private provision’ (Burt and Taylor, 2002:93). Policy rhetoric 
about the importance of the state-NFP sector relationship has increasingly solidified into 
policy commitments (Dacombe and Bach, 2009:19). 
The opening of new policy spaces between the sector and the devolved administration 
has helped to overcome the problems of geographical and philosophical distance, and 
has served to elevate engagement with ‘elite’ national intermediary organisations such 
as the SCVO (Burt and Taylor, 2002:92-93, Alcock, 2012:227). Growth in both the size 
of the sector and the scale of its involvement in contracting have also contributed to 
increased policy and political salience (Alcock, 2012:229). 
Implementation, issues and impact 
The Scottish Executive (renamed the Scottish Government in 2007) endorsed the 1998 
compact (The Scottish Office, 1998) and it was through the processes of 
implementation and formal review that the Executive engaged with policy communities 
about shaping the relationship. In 2003 the Executive commissioned a ‘Scottish 
Compact Baseline Review’ to assess the extent to which the principles set out in the 
compact were being promoted and upheld. The review acknowledged that major 
constitutional changes afoot during 1999/2000, involving the transfer of functions to the 
new Scottish Executive, contributed to ‘some delay in implementing the principles set 
out in the Compact’ and made difficult the task of measuring its impact (Scottish 
Executive, 2004b:5).  
The review recommended that the compact be revised and that an annual action plan 
drawn up by the Executive and the sector to be used as basis for monitoring (Scottish 
Executive, 2003c:8). The Executive acted on both of these recommendations: a revised 
Scottish Compact was produced (Scottish Executive, 2003b, c) followed in short order 
by a three-year implementation strategy (Scottish Executive, 2004b).  
A further review published in 2005 found that there was limited awareness of the 
Scottish Compact among smaller organisations (Scottish Executive, 2005:38). This was 
not in itself troubling given that the majority of small NFP organisations ‘were more 
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interested in the development of local compacts embracing their local council areas’ 
(Scottish Executive, 2005:37) and, indeed, partnership protocols between the sector and 
local government had existed since 1995.75  
Although the 2005 Baseline Review reported some signs that the Scottish Compact had 
a positive impact, it also found that only a minority of government and sector 
organisations surveyed had made use of it.76 The review also found that ‘levels of 
awareness of the Compact are higher in government than amongst the sector’ and 
speculated that this might imply that the Compact was seen as irrelevant by NFP 
organisations (Scottish Executive, 2005:37). The review concluded that some form of 
compliance monitoring would be required in order to lend credibility to efforts to 
promote the Compact and increase its use: left unchecked, non-compliance ‘could easily 
result in the Compact being seen as little more than tokenism’ (Scottish Executive, 
2005:39). 
Concurrent with the implementation of the Scottish Compact, the Scottish Executive – 
with cross-party support – signalled its intention to focus on the social economy. The 
publication in 2003 of the review of policy measures taken over the life of the Scottish 
Parliament to support the social economy (Scottish Executive, 2003a) underscored the 
Executive’s intention to ‘encourage the growth and sustainability’, as well as the ‘range 
and supply’ of social economy organisations capable of bringing ‘added value to the 
delivery of public services in terms of their capacity to innovate, their closeness to and 
ability to engage effectively with and meet the needs of their customers/clients and the 
communities in which they operate’ (Scottish Executive, 2003a:5). 
The review ‘set out a framework for strengthening the social economy’ and, in 2004 the 
Executive announced the establishment of Futurebuilders Scotland, a two year (2004-
2006), £18 million investment to translate the strategic objectives set out in the review 
into ‘practical action’ (Scottish Executive, 2004a:1).77 This initiative was presented as ‘a 
central part of an integrated set of measures ... to help sustain and develop the social 
economy, the voluntary sector and charities’ (Scottish Executive, 2004a:2). These 
measures comprised: charity law reform through the creation of a statutory charities 
regulator;78 a volunteering strategy to support volunteers and volunteer-dependent 
organisations; and a strategic funding review of the voluntary sector to identify options 
for ‘increasing the sustainability of voluntary organisations by adjusting the funding 
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environment within which the voluntary sector and social economy operates’ (Scottish 
Executive, 2004a:3).  
In March 2007, following a period of ‘extensive consultation’, the Executive published 
Better Business – A strategy and action plan for social enterprise in Scotland (Scottish 
Executive, 2007). By this time, the term ‘social economy organisation’ had been 
replaced with the term ‘social enterprise’, although the definition was identical (Scottish 
Government, 2007b). The Action Plan set out four ‘strategic aims’: 
• raising the profile and proving the value of social enterprise; 
• opening up markets to social enterprise; 
• increasing the range of finance available to develop social enterprise; and 
• developing the trading capacity of social enterprises by providing better business 
support (Scottish Executive, 2007:1-2).  
This was followed with the publication in 2008 of Enterprising Third Sector Action 
Plan 2008-2011 the aim of which was spelt out in the Ministerial Foreword: 
The Scottish Government wants to create the right operating conditions in 
which an enterprising third sector can play a full role in the development, 
design and delivery of policy and services in Scotland, putting the people 
of Scotland at the heart of their plans. We want to support a country in 
which an enterprising third sector is encouraged, valued and is given the 
opportunities it needs to prove its value and deliver more (Scottish 
Government, 2008b). 
The three year action plan (see exhibit 5.3 below) aimed to achieve a ‘step-change in the 
capability and capacity of the sector’ and set out a range of measurres to encourage 
innovation and build the capacity necessary to ‘maximise the sector’s potential to 
deliver for Scotland’ (Scottish Government, 2008b:2,15, 18).  
The Scottish government described the action plan as a ‘key part’ of a broader program 
of support it claimed would ‘help the third sector carry out its key representational and 
advocacy roles, building a strong civil society in Scotland’ (Scottish Government, 
2008b:31). Other elements of the government’s program included the following: 
• supporting the infrastructure – the Government assists national 
representative bodies and networks to provide a voice for the sector, 
and to provide support for third sector organisations from grassroots to 
national level. In a time of change across Scotland, this support will 
help ensure the sector’s voice is strengthened, not lost, in new 
structures both at national and, vitally, at local level 
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• strategic partnerships – developing a series of strategic partnerships 
with national third sector organisations around shared outcomes. 
These partnerships will provide a mechanism to allow the third sector 
to contribute effectively to Scottish Government policy 
• supporting the roles the third sector plays in our communities across 
Scotland, encouraging structures which enable the sector to deliver 
more effectively on a local basis and to act as an advocate through 
clear strategic links to community planning and outcome agreements 
• supporting volunteering – through infrastructure support, funding and 
award development (Scottish Government, 2008b:31).  
It was envisaged that about half of the Scottish Investment Fund would be for ‘loan and 
other repayable finance’ and would therefore ‘become a recycling fund operating 
beyond the current spending review period (2008-2011), to which further investment, 
potentially from a range of sources including the private sector, can be added in the 
future’ (Scottish Government 2008b: 2). 
A key feature of the social policy landscape in Scotland is the nexus between local 
government and the NFP sector.79 The Local Government in Scotland Act 2003 
establishes a duty on local authorities to undertake Community Planning in order to 
‘deliver better, more responsive, public services’ (Scottish Government, 2010b). The 
Act also provides for the establishment of Community Planning Partnerships (CPPs), 
these being the primary mechanism for ‘joint working and decision-making’ by local 
government and third sector organisations (Scottish Government, 2009).80 CPPs are now 
in place in each of Scotland’s 32 local authority areas providing an ‘outcome-focussed’ 
framework for collaboration on ‘strategic commissioning and procurement’ by local 
authorities and their third sector partners. CPPs are obliged to report to communities on 
progress, ‘giving information on how they have implemented their duties and how 
services have improved as a result’ (Scottish Government, 2010b).81  
Finally, because the ‘size and diversity of the sector can be seen as, and can indeed be, a 
barrier to partnership working with the public sector’, the Scottish Government, 
together with Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA), SOLACE 
(Scotland)82 and the Scottish Council of Voluntary Organisations (SCVO) have agreed 
to harness ‘local third sector infrastructure’ in the establishment of a ‘Third Sector 
Interface’ in each Community Planning area to provide a ‘visible connection and 
communication channel between the third sector and the CPP’ (Scottish Government, 
2009). 
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In 2007 the Scottish government signed what it called an ‘historic’ concordat with 
COSLA marking a ‘fundamental shift’ in its relationship with local government ‘based 
on mutual respect and partnership’ (Scottish Government, 2007a). The concordat 
recognises the ‘unique position held by local government in the governance of Scotland’ 
and seeks to put into place Single Outcome Agreements (SOA) with each of 32 local 
councils. SOAs are focused on the achievement of ‘national outcomes and indicators’ 
and seek to address priority issues identified by local authority areas (Scottish 
Government, 2007a). This strategic reform initiative was designed to reduce 
administrative and bureaucratic complexity and contribute to improved performance in 
straitened financial circumstances: 
For Local Authorities, the Concordat is bringing many welcome 
developments, including: the development of a more proportionate system 
of regulation, inspection and audit; streamlining the funding streams 
available to Local Government; reducing ring fencing; reducing 
bureaucracy; and a commitment from the Scottish Government to step 
back from micro-managing delivery (Scottish Government, 2009). 
The Concordat works in tandem with policy frameworks setting out joint Scottish 
government/local authority action to tackle poverty and income inequality (Scottish 
Government, 2008a) and was further reinforced in 2009 by the publication of a Joint 
Statement on the Relationship at Local Level between Government and the Third Sector 
(Scottish Government, 2009). The Joint Statement comprises 41 articles addressing ‘the 
areas of agreement that will inform the hard work going on to create partnerships’. It 
also affirms that the Scottish government and local authorities: 
... will value the third sector as an integral part of shaping and delivering 
better services for Scotland’s people and will be flexible in their approach 
to partnership and funding so as to recognise their role in the 
sustainability of the sector alongside the delivery of public service’ 
(Scottish Government, 2009).  
The Joint Statement also affirms that ‘[t]he third sector will organise itself 
so as to effectively participate in mutually acceptable decision-making 
structures, in a transparent and acceptable way’ (Scottish Government, 
2009: articles 5 and 6). 
Under the SNP there is an expectation that the NFP sector will continue to offer 
diversity in provision and at the same time generate scale economies and consistency in 
standards of governance, management and service quality (Burt and Taylor, 2009:91).83 
The Scottish Government’s policy framework on poverty and income inequality, 
Achieving Our Potential, acknowledges the role played by third sector organisations in 
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‘connecting individuals and communities’ and extols the potential for social enterprise 
to ‘create opportunities for income and employment in areas where the private sector 
might not choose to operate’ (Scottish Government, 2008a:18-19).  
The Scottish government’s relationship with the sector is complicated and confounded 
by what Burt and Taylor (Burt and Taylor, 2009:85) refer to as the ‘pathology of 
independence’. Scotland’s NFP sector is represented by a diverse array of intermediary 
organisations that are ‘pathologically wedded’ to organisational independence and 
autonomy which, they argue, are essential pre-requisites to providing services to 
member organisations (Burt and Taylor, 2001:86). The continuation of a ‘culture of 
autonomy’ at the sector level (from government) and the organisational level (from 
other NFP organisations) acts paradoxically as a force against achieving common 
purpose and is a source of frustration for a government wishing to work with ‘leaner 
and fitter’ representative organisations (Burt and Taylor, 2009:84-86, 95).  
Burt and Taylor (2009:88-89) observe that the Scottish sector tends to think of 
independence as ‘freedom from constraints’ (in the form of the burdensome imposition 
of inappropriate tendering regimes, stringent contractual requirements, et cetera). 
However, while devolution has brought opportunities to Scotland’s NFP sector, the 
Scottish government’s enthusiasm to engage the sector brings with it increasing scrutiny 
and heightened expectations in relation to transparency and accountability (Burt and 
Taylor, 2009:90). 
Implications 
The Scottish Compact and associated Good Practice Guides appear to still form part of 
the corpus of official documentation pertaining to Scottish government policy on the 
third sector (at least inasmuch as these documents can still be found on official 
government internet sites). Current Scottish government policy retains a strong flavour 
of cross-sector and inter-governmental collaboration, however, it appears that the 
Scottish Compact has been superseded by more recent policy frameworks focused on 
the ‘social economy’ and ‘social enterprise’.84  
A lack of attachment to the Scottish Compact is perhaps unsurprising given the 
document’s pre-devolution origins in Whitehall. It does seem that in its first years, the 
Scottish Executive make genuine attempts to implement the framework. It also seems 
that the framework was a poor fit, especially given the apparent strength of the Scottish 
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NFP sector’s connection with local government. If the Scottish Compact is indeed a 
‘dead letter’ the apparent absence of commentary from the sector suggests that it is 
unlamented.  
Scottish public sector reform 
The Scottish government’s commitment to cross-sector cooperation should be viewed 
against the backdrop of its pursuit of a suite of long-term reforms aimed at simplifying 
and improving the efficiency of Scotland’s public services. While professing a strong 
belief in the ‘ethos, value and importance of public services’ the First Minister, Alex 
Salmond, in 2008 announced the government’s intention to introduce a range of 
measures to remove ‘unnecessary bureaucracy and duplication’ (Scottish Government, 
2008c).  
In this ‘clearer, more focussed organisational landscape’ public services will be 
‘designed and delivered in increasingly innovative ways by diverse providers from 
across the public, private and third sector’ (Scottish Government, 2008c). This would 
include a 25 per cent reduction in the number of ‘national public sector organisations’ 
through amalgamations and the cessation of ‘activity that no longer contributes to the 
public purpose’ (Scottish Government, 2008c).  
Responding to fiscal challenges 
In 2010 the UK national budget foreshadowed ‘the biggest reduction in public spending 
imposed on Scotland by any UK government’ (Scottish Government, 2010a). However, 
it is unlikely that an SNP majority government will rush to emulate policy responses 
crafted in Whitehall. McCrone (2001:121) observes that post-Thatcher Scotland is ‘an 
ideological category incompatible with Conservative Anglo-British rhetoric’. The 
‘hegemony of the Right at Westminster’, he asserts, was built on English and not 
Scottish (or Welsh) votes: the Conservative Party was labelled by its opponents as an 
‘English’ party (McCrone, 2001:113-114). A similar view was recently expressed by 
the senior finance and policy reporter at Third Sector Magazine: 
... the mood music is somehow different north of the border, with less 
sense of change and conflict. Many observers ascribe this to 14 years of 
devolution, a more consensual body politic where the Conservative party 
features little and a smaller, more cohesive society (Ainsworth, 2012). 
In November 2010 the First Minister announced the establishment of a ‘high-level’ 
commission ‘to examine how Scotland’s public services can be delivered in future to 
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secure improved outcomes for communities across the country (Scottish Government, 
2010a). The commission reported in June 2011 and, in his foreword, the Chair, 
Campbell Christie declared: 
[O]ur public services are now facing their most serious challenges since 
the inception of the welfare state. The demand for public services is set to 
increase dramatically over the medium term - partly because of 
demographic changes, but also because of our failure up to now to tackle 
the causes of disadvantage and vulnerability, with the result that huge 
sums have to be expended dealing with their consequences. 
This rising demand for public services will take place in an environment 
of constrained public spending. In the absence of a willingness to raise 
new revenue through taxation, public services will have to ‘achieve more 
with less’ (Christie, 2011).  
The commission noted that the complexity, fragmentation and opaqueness of Scotland’s 
public service system served to hamper joint working between organisations: 
As a whole, the system can be ‘top down’ and unresponsive to the needs 
of individuals and communities. It lacks accountability and is often 
characterised by a short-termism that makes it difficult to prioritise 
preventative approaches (Christie, 2011:viii). 
Whilst acknowledging ‘isolated examples’ of effective collaboration, the report noted 
that addressing ‘systemic defects’ would require ‘a fundamental overhaul of the 
relationships within and between those institutions and agencies – public, third sector 
and private – responsible for designing and delivering public services’ (Christie, 
2011:viii). Noting a ‘widespread belief that the Scottish government and local 
authorities are less diligent about scrutinising and costing in- house services than those 
contracted out to external providers’ the commission recommended:  
• applying the same standards of scrutiny and transparency to the procurement of 
goods and services from all providers; and 
• creating a level playing field by ensuring ‘competitive neutrality’ between all 
potential suppliers of public services, including in-house bids from public bodies 
(Christie, 2011:65-66). 
The Welsh Compact in context 
The ‘Compact between the Government and the Voluntary Sector in Wales’ was 
developed in 1998 by the Voluntary Sector Branch of the Welsh Office in consultation 
with the Wales Council for Voluntary Action and over 30 state and non-state  
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organisations (Morison, 2000:117). Then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, heralded the 
Compact as ‘a document of both practical and symbolic importance’ (Welsh Office, 
1998). The Welsh Compact owes its provenance to the same communitarian and 
horizontalist impulses that drove the English and Scottish compacts. Indeed, its aims 
(Figure 5.5) were drawn from Labour’s 1997 manifesto ‘Building the Future Together’ 
(Welsh Office, 1998). 
 
The Welsh Compact was co-signed by the Chair of the Wales Council for Voluntary 
Action (WCVA), Marjorie Dykins, and the then Secretary of State for Wales, Alun 
Michael, the same senior Labour Party figure who with Nicholas Deakin was 
instrumental in placing a compact on ‘New’ Labour’s policy agenda (Kendall 2003: 
61).85 This might go some way towards explaining why, alone amongst the compacts in 
the Anglo-Saxon world, there is a statutory requirement for Welsh ministers to ‘make a 
scheme (“the voluntary sector scheme”) setting out how they propose, in the exercise of 
their functions, to promote the interests of relevant voluntary organisations’ 
(Government of Wales Act 2006: see Appendix 3, Figure A3.4).  
The 1998 Compact was always intended as a transitional measure. In their joint 
Foreword Michael and Dykins confirmed that, ‘[t]he Compact paves the way for the 
Figure 5.5 – The Aims of the 1998 Welsh Compact 
1. To encourage good practice and co-operative methods of decision making and for reviewing 
performance, particularly where organisations receive Government finance as service providers.  
2. To encourage voluntary organisations and charities through co-operation and training as well as 
through financial support.  
3. To encourage volunteering initiatives and the idea that voluntary activity is an essential part of 
citizenship.  
4. To encourage the work of umbrella organisations and co-operation between such organisations.  
5. To recognise specific needs and special contributions made by groupings within the sector. The 
contribution of the Black voluntary sector, the work of organisations of disabled people and the 
voluntary sector in rural areas are just three examples.  
6. To encourage a growth in the contribution of different age groups. Voluntary activity must be seen 
as a part of citizenship for young people while the contribution of older people, who bring to bear a 
lifetime's experience, should not be underestimated. While many organisations depend on the 
commitment of their older members and while many young people contribute zeal and energy, the 
fact is that the potential is not being realised to the full at either end of the age range.  
7. To ensure that Government is measuring and recognising things that really matter, both within 
Government and between Government and non-Governmental organisations.  
8. To review the co-ordination of Government relationships with the voluntary sector across 
departments.  
9. To assess carefully, in consultation with relevant voluntary organisations, the potential impact of 
policy changes upon the sector (Welsh Office, 1998). 
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future as it is intended to form the basis for the National Assembly’s Voluntary Sector 
Scheme’, as was required under the Act which established the devolved National 
Assembly for Wales – the original Government of Wales Act 1998 (Welsh Office, 
1998:5).86 
The Welsh Compact – the problem stream 
The problems besetting the government-NFP sector relationship in pre-devolution 
Wales were largely identical to those in England (Birrell, 2009). Prior to devolution 
there was limited territorial separation between the two constituent countries and social 
regulatory policy in Wales was highly integrated with that of England (Mitchell, 
2006:161-162).87 Although the push for devolution lapsed into dormancy during the 
1980s,88 the policies of the Conservative governments of Thatcher and Major 
contributed to renewed calls for self-government (National Assembly for Wales, 2013). 
Tensions between the NFP sector and central government were exacerbated by factors 
such as geographical distance from the seat of decision-making at Westminster 
(Mitchell, 2006) and a tendency towards ‘power hoarding’ by central government 
(King, 2001:24). Important too were differences in political culture, including latent 
nationalist aspirations within the Welsh community, a strong associational culture (Day, 
2009a), a larger public sector public sector (Mitchell, 2006:162) and coupled a ‘centre 
of electoral gravity’ to the left of that in England (Wincott, 2006:175).89  
In its first term, and in keeping with its pre-election commitments, the Blair Labour 
government subjected a proposition to establish a Welsh Assembly to a referendum. The 
referendum was approved by a bare majority, and thus reflected a long-standing 
ambivalence on the part of the Welsh population towards greater territorial and political 
autonomy (Day, 2009a:126).90 
As in Scotland, the problem stream post-devolution was concerned primarily with 
giving effect to an entirely new relationship between the fledgling Welsh Assembly and 
the NFP sector and establishing the institutional framework that would allow the 
relationship to unfold. In its first term the Welsh Assembly agreed an Action Plan that 
set out a number of issues affecting the sector requiring an operational response by 
government, including: 
• establishing effective arrangements for the provision of financial assistance and 
monitoring the use made of that assistance; 
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• developing and implementing arrangements that enable community and voluntary 
sector organisations to participate in consultation exercises affecting or of concern 
to the sector; 
• establishing a clear locus for the voluntary sector in processes for policy 
development and evaluation; 
• stimulating greater, more sustainable levels of volunteering activity; and 
• promoting community regeneration, combatting social deprivation and building 
sustainable communities (National Assembly for Wales, 2001). 
One might infer from this list of actions the agreed suite of problems requiring a policy 
and/or administrative response in the first years of the devolved Welsh administration.  
The Welsh Compact – the policy stream 
As in Scotland, devolution brought the seat of governmental decision-making closer to 
the coalface – in both geographical and political terms. The establishment of the Welsh 
Assembly created an entirely new space for dialogue between the sector and 
government (Alcock, 2010a, 2012). That the Assembly was required by its founding 
legislation to make a scheme to guide government’s relationship with the NFP sector 
was a foregone conclusion and early in its first term the Welsh National Assembly 
applied its energies to this task. 
The Voluntary Sector Scheme (VSS) adopted by the Welsh Assembly ‘assures the 
Sector and all its constituent parts unprecedented access to the means and process of 
government in Wales’ (National Assembly for Wales, 2004:2). The VSS effectively 
superseded the original compact and has endured and evolved as the guiding policy 
instrument governing the relationship between the Welsh government and the voluntary 
sector. Here it should be noted that by virtue of having a statutory basis in the 
Government of Wales Act 2006 the VSS (Appendix 3, Figure A3.5) is quite unlike other 
Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions whose policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation can be 
abrogated by governments without recourse to a legislature (Birrell, 2009).  
Although some express concern that the voices of larger, better resourced and better 
organised NFP organisations are privileged over those of smaller ‘grass-roots’ 
organisations (Day, 2009a), the WCVA describes the VSS as ‘ground breaking’, and 
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claims it gives the sector ‘a unique opportunity to engage with, and put its views to, the 
Welsh Government’ (WCVA, 2012).  
From the time the VSS was first initiated in 2000 the nature of the relationship between 
the Welsh NFP sector and the Assembly government has continued to evolve, as has the 
form of the Welsh state itself. The original devolution settlement for Wales did not 
confer primary legislative powers, meaning that responsibility for primary legislation 
for social policy remained with Westminster. While the Welsh Assembly did have 
control over subordinate legislation (the making of regulations and the setting of 
standards, et cetera) the insertion of ‘Wales only’ clauses in UK legislation and/or the 
approval of ‘Wales only’ Bills required the agreement of Westminster and constrained 
the ability of the Assembly to act (Birrell, 2009:8-9).  
A 2004 inquiry into the adequacy of devolved powers in Wales cited evidence that the 
complexity of the devolution settlement both constrained the ability of the Assembly to 
make payments to voluntary groups and acted to discourage the participation of 
voluntary organisations in the policy process (Richard Commission, 2004:96-97). Wales 
was subsequently given enhanced legislative powers in 2006, and in 2011 Welsh voters 
approved a referendum to give the Welsh Assembly primary law making powers in 20 
broad policy ‘fields’ including social policy (BBC, 2011). 
The Welsh Compact – the politics stream 
Day attributes earlier Welsh reticence about self-government to the localised, 
fragmented, and sometimes divisive, nature of Welsh society and associational culture 
(Day, 2009a:126). For years fears that any new governing body might be dominated 
either by Welsh nationalists or by the Welsh Labour Party served to prevent a 
groundswell of public opinion in favour of constitutional change. In the end, the vote in 
favour of devolution (representing less than a quarter of the voting population) was less 
about nationalist aspirations than a vote in favour of ‘modernisation, effectiveness, and 
democratic renewal’ (Day, 2009a:126). 
In the first three National Assembly elections held since devolution, Welsh Labour 
formed government: from 1999-2003 in coalition with the Liberal Democrats; from 
2003-2007 in minority government with just 30 seats in the 60 seat assembly; and from 
2007-2011 in coalition with the centre-left Welsh nationalist party, Plaid Cymru (The 
Party of Wales). The Welsh Assembly elections held in May 2011 again saw the Labour 
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Party gain the highest share of the vote and the highest number of seats (30), although 
short of an absolute majority. These fourth Assembly elections were notable in that ‘it 
was the first time the Welsh Labour Party faced elections without a Labour government 
in Westminster, the first time Plaid Cymru faced Assembly elections as a party of 
government, and the first time the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats faced elections 
as members of a coalition government in Westminster’ (House of Commons Library, 
2011a). 
As in Scotland, the political dominance of centre-left coalition governments since 
devolution reflects an on-going political commitment to maintaining public services in a 
strong public sector (Day, 2009a:125-126). There are also strong upward connections 
between the Welsh NFP sector and policy-makers. In part, this has occurred in response 
to exhortations from the political elite for voluntary organisations and civil society 
activists to become part of ‘Team Wales’ in order to produce ‘an appropriately Welsh 
response’ to the opportunities that devolution affords (Day, 2009a:128).  
In this respect, the VSS is very much an integral part of the Welsh nationalist project. 
And although the sector does wield influence, in a ‘congested field’ of ‘potential 
collaborators and rivals’, the capacity to influence selectively favours a relatively small 
group of organisations that form part of a distinct voluntary or third sector ‘industry’ 
(Day, 2009a:133). 
Implementation, issues and impact 
In September 2003, following the second ever Welsh Assembly election, then Minister 
for Social Justice and Regeneration, Edwina Hart, established an Independent 
Commission to review the VSS in in keeping with the requirements of the Act (National 
Assembly for Wales, 2004). Chaired by Simon Jones,91 the Commission reported in 
March 2004. In the foreword to his report, Jones described the opportunities afforded by 
the VSS for the voluntary sector to work with the Assembly as ‘surely … the envy of 
the voluntary sector not just in the United Kingdom but much farther afield’ (National 
Assembly for Wales, 2004). He went on to add, ‘By the same token the relationship that 
the government of Wales enjoys with the sector must also be one of the most 
constructive’ (National Assembly for Wales, 2004).  
The Commission made the observation that: 
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The Scheme is unique in the UK and to the best of the Commission’s 
knowledge, in the world. Its two key unique features are that it places the 
voluntary sector on an equal footing with local government and the 
business sector as formal partners of the Assembly; and that it gives the 
voluntary sector a statutory right of access to and inclusion by 
Government (National Assembly for Wales, 2004:27). 
The Commission’s overall findings were that the VSS was a highly valued and ‘ground-
breaking’ innovation; that it continued to be ‘fit for purpose’ and apart from some minor 
revisions ‘should not be remade’; and that implementation ‘is very much a work in 
progress and there is more work to do’ (National Assembly for Wales, 2004:6).  
The Commission heard evidence confirming that ‘communication between the sector 
and government and its agents had improved since the days of the Welsh Office’ 
(National Assembly for Wales, 2004:56). However, it also warned against complacency, 
highlighting a number of ‘recurring themes’ that suggested a need for further progress, 
including: a need for a more comprehensive and strategic action plan; greater 
consistency in the application of the Scheme and the Funding Code of Practice across 
government; encouraging local government to apply the principles of the Scheme in its 
relationship with the sector; promoting application of the Scheme to areas of policy and 
funding not devolved to the National Assembly; and using the Scheme and the Funding 
Code of Practice to drive appropriate practices within the sector itself (National 
Assembly for Wales, 2004:32). 
The Commission made a total of 59 recommendations: 40 of these were directed to the 
government; six were directed at the WCVA; four were directed jointly to the Assembly 
and the WCVA; and nine to the Voluntary Sector Partnership Council: these were 
agreed by the sector and the government. The Welsh Assembly subsequently was 
developed and agreed a ‘First Stage Strategic Implementation Plan’, built around key 
themes identified by the Commission: consistency, clarity and communication (Welsh 
Assembly Government, 2006). That first plan sought to present ‘a vision for the 
Assembly Government’s future work with the sector’ to ‘help tackle some of the most 
deep-rooted problems facing Wales’ (Welsh Assembly Government, 2007). A further 
iteration of the Strategic Plan was published in 2008, adding to the implementation 
agenda a range of measures aimed at ‘accelerating social enterprise’, thereby: 
• creating a climate in which fully-fledged social enterprises can thrive 
and grow; and 
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• providing support to all third sector organisations interested in 
diversifying their income streams through enterprise and trading 
activities (Welsh Assembly Government, 2008:30-31).  
This brought the VSS into alignment with the Welsh government’s 2005 Social 
Enterprise Strategy (Welsh Assembly Government, 2005).92 Although the Strategy did 
not draw express linkages with either the VSS or the Third Sector Partnership Council, 
these are now reflected in its successor, the 2009 Social Enterprise Action Plan for 
Wales (Welsh Assembly Government, 2009). 
Implications 
It is over a decade since the National Assembly for Wales first promulgated the VSS. In 
that time the Scheme has weathered four Welsh Assembly elections, revisions to the 
legislation establishing devolved government (and the Scheme itself), and a change in 
the UK government. In keeping with the statutory requirement, the VSS has been 
reported on annually in each year of its operation. 
In his Foreword to the eleventh Annual Report since the Scheme’s inception, the 
Minister for Local Government and Communities, Carl Sargent, remarked that: 
2010-11 was a challenging year for both the Welsh Government and the 
Third Sector. The impact of the UK Government’s Comprehensive 
Spending Review was significant in Wales. The Welsh Government 
worked closely with our colleagues in the Sector to minimise the impact 
of funding reductions, but we were not always able to immunise the 
Sector from the effect of the UK Government’s decisions (Welsh 
Government, 2012). 
Separately, the Chair of the WCVA, Win Griffiths remarked that the VSS ‘continues to 
provide the basis for an open and constructive dialogue with the third sector’ while 
echoing the Minister’s remarks about the ‘challenges for both the public and the third 
sectors’. Griffiths went on to suggest that: 
Elsewhere in the UK the third sector had already experienced damaging 
cuts in funding from both central and local government, and organisations 
working in Wales funded by non-devolved government had been 
similarly affected. Against this background, I am pleased that we were 
able to work with Ministers to make sure that there was a more measured 
and careful approach to minimising the impact on people and 
communities supported by the third sector in Wales (Welsh Government, 
2012). 
According to Day (2009a:123), devolution in Wales has provided the impetus to ‘create 
a stronger and more focussed civil society, underpinned by distinctively Welsh social 
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and political values’. Social life in Wales, he suggests, ‘has been considered to be 
strongly associational, producing powerful communitarian identities rooted in local 
networks of social ties’ and the idea of ‘community’, he argues, ‘has never been very far 
from the minds of Welsh commentators and policymakers’ (Day, 2009a:125). The VSS 
is the primary mechanism through which government and the sector are jointly engaged 
in ‘a nation-building consensus’ and, says Day, ‘has been applauded as marking an 
unprecedented commitment to collaborative working’ (Day, 2009a:123). There is a 
downside, however, owing to the constraints and obligations imposed on voluntary 
organisations as a consequence of entering into partnership with government (Day, 
2009a:123).  
As is the case elsewhere, diversity is a defining characteristic of the voluntary sector in 
Wales and is ‘the source of many of its accepted strengths, including its dynamism, 
representativeness, and ability to respond to change’ (Day, 2009a:124). The demands of 
engagement with government, however, can give rise to ‘partnership fatigue’ amongst 
voluntary organisations ‘as willing individuals struggle to keep up with the demands of 
attending meetings, reading papers and undertaking other work for partnership 
activities’ (Day, 2009a:129).  
Because the Welsh government cannot possible engage meaningfully with individual 
organisations, it has been necessary to rationalise its interface with the sector by 
working preferentially through representative organisations and umbrella networks. 
Thus the WCVA is the government’s key interlocutor on the VSS, and receives core 
funding from government to carry out this role. This in turn means that the WCVA has 
a major stake in helping achieve the government’s aims (Day, 2009a:133). 
Unsurprisingly, the formal collaborative structures established to support the VSS tend 
to favour larger, better-organised and professional voluntary sector organisations: 
… it is the bigger, and better serviced organisations, which speak the 
same kind of language as politicians and officials, which thrive in such an 
environment. Smaller groups and interests tend to have to work through 
umbrella groups and networks (Day, 2009a:132). 
Day observes in Wales the emergence of a ‘second tier’ of voluntary organisations that 
exist for the purpose of organising and representing others. There is, he says: 
... a tendency for power to accrue to the relatively small proportion of 
organisations explicitly concerned with providing advice, advocacy and 
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infrastructural support, which form part of a distinct voluntary or third 
sector ‘industry’ (Day, 2009a:133). 
The danger in this, he suggests, is that: 
... a more focussed voluntary sector is also one that is more hierarchically 
organised, and held together by relationships of dependency. The sector 
gains influence as an entity, but the available means of expression are 
narrowed (Day, 2009a:133). 
Furthermore, the increasing formalisation, and indeed normalisation and mainstreaming 
of the relationship between government and the sector can also evoke concerns that the 
sector ‘is being reshaped into an arm of government’ (Day, 2009a:131). He concludes 
that, ‘[c]lose collaboration with government risks displacing the aims and objectives of 
voluntary organisations with those of government itself’ and that ‘[t]he development of 
strong upward connections to policy makers and funders may come at the expense of an 
attrition of downward links to grassroots supporters and rank and file volunteers’ (Day, 
2009a:134).  
The same processes identified by Day might also serve to narrow the lines of 
communication between the sector and government in different policy domains. Indeed, 
one observes in Wales simultaneous trends towards both centralisation (through the 
VSS and its administrative apparatus) and divergence at the domain level. Alcock, for 
one, suggests that the absence in Wales of strong horizontal policy frameworks serves to 
diffuse third sector policy and practice in ways that militate against the development of 
a strong central policy steer and associated funding (Alcock, 2009:11-12).  
Alcock’s observations are contradicted somewhat by the emergence in Wales of sectoral 
compacts in policy domains such as the environment, arts and culture, health and the 
Welsh language. These have effectively cascaded from the VSS and reflect the 
intentions of the Welsh government that each of the Assembly Sponsored Public Bodies 
(ASPBs) will develop complementary compacts for working with the voluntary sector.93  
The success of the VSS and of devolution itself, according to Day, will ultimately 
depend on the emergence of distinctively Welsh civil society, imbued with ‘a more fully 
Welsh consciousness’ and a readiness to share in delivering the aims of the devolved 
government (Day, 2009a:127). In Day’s view, the potential for Welsh civil society to 
contribute to modernisation and improved efficiency in service delivery rests on the 
success of the devolution project itself and the extent to which the Assembly ‘wins 
legitimacy from the Welsh people’ (Day, 2009a:127).  
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Despite Day’s reservations, there is abundant commentary underscoring the unique 
character of the settlement between the Welsh government and the voluntary sector. 
This settlement has proved to be durable and, owing to its statutory basis and the level 
of political consensus about the worthiness of the VSS, it has demonstrated a level of 
institutional embeddedness unmatched in other Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions (Birrell, 
2009).  
As to the question about the long-term prospects for Welsh devolution and Welsh civil 
society, there is less certainty. Although the referendum on full law-making powers for 
the Welsh Assembly succeeded on the basis of a 63 per cent ‘yes’ vote, the overall 
turnout of 35.6 per cent of registered voters is not suggestive of strong voter interest in 
the Welsh national project (Electoral Commission, 2011b).94 
The Northern Ireland Compact in context 
When the Blair Labour government initiated the long and complex process of re-
establishing an elected Northern Ireland Assembly, it also sought to bequeath to that 
troubled province a model for engagement between the governing Executive and the 
third sector. Accordingly, the Voluntary Activity Unit of the Northern Ireland Office 
(NIO) and the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action (NICVA) consulted 
widely amongst the ‘statutory’ and the ‘voluntary and community’ sectors in the 
development of a compact document – Building Real Partnership–Compact between the 
Government and the Community and Voluntary Sector in Northern Ireland (Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland, 1998).  
Acknowledging the ‘strong, mature relationship’ between central government and the 
sector in Northern Ireland, the then Secretary of State, Majorie Mowlam, heralded the 
compact as a means to harness the ‘energy, dedication and resource’ of the sector at the 
commencement of ‘a new era in Northern Ireland’s affairs’ (Figure 5.6). Accordingly, 
Mowlam commended the compact to the Northern Ireland Assembly for endorsement 
(Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 1998). The compact also contained a message 
from the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, who lauded the work of voluntary and community 
organisations in promoting citizenship, re-establishing a sense of community and 
helping to achieve a just and inclusive society.  
 
  144 
Like the Scottish and Welsh compacts, the Northern Ireland Compact traces its origins 
to Labour’s ‘Building the Future Together’ (Labour Party, 1997, cited in Murdock, 
2005:12-13). The Compact also acknowledges a deeper history of government-NFP 
sector engagement, citing a 1993 ‘Strategy for the Support of the Voluntary Sector and 
for Community Development in Northern Ireland’ – a document that was itself a central 
government response to a sector-initiated review undertaken in 1989 (Morison, 2001).  
 
Morison (2001) suggests that the idea of ‘partnership government’ is more developed in 
Northern Ireland than in other parts of the UK. He cites the long history of voluntary 
activity in Ireland and notes that the voluntary sector in Northern Ireland is 
proportionately larger than in other parts of the UK. Morison maintains that in the 
recent past the NFP sector in Northern Ireland has performed a different and wider role 
than its counterparts, encompassing both service provision and policy development 
(Morison, 2001:296). He argues that a quarter century of ‘direct rule’ from 
Westminster, with only brief restorations of devolved government, has allowed the NFP 
Figure 5.6 – The Aims of the 1998 Northern Ireland Compact 
• The shared vision of Government and the voluntary and community sector is to work together as 
social partners to build participative, peaceful, equitable and inclusive communities in Northern 
Ireland. This Compact will cement this partnership. lt will enable the energy and talent both within 
Government and the sector to unite in creating a new dynamic for the betterment of society as a 
whole. 
• In furtherance of its aims this Compact establishes a framework of values, principles, and 
commitments which will underpin the future relationship between Government and the voluntary 
and community sector in Northern Ireland. The Compact lays the foundation for a partnership 
based on mutual trust and respect and will open up opportunities for more active participation by 
the voluntary and community sector in developing public policy into the new Millennium. 
• In this partnership, Government acknowledges the nature, scope, diversity and value of the 
contribution which the voluntary and community sector makes to the social, economic, 
environmental and cultural life of Northern Ireland. lt recognises, respects and supports the 
independence of the sector and its right to campaign within the law, to comment on and, where 
appropriate, to challenge Government policy. lt recognises and values highly volunteering as an 
important expression of citizenship, as individuals contribute actively to the development of their 
communities and to meeting the needs of others, in a way which is complementary and of equal 
importance to financial investment. Finally, Government recognises and supports the importance, 
value and potential of community development to promote active citizenship and as a means of 
reaching and involving local people and groups in effecting change and addressing needs. 
• In this partnership, the voluntary and community sector acknowledges the discrete and strategic 
role played by Government in the development of public policy and services. lt recognises and 
respects Government's responsibility to provide the legislative framework for society and the 
parameters within which it acts in doing this. lt also welcomes Government's recognition of the 
contribution to society made by the voluntary and community sector. lt acknowledges the legal and 
financial framework within which Government works and its responsibility for public accountability 
for resources (Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 1998). 
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sector in Northern Ireland to ‘act as an alternative site of politics and as an unofficial 
opposition’ (Morison, 2001:296).  
The NFP sector in Northern Ireland has been encouraged over the last three decades to 
engage with government in order to counter the perceived democratic deficit inherent in 
direct rule, and to bring a degree of legitimacy to state action in politically sensitive 
areas (Morison, 2001:297). Although the state was never rolled back as far in Northern 
Ireland as elsewhere in the UK, the public sector has not been immune to the influence 
of NPM (Morison, 2001:302). However, while the NFP sector in Northern Ireland has 
taken on a significant role as a provider of statutory public services, this has as much to 
do with a desire to de-politicise service delivery by distancing it from both local 
government control and the mechanisms of direct rule as with the tenets of neoliberal 
governance (Morison, 2001:297).  
The 1998 Compact acknowledged the voluntary sector as a ‘social partner’ capable of 
working with government to ‘build participative, peaceful, equitable and inclusive 
communities in Northern Ireland’ (Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 1998). This 
aim had particular resonance in a society scarred by sectarian conflict. In fact the 
politics of peace in Northern Ireland created opportunities for the NFP sector to by-pass 
domestic government institutions and engage directly with European state institutions 
(Morison, 2001:299). For example, non-state human rights organisations successfully 
secured major European Union investments in sector development for peace-related 
initiatives. This demonstrated the sector’s capability to engage in governance at all 
levels and its capacity to play a role in ‘getting the business of government done in 
difficult circumstances and in developing new forms of governance and conflict 
resolution’ (Morison, 2001:299). 
In line with compact documents elsewhere, the Northern Ireland Compact set out the 
respective roles of government and the voluntary sector; shared values; shared 
principles relating to interdependence, cooperation, participation and representation; 
respective commitments; and an outline of further action (Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, 1998). The Compact also committed government to ‘prepare a 
supporting document to the Compact in consultation with the voluntary and community 
sector, setting out how Government will put the principles and commitments in the 
Compact into practice, and to keep it under review’. This would ‘replace the 1993 
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Strategy for the Support of the Voluntary Sector and for Community Development in 
Northern Ireland and would (inter alia): 
• contain sectoral strategies setting out how government will put the principles and 
commitments in the Compact into practice with target dates where appropriate 
• deal with issues common to all departments and their agencies in their relationship 
with the voluntary and community sector 
• provide good practice guidance in relation to consultation, volunteering, community 
development and funding 
• address the issue of co-ordination of government relationships with the sector, and 
• describe mechanisms for monitoring its content (Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland, 1998). 
It was made clear that the Compact had no statutory basis and was not a contract. 
Nevertheless it contained a commitment to establish a Joint Government/ Voluntary and 
Community Sector Forum for Northern Ireland for the purposes of monitoring its 
operation. The Compact also clearly stated that it did not ‘represent a commitment on 
behalf of the new Northern Ireland Assembly or the new Northern Ireland Executive’. 
Rather, it expressed a hope that these bodies would ‘endorse the Compact or draw on 
the work done to develop their own partnership agreement’ (Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, 1998:16, Morison, 2000:114).  
The Compact was endorsed by the Northern Ireland Executive in 1998 as the basis of its 
relationship with the sector and was accompanied by the establishment of a Joint 
Government Voluntary Sector Forum with a coordinating and monitoring role in 
relation to the undertakings contained within it (Acheson et al., 2006:25). However, 
endorsement of the Compact was clearly subsidiary to more immediate, and far less 
tractable political challenges along the path to devolution in Northern Ireland (the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive operated only intermittently between 1998 
and 2007). 
The difficulties encountered in reaching a viable political settlement in Northern Ireland 
protracted the task of formalising a constructive relationship between a devolved 
government and the NFP sector. Although a superficial appraisal would suggest that the 
Northern Ireland Compact had fallen between the cracks of a drawn-out and fraught 
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process of devolution, direct rule under a Labour government in Westminster provided 
an important source of continuity pending the restoration of a devolved Assembly in 
May 2007. Given the stop-start process of devolution in Northern Ireland and the 
clamour of vitriolic claims and counter-claims for political legitimacy, it is a wonder 
that the relationship between government and the NFP sector received any policy 
attention at all. 
The Northern Ireland Compact – the problem stream 
The narrative of devolution in Northern Ireland was one of building a sustainable 
peace through locally accountable, cross-community institutions (Jeffery et al., 
2010:5). As with Scotland and Wales, the Northern Ireland Compact was a policy 
prescription crafted in Whitehall. Unlike the Scottish or Welsh compacts, the Northern 
Ireland Compact was less concerned with redressing problems in the government-NFP 
sector relationship than it was with enlisting civil society organisations in a devolution 
project focussed on attaining and maintaining peace and order (Mitchell, 2006).  
Acheson observes that traditions in public administration in Northern Ireland have a 
different, more ‘corporatist’ feel to those in the rest of the UK – in which relationships 
among elites are easy to establish and maintain (Acheson, 2009:67-68). Although there 
has been a long tradition of government interest in the ability of NFP organisations to 
play a part in public administration, the history of ethno-religious partition in Northern 
Ireland has created a civil society landscape in which voluntary and community 
organisations are structurally embedded within separate spheres of voluntary action in 
the Protestant and Catholic communities (Acheson, 2009:68). In addition, the NFP 
sector is overwhelming constituted of organisations that exist only in Northern Ireland, 
meaning that government-voluntary sector relations are insulated to a degree from direct 
external interventions (Acheson, 2009:69). 
Although bridging the sectarian divide in the province formed part of the subtext of the 
original Northern Ireland compact – encouraging and supporting partnership working 
between the Protestant and Catholic spheres in civil society as in the political apparatus 
– it was also concerned to provide a platform for cross-sector working in an 
environment in which the NFP sector might be expected to play a greater role in the 
delivery of statutory services.  
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In 2010 the Northern Ireland Audit Office (NIAO) prepared a report on the 
effectiveness of the partnership between government and the voluntary and community 
sector. The NIAO concluded that: 
Principles and commitments for partnership working have been agreed 
between government and the voluntary and community sector, and 
substantial good practice guidance exists. While it is clear that there are 
examples of where this is working, it has not been widely or consistently 
applied (NIAO, 2010:7). 
The report notes that the 1998 Compact agreed by the government and the sector, and 
endorsed by the Northern Ireland Assembly, ‘sets out principles and commitments 
aimed at improving the broader relationship between the two sectors’, notwithstanding 
the practical reality that ‘relationships will be formed and developed between individual 
funders and funded bodies’ (NIAO, 2010:12). The report also noted past actions by 
government to put the compact into practice as well as the conclusions of a 2004 
external evaluation that ‘there were benefits from having a centralised partnership 
strategy’ (NIAO, 2010:12).  
It is clear from the record that government in Northern Ireland – whether through the 
NIO or the Assembly – has focussed significant policy attention and resources on 
building workable frameworks for constructive sector engagement. However, the NIAO 
remarked that while prior initiatives had identified actions aimed at building a more 
effective relationship between government and the sector, progress in many areas had 
been slow and the ‘working relationship between government bodies and the sector 
could be improved’ (NIAO, 2010:16).  
This much was conceded by a senior departmental official in testimony before the 
Northern Ireland Public Accounts Committee: 
… what we have not done, perhaps, is to find a resolution on the complex 
issue of bureaucracy … Do we have a streamlined system that avoids 
undue pressure? Although we have not achieved that, I would say that it is 
a very difficult area and we did try to do so. … We did work on policy 
and sector involvement, yet we hear that the sector is not happy about that 
process. So, there is more to be done on that. With regard to outcomes 
and getting an outcome process … we have done some very good initial 
work … We achieved a lot, but a lot more is to be done. Therefore, I 
would hope to give ourselves at least a seven out of 10 (Public Accounts 
Committee, 2011). 
The Department for Social Development conceded that, by comparison with England, 
Northern Ireland had ‘diverged from, or fallen behind in terms of policy and practice’ 
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(NIAO, 2010:18). While taking into account statements from the Department that ‘there 
had been little or no attempt to promote the Compact across departments’, the NIAO 
also recognised that: 
... much effort has gone into establishing a framework promoting the 
relationship between government and the Sector … However, more than 
ten years after the Compact agreement, there is now widespread 
recognition that the relationship has not fully developed in accordance 
with its principles. We consider that relationships between organisations 
will not develop or achieve their full potential without substantial 
understanding, commitment and endeavour from government, public 
sector bodies and the Sector (NIAO, 2010:14). 
The Department for Social Development informed the NIAO that work had commenced 
on a replacement for the Compact, to be in place by late 2010, which would ‘provide an 
agreed vision, establish commitments for all signatories and facilitate the issue of codes 
of best practice’ (NIAO, 2010:14). The Department observed that the existing compact 
‘was a policy of the newly elected direct-rule Labour Government, and whilst it was 
endorsed by the NI Executive in 2000 the current Executive government does not have, 
or exercise, any ownership of it’ (Joint Government/Voluntary and Community Sector 
Forum, 2011).  
For its part, the NIAO acknowledged the likelihood of an increasingly difficult 
economic and funding environment in which pressures on both government and the 
sector will increase (NIAO, 2010:18). Despite the undoubted pressures, there is little 
evidence in Northern Ireland of the levels of rancour sometimes seen in the 
government-sector relationship in other jurisdictions. 
The Northern Ireland Compact – the policy stream 
The Northern Ireland Executive and the NIO (when the Assembly has been suspended) 
have pursued a number of initiatives to further the aims of the original 1998 Compact. 
One of these, ‘Partners for Change: Government’s Strategy for Support of the Voluntary 
and Community Sector in Northern Ireland 2001-2004’, was intended to provide the 
foundation for ‘fundamental decisions … about the future of government’s financial 
support of the sector’ (Department for Social Development, 2001).  
Partners for Change gave effect to the commitment to develop a supporting document 
setting out how government would put the principles and commitments in the Northern 
Ireland compact into practice. ‘[D]riven by a vision of government working with the 
voluntary and community sector’, Partners for Change set out a detailed ‘catalogue’ of 
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cross-cutting actions to be taken by all government departments in Northern Ireland to 
further their partnership with the sector (under the policy lead of the Department for 
Social Development).  
Actions were grouped under three themes: capacity building; working together; and 
resourcing the sector. They were underpinned by four common aims intended to 
‘demonstrate Government’s commitment to ensure a coherent and co-ordinated policy 
of support for the voluntary and community sector in keeping with the aims, principles 
and values outlined in the Compact’ (Department for Social Development, 2001:39). 
The four commons aims were:  
• Shaping Policy Development through co-operation and shared learning in policy and 
programme formulation and by sharing models of best practice between the 
voluntary and community sector and the statutory sector; 
• Building Communities by recognising that local ownership and involvement in 
planning, decision-making and regeneration processes are necessary foundations 
upon which lasting peace, equality and prosperity can be built; 
• Promoting Active Citizenship through measures to increase the level of community 
volunteering and giving priority to developing community involvement amongst 
groups currently under-represented in volunteering activities; and 
• Tackling Disadvantage by ensuring that funding for voluntary action and 
community development is targeted towards those individuals, groups and areas 
where need is recognised to be greatest (Department for Social Development, 
2001:39). 
In 2004, PricewaterhouseCoopers was commissioned to undertake an independent 
review of the strategy. The evaluation took note of two factors: (1) that Partners for 
Change was from the outset an ‘unfunded policy’; and, (2) the inherent complexity of 
co-ordinating all operational departments in the development of best practice and 
forging new partnership relations with the sector (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004).95  
The evaluation also affirmed that ‘the benefits from partnership working outweighed the 
costs of doing so’ and confirmed the ‘ongoing relevance of the Compact as a 
“backdrop” for a future strategy’. It also found ‘confusion between the cross cutting 
themes and core aims in Partners for Change, compounded by the shared values and 
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principles of the Compact’ and recommended ‘that a subsequent Strategy should have 
one overall aim specified and a small number of strategic objectives’ in order to 
establish ‘a clear identity or “brand” distinct from other initiatives’ 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004:vi). The evaluation recommended financial investment 
in furthering the strategy:  
… the enhanced monitoring requirements and need for active promotion 
and marketing suggest, that unlike the current Strategy, which was not 
additionally funded, there will be a degree of investment required for the 
development, implementation, monitoring and promotion of a future 
strategy (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004:viii). 
A subsequent Partners for Change strategy (2006-08) set out actions to be undertaken 
by operational departments in relation to three key themes: 
• building communities and promoting active citizenship; 
• shaping policy development and working together; and 
• investment in the Sector and capacity building. 
Departments nominated a total of 112 ‘action points’ or commitments addressing the 
themes. Targeting disadvantage was a key objective across all three and the Strategy 
was also informed by a separate 2005 initiative, 'Positive Steps', the government’s 
strategy for resourcing the voluntary and community sector (Department for Social 
Development, 2006, NIAO, 2010:12).96 
However, in its 2010 audit the NIAO expressed disappointment that:  
… departments have not done more to ensure that the principles contained 
in Positive Steps and the Guide to Funders (adopted and promoted by the 
Department of Finance and Personnel in 2007) are being fully applied. 
This would provide a robust basis to inform further guidance and policy 
developments (NIAO, 2010:47). 
The NIAO also drew attention to a degree of disconnect between the progress reported 
by the Department for Social Development against Partners for Change/Positive Steps 
and sector perceptions that actions to date fell well short of expectations (NIAO, 
2010:16). 
The Northern Ireland Compact – the politics stream 
Any discussion of the Northern Ireland Compact and its successor framework(s) is 
inseparable from a consideration of the fraught process of devolution in the province. 
For over fifty years from 1921 Northern Ireland had a devolved legislature in the form 
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of the Parliament of Northern Ireland until it was dissolved and replaced with short-
lived assemblies in 1973 and again in 1982. Thus, from 1972 until 1998 when the 
current Northern Ireland Assembly was established, the NFP sector in Northern Ireland 
existed in the political spaces created by direct rule (apart from brief periods). Even 
then, suspensions of the Assembly have meant that the realpolitik of direct rule has been 
the operational norm until the Assembly resumed operation in 2007.  
The devolved legislature for Northern Ireland – the New Northern Ireland Assembly 
(so-called to distinguish it from the Assembly provided for under the terms of the 
Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973) – was established under the terms of the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998. The Assembly’s executive arm is the Northern Ireland 
Executive, which first took power on December 2, 1999. There have been four elections 
(1998, 2003, 2007 and 2011) since the Assembly was created in 1998, although the 
Executive has been suspended on various occasions. Devolution was suspended in 
October 2002, under the terms of the Northern Ireland Act 2000, and the functions of 
the Assembly reverted to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (BBC, 2006, 
2007a, 2009, House of Commons Library, 2011b).  
Assembly elections took place on 26 November 2003 but the Assembly was again 
suspended. Further talks between Northern Ireland’s political parties (and involving the 
British and Irish governments) commenced in 2004 and led to the convening of a 
Transitional Assembly in May 2006 in preparation for a 2007 election, but without 
legislative powers (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2007?, House of Commons Library, 
2011b). At the 2007 election, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the republican 
Sinn Féin between them elected the largest number of MLAs. The so-called Stormont 
Agreement between the leaders of the DUP and Sinn Féin resulted in a commitment to 
set up an Executive Committee in a Northern Ireland Assembly to which devolved 
powers were restored in May 2007 (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2007?, Transitional 
Assembly, 2007?). 
The Northern Ireland Assembly elections in May 2011 were the first to take place 
following a full term of the Assembly (House of Commons Library, 2011b). The 
Northern Ireland Executive is made up of the First Minister, the deputy First Minister 
and 11 other ministers nominated by the political parties in the Northern Ireland 
Assembly in accordance with each party’s share of Assembly seats. It is a power-
sharing government in which the First Minister and deputy First Minister are nominated 
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by the largest (Democratic Unionist Party, or DUP) and second largest parties (Sinn 
Féin) respectively and act as chairmen of the Executive (Northern Ireland Executive, 
2010).  
Two agreements, the Good Friday agreement (1998) and the St Andrews Agreement 
(2006), establish the basis for Northern Ireland’s devolved system of government made 
up of the Northern Ireland Assembly and a joint executive based on cross-community 
power-sharing (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2007?). The 2011 election saw the 
formation of an Executive in which the DUP has five ministers and one junior minister; 
followed by Sinn Féin with four ministers and one junior minister; the Alliance Party of 
Northern Ireland with two ministers; and the Ulster Unionist Party and the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SLDP) each with one minister.97  
The Social Development ministry, wherein resides responsibility for community and 
voluntary sector development, is currently held by the DUP, although from May 2007 to 
May 2010, the ministry was held by the SLDP.98 Unlike other jurisdictions where 
majoritarian politics determine the ideological cast of government the dynamics of 
Northern Ireland’s executives tend to blur traditional left-right distinctions. Party 
political identifiers are entirely absent from Assembly or Executive websites, for 
example, including Ministers’ websites, presumably owing to historical sensitivities 
around ‘the troubles’ and the desire of stakeholders for stable government (The 
Economist). 
Implementation, issues and impact 
The 1998 compact continued as the touchstone for government-NFP sector relationships 
through the brief periods of home rule and the longer spells of direct rule in Northern 
Ireland. However, the exigencies of governing in a conflict-ridden community meant 
that the pace of public sector reform in the province was slower than in the rest of the 
UK (Birrell, 2012). As a result the NFP sector in Northern Ireland was to some extent 
insulated from the impact of public sector management reforms pursued elsewhere. The 
meant that some of the compact’s underpinning assumptions – those founded on 
expectations increased emphasis on cross-sector working and the modernisation of 
governance – remained largely unrealised. 
In 2003 a Task Force on Resourcing the Voluntary and Community Sector was 
established to develop a strategy that would enable the sector to contribute to the 
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achievement of government objectives and to the well-being of the Northern Ireland 
community. The Taskforce noted that increased levels of funding for the sector during 
the 1990s led to growth in established organisations and to an increase in the number of 
organisations in receipt of public funds. However, the short-term nature of available 
resources meant there was no long-term planning framework for resourcing the sector.  
Short-term funding equated to a constant round of applications for funding and ‘form 
filling’, leading to feelings of frustration in the sector and a sense of being under-valued. 
The Taskforce found that an increasing array of checks and audit requirements by 
funding bodies did little to help the sector develop better systems of governance. In 
addition, many voluntary organisations were hampered by a lack of recognition on the 
part of funding bodies of the full cost of service delivery; a lack of investment in 
knowledge and skills development; and the lack of a secure funding base necessary to 
either facilitate bid preparation for public sector contracts or to contribute in any 
meaningful way to policy development.  
The Task Force made a number of recommendations aimed at addressing funding 
approaches, investment in sector development and enhancing internal governance. The 
Task Force also made recommendations in relation to a number of ‘change drivers’, 
such as access to support services, a skills strategy for the sector and a modernisation 
fund to enhance the technical capability of the sector. The Task Force advocated action 
at senior levels in government departments to promote adherence to and awareness of 
the compact: for example the appointment of a senior official in each department who 
would have responsibility for compact implementation and overseeing relationships 
with the sector. The Task Force also recommended the creation of an appropriate 
mechanism to consider and report on non-compliance with the compact (McGrath, 
2004:8, 29-30,39-41). 
The government’s response to the Task Force came not from the Northern Ireland 
Executive but from the Minister of State for Northern Ireland. On the whole the 
government welcomed the recommendations and observed that they ‘fit well with the 
government’s desire to develop coherent working relationships with the sector’ 
(Department for Social Development, 2005). The government acknowledged that the 
Task Force report represented ‘a significant agenda for change’, although not all 
recommendations were accepted, and many were deferred for further study (Department 
for Social Development, 2005:30-31). The government also committed to the 
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development of an action plan to be incorporated into a further iteration of Partners for 
Change (2006-2008) (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2007). 
Although the government accepted that adherence to the compact ‘is fundamental to 
effective and equitable partnership working between the Government and the voluntary 
and community sector’, it did not ‘deem it appropriate to establish a quasi-judicial 
mechanism for enforcing improved performance in an area which should focus on 
developing agreement and consensus on the measures and requirements to adhere to the 
Compact’, suggesting instead that existing complaints mechanisms would continue to 
be relied upon for instances of non-adherence to the compact (Department for Social 
Development, 2005:24). The government accepted the recommendation to task senior 
officials in government departments to promote awareness of the compact, but noted 
that it was incumbent upon the sector to act similarly within it’s own sphere 
(Department for Social Development, 2005:24). 
The government established an Implementation Group comprised of senior officials to 
oversee the implementation of agreed measures. Implementation was originally 
envisaged to occur over two years, however, despite ‘considerable progress against the 
majority of the recommendations’, the lifespan of the Implementation Group was 
extended in 2007 ‘until key actions are fully delivered’ (Department for Social 
Development, 2007). In the second annual report on the progress with the 
implementation of Positive Steps, the Minister – this time Northern Ireland MLA 
Margaret Ritchie rather than the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland – acknowledged 
an ‘expectation gap’ in relation to issues of longer-term funding, citing the constraints 
imposed by the government’s three-year budgetary cycle (Department for Social 
Development, 2008?). Nevertheless, the minister announced a number of new 
investments in capability and capacity building measures and the publication of a Best 
Practice Manual on Finance and Governance as well as a Code of Good Governance. 
The government’s final implementation report in 2009 outlined a number of key 
achievements, including substantial investments in community development and 
capacity-building; cross-cutting policy; charities law and regulation; and the 
establishment of a Charity Commission for Northern Ireland (Department for Social 
Development, 2009). Commitments still outstanding fell under two broad headings: 
developing processes of audit and accountability that minimise the ‘bureaucratic 
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burden’ on the sector, and the relationship between the government and the sector. With 
regard to the latter, the report indicated that: 
Minister Ritchie has recently signalled her intention to bring forward to 
the NI Executive a new framework for relationships between Government 
and the sector by the end of 2009. Policy development work is continuing 
to ensure that this exacting timetable is met (Department for Social 
Development, 2009:vii). 
In November 2008, a motion put to the Assembly called on the Executive to 
commission a policy paper on options to strengthen its relationship with the voluntary 
sector (NIAO, 2010:14). In speaking to the motion, Alliance Party MLA Anna Lo, 
noted the significant contributions made by the community and voluntary sector as ‘a 
key social partner working with Government’. She also drew attention to the sector’s 
‘enormous experience and expertise’, as well as its capacity ‘to be innovative, flexible 
and value for money’. Lo went on to remark that: 
The 10-year-old compact between Government and the sector is a largely 
aspirational document but, despite follow-on initiatives … to implement a 
compact in a practical way, its principles have not translated into day-to-
day practices. In particular, the sector has become frustrated by the 
increasingly bureaucratic and complex accounting system, which takes 
away the focus on service delivery (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2010). 
Lo suggested that the policy paper should set out ‘a structure for relations between the 
Northern Ireland Assembly, the Executive and the sector’ that would provide a basis for 
‘structured contact’ between the sector, officials, politicians and ministers. The 
Assembly accordingly resolved: 
That this Assembly calls on the Executive to produce a policy paper 
committing itself to strengthening the relationship between Government 
and the voluntary sector, thereby developing an important asset for the 
whole community; urges Ministers to review the impact of efficiency 
savings and other departmental discussions on the sector and those who 
depend on its services; notes the downturn in European Union funding 
across the sector; and further calls for better cross-departmental funding 
to support the delivery of Programme for Government targets using the 
third sector’s capacity (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2010). 
Consultation on a new ‘Concordat’ between the government and the voluntary and 
community sector commenced in early 2011. NICVA strongly supported the move to 
replace the previous compact, although it also expressed misgivings about the adequacy 
of the consultation process and timescale. NICVA also cautioned that ‘the concordat 
will only work if it has strong advocates in the sector and is developed with enough 
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‘buy in’ from organisations right across the voluntary and community sector – not just 
around the Joint Forum table’ (NICVA, 2011).  
A consultation paper on the proposed Concordat acknowledged general support across 
both government and the sector for replacement of the existing compact and for: 
... providing greater recognition for the voluntary and community sector 
and the role it plays in delivering public services and its contribution to 
the development of civil society … It is recognised by all that good 
working relationships between Government and the voluntary and 
community sector are vital to the public interest (Joint 
Government/Voluntary and Community Sector Forum, 2011:1). 
Whilst retaining and reinforcing the values and principles set out in the original 1998 
Compact, the new Concordat would: 
• emphasise that the interests of the public must come first when the sector and 
government do business together; 
• require genuine commitment and a willingness to deliver, not just from 
government, but also from the voluntary and community sector; 
• more fully reflect new structures for delivery of local services; and 
• emphasise the need for modernisation, mergers and collaboration in the face of 
‘difficult economic times’ (Joint Government/Voluntary and Community Sector 
Forum, 2011:2). 
The new Concordat, signed by each of the 13 members of the Northern Ireland 
Executive together with 14 sector representatives, was launched in October 2011. 
Announcing the Executive’s endorsement of a new Concordat, Social Development 
Minister Alex Attwood said: 
Signatories to this Concordat share the belief that these partnership 
arrangements will assist citizens and communities to empower 
themselves, make a significant contribution to democratic governance, 
bring people and politicians closer together and provide opportunities to 
influence decision making and resource allocation (Attwood, 2011). 
According to one senior official, giving evidence at a hearing of the Northern Ireland 
Public Accounts Committee, the key difference between the compact and the concordat 
is that the former was a ‘rather general statement’ whereas the Concordat is intended to 
be ‘very practical’: 
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The compact was a rather general statement about working together. It 
was a general approach and process, which came from the direct rule 
period …The key difference is in the public accountability for the 
relationship and the fact that there are going to be annual reports, rather 
than the more generalised process there has been up to now. I think that 
the concordat is more likely to get traction than the compact (Public 
Accounts Committee, 2011:5, 19). 
The same official noted that under the concordat, the Department for Social 
Development will report annually to the Minister and the Executive ‘on how the 
voluntary and community sector and the Departments, led by DSD, have worked 
together, and, in particular, how we have resolved some of the key issues that need to be 
sorted out to make sure that our partnership is effective’. He added a further contextual 
qualification:  
We heard today that unemployment is at its worst level in 17 years. We 
look at the pressures that will be around here. We recognise that, unless 
the partnership is effective, we cannot deliver the quality of services to 
the public that is essential (Public Accounts Committee, 2011:5). 
The Concordat follows a similar formula to other cross-sector agreements. It 
commences with a series of statements about shared vision, the respective roles of 
government and the sector, the nature of the relationship and shared aspirations. Annex 
1 to the agreement identifies shared values and principles, and Annex 2 – importantly – 
sets out a ‘commitment programme’ of 12 key activities that will act as ‘drivers for 
change’ and help to ‘ensure the effective delivery of significant elements of the 
Concordat’ (see Appendix 3, Figure A3.6). 
The official providing testimony to the Public Account Committee spoke about the 
importance of the sector using the annual reporting framework as a means to leverage 
its voice in the policy domain and offered a realistic appraisal of the effort required by 
both parties to give practical effect to the undertakings contained in the Concordat: 
There often has to be quite robust debate between the public sector and 
the community and voluntary sector. It is about a robust, effective 
partnership; it is not about sweetness and light. There are some really 
tough issues that we have to hammer out; not all of them are easy. The 
sector often has to raise its game in different areas to deliver for the 
public. These are the issues that we have to deal with. In truth, it will 
depend on how well we use the mechanisms. I think that they are 
effective, but they are only as good as the effort we put in. I readily admit 
that (Public Accounts Committee, 2011:22). 
  159 
Implications 
In its first annual report on the Concordat in June 2012, the Joint 
Government/Voluntary and Community Sector Forum (the Joint Forum) informed the 
Executive and the Assembly that four Concordat Action Teams (CATs) had been 
established to pursue actions deemed to have a high priority by virtue of their being 
essential building blocks for the remaining reforms. The four CATs have focussed on: 
• Structural reform (providing the Assembly with a yearly report from the Joint 
Forum through the DSD Minister on issues impacting on the Voluntary and 
Community Sector; reviewing the terms of reference and membership of the Joint 
Forum; documenting the new agreement and emerging public sector structures 
and responsibilities; and exploring and developing processes whereby Concordat 
non-compliance can be addressed) 
• Outcome-focused Approach to Funding (by identifying good practice models of 
outcome-related investment; identifying best practice policy/legislation in relation 
to outcome-related investment within other jurisdictions; developing appropriate 
definitions relating to outputs and outcomes; and producing appropriate guidance 
material on how an outcome-focus will be built into government funding and 
procurement as well as the manner in which the sector is expected to evidence 
outcomes delivered as a consequence of investment by government) 
• Influence and Examine the Impact of Government Policy (by providing 
opportunities for the voluntary and community sector to influence and examine 
the impact of government policy) and 
• Bureaucracy (by identifying options for improvements to public sector funding to 
the sector, that will deliver greater proportionality of administration, reduce 
duplication of effort or deliver better value for money) (Joint 
Government/Voluntary and Community Sector Forum, 2012:10-16). 
While reporting ‘good progress’ in relation to commitments such as the impact of policy 
development and outcome-focused funding and bureaucracy, the Joint Forum reminded 
the Assembly that: 
It was never the intention of the Concordat to offer quick-fix solutions but 
rather that it would provide the framework for a long-term process that 
would develop and mature over a number of years. Where matters can be 
addressed with speed, however, it is the intention of the Joint Forum to 
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ensure that this happens (Joint Government/Voluntary and Community 
Sector Forum, 2012). 
Speaking to the report, the Minister for Social Development informed the Executive and 
the Assembly that: 
Progress over the last six months has been substantial and I have been 
impressed by the commitment of representatives from the Public Sector 
and from the Voluntary and Community Sector to collaborative and 
partnership working on issues that have not proven easy to resolve. A 
great deal of energy and thought has gone into the design of structures 
and arrangements for working together to provide the roadmap for future 
action and bring effective and efficient results in the coming years 
(Northern Ireland Assembly, 2012). 
Conclusion 
Relations between the NFP sector and government in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland have been shaped by endogenous factors such as historical legacies of strong 
associational cultures and voluntary action; long-standing representation of sector 
interests by local intermediary organisations; the creation newly devolved governments 
of institutions for cross-sector working; a continuing attachment to the idea of state 
intervention and provision; a willingness to develop an expanded narrative embracing 
social enterprise and other forms of non-state action; and the fashioning of new political 
discourses around governance and national consciousness. The single greatest 
exogenous factor affecting the government-sector relationship is economic austerity 
flowing from a fiscal policy crafted by Westminster. In all likelihood this will shape the 
social policy approach of all UK governments in the immediate term, especially given 
the Cameron government’s resolve to slash public sector borrowing commitments by 
2015 (Alcock, 2012:234). 
Although each of the devolved UK jurisdictions inherited a compact developed in 
Whitehall, these were not ‘boilerplate’ versions of the ‘English’ compact. Nevertheless, 
the sub-national compacts bore the imprint of New Labour’s communitarian agenda and 
were, in essence, Blarite prescriptions for the ills that had afflicted past relationships 
between the sector and Conservative governments. They did not, and realistically could 
not anticipate the nature of the relationships between the NFP sector and the yet-to-be 
devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Thus, the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland compacts acted as drivers of policy 
rather than responses to problems identified within sub-national policy communities or 
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solutions championed by policy entrepreneurs. It is also apparent that the elected 
executive in each jurisdiction sought, over time, to re-fashion the relationship 
framework to suit prevailing conditions and the preferences of local state and non-state 
actors.  
In Scotland, the Scottish Compact quietly gave way over time to a much broader 
discourse emphasising the social economy and based upon a tripartite relationship 
between the Assembly government, local government and the sector. It appears from the 
record that the first minority Labour administrations in Scotland did attempt to 
implement the Scottish Compact in a meaningful way. However, a framework 
agreement predicated on relations between the Scottish government and intermediary 
organisations appeared to have less relevance in a jurisdiction where the nexus between 
the NFP sector and local government is of greater salience.99  
Of the devolved jurisdictions NFP sector policy in Wales has shown greater overall 
stability and continuity owing to its statutory foundations and a political consensus 
about the value of the VSS. The ‘Welsh compact’ was designed with a view to it 
becoming quickly redundant – which indeed it did. What replaced it was something 
altogether more durable, the VSS – the only cross-sector cooperation framework in the 
Anglo-Saxon world with a basis in legislation. Unlike Scotland, where the devolved 
Executive attempted to graft an inherited framework upon a new and evolving 
relationship, Welsh ministers had a statutory obligation to make a scheme in 
consultation with the sector from the outset. In this endeavour they were unconstrained 
by a framework document and were thus able to arrive at an accommodation agreeable 
to the Welsh Assembly and the NFP sector early in the life of the newly-devolved 
government. 
Northern Ireland, on the other hand, had a far more fraught path to devolution, and 
continued under direct rule for the better part of the Labour decade. Interestingly, direct 
rule acted to tacitly anoint the NFP sector in Northern Ireland as both a crucial partner 
and unofficial opposition. In addition to its role as a service provider and partner in 
policy development, the sector has been an important source of conferred legitimacy for 
government and has played an important role in bridging the sectarian divide in the 
province. The Northern Ireland compact guided relations between the NFP sector and 
central government at Westminster (via the NIO) and the Northern Ireland government, 
until being replaced in 2012 by the Concordat (the adoption of which suggests that the 
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Northern Ireland power-sharing executive continues to see the sector as an important 
contributor to governance and, increasingly, service delivery).  
The establishment by assembly governments of new instrumentalities to develop and 
deliver policies for the NFP sector has, according to Alcock, created new spaces for 
policy engagement, particularly as the remit of lead agencies in each jurisdiction 
extends beyond a narrow focus on the voluntary and community sector to embrace 
social enterprise and other organisational forms in a wider third sector (Alcock, 
2012:225-226). Furthermore, the development of formalised government-sector 
relations where none had existed previously has given intermediary organisations more 
power and influence than they had before devolution, especially given the smaller scale 
of government in the devolved jurisdictions (Alcock, 2012:227). 
Even after the passing of the ‘New Labour’ era there remains in all four of the 
constituent countries (including England) a continuing appetite for policy frameworks 
that support cross-sector engagement and collaboration. This is a testament to the 
durability of that element of the ‘Third Way’ doctrine and the extent to which it has 
served to politically de-contest the question of the NFP sector having a central role in 
the framing and implementation of social policy. Although the ‘Third Way’ has given 
way to new discourses, the third sector is still in the frame. A continuing interest in 
cross-sector working also underscores the incontestable fact that governments have 
come to depend on the NFP sector for the delivery of a significant share of mandated 
public services, and that the NFP sector is no longer content to act merely as a service 
agent for government. 
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Chapter Six – Formal relationship frameworks in 
Australia’s states and territories∗ 
This chapter considers policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation in Australia’s 
eight states and territories and examines the political and historical factors that brought 
them about. Owing to the number of jurisdictions covered in this chapter it is infeasible 
to examine each of the cases in detail.  
In the discussion that follows, observations from each case are drawn together the under 
the broad headings of the problem stream, the policy stream, and the politics stream, in 
order to identify significant commonalities and differences between the cases. Readers 
wishing to investigate in greater detail the history of cross-sector policy frameworks in 
each state and territory jurisdiction may look to the series of one-page vignettes at 
Appendix 5. 
Not all of the policy frameworks considered in this chapter were fully implemented or 
realised their full potential: some were reshaped or relegated by incoming governments 
and some failed to live up to their initial promise and fell by the wayside. Others have 
exhibited durability and have enjoyed some success. All were pursued in order to give 
effect to agreed ‘rules of engagement’ between governments (and their 
instrumentalities) and the NFP sectors in each jurisdiction. Although some of the 
frameworks aim to embrace the ‘whole-of-government’ or ‘whole-of-sector’, in practice 
most give particular emphasis to those parts of the sector upon which governments have 
become increasingly reliant for the delivery of mandated public services. In general, 
these fall into the category of community-based social welfare and ancillary health 
services. 
As discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, formal relationship framework documents 
in part represent a symbolic acknowledgement of the important contribution of civil 
society generally, and NFP service providers in particular, to the social well-being of 
the community. These frameworks are also intended to serve as a touchstone for agreed 
                                                
∗ This chapter is an expanded version of a paper first presented at the Association for Research 
on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA) 40th Annual Conference in 
Toronto, Ontario, from17-19 November 2011. An amended version of the original paper was 
peer-reviewed and accepted for publication in a forthcoming volume in the ANZSOG 
monograph series. 
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values, principles, attitudes and norms underpinning government’s relationship with the 
sector. In practice, most compacts have been framed as a means to remedy the 
perceived corrosive effects of past procurement and contracting practices and to give 
substance to the rhetoric of ‘partnership’.  
Historically, the procurement and contracting practices of governments have tended to 
emphasise the accountability of service providers (agents) to governments (principals). 
Accountability is not unidirectional: Compacts have a role to play in balancing the flow 
of accountability between government, the NFP sector and the public: accountability 
from NFP service providers for performance; and the accountability of government for 
maximising the effective delivery of public policy in the public interest.  
NFP service providers have never been comfortable with being cast in the role of mere 
‘contractors’ or agents of state service delivery. To the contrary, NFP service providers 
see themselves – individually and collectively – as policy actors in their own right; as 
repositories of expertise and knowledge; and, importantly, sources of legitimacy. 
Indeed, it might be said that when entering into contracts with NFP providers for the 
delivery of publicly mandated services, governments are buying both capacity and the 
legitimacy that NFP providers bring to service delivery (Moore, 2000).100  
Elson (2011a:137) observes that there have been few comparative analyses of 
subnational relationship framework agreements within the same country, and this is 
certainly true of Australia. Although compacts have been part of the policy mix in 
Australian states and territories for over a decade, there have been few attempts at a 
systematic survey of relationship framework documents and relatively little has been 
published in peer reviewed journals, notable exceptions being Baulderstone (2008), 
Brown and Ryan(2003), Butcher (2006, 2011, forthcoming), Edgar and Lockie (2010), 
and Pugh (2007).  
The analysis presented here is based upon an extensive review of relevant primary 
documents and a more limited secondary literature. The primary literature – as is the 
case with the other jurisdictions considered in this dissertation – is replete with policy 
documents, press releases, correspondence and reports (including Parliamentary 
Reports, reports by State Audit Offices and consultants). This literature is invaluable in 
re-constructing the policy histories of the relationship frameworks in each jurisdiction.  
 
 
 
 
167 
Insights drawn from the literature are corroborated by in-depth interviews conducted 
with senior public officials, senior NFP sector representatives and other elite policy 
actors in each jurisdiction (with the exception of the Northern Territory). In order to 
protect the confidentiality of interviewees none is identified by name or organisation. 
State and territory relationship frameworks in context 
When in March 2010 the Commonwealth announced the Australian National Compact 
it was traversing ground already well-ploughed by state and territory governments. 
From the mid-1990s all Australian state and territory governments have explored the 
potential of formal relationship frameworks with the NFP sector to resolve the tensions 
and contradictions inherent in the contract state.  
The discussion that follows considers the range of factors influencing the adoption of 
formal cross-sector policy frameworks, as well as the factors contributing to their 
success and failure. This thesis contends that the processes underlying the diffusion and 
adaptation of these policy frameworks have as much interest for the researcher and 
policy practitioner as does their content or operational dimensions. 
Although each of the frameworks discussed trace their provenance to the ‘English’ 
compact, each has deviated from that original template in response to local political, 
social or institutional factors (as indeed has the English compact itself over time). Some 
of the frameworks that have emerged are genuine bilateral agreements, while others are 
unilateral policy statements formulated with differing degrees of co-development. Each 
policy framework differs in its scope, institutional arrangements and operational 
frameworks.  
Some are intended to encompass the ‘whole-of-sector’ or ‘whole-of-government’ (ACT, 
TAS, QLD), while others are expressly concerned with the health and social welfare 
sub-sectors (NSW, SA, VIC, WA). Some have effectively lapsed (NSW, QLD) owing 
to changes of government, or appear to have lost policy salience (SA). Others appear to 
enjoy ongoing or renewed policy salience (ACT, VIC). Two are relatively recent, and 
their performance is yet to be assessed (WA, TAS). A listing of current and lapsed state 
and territory framework documents is provided in Figure 6.1 below: 
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*  Denotes jurisdictions in which existing or proposed relationship frameworks have been 
affected by a change of government. 
** Denotes year in which a change of government occurred in jurisdictions where compacts 
have lapsed. 
Legend 
ACT Australian Capital Territory 
SA South Australia 
VIC Victoria 
WA Western Australia 
TAS  Tasmania 
NSW New South Wales 
QLD Queensland 
NT Northern Territory 
 
State and territory relationship frameworks – the 
problem stream 
It should be no surprise that Australia’s state and territory governments have explored 
the potential of formal cross-sector policy frameworks to support a more cooperative 
relationship with the NFP sector. It one respect, this is a natural consequence of 
Australia’s constitutional division of powers which confers primary responsibility upon 
states and territories for the delivery of health and human services, housing and 
education (ACT, 2000:6, Casey et al., 2008c:4).101 This means that state and territory 
administrations have a much larger financial and operational exposure to the NFP sector 
by comparison with the national government. 102 
 
Figure 6.1 – State and territory relationship framework documents 
Relationship frameworks currently in force 
ACT*  
SA  
VIC*  
WA* 
TAS 
Social Compact  
Stronger Together 
Memorandum of Understanding / Partnership Agreement  
Delivering Community Services in Partnership  
Partnership Agreement 
2001, 2004 & 2012 
2009 
2009-12 / 2010-14 
2011 
2012-15 
Relationship frameworks that have lapsed owing to a change of government 
NSW* 
QLD* 
Working Together  
Queensland Compact 
2006 (2010)** 
2008 (2012)** 
Proposed relationship frameworks never formalised  
NT* Common Cause 2004-05 
  
The interdependence between the state/territory public sector and NFP service providers 
has been cemented by the former’s adoption of competitive tendering and contracting as 
a preferred service delivery modality.103 It might be argued, therefore, that resource 
dependence leads the NFP sector to seek accommodations with sub-national 
governments to assure income and to ameliorate the power imbalance between the 
purchasers and providers of mandated public services.  
In the problem stream are found a similar mix of issues to those that apply in many of 
the other jurisdictions so far examined. In a series of semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews with elite-level sector representatives and public officials in six states and the 
Australian Capital Territory the following ‘problems’ emerged as having broad 
salience: contracting practices employed by public sector purchasers; compliance 
burdens on NFP sector providers; failure to fund providers for the full cost of services; 
marginalisation of the sector in policy formulation; and the effects of competition on 
NFP sector culture and behaviour. Each of these is discussed below.  
Principal agent contracting 
During the 1990s state and territory governments were under constant pressure to at 
once reign-in expenditure and expand services. In their attempts to respond to these 
conflicting imperatives most states and territories engaged in almost continual 
restructuring and re-organisation. Public sector agencies were re-profiled, re-configured 
and downsized. Mandatory across-the-board savings requirements were imposed in 
many jurisdictions and agencies were constantly challenged to do more with less.  
Reducing programs by cutting expenditure and/or changing eligibility requirements or 
imposing fee-for-service arrangements had the effect of forcing people in need to seek 
assistance from NFP organisations. However, the change from grant funding to contract 
funding (for which there was seldom provision made for operational overheads) meant 
that the income base of NFP service providers was considerably narrowed, thereby 
constraining their capacity to respond to demand outside the bounds of contracted 
service delivery. Cost-shifting and cross-subsidisation were natural recourses for 
organisations seeking to fulfil their value mission. 
In each of the jurisdictions examined, those interviewed – both from the NFP sector and 
the public sector – cited a variety of externalities associated with the service 
procurement and contracting regimes used by government instrumentalities. In many 
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ways, this was a re-play of the contracting experience in overseas jurisdictions such as 
the UK and Canada where the introduction of neoliberal approaches to public 
administration and governance had been underway since the early 1980s, including the 
progressive replacement of grant funding with POSCs with NFP service providers. One 
senior NFP sector administrator remarked that the impact of contracting on the altruistic 
mission of NFPs and upon diversity in values and modes of service delivery was 
‘something we need to reflect on’ (personal communication, 1 April 2011). 
In New South Wales it was argued that a compact might ‘help to ameliorate the 
[tensions inherent in] the great rush to market-based funding mechanisms’ (personal 
communication, 13 September 2011b). A compact might also assist the sector to 
respond to major structural changes begin driven, in part, by a shift from grants-based 
funding to performance-based funding under contract (personal communication, 13 
September 2011b). A senior Western Australian government official conceded that past 
contracting practices not only served to diminish the ability of the NFP sector ability to 
innovate and provide alternate service delivery models (e.g. by being excessively 
prescriptive about inputs and outputs), but also asked NFP providers to deliver services 
‘at a price that we knew was not sustainable’ (personal communication, 5 July 2011). 
Compliance burden 
Where public and NFP service providers had once co-existed in a state of 
complementary symbiosis, a growing emphasis on NPM-inspired reforms from the 
early 1990s led Australian state and territory governments to favour non-state service 
provision over in-house provision where it was politically and practically feasible. In 
part this was driven by a national policy preoccupation with competition policy 
underpinned by an orthodox principal/agent approach to competitive tendering and 
contracting (CTC). Contracting – coupled with the absence of mature markets for public 
services, a risk-averse public sector culture, and capacity and capability deficits in both 
the public and NFP sectors in relation to CTC processes – resulted in a range of 
problems, including: excessive reporting requirements; prohibitive tendering costs; poor 
contract management; and financial uncertainty. The adverse effects upon NFP service 
providers of the compliance burden – long acknowledged within the sector – has come 
to be recognised by the public sector. As observed by one South Australian official:  
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Decisions we make about how we describe that relationship, how we 
regulate that relationship, how we request information from them, directly 
affect their day-to-day operations. We get that wrong, they spend way too 
much time writing reports to us about things that really don’t matter 
(personal communication, 6 July 2011b). 
The compliance burden is a common theme in NFP sector commentary across all 
jurisdictions. In 2006 the Victorian state Treasurer (under Labor) requested the State 
Services Authority to examine the impact of government regulation and other reporting 
requirements on the NFP sector. Overseen by Commissioner Susan Pascoe AM104 the 
report observed that regulation affecting the NFP sector had not received the same 
attention as regulation affecting the business sector. The review noted ‘growing 
concerns about the proliferation of legislation and rising burden of regulation’ and made 
a number of findings and recommendations aimed at reducing that regulatory and 
administrative burden while maintaining appropriate levels of accountability and 
transparency (Victoria, 2007).  
Full-cost pricing 
NFP service providers in all state and territory jurisdictions report the failure of 
commissioning agencies to fund the full-cost of service delivery. The impact of this 
‘funding gap’ on NFP organisations has been considerable, especially considering the 
shift away from grant funding and a consequently narrowed income base.  
Among the contributors to this situation are: (1) a presumption that community-based 
service providers will co-contribute to the cost of service delivery in accordance with 
their founding mission (but failing to take into account their limited ability to generate 
additional sources of income); (2) inexperience and lack of understanding in the tender 
preparation process, especially the calculation of an appropriate price/cost structure 
(including inadequate provision for overhead costs); (3) a presumption that cost 
structures are inherently lower in the NFP sector by comparison with the public sector 
(which they are, primarily because of a lack of wage parity under existing awards); and 
(4) a failure on the part of commissioning agencies to accept a responsibility to invest in 
the development of the NFP sector.  
As one NFP agency head from Western Australia observed: ‘government just doesn’t 
understand what it actually costs to deliver these services and in fact many government 
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agencies would still believe that they should be delivering these services’ (personal 
communication, 4 July 2011). 
In a number of jurisdictions the funding gap has been exacerbated by the failure of 
commissioning agencies to pass on indexed price adjustments to funded NFP service 
providers. Even when notionally obliged to do so (e.g. Western Australia and Victoria) 
public sector organisations have not consistently applied annual indexation to contract 
funding, sometimes choosing instead to use monies nominally earmarked for the 
purpose to defray mandated savings requirements in their own operations (personal 
communication, 18 April 2011). Failure to index funding had the effect of imposing real 
reductions in funding over successive years and potentially compromising the quality of 
services provided to clients.  
The problem is further complicated by the fact that industrial awards in the NFP 
community sector are already substantially lower than in the public sector or equivalent 
industries, making the recruitment and retention of suitably qualified staff much more 
difficult (personal communication, 3 October 2011b, 5 July 2011, 7 July 2011a, 18 
April 2011, 21 July 2011, 22 November 2010).105  
South Australian officials cited examples of sites where the public sector is obliged to 
continue providing services directly because NFP providers are unable to recruit and 
retain staff at a price they can afford:  
For example, we’re changing the arrangements for the delivery of anti-
poverty programs in Families SA – now in Coober Pedy we’re NOT 
changing the arrangements, we are continuing to deliver the services 
across the spectrum in Coober Pedy because we know there’s no other 
organisation that would be able to do it and, interestingly enough, we’ve 
got the same situation at Victor Harbour – there are no organisations that 
can actually deliver the same service in Victor Harbour, so we’re 
continuing to deliver that service in Victor Harbour rather than 
contracting out (personal communication, 7 July 2011a). 
Plainly, the funding gap severely constrains organisations in their attempts to grapple 
with significant structural bottlenecks in their labour markets. 
Marginalisation 
The late 1980s onwards witnessed a gradual substitution of a largely monopolistic 
welfare state directly providing a wide range of statutory public services for a largely 
monopsonistic state delivering services via third party providers where feasible. The 
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monopolistic state used its legislative and financial power to ensure the provision of a 
range of public services unable to be provided – so it was believed – by the private 
market or charitable sector. The monopsonistic state, on the other hand, uses it 
legislative and financial power to leverage the delivery of public goods by private 
and/or NFP sector providers. In some human services sub-sectors mature markets do 
not exist and new quasi-markets have had to be established in order to establish a 
contestable market environment in which competition between rival providers can 
generate choice, responsiveness to consumers and economic efficiency.  
Under the monopolistic state NFP organisations were funded for the purpose of 
undertaking activities deemed to be complementary to the public sector, such as 
providing non-standardised forms of service. Cross-sector relationships were often 
cordial and collegial (although the public sector sometimes adopted a ‘state knows best’ 
position). The monopsonistic state was less inclined to engage with the sector as a 
policy partner. The contractual nexus reinforced a principal-agent dichotomy in which 
the state – as commissioner and purchaser – tended to be directive, authoritarian and 
controlling. This took the form of prescribing inputs and outputs and, perversely, 
stifling innovation. 
Competition 
The introduction of contracting brought with it a set of competitive behaviours that in 
times past were not much in evidence in the NFP sector. Although governments held 
out the promise of ‘healthy’ competition to deliver choice, better practice and 
innovation through benchmarking, competition between NFP service providers 
inhibited cooperation, information-sharing and other collaborative behaviours. 
Competition also encouraged predatory business practices such as under-cutting rival 
bidders and poaching staff (Butcher and Freyens, 2011).  
One NFP sector leader from South Australia asserted that competitive tendering has 
resulted in the breakdown of collegiality around the sharing of resources and skills 
within the sector. As he put it, governments determine the level of resources they are 
prepared to commit and the sector is then invited to fight over those resources (personal 
communication, 6 July 2011a). Similarly, in New South Wales ‘throwing open’ human 
services markets to competitive tendering led to competition between organisations and 
a ‘great deal of tension’ (personal communication, 17 November 2010). 
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State and territory relationship frameworks – the policy 
stream 
It is quite clear from the primary documents that in coming to their decisions, each 
jurisdiction has expressly taken into account framework agreements overseas or in other 
Australian jurisdictions. This is suggestive of a process of policy diffusion in which the 
preferred policy responses in one polity are systematically conditioned by prior choices 
made in others (Simmons et al., 2006:787) and describes well the succession of policy 
discourses around the issue of cross-sector collaboration and partnership in Australian 
states and territories over the past decade. It might also be suggested that interest in the 
possibilities of cross-sector framework agreements followed in the wake of the prior 
diffusion of public administration doctrines, such as those encompassed by NPM 
(Hood, 1991, Common, 1998, Halligan, 2011).  
It is clear from the primary documents and from contemporaneous NFP sector 
commentary that framework agreements were intended to address a suite of problems 
that were substantially the same in each jurisdiction. For this reason the emergence of 
policy discourses around issues of cross-sector cooperation is also suggestive of 
processes of policy convergence – the tendency for policy formulations in different 
jurisdictions to grow more alike in response to commonly-shared problems (Drezner, 
2001). In this light, the adoption of compacts or similar framework documents in 
different jurisdictions can be seen as a convergent response to the range of externalities 
associated with particular applications of NPM, such as the competitive tendering and 
contracting (CTC) of human service delivery. 
Although the factors referred to above go some way towards explaining the emergence 
in state/territory jurisdictions of policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation, they do 
not explain the often marked differences in their expression ‘on the ground’ in terms of 
their form, durability and impact. Closer consideration of the historical, institutional and 
political context within which these policy frameworks arise is, therefore, required. In 
order to do so, the following factors are taken into account: the influence of policy 
communities such as the state and territory Councils of Social Service (COSS 
networks), research communities (research centres and ‘think tanks’), and political 
parties (especially those of the centre-left); the influence of cross-sector policy 
frameworks in other overseas or Australian jurisdictions; and the role of policy 
entrepreneurs.  
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COSS networks  
The most influential conduit of information about current issues in NFP sector-related 
policy and practice is via the Councils of Social Service (COSS) in each state and 
territory and through the national organisation, the Australian Council of Social Service. 
As a ‘peak of peaks’ the COSSs are the natural collecting point for information, 
research and shared experience in the health and human services sectors. The COSSs 
are important interlocutors with government on issues of sector reform, social welfare 
and the impact of public policy on the vulnerable and disadvantaged and for this reason 
the COSS leadership was also at the leading edge of adaptive responses to the 
challenges confronting the sector as a consequence of public sector reforms in the 
1990s.  
COSSs led the case within the NFP sector in favour of framework agreements as 
evidenced by the fact that they were signatories to most policy frameworks, either in 
their own right (SA) or as the lead organisation in a consortium of peak organisations 
(Qld, NSW, Tas, Vic). The ACT’s Social Compact does not have signatories, although 
it does include ‘endorsements’ from a variety of community sector organisations, 
including the ACT Council of Social Service. The WA Delivering Community Service 
in Partnership Policy, as a policy statement of government, does not have signatories 
although the document was co-developed with the WA Council of Social Service. 
Research communities 
A number of university research centres and non-profit ‘think tanks’ have had some 
influence in the NFP policy space. There are think-tanks with deep historical and 
institutional links to the ALP (such as the Evatt Foundation) or the Liberal Party (the 
Menzies Research Centre), just as there are those whose worldview is broadly aligned 
with either the left (the Australian Fabian Society), centre left (the Australia Institute), 
centre right (the Centre for Independent Studies) or the right (the Institute for Public 
Affairs) of the political spectrum, however none focus exclusively on the NFP sector or 
civil society (although they might occasionally venture in that direction). For example, 
there is no equivalent Australian organisation to Demos or Centris in the UK that have 
exerted influence on British Labour’s approach to the not-for profit sector. 
A number of Australian universities do have centres with research streams on the NFP 
policy space. These include the Whitlam Institute (University of Western Sydney); the 
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Centre for Social Impact (a collaboration of the University of New South Wales, the 
University of Melbourne, Swinburne University of Technology and the University of 
Western Australia); Cosmopolitan Civil Societies (University of Technology Sydney); 
and the Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies (Queensland 
University of Technology). A relative newcomer to this research space, the Centre for 
Social Impact, whose inaugural CEO was former head of the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet Peter Shergold, has gained the ear of Australian governments 
since its establishment in 2008.  
Although centres such as these are important sites for scholarly and commissioned 
research it is difficult to gauge the impact of their research output on policy in the NFP 
domain. In addition, the Australian and New Zealand Third Sector Research (ANZTSR) 
is a network supporting scholarly research on NFP organisations, volunteering and 
philanthropy. The ANZTSR is an analogue of similar organisations in the US 
(ARNOVA) and the UK (ARVAC) as well as the International Society for Third Sector 
Research (ISTR).  
Political parties 
The concept of ‘policy communities’ describes a process in which ‘extra formal’ 
organised interests and governmental actors meet at the interstices between formal 
governmental or social institutions in order to pursue particularistic matters of public 
policy that are instrumental to their interests (Miller and Demir, 2007:137). Policy 
communities arise in order to shape the direction and outcome of public policies in 
policy environments characterised by pluralism, complexity and fragmentation (Miller 
and Demir, 2007:137).  
In the course of pursuing their interests, policy communities engage with a variety of 
(individual and collective) policy actors, including formal political parties. Such 
engagement can be mutually beneficial: political parties might benefit from the policy 
inspiration and intellectual legitimacy conferred by policy communities, and the latter 
might benefit from having their particularistic interests reflected in the formal policy 
platform of a political party.  
In democratic countries political parties exist to elect their member to legislatures and 
are therefore an integral part of the formal governmental process. However, many 
political parties have origins in informal social movements with which they often retain 
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political or institutional links. In addition, political parties sometimes also enjoy strong 
historical and institutional links kindred parties in other countries. This is particularly 
true of the Australian and British ‘labour’ parties (Frankel, 1997, James and Markey, 
2006).  
Just as NPM with its emphases on markets, competition, consumer empowerment and 
choice resonated with the neoliberal critique of ‘big government’, centre-left political 
parities, such as the ALP, appear to have been strongly attracted to ‘Third Way’ policy 
formulations – often in a visceral reaction to the more extreme manifestations of the 
neoliberal policy doctrine.  
Influence of prior framework documents 
The policy conversations concerning policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation in 
Australia’s states and territories have all at some point acknowledged the English or 
Canadian agreements. Knowledge of these seminal agreements was widely promulgated 
within NFP policy communities from their earliest days (PAEC, 2002). The 1998 
English Compact in particular was long considered the exemplar agreement according 
to which others might be judged. It is true that some jurisdictions elected to depart from 
the English model, judging that a bilateral agreement might not suit their needs, 
however, even unilateral policy documents such as the Western Australian Delivering 
Community Services in Partnership Policy (Western Australia, 2011) bears in its text an 
imprint of the template pioneered by the English Compact. 
Interestingly, there is little tangible evidence of policy transfer between Australian 
jurisdictions. Although informed NFP policy actors are aware of framework documents 
in other states and territories, that knowledge appears to of a highly superficial nature. 
Although this study did not set out to explicitly measure domain knowledge, 
conversations with policy actors in the NFP sector suggest that they are somewhat more 
aware of frameworks in other Australian jurisdictions (more by reputation than detailed 
knowledge) than are their counterparts in the public sector.  
That said, there was evidence of both formal and informal knowledge transfer between 
particular jurisdictions – such as from Victoria to Tasmania, both as a by-product of 
professional mobility between the public sectors of the two states and as a result of the 
explicit transfer of policy discourses (for example, the transmission of discourses 
around social inclusion from South Australia via Victoria to Tasmania). The clearest 
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example of policy transfer in the NFP sector is the duplication in NSW of a community 
sector charter (FONGA, 2011) originally developed in Queensland (Futures Forum, 
2007).  
Policy entrepreneurs 
As suggested above, there is little hard evidence for the explicit adoption of policy 
learnings between state and territory government agencies – even amongst those 
jurisdictions with Labor governments. What does emerge in the Australian context, is 
the importance of particular individuals who have acted as transmitters of ideas, 
constructs and norms from one jurisdiction to another. 
Interviews with elite policy actors in the public and NFP sectors revealed instances 
where particular persons acting as policy entrepreneurs played an important role in 
placing the notion of a formal framework agreement on the policy agenda. Kingdon’s 
(1995) characterisation of a policy entrepreneur is that of an individual with the drive, 
commitment and connections necessary to wield influence in the policy arena. Indeed 
there are examples of such persons from the cases: in New South Wales, for example, it 
was clear from the recollections of all persons interviewed that one person above all is 
attributed with having placed a compact on the policy agenda in that state (personal 
communication, 13 September 2011b, 17 November 2010, 18 November 2010b).  
Although this individual did not act alone, he had identified early on the evolving policy 
discourse in the UK and promoted a similar policy formulation here in Australia 
(personal communication, 13 September 2011b, 17 November 2010). Moreover, he 
used his high profile in the NFP sector in NSW together with contacts in the (then) 
Labor government to mobilise support for a compact within the NFP and the public 
sectors (personal communication, 17 November 2010, 18 November 2010b).  
There are other examples of individuals who by virtue of their expertise and experience 
have served as influential ‘transmitters’ of policy ideas and practice. One is Professor 
David Adams, who prior to being appointed Tasmania’s inaugural Social Inclusion 
Commissioner had formerly worked on social inclusion strategies for the Victorian state 
government. Another is the former Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet under Howard, Professor Peter Shergold, who as the inaugural CEO of the 
Centre for Social Impact, has been enlisted by the Western Australian and Tasmanian 
governments to facilitate the cross-sector dialogue leading to cross-sector policy 
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frameworks in those states. Both of these individuals have served as important conduits 
for the sharing and transmission of knowledge between jurisdictions. 
In some states and territories the intervention of a first minister (Anna Bligh in 
Queensland, Colin Barnett in Western Australia, Laura Giddings in Tasmania and Jon 
Stanhope in the Australian Capital Territory) was regarded by the NFP sector and 
government as conferring authority and legitimacy on the processes of negotiation and 
implementation. Interestingly, policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation have lost 
political and policy salience in jurisdictions beset by political instability and leadership 
change (as was the case with Labor governments in the Northern Territory, Western 
Australia, South Australia and New South Wales). 
The passage of time, the turn-over of personnel and the ephemeral nature of collective 
memory in the public and NFP sectors means that it is difficult to identify or to confirm 
with precision the precise roles played by the range of policy actors involved in 
mobilising support for particular policy frameworks for cross-sector working. 
Undoubtedly, the signatories to framework documents – the state COSS directors and 
the leadership of affiliated peak organisations would have played a role, as would 
government signatories and the public officials advising them.  
Professional mobility within the upper ranks of the state and territory public services 
might also contribute to the transmission of ideas and approaches between organisations 
and between jurisdictions. As a case in point, Tasmanian officials interviewed for this 
study in part attributed early support for a compact in the Tasmanian Department of 
Health and Human Services to the influence of senior public servants formerly 
employed by the Victorian state government (personal communication, 3 October 
2011b, 4 October 2011b). 
State and territory relationship frameworks – the 
politics stream 
At one time or another formal cross-sector policy frameworks have been part of the 
policy palette in all Australian states and territories in states and territories and have in 
most cases been initiated by Labor administrations. This might be explained in part by 
the ALP’s historical and institutional associations with parts of what might be 
collectively termed ‘civil society’ (which includes the NFP sector), in particular the 
labour movement and ‘progressive’ social movements. The attractiveness for the NFP 
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sector of subnational cross-sector frameworks was possibly accentuated by the actions 
of a centre-right federal government pursuing a vigorous marketisation agenda 
(Considine, 1999, 2003, Halligan, 2005, Mendes, 2005, Singleton, 2005, Aulich and 
O'Flynn, 2007a, Aulich and O'Flynn, 2007b). 
Throughout the first decade of the new century state and territory state and territory 
Labor governments explored options to improve their relationships with the NFP 
service providers. The desire to find better ways of cross-sector working has two broad 
antecedents: first, in the problem stream there was a growing recognition by 
governments and thought leaders of the limitations, contradictions and externalities 
associated with the application of the policy nostrums associated with NPM (see Pusey, 
2008); second, in the policy stream, there was a flowering of new policy thinking 
founded on notions of joined-up and networked governance (promoted at every 
opportunity by influential policy entrepreneurs both within and without the 
bureaucracy).  
In Australia’s states and territories the problem, policy and politics streams came 
together at different times, under different circumstances and with different results. In 
most jurisdictions the convergence of the three streams resulted in formal cross-sector 
policy frameworks achieving policy salience. However, political and leadership change, 
structural change in the machinery of government and the turn-over of senior personnel 
(some of them the very policy entrepreneurs who caused compacts to be placed on the 
agenda in the first place) also contributed to the closing of policy windows and the 
crowding-out or relegation of cross-sector policy frameworks in those jurisdictions 
where the frameworks had not achieved sufficient political momentum or were not 
institutionally or practically embedded. 
This section considers the characteristics of the political context in Australia’s states 
and territories along the following dimensions: the significance of Labor governments 
and the influence of election cycles and leadership change.  
Labor governments  
For the most part, the dialogue about formal policy frameworks for cross-sector 
working commenced under state and territory Labor governments. The one notable 
exception is the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) where Australia’s first compact was 
introduced in 2001 by an incumbent Liberal government in the lead-up to a territory 
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general election. It is difficult to say whether that document was a product of genuine 
policy conviction or political opportunism. What is known is that the ACT’s original 
compact was supported at the time of its introduction by the NFP sector and was 
subsequently re-branded and re-launched as Labor government policy in 2004 (personal 
communication, 1 April 2011).  
The period during which the majority of these policy frameworks were discussed 
coincided with a period in Australian political history when there were ‘wall-to-wall’ 
state and territory Labor governments. In 1996 Labor held office in only one state – 
New South Wales. In 2001, only South Australia and the ACT still had Liberal-led 
governments. By 2004, Labor governments held sway in each state and territory – a 
situation that would prevail until September 2008 with the formation of a Liberal-led 
government in Western Australia (see Figure 6.2).  
 
 
 
Thus, for much of the time that the Liberal/National Coalition governed nationally 
(1996-2007) Labor governed in the states and territories. This had the effect of raising 
hopes in the sector about the possibility of improved relationships between the sector 
Figure 6.2 – State and territory governments 1996-2011 
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and government, and between levels of government. As one Victorian sector 
representative put it: 
Of course we all had those high hopes when we had wall-to-wall Labor 
[governments], we had these high hopes that suddenly state-federal 
relationships would suddenly become easy. That the states would cede 
logical things to the feds; that feds wouldn't blame the states for service 
delivery going bad. I think we had fantasies that Federal Treasury would 
suddenly want to give money to the state housing bodies to actually do 
something about public housing … 
That was probably the first time in, you would know, how many years we 
had wall-to-wall Labor [and] it only lasted a few minutes really, and now 
we’re back to ‘business as usual’, which means that probably the COAG 
[Council of Australian Governments] forums will become more difficult, 
more politicised, more grandstanding: Julia Gillard used to work for John 
Brumby so there was a moment there where you could have beautiful 
harmony (personal communication, 15 April 2011). 
During this time the NFP sector, buffeted nationally by the Howard government’s 
enthusiastic embrace of neoliberal policy doctrines, sought to shore up its position as a 
trusted partner to ‘friendly’ state and territory Labor administrations.106  
This period also coincided with the three terms of the Blair Labour government in the 
UK (1997-2007) whose third-way policy framings – including compacts in England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – had attracted the attention of Australian Labor 
politicians and the NFP sector. Seen at the time as an innovative approach to 
governance, the ‘Third Way’ helped to shape the Australian sector’s framing of its own 
relationship with the state (and offered a solution: compacts), and it provided an 
authentic social democratic policy response that Australian Labor governments could 
emulate. 
The national Coalition government was certainly not prepared to contemplate any 
formal policy advisory role for the sector. One ACT government official suggested that 
it was a ‘strange irony’ that a federal government that so actively promoted purchaser-
provider relationships and accelerated the shift towards third party contracting would 
not have seen the necessity of negotiating more constructive relationships between 
government and the sector (personal communication, 31 April 2011). In any case, it is 
unlikely that state and territory Labor governments would have elected to emulate the 
example of the federal Coalition.  
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The ACT Liberal government’s 2001 decision to introduce the first Australian compact 
might seem to have been out of character politically, at least at that time. Over a decade 
on it cannot be said with certainty what influences led to that decision. In a small 
jurisdiction like the ACT where there are few degrees of separation between elected 
representatives, public officials and NFP sector leaders, it would be unsurprising to find 
that policy strategists in either major party were conversant with the arguments in 
favour of formal relationship frameworks. The same might not have been true (at that 
time) of other, larger states and territories where the effects of scale might lead to 
different outcomes.  
Election cycles and leadership change 
The link between the election cycle and the pursuit of cross-sector policy frameworks 
does not appear to be especially strong, and this likely reflects a perceived low political 
salience of policies concerning the sector generally (there are few ‘votes’ in the NFP 
sector). Nevertheless, framework documents such as compacts might have some appeal 
owing to their symbolic content in that they convey an impression of action without 
necessarily binding government or incurring additional expenditure. In other words, 
they help to convey an impression of government doing positive things. However, a 
high level of symbolism might contribute to a low level of political attachment, 
especially under circumstances of leadership change, if only because the priorities and 
policy preferences of leaders differ. Take into account the following examples: 
• Australian Capital Territory – The minority Liberal government in the ACT 
launched a compact in 2001 less than a year after Chief Minister Kate Carnell 
resigned in favour of her deputy, Gary Humphries, prior to a threatened vote of no 
confidence. Humphries faced polls that same year and possibly hoped that a 
compact would better his electoral chances by mending fences with the community 
sector. In any case, the Liberal Party lost the election and the new Labor 
government re-branded and re-launched a similar document as its own just months 
before the 2004 election. A ‘refreshed’ version of the Social Compact was re-
launched in 2012, under a new Labor Chief Minister just months before fighting her 
first election in that role. 
• New South Wales – During its first term the Labor government led by Premier Bob 
Carr responded to lobbying by the community sector by including a commitment to 
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a compact in its re-election platform in 2003. By the time the compact – Working 
Together for NSW – came to fruition in 2006, Carr had already resigned (2005). The 
document thus lost its original sponsor and further leadership changes in 2008 and 
2009 possibly helped to seal its fate as a dead letter by the time of the 2011 election, 
which Labor lost to the Liberal/National Coalition. 
• Northern Territory – In her first term Clare Martin, the Northern Territory’s first 
Labor and first female Chief Minister, promoted community engagement as an 
organising theme for her government. Common Cause (a precursor to a formal 
framework agreement) would provide a platform for cross-sector engagement. 
Although Martin was re-elected in 2005 with an increased majority, escalating 
tensions between the Territory and the federal government concerning entrenched 
social problems in the Territory’s aboriginal townships (which culminated in a 
dramatic federal intervention) contributed to Martin’s decision to resign in 2007. By 
that time, Common Cause appears to have been abandoned. The notion of a formal 
relationship framework re-emerged only briefly, just prior to the 2012 Territory 
election, which Labor lost to the Country Liberal Party. 
• Queensland – Charismatic Labor Premier Peter Beattie led his party to four 
successive election wins in 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2006. Apart from its first term, 
Labor enjoyed strong majority government. During this time, apart from introducing 
a policy on volunteering, there was little pressure on government to entertain a 
formal cross-sector relationship with the sector. A compact only gained policy 
salience after Beattie resigned in favour of his deputy, Anna Bligh in 2007. The 
Queensland Compact took effect in November 2008, just months before Labor was 
re-elected at the 2009 general election. Bligh personally championed the compact as 
a signature policy of her administration, however a landslide win to the Liberal 
National Party in 2012 threw the compact into abeyance. 
• Tasmania – Although government and the sector in the ‘Island State’ had for a 
number of years discussed the prospect of a compact or similar policy framework, 
there was little tangible progress until 2011 following the sudden resignation of the 
state’s third Labor premier, David Bartlett in favour of Lara Giddings. Bartlett had 
led Labor to a hung parliament at the 2010 election and left Giddings to lead a 
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minority government in coalition with the Tasmanian Greens. The Tasmanian 
Partnership Agreement took effect in 2012, ahead of the next election in 2014. 
• South Australia and Victoria – These states offer a study in contrasts. In South 
Australia a stable Labor government first elected in 2002 and led by a Premier 
influenced by Blairite ‘Third Way’ politics, first initiated a compact in 2004. Both 
that first compact, Common Ground, and its 2009 successor, Stronger Together, are 
narrowly focused on the health and human services sub-sectors. In Victoria, 
government also made an early deliberate decision to utilise cross-sector agreements 
with the health and human services sub-sectors, starting in 2002. In South Australia, 
both agreements were signed on behalf of government by relevant ministers, 
whereas the partnership agreements in Victoria are signed on behalf of government 
by the chief executives of the relevant departments. In South Australia, the sector 
reports little success in gaining an audience with ministers and regards the 
agreement as largely ineffectual. In Victoria, where the agreements are stripped of 
their political branding they not only serve as a robust platform for addressing a 
range of policy and operational matters, but they have endured a change a 
government and continue as a valued policy instrument. 
• Western Australia – In Western Australia another Labor Premier with strong 
personal and intellectual ties to the Blair government, Geoff Gallop, took a 
divergent path with that state’s Industry Plan (2004). The Industry Plan was 
intended to help build sector capacity and so enable it to better fulfil a role as a 
valued partner with government in service delivery. Although well regarded at its 
inception, the Industry Plan lost potency owing to the absence of a strong central 
agency steer and poor adherence by line agencies. By the time of Gallop’s 
resignation in 2006, the Plan had already waned as a force for change, and failed to 
revive under the new Labor Premier Alan Carpenter. The election in 2008 of a 
Liberal/National government led by Colin Barnett once again blew wind into the 
sails of cross-sector partnership. Picking up where the Industry Plan left off, the 
2011 Delivering Community Services in Partnership Policy enjoys strong backing 
from the Premier, joint governance with the sector, targeted resourcing, and a strong 
central agency lead from the departments of Premier and Cabinet, Treasury and 
Finance. 
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Implementation issues and impact 
The success or failure of any public policy measure very much depends on the manner 
in which it is implemented. Policy actors in both the public and NFP sectors nominate a 
wide array of factors that impinged on the performance of cross-sector policy 
frameworks. The following aspects of implementation were particularly salient: 
appropriate governance structures; bureaucratic resistance; domain boundaries and 
policy silos; financial resources; penetration and embeddedness; and expectation gaps. 
These are discussed with reference to the cases. 
Governance structures  
In most jurisdictions with some form of active cross-sector policy framework some 
form of joint government-sector body has been established to provide oversight in 
relation to implementation and on-going review, although these vary in terms of their 
actual impact. Examples of joint governance arrangements with which participants  
express a high level of satisfaction are those in the Australian Capital Territory (see 
Figure 6.3) and Western Australia (see Figure 6.4). Until the election of the Liberal 
National Party government in Queensland halted formal processes associated with the 
Queensland Compact, the governance structures in that state provided the benchmark 
for other jurisdictions (see Figure 6.5).  
  
Figure 6.3 – The Social Compact (ACT) Joint Community Reference Group 
In the Australian Capital Territory (the ACT) a Joint Community-Government Reference Group (JCGRG) 
provides a high level forum for government-sector engagement on a range of cross-sector issues. 
Established in 2002, the JCGRG meets at six-week intervals and is a valuable mechanism for monitoring 
the policy framework underpinning the Social Compact as well as addressing other matters arising in the 
context of the government-sector relationship (personal communication, 6 April 2011). Although the Social 
Compact derives legitimacy from the work undertaken by the JCGRG (an example being the 2012 ‘refresh’ 
of the compact) (personal communication, 1 April 2011), over the years consultation between the sector 
and government has become increasingly dispersed and fragmented (personal communication, 31 April 
2011).  
One central agency official suggested that if the JCGRG was the primary locus of consultation, overall 
performance with respect to engagement would be ‘outstanding’ (personal communication, 31 April 2011). 
Fragmentation, however, has affected the quality of consultation, leading to greater complexity and 
‘chaos’: ‘In an ideal world, the JCGRG, if it had the buy-in that it ought to have, could have wrapped all 
those things into one’ (personal communication, 31 April 2011). To fragmentation can be added the 
turnover of personnel and associated impacts on collective memory, corporate knowledge and continuity 
(personal communication, 31 April 2011). 
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Figure 6.4 – Delivering Community Services in Partnership (WA) Partnership Forum 
Although Western Australia does not have a bilateral agreement with the state’s NFP sector, it does 
have a joint government-sector Partnership Forum. The Partnership Forum was established in 2010 by 
the state government to help build the relationship between the public and NFP community sectors and 
address issues of mutual concern (Western Australia, 2012). The Premier selected its Independent 
Chair, Professor Peter Shergold, and the Forum itself is made up of state government agency CEOs 
and senior NFP community sector representatives. The Department of Premier and Cabinet provide 
secretariat support for the Forum. 
 The Forum’s first task was to establish a set of aspirational ‘principles’ to guide the government-sector 
relationship. According to one informant, the Forum reflected on underpinning the National Compact and 
was keen not waste time ‘wordsmithing’ a compact: ‘They wanted to just set something that they all 
agreed was ‘aspirational’, but that they would work towards …What was more important was than the 
principles was the behaviours that they would expect to test those principles against’ (personal 
communication, 5 July 2011). The Forum reports to the Premier every six months and to date has met 
on eight occasions. The range of matters addressed by the Forum include: funding and contracting; 
policy, planning and service design; self directed services; a social enterprise fund; and a social 
innovation grants program. 
Figure 6.5 – The Queensland Compact, Compact Governance Committee 
In Queensland a Compact Governance Committee (CGC) committee was established with an 
Independent Chair appointed by the Premier. The CGC worked to an action plan developed to give 
effect to the Queensland Compact. The CGC grew out of a Joint Working Party convened to develop 
the Compact and was supported by a secretariat located in the Queensland Department of 
Communities. Until its activities were suspended by the incoming Liberal National Party government in 
2012, the CGC held three full-day meetings and two full-day inter-sectoral forums annually to progress 
activities from the action plan. In addition, the CGC spawned working parties and workshops targeting 
diverse issues such as a chart of accounts, governance and workforce development (personal 
communication, 22 November 2010). The CGC actively pursued ‘intractable issues’, it being the view of 
the Chair that if the committee ‘can’t have the hard conversations’ it’s not doing its job (personal 
communication, 20 December 2010b, 22 November 2010).  
The CGC reported annually on progress with the action plan, which was scheduled to expire in 2010 
pending a formal commissioned review of the Compact. Despite strong commitment to the CGC 
scepticism persisted in parts of the sector, in part owing to perceptions that non-government members 
did not represent whole-of-sector views (personal communication, 20 December 2010a). This 
perception led the Futures Forum – the coalition of peak organisations that spurred the development of 
the compact – to seek leave to make direct representations to the minister outside the CGC. This 
request was denied on the grounds that it would compromise the integrity of the CGC and the 
Independent Chair (personal communication, 20 December 2010a). That participants in a formal 
bilateral process should seek to by-pass agreed rules of engagement is suggestive of a legacy of 
deeply ingrained political behaviours in a sector conditioned more by the spirit of contest than 
collaboration. 
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In other jurisdictions, government-NPF sector forums have not enjoyed a similar level 
of confidence or had an appreciable impact on the resolution of the tensions inherent in 
the relationship. Examples are the cross-sector forum established in New South Wales 
to give effect to Stronger Together, which began with muddled objectives and poorly 
articulated mechanisms (Figure 6.6) and the Human Services Peaks Forum in South 
Australia, of which government and NFP sector officials give quite different accounts 
(Figure 6.7). 
 
What becomes clear is that whether it is effective or not, the mechanism established to 
give effect to the relationship framework can become a site for contestation and 
conflict. Departmental officials in New South Wales commented that parts of the sector 
used that state’s compact in an adversarial way to confront and criticise government for 
perceived failures adding that, in general, it is the more ‘conservative’ parts of the 
sector (i.e. those most resistant to change) that appear to be most inclined to ‘wave the 
compact’ (personal communication, 18 November 2010a). One official suggested that  
Figure 6.6 – Working Together for New South Wales, Annual CEOs Forum 
In the five years from the New South Wales government’s announced intention to negotiate a compact 
until Working Together for New South Wales was launched in 2006 there had been little discussion 
about how it might be operationalised (personal communication, 17 November 2010). In the end it was 
agreed that Working Together would be overseen by an annual meeting between NFP sector leaders 
and the CEOs of the Human Services and Justice departments. No subsidiary mechanisms were 
established for the purpose of pursuing any actions arising from the annual meetings although the 
intention was that the human service department heads would task their respective agencies to action 
any tasks arising (personal communication, 18 November 2010a). Along the way, the effectiveness of 
this forum was compromised further by inconsistent representation, the turnover of personnel and 
machinery of government changes. 
Although examples of constructive cross-sector relationships and practices are in evidence, these could 
not be attributed directly to the compact: in most cases, these reflect a history of good relationships 
between parts of public sector agencies and parts of the sector rather than ‘because the Compact says 
they have to’ (personal communication, 17 November 2010). There is some acceptance within the sector 
of its own failure to hold the government to account. A sector representative observed that while the 
sector is ‘good at blaming government’ it is not good at articulating solutions (personal communication, 
17 November 2010). 
In spite of the failure Working Together to deliver tangible outcomes, one sector observer sees value in 
having a high level aspirational document that sets out broad rules of engagement, adding that 
government and the sector also need to have appropriate expectations about what such a document can 
achieve: ‘The sector needs to understand that politeness and a well-articulated policy will only get you so 
far – it means nothing if you can’t actually influence debate’ (personal communication, 17 November 
2010). Concrete actions have not flowed from the meetings: the first two meetings focused on why 
wasn’t the government committing to an action plan with funding for the sector. It wasn’t until the 3rd 
meeting that sector representatives acknowledged that Working Together was about a ‘principled 
agreement about how the engagement with the sector will work’. By the third year there was a growing 
realisation on the part of the sector that Working Together ‘was about creating a dialogue, not a list of 
projects ... that’s what we’d been trying to say’. ‘It’s [Working Together] been singularly unsuccessful in 
creating that dialogue ... the real problem with it is that it’s not connected to anything ‘real’’. 
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parts of the sector saw Working Together in purely instrumental terms (a charge usually 
laid at the feet of government agencies): ‘I think that’s because they’ve had this history 
of, you know, advocacy, agitating, and then using whatever tools are available to them 
so I think when the Compact came along there was a sense of, “we’ll be able to use this 
to get at the table and, you know, get some dollars and whatever else”...’(personal 
communication, 18 November 2010a). Even in the ACT where the Social Compact 
appears to be working well, public servants report that ‘sometimes it does feel it is used 
against government when we’re really trying to work collaboratively’ (personal 
communication, 6 April 2011). 
 
Conversely, in South Australia peak organisations, fearful about losing their funding, 
have been accused of a ‘lack of preparedness to really take up the issue in a vigorous 
debate’:  
Figure 6.7 – Stronger Together Peaks Forum 
In South Australia the Human Services Peaks Forum is the body responsible for reviewing the 
operation of that state’s principal cross-sector policy framework, Stronger Together. The Chair of the 
Peaks Forum rotates between the chief executives of SACOSS, the Department of Health and the 
Department for Families and Communities. The Forum’s agenda is shaped by ‘structured discussion’ 
of issues arising at the program level (personal communication, 7 July 2011b). Departmental officials 
contend that the Forum is characterised by goodwill and constructive feedback, and that the sector 
looks upon the attendance of the Chief Executives as ‘high value’ (personal communication, 7 July 
2011b). A key product of the Forum is an annual Action Plan: although it has been referred to from 
time to time in annual reports there is no specific internal reporting on the performance of Stronger 
Together. Departmental officials report that Stronger Together is cross-referred in policies and 
procedures and is used to provide guidance on managing relationships with NFP organisations in the 
context of a ‘performance partnership conversation’ (personal communication, 7 July 2011a).  
However, there are reservations within the sector about the capacity of the Forum to support a ‘deep 
conversation’ about Stronger Together (personal communication, 6 July 2011a). Said one key sector 
informant: ‘Over the years it’s had various functions, much of which has been dominated by 
“information-giving” and never as much dominated by real whole-hearted discussion of key issues … 
Over the years, many of the peak bodies turn up at the Peaks Forum only because they fear that if 
they don’t their funding might get cut rather than because they see it as being one of those meetings 
it’s really important to be at because it actually provides such a vital contribution’ (personal 
communication, 6 July 2011a).  
Citing peak organisations as an ‘easy source’ of consultation, coordination and feedback, the same 
informant suggested that unless agreements are driven by a senior figure such as the premier or a 
minister well versed in the principles of community engagement, their purpose will be largely 
symbolic and they will not be effective in driving meaningful change: ‘What you then end up with is 
this alienated relationship, despite whatever’s written on the paper, basically the sector’s being told 
what to do’ (personal communication, 6 July 2011a). The proof of government intentions is always in 
its actions not words and the minute there is a mismatch between what is said and what is done, 
there is an opening for a lack of trust to emerge: ‘Trust is one of those things that takes years and 
years to build up and can be shattered in a matter of seconds … These relationships mean much 
more than just a vision statement … they need constant attention, and they need deep respect and 
sometimes they need opportunities for good old fashioned plain speaking … maybe even remedy!’ 
(personal communication, 6 July 2011a). 
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In practice, we know that there are instances where organisations that 
have bitten the hand are abandoned or do lose funding … This brings 
about silence’ (personal communication, 6 July 2011a).  
The effects of sector acquiescence are exacerbated by a public sector that no longer 
fulfils its historical role as a source of ‘fearless advice’ on public interest grounds about 
alternatives to the preferred positions of the government (personal communication, 6 
July 2011a). Instead, the public sector’s first response is to protect the minister from 
negative commentary and as a result, there is a lack of healthy, serious discussion of 
important issues (personal communication, 6 July 2011a).  
Bureaucratic resistance  
Interviewees from the public and the NFP sectors in all jurisdictions have underscored 
the challenges of achieving cultural change on both sides. In part, the challenge is to put 
aside those parts of organisational memory in which distrust and contention have 
become reified in the form of knee-jerk behaviours and procedures. In the realpolitik of 
public sector governance, some government line agencies might be reluctant to be 
bound by central agency directives or to be bound by the provisions of a framework 
agreement. Similarly, in the NFP sector some (mainly larger and older) organisations 
with established relationships with government might not see the relevance of a 
compact to their interests.  
It is in public sector agencies, however, where the demands of systemic and process 
adjustment are most keenly felt. In Western Australia for example the policy framework 
encourages a culture of partnership between government line agencies and the NFP 
sector founded on more flexible contract mechanisms and a fair price for services 
(personal communication, 4 July 2011). Despite a strong policy steer from central 
agencies, it was anticipated that the policy might meet resistance from line agencies 
sceptical about the capacity of central agencies to understand the operational reality of 
commissioning and delivering services. One sector official summed up this concern in 
the following terms:  
I am hesitant about how line agencies are interpreting being pushed down 
a path by central agencies they perceive as not understanding as much 
about service delivery as, obviously, they do. You know, ‘the bean 
counters in Treasury don’t know what it takes to contract a child 
protection service, so why are they trying to tell us how to do this?’ 
(personal communication, 4 July 2011). 
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Other line agencies, believing that they already enjoy good relationships with the sector, 
might resent perceived imputations from central agencies about their contracting or 
engagement practices: 
So don’t tar us with the same brush just because other agencies have not 
been playing fair (personal communication, 4 July 2011). 
The reluctance of public sector organisations to cede authority to non-government 
actors is not new, nor is it a thing of the past. As one of the key proponents of Working 
Together for New South Wales observed: 
Even today, in New South Wales, there would still be solid resistance to 
dealing with the not-for-profit sector as a partner, let alone an equal, in 
any sort of regard (personal communication, 13 September 2011b). 
In some respects the doubts entertained by public sector agencies about the value of a 
formal cross-sector policy framework can be a by-product of ineffective communication 
about policy objectives and the means by which they are to be achieved. For example, 
an early attempt to gain government support for a compact in Queensland107 foundered 
after meeting resistance within the state bureaucracy: ‘What’s the point of this? What 
purpose would it serve?’ (personal communication, 20 December 2010a). Such doubts 
are likely to be heightened when relationship frameworks are pursued for narrow 
political or transparently symbolic reasons and have not been grounded in a coherent 
policy narrative. 
As was pointed out by a central agency official, ‘push-back’ from parts of the public 
sector is only to be expected when well-entrenched service models are under challenge 
– particularly when one of the aims of reform is a shift in the power balance between 
players: ‘When you start to ask people to think differently about the traditional systems 
and processes they’ve had in place … of course we expect resistance’ (personal 
communication, 5 July 2011). Resistance to change can be founded on: fears that 
change will ‘undermine the public sector’; perceptions of risks to public accountability; 
recognition of the inherent difficulties of working across domain and organisational 
boundaries; and doubt about government’s resolve to follow-through (personal 
communication, 5 July 2011). One central agency official in Western Australia 
summed-up the challenges in the following terms: 
You know, for the first six months people are like, ‘just duck your head, 
this’ll go away’, next six months, ‘ah, gotta go to another boring 
workshop, this is just another imposition’, and then the first six months of 
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this year, now we’re into implementation, and you could see people go, 
‘oh really?’ and then, we go through the cabinet process, and people go, 
‘wow!’  
And then you get a big government announcement: the Premier and two 
of the relevant ministers did a forum with 200 people from the not-for-
profit sector – we made sure we had key line agencies in there, we had the 
key D-Gs [Directors-General]; we’ve been engaging with the D-Gs for 
six to twelve months, we’ve been listening to them … when they heard 
the Premier and the ministers speak to the not-for-profit sector, they heard 
the same message, which is ‘this is going to happen’. 
… One of the public sector cultural issues is shifting people from the ‘oh 
here we go again’ (and in the public sector it’s a lot easier to go ‘nah, it 
ain’t gonna happen’) to the ‘right! It’s happening!’ and then you just keep 
going back with information, workshops, presentations (personal 
communication, 5 July 2011). 
Domain boundaries and policy silos  
Although a number of persons interviewed for this study – in both the NFP and public 
sectors – referred disapprovingly to the persistence of organisational silos between and 
within public sector agencies. It is also clear from these accounts that silos also feature 
in the NFP sector and are similarly demarcated by functional or policy domain 
boundaries. As one NSW official remarked:  
The inherent problem with the compact and the ambition in NSW is that 
that it tried to bring everyone together around something that just wasn’t 
tangible because the sector is not a single entity (personal communication, 
18 November 2010a).  
In both sectors functional and organisational demarcation is portrayed as problematic by 
some, and as unavoidable by others. Moreover, differences in organisational culture, 
history and operational norms can be difficult to reconcile with the rhetorics of ‘joined 
up government’ and of cross-sector engagement which often assume a capacity for 
seamless working across boundaries. NSW officials stressed that it is valid for agencies 
or portfolios to establish parallel and relationships strategies with particular sub-sectors 
and to continue to use existing consultation mechanisms or engagement mechanisms 
regardless of any over-arching framework because ‘trying to corral programs into some 
kind of consistent engagement model … is never going to work’ (personal 
communication, 18 November 2010a). 
All of the cross-sector relationship frameworks so far examined in this dissertation have 
come about largely as a response to the tensions arising from contracting practices. In 
Australia’s states and territories, the preponderance of contracting with the NFP sector 
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concerns the purchase of community-based social/human services by human services 
departments. This can result in ‘domain capture’ by those public sector entities who 
claim a leading role in that policy space, even though the same or similar activities 
might also form part of the suite of functions performed by other agencies or 
departments (personal communication, 6 July 2011c). A leading NFP sector 
spokesperson in Tasmania portrayed the situation as follows: 
In this jurisdiction some … line agencies have been excluded by others 
[from] even participating in the discussion [about the relationship 
agreement]. I think an example would be a business unit – such as those 
that work in our human service component of Health and Human Services 
– really think that that’s where the work of the community sector is done. 
Rather than having an understanding and knowledge of the breadth of the 
human and health services system. To even have to remind people, for 
example, that the youth agenda crosses a number of government agencies 
– so does health promotion … And people think aged care and they just 
think ‘nursing homes’ rather than thinking ‘housing’, ‘hospitals’, ‘social 
inclusion’, for example. So, some of those are sidelined because ‘it’s not 
our business’, sort of attitude (personal communication, 4 October 
2011a). 
Often left out of the equation are government departments of education, sport and 
recreation, the arts and the environment that often have separate long-standing 
relationships with NFP organisations and are engaged in activities that complement the 
policy objectives of human service and health agencies. Examples might include a state 
government arts and culture agency providing financial support to NFP theatre groups 
or visual arts organisations offering programs designed to promote social inclusion; or a 
state government department of sport and recreation offering specialised programs for 
people with disabilities; or an education department working with local community 
services organisations to offer outreach services to at-risk students; or a department of 
the environment working with volunteer LandCare groups providing opportunities for 
participation by at-risk youth. 
South Australian officials interviewed for this study affirmed the importance of raising 
awareness across government of the role of the NFP sector and portrayed the challenge 
as one of mobilising support and building coalitions across administrative silos 
(personal communication, 7 July 2011a). In South Australia, this means using influence 
and personal relationships with key players as opposed to official processes to build 
relationships across the bureaucracy (personal communication, 7 July 2011a): 
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We’re not going to get up an interdepartmental committee – we’re not 
going to get one of them approved to do something about the NGO 
sector: it’s not going to happen. It’s going to be networking that will get 
this stuff happening. Whereas in New South Wales or Victoria you’d 
probably get an interdepartmental committee approved by Cabinet, and 
work would be done and proposals would be put to Cabinet and decisions 
would be made, it’s not going to happen here (personal communication, 7 
July 2011a). 
In Victoria this problem was addressed by negotiating separate agreements with the 
community services and early childhood sub-sectors. In New South Wales the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet initially wanted a consistent and homogeneous 
approach across government in relation to funding, contracting, tendering processes and 
consultation. However, this was subsequently considered to be infeasible owing to 
historical, cultural, operational and institutional differences across the various sub-
sectors. Instead of a whole-of-government framework, Working Together for New South 
Wales embraced only those sub-sectors under the human services portfolio umbrella: 
ageing, disability, community services and juvenile justice (personal communication, 18 
November 2010a). Even so, awareness of and attachment to the compact varied 
amongst even those sub-sectors to which it directly applied:  
The disability sector, which is in fact the largest in size – not in the 
numbers of providers but in the scale of their businesses – if you asked 
them what the compact was they couldn’t tell you, and I’d be pretty hard 
pushed with a lot of the home and community care providers if I asked 
them ‘what is Working Together for NSW?’ for them to tell me. A 
number of the CSGP [Community Services Grants Program] providers in 
community services would know exactly what it was and would give you 
an ‘ah, well, but that turned to nothing’… (personal communication, 18 
November 2010a). 
Although it is at the frontline of service delivery that relationship issues most often 
arise, governments are also sensitive to the needs of the broader NFP sector. There are 
numerous examples of grassroots NFP organisations or informal groups whose 
activities confer a genuine public benefit and who are not dependent upon government 
funding. Unlike contracted service providers that rely on paid employees, most church 
or community-based organisations rely upon volunteers to undertake activities that the 
public might otherwise look to government to perform. Apart from the tangible direct 
benefits associated with these activities, governments are also mindful of the less 
tangible social capital gains such as social cohesion and are therefore concerned to 
preserve the viability of voluntaristic endeavour.  
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A number of jurisdictions accept the need to address issues of sector capacity that are 
broader than the specific concerns of NFP organisations providing contracted services 
on behalf of government. Some states (Western Australia and South Australia) have a 
minister with designated portfolio responsibilities for volunteers. Others offer support 
for volunteering through departments or functional areas (such as special offices or 
divisions) for community development and/or engagement.108 In Victoria an Office for 
the Community Sector (OCS), created in 2008 and located in the Department of 
Planning and Community Development, supports sector sustainability by driving cross-
government efforts to reduce unnecessary accountability and compliance burdens and 
supporting capacity-building. A Tasmanian Office for the Community Sector set up in 
2008 along similar lines within the Department of Health and Human Services was 
disestablished after less than two years.109  
Resources  
The English and Canadian compacts came attached with a dedicated pool of funds for 
the purpose of investing in sector development. With the notable exception of Western 
Australia’s Delivering Community Services in Partnership Policy, none of Australia’s 
state and territory framework agreements comes with any such commitments. States and 
territories do invest in sector development as an integral part of policy and program 
delivery and some have earmarked resources to support the implementation of a range 
of activities in furtherance of aims set out in framework agreements, but these 
investments have been on a modest scale.  
By contrast, the Liberal government in Western Australia has breathed new life into the 
government-NFP sector relationship with a settlement – backed by a major investment 
of tax dollars – that empowers rather than marginalises the sector. There the 
government and the sector have eschewed a bilateral compact in favour of a 
comprehensive policy statement. Western Australia is distinguished by the fact that a 
centre-right government appears to have succeeded in negotiating a settlement with the 
sector where a centre-left government demonstrably failed.  
In its 2011/12 State Budget the state government announced a $1 billion 'social services 
package'. This includes an investment of $604 million over five years to ensure the 
sustainability of those NFP organisations that have funding agreements with the state, 
comprised of: $491million to close the ‘funding gap’ for eligible service agreements; 
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$96 million for the provision of indexation to eligible human services; and $18 million 
to support the implementation of the policy. In addition, the WA government has made 
major investments (about $400m) in new service provision as well as earmarking grant 
funding to support social innovation and social enterprise development. 
Penetration 
The anecdotal accounts of various policy actors interviewed for this study suggest that 
framework agreements in the different jurisdictions suffer from low levels of 
penetration and embeddedness, both horizontally across the sector/government and 
vertically.110 Cross-sector policy frameworks in Australia’s states and territories are 
most closely associated with human or community services. It would be unsurprising, 
therefore, to find that interest in and awareness of such frameworks is largely confined 
to that policy domain, in both the NFP and the public sectors.  
Much of the language used to describe and refer to NFP organisations contributes to an 
illusion that the ‘sector’ is a monolithic or unitary entity. Nothing could be further from 
the truth. Although NFP organisations have common attributes, the NFP sector is 
variegated and fragmented. Broad domains like human services can be further 
segmented into sub-domains with quite different histories, clinical praxis, legal 
frameworks, policy agendas and professional cultures. Examples of sub-domains within 
human services include disability, family relationships, child protection, homelessness, 
mental health, ageing and juvenile justice. In addition, policy and programmatic 
responsibility for these sub-domains might reside in different departments.  
Awareness of and attachment to cross-sector policy frameworks at the sub-domain level 
might depend on a variety of factors, including sector ‘politics’ and where the various 
actors sit in relation to the ‘machinery of government’. For example, New South Wales 
officials observed of the disability sub-sector: ‘if you asked them what the compact was 
they couldn’t tell you, and I’d be pretty hard pushed with a lot of the home and 
community care providers if I asked them “what is Working Together for New South 
Wales?” for them to tell me’ (personal communication, 18 November 2010a). 
Promoting awareness and demonstrating the benefits of cross-sector policy frameworks 
is an important aspect of implementation. Both the Queensland Compact and the 
Western Australian Delivering Community Services in Partnership Policy, for example, 
included a communication strategy as an integral component of their policy 
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implementation process. However, in both the NFP and the public sectors the 
effectiveness of communication about cross-sector policy frameworks can be 
compromised by a variety of factors, such as policy or functional silos, poorly targeted 
messaging, information overload, staff turnover and reorganisations.  
In the Australian Capital Territory both the government and the NFP sector 
acknowledged that awareness and understanding of the Social Compact have 
diminished over time (personal communication, 1 April 2011). Although the Social 
Compact was well-promoted at the time of its original launch in 2004, the 
communications effort waned over time and the document itself became increasingly 
difficult to find on ACT government websites. By 2011, a survey undertaken by the 
ACT Council of Social Service (ACTCOSS) found that a significant proportion of 
workers in the public and community sectors were not aware the compact existed which 
became a factor in the decision to ‘refresh’ the framework (ACTCOSS, 2011).111  
In New South Wales, a survey by Dalton et al. (2008) of selected human service 
organisations operating in the family services, homelessness and disability sub-domains 
research found that only two years after being announced, organisations exhibited a low 
level of awareness and a lack of attachment to Working Together for NSW. The research 
also revealed a lack of confidence in the capacity of the compact to ‘make a difference’ 
as well as fears that the negotiation process served to divide the sector into ‘insiders’ 
and ‘outsiders’ (Dalton et al., 2008). These observations were corroborated by Casey et 
al. (2008a) who observed that: 
It is not clear how widely Working Together is known/understood outside 
a core group of bureaucrats and [Forum of Non-Government Agencies] 
FONGA regulars. There appears to be a lack of knowledge at both ends 
of the spectrum (i.e. among bureaucrats outside the group who negotiated 
the agreement, and among community sector workers outside the 
FONGA/NCOSS working groups) (Casey et al., 2008a:7). 
Similarly, research by Edgar and Lockie found that, owing to the failure of the 
government to provide supporting structures for Working Together for NSW and in the 
absence of a senior government ‘champion’, awareness of the agreement was low in 
both the public and NFP sectors (Edgar and Lockie, 2010:355). 
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Expectation gaps  
In some cases state/territory frameworks appear to have taken shape without 
considering the quite different policy legacies attached to the many NFP sub-sectors 
they purported to embrace. It also seems that in some jurisdictions the peak 
organisations driving the compact agenda initially harboured somewhat idealistic (and 
perhaps unrealistic) expectations about the possible scope and likely impact of a 
framework agreement.  
The reflections of a number of NFP sector policy actors interviewed for this study 
strongly suggest a late appreciation of the limits of framework agreements, whereas the 
accounts of policy actors in the public sector for the most part suggest a far more 
measured (and in some respects pessimistic) view about their likely efficacy. These 
accounts also leave an impression that government agencies – caught between an 
activist minority of influential peak organisations, and elected representatives for whom 
compacts represent ‘good politics’ – acceded to cross-sector frameworks without much 
enthusiasm or conviction.  
The following account given by a senior NSW government official is instructive in that 
regard. This is a rich narrative account of the environment in which that state’s compact 
gained impetus. The official offers insights that, in many respects, align with the 
experience of other jurisdictions and for this reason is quoted in full: 
I don’t think they [the sector] really knew what it was that they wanted ... 
in hindsight and now seeing how the sector relationship has evolved, I 
don’t think they wanted a compact at all, I think they wanted a better 
relationship and they saw the only way to do that was through a piece of 
paper, and we were unable to understand at the time, because we were 
driven forward by competition policy, and you know, in the early-mid 
‘90s the Department of Premier’s desire for there to be a completely 
consistent and homogenous approach to grants administration across 
NSW, so we were focussed on sort of fighting the fight to say ‘no actually 
… we can do some degree of consistency but in fact our relationships 
across this sector are inherently different because the sector is not a 
homogenous thing,’ and so we had really fantastic relationships, for 
example in the home and community care space, because we had really 
empowered peaks ... in the community services side not so great, and in 
the disability side not so great either, because we had all these legacy 
historic funding issues from the Commonwealth-State in the 80s with the 
transfer of that responsibility in the early 90s, which we were only just 
trying to grapple with.  
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So, there was that incredible environment of change going on, and really 
what the sector was saying was ‘we want to be at the table’. In some 
places they were already at the table, and therefore the compact or the 
notion of a compact was completely superfluous, so people just went 
‘why would we want that, we’re not engaged in that’. There are other 
parts of the sector like the disability sector that saw no value in a compact 
because all they wanted to do was to get viable businesses up and running 
because they had unviable services from the legacy funding, so all they 
were interested in was competing for money. So they didn’t see it either. 
And it was the small, sort of community ... the [Forum of Non-
Government Agencies] FONGA style that was taking this agenda 
forward.  
… At the end of the day ... the lobby was so strong people were just a bit 
tired of it, and we actually saw some benefit in it ... it’s a funnily-crafted 
document [Working Together for NSW]... there were all these drafting 
committees but when it was drawn together there was no cohesion to the 
document, so ... I think we got a little bit worn down to be honest ... and 
then there was a decision taken by Community Services then ... to sort it 
out ... what harm could it do? ... it would be a measure of good will to 
bring this about ... but with the most minimum infrastructure around it. So 
the deal was that it would be a statement of intent almost, a principled 
statement, and that what we would do would be to sit around the table 
once a year only and have a yarn about the kinds of things we might do 
together (personal communication, 18 November 2010a). 
Compacts are often portrayed in the literature and in the accounts of participants as 
providing a platform for a longer term ‘conversation’ about the nature of the cross-
sector relationship. However, those in the NFP sector not directly engaged in the 
negotiation, drafting or roll-out of the policy framework might have high expectations 
about what government might bring to the relationship in terms of financial certainty or 
participation in policy development (personal communication, 6 July 2011b). NFP 
sector expectations have a corollary in the form of public sector apprehensions about the 
implications of cross-sector agreements for the integrity of financial accountability 
frameworks or the confidentiality of internal policy processes. Furthermore, the absence 
of immediate and concrete actions can contribute to disillusionment (on the part of NFP 
sector actors) or complacency (on the part of public sector actors). 
Implications 
Cross-sector framework documents can be effective, provided policy actors in both 
sectors have a clear – and shared – understanding about where they are starting from, 
where they want the framework to take them and by what route. The cross-sector policy 
framework in New South Wales, by the common admission of actors in the public and 
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NFP sectors, did not pass this basic test. The South Australian framework document 
endures on paper, but there is a major disconnect in the public and NFP sector accounts 
of its usefulness. Both frameworks lacked genuine investments of political capital. 
That said, political capital can be ephemeral and even well-considered frameworks will 
fail when political commitment fails (conversely, political commitment can revive 
dormant or dysfunctional relationships). In Western Australia a well-considered 
unilateral policy approach by a previous Labor government failed to sustain the 
confidence of the sector owing to a lack of leadership and commitment. However, the 
new Liberal-led government has so far succeeded where Labor failed because of the 
strong backing of the premier and central agencies of government. Queensland took a 
different approach: rather than a unilateral policy (albeit one co-developed with the 
sector) it took the route of a bilateral agreement backed by a realistic and achievable 
action plan. That initiative – which largely enjoyed sector confidence but was closely 
tied to the fortunes of an incumbent Labor premier – did not survive a change of 
government. 
A number of issues arise repeatedly in conversation with policy actors in the public and 
NFP sectors that have implications for the longer-term viability of formal cross-sector 
framework agreements. These are: managing expectations; dispute resolution and 
governance; political access; the political orientation of the governing party; the effects 
of leadership and/or regime change; and the limitations of frameworks that are largely 
‘symbolic’ in nature and have few practical measures attached. 
Managing expectations  
Australia’s states and territories offer up examples of success and failure and much in-
between. Of all the state and territory cross-sector policy frameworks Working Together 
for New South Wales is widely acknowledged as probably the least successful – not 
least by key policy actors in that state. The foregoing observation is also corroborated 
by the findings from scholarly research by Casey et al. (2008a), Dalton et al. (2008) and 
Edgar and Lockie (2010).  
While it is true that the NSW government has invested in sector development, reduced 
the regulatory burden on NFP organisations, invested in new service delivery and 
worked collaboratively with NFP providers to improve the quality of community 
services, officials contend that such efforts have had little to do with the compact and 
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offer the view that success on the ground has more to do with personalities and 
relationships (personal communication, 18 November 2010b). Said one official: 
I think it’s singularly un-useful to talk about Working Together for NSW 
as a thing in and of itself ... how do we make a document useful? ... 
What’s the end result we want from it and I’ve yet to understand that. I 
struggle with the notion that the first point of discussion is ‘how do we 
make Working for NSW useful?’ ... That’s not the right question ... the 
question is, ‘how do we make sure that government is working effectively 
and well ... with the non-government sector to maximise its contribution 
to the NSW community’. How do we do that? ... How do we draw the 
best benefit out of that sector, who do things government would never do, 
but that government absolutely needs in communities of disadvantage and 
in other places? (personal communication, 18 November 2010a). 
Another agreement that appears to have fallen short of expectations is South Australia’s 
compact, Stronger Together, about which the NFP and public sectors appear to have 
quite divergent views. Although the agreement is cast in a favourable light by public 
sector policy actors (personal communication, 7 July 2011b), a key NFP sector actor 
paints the agreement in a quite different terms, portraying it as cynical and ineffectual 
(personal communication, 6 July 2011a). This level of disconnect alone supports a 
conclusion that the policy framework – which has been in place for a number of years – 
has failed to deliver a more equable relationship between government and the 
community sector in that state. 
Expectations in the NFP policy space are often very high (personal communication, 18 
April 2011). Interviewees in a number of jurisdictions alluded to the gap between what 
the parties to a compact believe it can deliver and its actual impact. If the gap is too 
large, disillusionment and apathy set in. In the NFP sector this might take the form of 
cynicism, disengagement and a lack of attachment to the framework. In the public 
sector, it might take the form of defensiveness or denial.  
Nevertheless, there is still an appetite for these kinds of frameworks, even in New South 
Wales where the sector called upon the (then) opposition to commit to a reinvigorated 
compact should it win the 2011 state election (NCOSS, 2010). In Tasmania, the most 
recent jurisdiction to implement a compact (2012), there is an acceptance that 
expectations will vary within the NFP sector about what the new Partnership Agreement 
might deliver:  
There is a lot of hope resting on a partnership agreement, but it is not the 
first time we’ve attempted to have one where the sector has gone to the 
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government cap-in-hand and said, ‘We would really like to have some 
form of agreement between both groupings’ …  
Peak bodies have to walk a very fine line in terms of making sure that 
people who have that governance of that partnership agreement 
understand what the messages and needs and wants are of our 
constituents, but also communicating up and down very clear messages 
about what the Partnership Agreement is, what it’s for, what it can do: 
and I think it would be fair to say that some of us would be working with 
some of our key industry leaders – for example, if workforce 
development or sector capacity is part of that agreement, using that 
agreement to really get that on the agenda in a way that does see some 
shift. So of course we would be using it as a bit of a lobbying tool as well 
(personal communication, 4 October 2011a). 
Similar observations might also be made about understandings within the public sector:  
We’re sort of doing this by subterfuge, ‘coz I honestly think that’s the 
only way that it can happen because – a couple of reasons – one: the 
policy imperative to deliver an agreement like this hasn’t been properly 
articulated or understood across government and in some of those other 
agencies, whilst these issues are not unimportant, they’re down the 
pecking order of their priority lists. And I don’t think a case has 
sufficiently been made to just go to [other state government 
departments/agencies] now and say, ‘why don’t you be part of this?’ I 
think, you can’t just turn up and say to people, ‘have we got a deal for 
you!’ – come in and join this big happy family because they’ll say, ‘well, 
what’s in it for us? Why would we do that?’ 
… in some other agencies, like Education for example, it’s not a 
mainstream issue or mainstream concern. So the value proposition needs 
to be demonstrated for those agencies – and if it were, it would make 
perfect sense for … the number of organisations and agencies involved in 
[a relationship agreement] to grow. But it was quite a deliberate 
conversation that happened between people currently involved not to be 
too ambitious and drag everyone in until we actually knew we had 
something in the content and governance sense ourselves that was 
actually working and of some value (personal communication, 4 October 
2011b). 
Appropriate and effective messaging is very important – both within and between 
government and the NFP sector, as attested by a key sector representative in Western 
Australia: 
There’s a real communications challenge for the peaks and also for the 
sector because if we don’t use these monies wisely, we’ll have burned our 
bridges. We’ve run this campaign for a long time. We’ve done all the 
hard work. We have persuaded government this is the right thing to do 
and they have made the money available. If we don’t make the most of it 
I don’t think we can come back with our cap in our hand and say ‘sorry’ 
(personal communication, 4 July 2011). 
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In Queensland, managing the expectations arising from the compact was a constant 
challenge. The Compact Governance Committee (CGC) and regional forums convened 
to discuss progress and priorities for action were important mechanisms for meeting that 
challenge (personal communication, 20 December 2010b). One South Australian 
official warned of the danger of raising expectations within the sector about 
commitments to on-going funding or expectations that government will bear the 
ultimate burden for resolving perceived problems (personal communication, 6 July 
2011b). 
Dispute resolution and governance 
A recurring issue for many in the NFP sector is the absence of mechanisms for the 
resolution of disputes about the operation of, or adherence to the policy framework. 
None of the policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation in Australia’s states and 
territories set out a dispute resolution mechanism.112 Some agreements acknowledge the 
possibility that disputes will arise from time to time and note that this is natural 
considering the differences of perspective, operational environment, priorities and 
mission. One might go so far as to say that tolerance of disagreement is a prerequisite 
for an effective cross-sector policy framework. 
There are those in the NFP sector who see compacts as a mechanism for legalistically 
prosecuting historic grievances with government. Equally, there are cases where 
governments, having signed up to compacts or similar instruments, are accused of 
failing to act in the spirit or to the letter of the framework. In general, the weight of 
opinion in the NFP sector runs in favour of 'binding' dispute resolution processes. Their 
public sector partners, by contrast, generally do not favour binding processes; arguing 
that they are unnecessarily restrictive and that their very existence gives rise to 
adversarial – as opposed to cooperative – behaviour.  
A framework document or compact is functionally akin to a memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) such as might be entered into between two or more government 
entities or levels of government. Although considered to be morally binding on the 
parties, an MoU is not normally legally binding. As defined by the Victorian Solicitor 
General’s Office: 
An MOU is a document that records the common intent of two or more 
parties where the parties do not wish to assume legally binding 
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obligations. An MOU is usually less complex and less detailed than a 
contract, but provides a framework and set of principles to guide the 
parties in undertaking a project or working arrangement (VGSO, 2008). 
A prime example of exactly this sort of framework document is the MoU between 
Victoria’s ‘independent health, housing and community sector’ and the Victorian 
Department of Human Services (DHS, 2009). Although the MoU does not set out a 
dispute resolution process, it is nevertheless acknowledged by as having set a standard 
for effective cross-sector working. The MoU states: 
This MoU outlines the framework of a working relationship between the 
parties. It is not intended to constitute a contract; it is built on goodwill 
and binding in honour only. The activities outlined in this MoU are 
illustrative only, and any working arrangement in respect of these or other 
activities or projects may, if deemed necessary, be defined in separate 
agreements or in separate governance structures (DHS, 2009). 
The MoU goes on to commit the parties to: ‘participate collaboratively in a range of 
partnership forums to raise and address partnership-related issues as well as service 
planning and coordination issues including high-level forums to be convened by the 
Secretary of the department’ (DHS, 2009). 
Most agreements do articulate the respective roles and responsibilities of the parties 
including expectations about the conduct or behaviour of the parties with respect to 
timely communication, ethical behaviour and so forth. To the extent that agreements 
acknowledge the potential for disagreement, they tend to rely on broad language to 
express the understandings encompassed by the agreement. The 2009 Partnership 
Agreement between the Victorian Department of Education and Early Childhood 
Development and the Municipal Association of Victoria offers a case in point: 
The parties agree to work constructively to honour the terms of the 
Agreement. The parties agree that in the event of a party stating that one 
or more undertakings in the Agreement is not being fulfilled that the 
parties will use best endeavours to ensure that the undertaking is satisfied 
or that an alternative solution is agreed. The parties agree to monitor the 
implementation of the Agreement and evaluate its effectiveness on an 
annual basis (Victoria, 2009). 
On-going governance is another commonly neglected aspect of compacts. The absence 
of a dedicated governance framework not only makes difficult the task of addressing 
areas of disagreement or concern, it also heightens cynicism and contributes to the 
escalation of issues that otherwise might have been more effectively managed. There 
are examples of compact forums (New South Wales being one) without useful terms of 
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reference, poorly articulated aims, weak reporting requirements, poor transparency, 
little or no authority and, ultimately, no real impact.  
The proper function of a compact governance group is really more akin to a board of 
management authorised to undertake broad oversight functions, such as setting the tone 
and broad aims of the endeavour, reporting to shareholders in the form of the 
responsible minister(s) and other signatories to the agreement (who are the 
'authorisers').113 As the Queensland Compact demonstrated, not having a statutory basis 
does not prevent the establishment of a governing body or the tabling of an annual 
report. 
Government’s NFP sector partners generally feel that dispute resolution mechanisms 
are necessary to ensure compliance by relevant public sector entities and are ever ready 
to offer anecdotal accounts government departments’ failures to align their practices 
with common understandings of the policy framework. In Western Australia this has 
been addressed by the departments of Premier and Cabinet, Treasury and Finance 
sharing the policy lead and mandating adherence by line agencies to common form 
contracts and the like. The bottom line is that without an effective governance 
framework - call it a board or a compact governance committee or a partnership forum - 
there is no oversight and where there is no oversight there is no accountability for 
performance and no mechanism for preventing or resolving disputes. 
Political access  
Framework documents that are/were bilateral in nature and endorsed on behalf of 
government by a first minister or relevant portfolio ministers (New South Wales, 
Queensland, South Australia) create expectations that the NFP sector – or at least those 
sector groupings that have endorsed the framework on behalf of the sector or some part 
of it – will have direct access to ministers. The reality, however, is that once the 
framework is signed, the job of engaging with the sector around the framework is most 
often delegated to senior bureaucrats and ministerial access falls by the wayside. In the 
case of Australian states and territories, this is perhaps more true of the larger 
jurisdictions where the physical and political distance between elected representatives 
and the population is greater. 
A senior Tasmanian NFP sector representative portrayed their state as the envy of peak 
organisations elsewhere in Australia:  
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They are absolutely envious of … our ability to be able to access political 
leaders and community leaders whenever we want to. They often will 
have situations in their own states and territories where they’ve never 
actually met the Premier’ (personal communication, 3 October 2011a).  
The same individual noted that Tasmania has five members of the federal House of 
Representatives who, ‘if they don’t remain very accessible to their constituency, well 
then, they’ve got real problems’ (personal communication, 3 October 2011a). Another 
NFP sector leader affirmed this assessment and added that Tasmania’s ‘smallness’ 
sometimes means that, ‘you know your ministers personally – you probably went to 
school with them’ (personal communication, 4 October 2011a). Although this has 
obvious advantages for the NFP sector, one senior public official alluded to the pitfalls 
of navigating a political terrain where inter-personal relationships assume great 
importance: ‘Everybody does know everybody. There’s also a lot more easy access to 
the Minister and even us [the bureaucracy]. In terms of outsourcing our services, you 
can get caught up in a bit of micro-management’ (personal communication, 3 October 
2011b). 
The Australian Capital Territory is another jurisdiction with a small population that 
occupies a small geographical area. There are fewer ministers and fewer layers of 
government, and senior executives are also quite accessible (personal communication, 6 
April 2011). In some ways this makes the government-sector relationship both easier 
and harder. On one hand, an NFP sector leader observed that, ‘The minister will be in 
the same fruit market as the lobbyist’ (personal communication, 1 April 2011). On the 
other hand, a senior official observed that the accessibility of ministers in this 
jurisdiction contributes to a propensity on the part of NFP policy actors to ignore ‘due 
process’ and ‘common courtesy’ by going over the heads of departmental officers to 
raise matters directly with the minister (personal communication, 6 April 2011). 
Access to decision-makers appears to be more problematic in South Australia where the 
sector reports a lack of success in obtaining meetings with ministers to discuss matters 
of concern. Peak organisations meet principally with senior bureaucrats who, it was 
alleged, have few incentives to consider representations from the sector. One senior 
NFP sector representative noted that the first response of the South Australian public 
sector is to ‘protect’ ministers from negative commentary, resulting in a lack of healthy, 
serious discussion of issues (personal communication, 6 July 2011a). Referring to failed 
attempts to obtain a meeting meet with the Minister for Families and Communities to 
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discuss a series of budget measures; the same sector representative said that the minister 
‘has effectively locked the door’:  
… it seems to me that if the Minister was genuinely interested in and 
genuinely committed to the Stronger Together agreement, that the door 
would have been open to those conversations a long time ago, and in fact 
the minister probably would have worked to establish a process of 
catching up with the sector on a regular basis that was outside of any 
specific issues that needed conversation. However, that’s not how, in this 
instance, the Minister for Families and Communities has operated in a 
South Australian context (personal communication, 6 July 2011a). 
The ‘disconnect’ between public sector and NFP sector views of Stronger Together has 
been referred to elsewhere in this chapter. Interestingly, there is a similar disconnect on 
the issue of access. One senior central agency official offered a contrasting view to that 
of the NFP sector representative cited above: 
Where you have a place where ministers can be so close to the public 
[and] where the public can get so close to the minister – our ministers will 
meet with anybody, really, who makes an appointment with them – 
wherever that occurs you do find situations where personality or persona 
can play more of a role than it does, possibly, in a larger jurisdiction 
(personal communication, 21 July 2011). 
However, what the sector might regard as intransigence or gatekeeping on the part of 
the bureaucracy can also be characterised as part of the normal working of Westminster 
style governance. One South Australian official affirmed that ‘we need a strong sector – 
and every government needs a strong sector’ whilst cautioning that the public sector has 
an obligation to implement government decisions, ‘but the sector that we fund might not 
appreciate that’ (personal communication, 7 July 2011a). The same official offered the 
following insight, which in many ways goes straight to the heart of the tensions between 
executive government, the bureaucracy and the NFP sector: 
I keep thinking of Habermassian circles, you know, political government, 
civil society and administrative government and sometimes the fight 
between civil society and political government gets in the way of us 
having a partnership at the administrative government level (personal 
communication, 7 July 2011a). 
In New South Wales, the fact that executive government delegated its part in the 
relationship with the NFP sector to public sector officials was, in the words of a key 
NFP sector representative, ‘one of the failures of the compact’ (personal 
communication, 17 November 2010). It is alleged that under Labor ministers were 
‘highly protected’ and that after 15 years of Labor government the bureaucracy had 
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become very effective gate-keepers: ‘and if you look at some of the criticism of 
government generally, particularly Labor government and the federal Labor government 
as well, the policy advisers are the worst gatekeepers’ (personal communication, 17 
November 2010): 
You almost have – with some notable exceptions – a coterie of political 
advisers that manage and control in a way that’s not as conducive to open 
discussion as you might have done in the past (personal communication, 
17 November 2010). 
Bilateral frameworks such as those in New South Wales, South Australia and 
Queensland followed the lead of framework agreements in Britain and Canada by 
having first ministers and/or portfolio ministers as signatories. This introduces what a 
New South Wales official called a ‘disconnect’ between ‘who signed’ and ‘who meets’ 
(personal communication, 18 November 2010a) – a disconnect that can lead to 
unfulfilled expectations, defensiveness and dissatisfaction.  
The refreshed version of the Australian Capital Territory’s Social Compact breaks new 
ground by having no signatories (and unlike the earlier version no longer has a even a 
foreword from the Chief Minister, making it politically neutral). The Tasmanian 
Relationship Agreement contains a foreword from the Premier and the Chair of the 
Tasmanian Peaks Forum but is endorsed by relevant departmental Secretaries and 
representatives of peak organisations. In both jurisdictions this signals the intention that 
the primary relationship for operational purposes will be between the bureaucracy and 
the NFP sector. However, it is also likely that the sector will elect to occasionally 
exercise its prerogative to make direct representations to ministers. 
Political orientation of the governing party  
As has already been discussed, where a governing party sits on the political spectrum 
can be a factor in whether or not a cross-sector relationship framework is admitted onto 
the policy agenda. Although state and territory Labor governments are strongly 
associated with the implementation of compacts, such overtly collegial exercises can 
mask underlying tensions between government and the sector. As put by one Australian 
peak organisation: 
For many peak bodies, sometimes there’s a perception that Labor 
governments are ‘friendly towards [the sector]’, but in fact, in lots of 
instances Labor governments expect peak bodies to be friendly towards 
[government] … Oftentimes Liberal governments – I mean genuine 
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liberal governments – sometimes appreciate the place of advocacy in a 
much clearer and less emotional manner and as a result are sometimes 
able to have much clearer relationships with bodies like peak bodies, 
because they see their place and they understand what it is. Oftentimes, 
governments – particularly modern Labor governments – have often 
misinterpreted that the place of peaks is to support them, and not to apply 
critical analysis and provide policy guidance from a point of 
independence (personal communication, 6 July 2011a). 
Another agreed with the proposition that Labor governments expect loyalty from the 
sector, whereas Liberal governments – where they adhere to traditional liberal values – 
accept the sovereignty of the sector and its right to an independent view: 
I can remember people on the Left of the ALP in New South Wales 
[expressing] exactly that view, you know, ‘you should be damn grateful 
we’re in and do what we want’ – that sort of view, and I think the Left of 
the ALP still suffers from that in that ‘we’re the repository of all the good 
policy ideas’ and at the end of the day the public sector still knows how to 
do it best. Sorry, I don’t think either of those things are true … My 35 
years working in human services, as I said, in the early years of the Wran 
[Labor] government and the years of the Fahey [Liberal] government 
were the two periods of time when I could say truly there’s been 
progressive social policy enacted by government. The rest of the time it’s 
either been totally confused and muddle-headed, or just very 
conservative, residual welfarism (personal communication, 13 September 
2011b). 
In opposition Labor sometimes looks to the sector for political support, especially in 
relation to its social policy agenda. This was true of the Bracks Labor government in 
Victoria and the sector was duly rewarded with a commitment to take a fresh look at the 
government-NFP sector relationship (personal communication, 18 April 2011). In New 
South Wales the dynamic was quite different. A key insider commented that Labor in 
New South Wales singularly failed to understand the value of partnership with the NFP 
sector: 
[Premier] Bob Carr himself, at the end of the day, had a really residual 
notion of welfare … It was all residual welfare stuff. You never had in 
New South Wales, like obviously you had with the Labour opposition 
under Blair and then in the first period of the Blair government in the UK, 
or even let’s say in Victoria, just not that appreciation.  
… The best period of social policy in New South Wales, in my memory, 
happened between 1992 and 1995 under the Fahey minority [Liberal] 
government. As I said before, the early years of the Labor government – 
the first two terms under Bob Carr – were so dismal in terms of social 
policy – they were marked by traditional welfarism and the total 
dominance of running up Budget surpluses and running down debt, et 
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cetera, but really in a sense it was still the ‘deserving poor’ view of the 
world (personal communication, 13 September 2011b).  
This is a view echoed in the reminisces of former federal Labor leader, Mark Latham 
(2003-2005), who laments the ‘unreconstructed state paternalism’ that pervades the 
thinking of his erstwhile Labor colleagues (Latham, 2005:163). 
Leadership and regime change  
Over the last two decades the governing political parties in Australia have exhibited an 
increasing willingness to change leaders in the midst of a parliamentary term. State 
Premiers have resigned in favour of an anointed successor (Queensland, New South 
Wales, Victoria and Australian Capital Territory), been encouraged to resign amid 
controversy (Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia), resigned 
for health or family reasons (Western Australia, Tasmania) or have been ousted in party 
coups (New South Wales, Northern Territory, Victoria).  
This observation is relevant to the analysis for the reason that framework agreements 
are often initiated within a first minister’s department and the authority and legitimacy 
of that agreement is seen to cascade directly from the premier or chief minister. Of 
course, this is not always the case: the South Australian and Victorian agreements are 
signed, respectively, by relevant portfolio ministers and the chief executives of affected 
departments (although in the case of Victoria the dialogue leading to the current 
arrangements began in the Department of Premier and Cabinet). 
Leadership change creates a moment of political opportunity in which new ideas can be 
elevated to the policy agenda. In Queensland the proposal for a compact gained policy 
salience Peter Beattie resigned in favour of Anna Bligh. In Tasmania progress towards a 
compact gained impetus when Lara Giddings took over from David Bartlett. On the 
other side of the coin, existing policies can lose their high agenda status following a 
change in leadership.  
In New South Wales, the compact signed just months before the resignation of Premier 
Bob Carr afterwards lost policy salience. One sector observer reported that the new 
premier, Morris Iemma, was ‘perhaps not fussed’ about the practical framework for 
how the compact might operate, adding that it was commonly considered that the 
Compact was ‘Carr’s thing’: ‘You almost immediately saw the Compact being put in 
the bottom drawer’ (personal communication, 17 November 2010).  
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Similarly, in Western Australia, the resignation of Labor Premier Geoff Gallop saw the 
wind drop from the sails of that state’s Industry Plan. Movement towards a framework 
agreement in the Northern Territory ceased upon the sudden and unexpected resignation 
of Chief Minister Clare Martin. 
Another factor in the fortunes of cross-sector policy frameworks is regime change. 
Since 2010 long-term state and territory Labor governments in Western Australia, New 
South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and the Northern Territory have fallen to 
conservative Coalition, Liberal-national or Country Liberal governments. Said the 
former Independent Chair of the Queensland Compact Governance Committee: ‘there is 
no real way to future proof documentation that carries a previous Premier’s and 
Minister’s picture’ (personal communication, 2012).  
A change of government has dealt a blow to some cross-sector frameworks, but not all. 
Western Australia is the stand-out exception of a conservative administration that 
elected to co-produce a new settlement with the NFP sector that takes on board 
elements of the previous government’s policies and commits significant new resources 
for sector development. In Victoria, a new conservative administration chose to not only 
continue with the existing sub-sector-specific ‘MoU’ approach, but has repeated the 
approach in other policy domains. 
In New South Wales, the incoming Coalition government has ignored an already 
moribund compact and shows no sign of going down the same path. The views of senior 
New South Wales government officials interviewed for this study would suggest that 
the public sector would be entirely comfortable with this approach. In Queensland, the 
incoming Liberal National Party government acted immediately to shelve the 
Queensland Compact and its associated governance mechanisms. The government has 
also imposed strict requirements on contracts with NFP service providers preventing 
them from commenting on public policy. The government has indicated that 
consideration is being given to whether a new compact is required, and it will be 
interesting to see what form that might take. 
Symbolic policy  
Formal relationship frameworks carry the added attraction of embodying signature 
elements of the social democratic ethos and having few direct financial implications. A 
key actor involved in the development of Working Together for New South Wales 
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characterised compacts as symbolic ‘markers’ or exercises in ‘branding’ which might be 
very appealing to parties when in opposition, but when confronted with the reality of 
governing, their attraction might wane (personal communication, 13 September 2011b). 
In South Australia, a senior NFP sector representative also expressed the view that 
Stronger Together was a largely symbolic, hollow gesture (personal communication, 6 
July 2011a). In Victoria, on the other hand, a senior NFP sector representative reported 
the substance of discussions with a former Victorian (ALP) minister for community 
development, Peter Batchelor:  
[Batchelor] is a smart fellow and he and I had a number of discussions at 
the time and he said ‘well it will be fine words but what do you actually 
want to see achieved?’ and the things that the sector wanted were 
practical things, they weren’t ‘fine words’. So Peter, I think thought quite 
pragmatically, ‘I don’t want to spend six months negotiating fine words 
with the sector when they want some practical stuff’. So I think that was 
Peter's take, which seems reasonable (personal communication, 15 April 
2011). 
This particular informant added: ‘there were other things on our agenda that we would 
also die in a ditch for ahead of a written compact. So for us [the community sector] it 
was a “non-die-in-a-ditch” thing when it came down to the practicalities’ (personal 
communication, 15 April 2011). 
Remarks like these underscore the importance of focussing on practical measures 
necessary to give effect to a compact’s aims. Similar reservations were expressed by a 
number of interviewees from both the NFP and the public sector. Without action plans 
or sector investment strategies, there is a risk that a framework agreement will be 
looked upon as being more symbolic than practical in terms of its content or intent. A 
document that commands neither the respect nor the confidence of NFP and public 
sector actors and will eventually fall into irrelevance. 
Conclusion 
Do governments and the NFP sector need formal policy frameworks for cross-sector 
cooperation? Clearly, key players in Australian states and territories have at various 
times concluded that they do. It is also clear that faith in the potential of such 
instruments to materially re-shape the relationship between governments and the NFP 
sector is frequently challenged.  
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It might well be argued that the emergence of network governance as a central 
organising theme in the formulation and implementation of public policy lends a degree 
of inevitability to the pursuit of cross-sector frameworks. The ‘hollowing out’ of the 
state over the past two decades (Rhodes, 2000, Di Francesco, 2001, Rhodes, 2007) 
coupled with the marketisation of social provision has deepened the mutual dependency 
between governments and the NFP sector: governments are increasingly dependent 
upon the NFP sector to deliver services, while NFP organisations are increasingly 
dependent upon government contracts for their income.114 
‘horses for courses’ 
The cases examined in this chapter reveal that the form, content and implementation 
processes of formal cross-sector policy frameworks differ in each jurisdiction, and 
sector confidence in the frameworks is mixed. That Australian state and territory cross-
sector policy frameworks differ from one jurisdiction to another is unsurprising given 
the complexity of the political and policy environments within which they arise, and the 
different perspectives and priorities brought to the table by the parties.  
In some jurisdictions central agencies and/or line departments have assumed the lead in 
top-down approaches to the development of cross-sector agreements (South Australia 
and New South Wales), largely driven by a desire to resolve tensions arising in their 
contractual relationships with funded agencies. Where government takes the lead the 
NFP sector sometimes expresses a diminished sense of ‘ownership’ over the resultant 
policy frameworks. Meanwhile the NFP sector’s government ‘partners’ sometimes 
exhibit a ‘mission accomplished’ mentality and a corresponding lack of commitment to 
on-going governance.  
In other jurisdictions the agreement-making process has been initiated either by the 
sector itself in a bottom-up process (Queensland) or has come about as the result of a 
‘bottom-up and top-down’ convergence of government and sector interests (Australian 
Capital Territory, Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia). In these instances, the NFP 
sector is often able to exercise a greater degree of political or policy leverage and is in a 
better position to negotiate for the establishment of durable governance and operational 
structures to further the aims of the policy framework. 
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Successes and failures 
Examples of effective policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation can be found: 
those in Victoria and Western Australia appear to be making a positive, and important 
contribution both to the quality and durability of the relationship between government 
and the human services sector, and to the sustainability and adaptability of the sector 
itself. Both jurisdictions also have dedicated units (the Office for the Community Sector 
in the Victorian Department of Communities and the Community Engagement Unit in 
the WA Department of Communities) focused on issues of sustainability and capacity-
building for the broader NFP sector. In the Australian Capital Territory where the Social 
Compact had declined in visibility and relevance since its launch in 2004 (ACT, 2004) 
both the sector and government remain committed to its core principles and have since 
‘refreshed’ the compact and, by extension, the relationship.  
Examples of ineffective frameworks can also be found. In South Australia for example 
the divergent accounts of public officials and NFP sector representatives suggest a deep 
disconnect in their respective perceptions of Stronger Together (South Australia, 2009). 
Although the agreement is currently under review, it is far from clear that the sector has 
much confidence in the process. And New South Wale’s 2006 compact, Working 
Together for NSW (NSW, 2006), is acknowledged by the public and NFP sectors as 
ineffectual – full of laudable words, but having had little discernable effect on the 
operations of government or the sector. 
Cross-sector policy frameworks under centre-right governments 
The compact concept has not yet run its course. Whether a framework agreement exists 
or not, governments and parts of the NFP sector are still engaged in a highly symbiotic 
relationship. To the extent that the relationship is sometimes vexed by a lack of trust or 
lapses of good faith, there will be incentives to formalise or regularise aspects of the 
relationship. Thus, in October 2012 Tasmanian Premier Lara Giddings launched that 
state’s Partnership Agreement as a kind of policy coda to a decade long conversation 
about the government-sector relationship.  
Notably, most states and territories have recently seen long-standing Labor 
administrations replaced by centre-right Liberal-led governments.115 There are, however, 
few indications of a wholesale return by centre-right governments to the NPM inspired 
‘market fundamentalism’ that prevailed during the 1990s. For example, Liberal-led 
 
 
 
 
215 
administrations in Western Australia and Victoria recognise the value to government of 
ensuring the sustainability of NFP enterprises in particular sub-sectors and have 
breathed new life into the policy foundations established by their predecessors.  
There is some evidence in policy statements of a rhetorical shift away from terms such 
as ‘civil society’ and ‘social capital’ towards the language of ‘social enterprise’ and 
‘social innovation’. This is suggestive of policy borrowing from the Cameron 
government’s ‘Big Society’ agenda in the UK and can be read as centre-right 
governments restoring the ‘natural order’ by placing the policy framework firmly in the 
service of the commissioning environment without entirely discarding the notion of 
partnership. 
Still, no two succeeding Liberal-National administrations exhibit identical policy 
responses. Both New South Wales and Victorian Liberal-National coalition 
governments have continued to steer a course set in train by previous Labor 
administrations: in New South Wales a moribund agreement has been ignored by the 
new government whereas, in Victoria, the government appears set to continue the 
constructive policy track established by Labor. In Western Australia the government 
and the sector have eschewed a bilateral compact in favour of a comprehensive policy 
statement that has breathed new life into the relationship. This new settlement – backed 
by a major financial investment – empowers rather than marginalises the sector.  
The situation in Queensland is different again. At the time of writing, the Queensland 
Compact is being held in abeyance. The first-term Liberal National Party (LNP) 
government is firmly focussed on reducing public sector outlays and debt. Tensions 
have emerged between government and the sector over public sector cutbacks and the 
re-imposition of ‘gag clauses’ in service delivery contracts. Tellingly, the LNP 
government is being guided in its policy formulation and implementation by the former 
Howard government Treasurer, Peter Costello, whose own views on the sector have a 
strongly residualist flavour (Costello, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). An apparent absence of 
vocal sector concern about the fate of the Queensland Compact is suggestive of both its 
dependence upon government funding (and therefore, a natural reticence to antagonise a 
new government already focussed on reducing public expenditure) and the NFP sector’s 
lack of political potency. 
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Success factors 
For governments, adherence to the spirit and letter of compacts appears to prove 
problematic: not only have such instruments no legal force, the evidence suggests that 
compacts are frequently plagued by waning commitment and idiosyncratic or selective 
application by line agencies. Although underpinned by presumptions of partnership, 
cross-sector collaboration and co-production, success in aligning practice with the 
rhetoric is often elusive. Compacts also raise thorny questions about the nature, role and 
composition of the NFP sector as well as questions about representation and legitimacy. 
The NFP sector is after all a diverse, variegated and unruly political space.  
Public sector organisations seem at times to strive to preserve an increasingly 
anachronistic attachment to ‘command and control’ notions of governance, even when 
they are patently dependent upon third parties for the implementation and delivery of 
programs and services. NFP organisations, on the other hand, sometimes appear to 
regard contractual compliance and reporting as both an affront to their cultural and 
operational autonomy and an unnecessary regulatory impost with no intrinsic value 
(Shergold, 2008a:7).  
This is tricky terrain in which compacts also confront and challenge prevailing notions 
about the respective cultural and operational norms that shape the identity and modus 
operandi of both sectors. Compacts are intended to provide the roadmap for navigating 
this terrain. Where they come into existence against an historical backdrop of cross-
sector cooperation; where they demonstrate joint ownership and a commitment to a 
concrete program of meaningful actions; where they are guided by sound governance 
and exhibit vertical and horizontal policy integration, compacts provide a space in 
which governments and the NFP sector can work collaboratively towards shared aims. 
Each of the state and territory frameworks have ‘mutualist’ elements, such as statements 
about the respective roles and contributions of the parties; shared principles, aims and 
objectives; and the standards of conduct expected of government and the sector. There 
are also notable differences between jurisdictions in terms of the role played by central 
agencies; the presence (or absence) of influential ‘champions’; the existence of effective 
governance structures (including reporting and evaluation requirements); ‘action plans’ 
and dedicated resources; and the degree of vertical and horizontal integration with 
related policy frameworks.  
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These factors can be important determinants of success or failure. Their absence 
heightens the risk of fragmentation, inconsistency, irrelevance and cynicism. Although 
each of the framework agreements examined articulate the respective roles of the public 
and NFP sectors, a clash of roles can still occur as described by a South Australian 
official: 
We have consistently taken that line, we say ‘look, our job is to 
implement government decisions, we want to work with you to do that 
the best we possibly can, and want to engage with you to do that, but the 
bottom line is we must implement the government decision’, and they’re 
saying ‘we’ve got an advocacy role and we’re not going to play in the 
sandpit when the sandpit’s been cut in half’, and that’s where removing 
the central advocacy and representation components from the service 
delivery end would make the relationship, in my view, operate a lot more 
smoothly (personal communication, 7 July 2011a). 
Finally, unless formal framework agreements are institutionally embedded, they can be 
marginalised and rendered inconsequential as emergent issues crowd them off the 
policy agenda. Even those policy frameworks that enjoy strong support within the NFP 
and public sectors can falter at critical moments in the politics stream (e.g. the 
Queensland Compact). 
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Chapter Seven – The National Compact: civilising 
the relationship between government and the 
not-for-profit sector in Australia∗  
This chapter considers the origins of and prospects for Australia’s National Compact. 
Intended as a signature policy achievement of the first Rudd Labor government (2007-
10), the National Compact, like its better-known predecessors the ‘English’ Compact 
and the Canadian Accord, is a formal, deliberate policy framework intended to establish 
new rules of engagement between government and the NFP sector.  
The launch of the Compact in March 2010 marked an important milestone towards 
fulfilment of a 2007 pre-election promise by the Australian Labor Party (ALP) to 
‘repair’ the relationship between the federal government and the NFP sector (Gillard 
and Wong, 2007). The ALP’s commitment to canvass sector support for a compact was 
an important plank in a broader policy agenda for ‘social inclusion’. Notably, the 
National Compact – unlike the English Compact or the Canadian Accord – was not 
accompanied by a major investment component for sector development. Labor’s 
intention was to achieve NFP sector reform aims as much as possible within existing 
resources. This needs to be seen in the broader context of Rudd’s 2007 campaign vow to 
cut spending on administration and to exert tight control on outlays (Schubert and 
Shanahan, 2007). 
In his 2010 foreword, then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd hailed the compact as an 
expression of his government’s desire ‘to embrace new ways of governing – including 
forming innovative partnerships with the Third Sector to tackle the nation’s long-term 
challenges’ (Australia, 2010b). This chapter examines the policy antecedents and the 
political events that helped to bring about the National Compact, the policy 
entrepreneurs who contributed to shaping the policy discourse on which it is founded, 
and the trajectory of sector reform in uncertain political times. 
At its launch at Parliament House in Canberra on 17 March 2010, Rudd said of the 
National Compact: 
                                                
∗ This chapter draws together and expands upon two peer reviewed papers (including one co-
authored paper) and one book chapter – all based on research undertaken for this dissertation 
(Butcher, 2011, 2012, Butcher et al., 2012). 
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This compact sets the framework for all of the Government's work with 
Third Sector organisations as we tackle some of the greatest challenges 
facing Australia, an era of collaboration that will fundamentally 
strengthen and improve the way we work together, that will strengthen 
civil society and that will help the organisations which help many of the 
most needy and disadvantaged people in Australia. 
... This Compact gives community organisations, large and small, real 
input into Government policy and program delivery. It enables true 
collaboration on key social, economic and environmental challenges 
facing our communities and it allows the broad range of Australian not-
for-profit groups to work with Government to achieve a shared vision 
(Rudd, 2010). 
In order to corroborate the broad narrative suggested by a reading of the primary and 
secondary literatures, in-depth interviews were conducted with five elite policy actors 
working at senior levels in the national NFP policy space. The interviewees represent a 
range of views from within government, the bureaucracy and the NFP sector. Interviews 
with elite policy actors at the sub-national level also solicited views on the National 
Compact and, where relevant, their views also inform the analysis. In order to protect 
the confidentiality of interviewees none are identified by name. 
The Australian National Compact in context 
The micro-economic reforms of the Hawke and Keating Labor governments (1983-
1996) laid the platform for the rise of NPM in Australia.116 However, the shift towards 
neoliberal governance in Australia accelerated with the election in 1996 of a Liberal-
National Coalition government led by John Howard. Howard rejected Labor’s brand of 
state interventionism117 in favour of neoliberal and managerialist discourses.  
At the heart of this new policy discourse were the values of fiscal rectitude, self-
reliance, mutual obligation, public choice, a preference for private enterprise over public 
sector provision and the utilisation of market instruments to leverage choice and 
competition – all generously leavened with appeals to ‘conservative populism’ (Ryan, 
2005, Singleton, 2005:1-2, Mendes, 2009).  
In a 1998 speech, Howard declared that the increasing demand for greater choice was a 
driving force behind the transformation of economic, political and social life, and that: 
… more and more people who have more knowledge and information at 
their disposal … are demanding more choice in the workplace, more 
choice in education, more choice in their own telecommunications – in 
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short, more choice in how they and their families live their lives (Howard, 
1998). 
In its first two terms the Howard government’s enthusiasm for market-based approaches 
to public administration drove a massive program of public asset sales, the privatisation 
of government business functions, and the outsourcing of a variety of corporate support 
services (Aulich and O'Flynn, 2007a:160-163, Aulich and O'Flynn, 2007b). The same 
logic was applied to the delivery of human services, beginning in 1998 with the creation 
of a quasi-market to replace a long-standing system of (primarily) publicly operated 
employment services (Thomas, 2007).  
Branded as the ‘Job Network’, the new system was ‘one of the first comprehensive 
attempts internationally to apply market mechanisms to the provision of subsidised 
employment services’ (Productivity Commission, 2002:XXII).118 Tenders were invited 
from for-profit and NFP providers for employment services contracts valued at $1.7 
billion (1998-2000). With the second tendering round in 1999 the total value of 
employment services contracts offered to the market had grown to $3 billion 
(Productivity Commission, 2002:4.8-4.9). The Job Network thus became the template 
for the expansion of third party contracting and the creation of quasi-markets in areas 
such as family relationship and migration services (Wanna et al., 2010:160-167, 
Butcher and Freyens, 2011:16).119  
Many NFP service providers participating in the newly established human services 
quasi-markets experienced a significant expansion of their market-share. However, 
rapid growth also accentuated endemic capacity deficits within the sector. Larger NFPs 
participating in these new markets became more ‘professional’ and ‘business-like’. In 
contrast, many small to medium sized organisations were excluded from competitive 
tendering by high transaction costs. Those parts of the NFP sector unable to participate 
in the new human services markets languished in a capacity doldrums.120  
In general, the Howard government applauded the contributions to society and 
communities of churches, community groups, social clubs, philanthropic and charitable 
organisations. Yet, despite its growing dependence on the sector as an agent of service 
delivery, the government offered little in the way of practical support for capacity 
development. In part, this reflects a degree of distrust of parts of the sector within 
Howard’s administration. One respondent interviewed for this dissertation suggested 
that, had the Howard government been re-elected in 2007, there would have been no 
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program for NFP reform, such was the ‘deep suspicion of the sector’ on the part of 
Howard and certain of his ministers ‘that goes back decades’ (personal communication, 
11 May 2011).  
Although prepared to acknowledge a role for government in ‘facilitating linkages 
between individuals, communities, voluntary associations and business’ and accepting 
the need to be alert to potential threats to voluntary activity (Howard, 1998), the 
Howard government considered it unnecessary to intrude into the essentially private 
activities of NFP organisations. This ‘hands-off’ approach was neatly summed-up by 
Howard’s Treasurer, Peter Costello: 
... social networks are neither established by, nor controlled by 
government. They are voluntary. That is their strength. So while the 
Government cannot establish these associations and should not force 
engagement it should be careful to do no harm (Costello, 2003, emphasis 
added). 
Howard considered his government ‘reformist’ in market and economic terms, however, 
it was also socially conservative (Singleton, 2005:4-5, Johnson, 2007, 2010). In her 
book, God Under Howard, Maddox draws attention to a consensus amongst political 
observers that: 
[W]hile Howard’s economics were a matter of considered political 
conviction developed through his career, his social policy was a kind of 
default mechanism, ingrained in [his Methodist] childhood and never 
rethought (Maddox, 2005:2-3).  
Accordingly, the Howard government cultivated relations with large, socially 
conservative NFPs, such as The Smith Family, Mission Australia, or the Salvation 
Army, who were broadly sympathetic with elements of its social policy agenda 
(Mendes, 2005:147, Boucher and Sharpe, 2008, Mendes, 2008:130, Manderson, 
2011:234).  
The Howard government, according to one interviewee, did not like independent NFP 
peak bodies and did not like Commonwealth funds being used for systemic advocacy 
(personal communication, 11 May 2011). The same person noted that some of 
Howard’s ministers ‘intensely disliked’ the welfare sector ‘because it challenges them 
in so many ways’, adding that they were also ‘thin skinned and had really long 
memories … and they never, never move on’ (personal communication, 11 May 2011).  
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Under the Howard government commissioning agencies adopted a fairly rigid approach 
to contractual oversight and accountability with the aim, it was argued of imposing 
political as well as financial discipline on NFP organisations in receipt of government 
funding (Sawer, 2002, Maddison et al., 2004, Mendes, 2005, Staples, 2006, Hamilton 
and Maddison, 2007). Funding agreements, for example, included so-called ‘gagging 
clauses’ that enjoined contracted NFP service providers from commenting on public 
policy, and in 2003 the Howard government tried – and failed – to legislate a definition 
of ‘charitable purpose’ that threatened the tax deductible status of organisations 
‘attempting to change the law or government policy’ (Charities Bill 2003). 
By its fourth term (2004-07) a ‘re-balancing’ of policy emphasis was already underway, 
away from the nostrums of NPM towards inter-agency coordination and cooperation, 
and working across portfolio boundaries (Halligan, 2008:16-17). The practical 
challenges of program design, policy implementation and service delivery in complex 
environments required the incorporation of relational elements into funding agreements 
with NFP service providers, albeit still within stringent accountability frameworks 
(Butcher and Freyens, 2011:28-29).  
Australia was a relative latecomer to what Halligan calls ‘new wave coordination’ in the 
form of horizontal, integrated or joined-up government (Halligan, 2008:16). Any 
significant progress towards cross-sector cooperation would have to await a change of 
government. This was the backdrop against which the opposition ALP in 2007, under 
the leadership of Kevin Rudd, set out a ‘social inclusion’ agenda in which it committed 
to righting the alleged wrongs of the Howard government – including a commitment to 
consult with the NFP sector about a compact (Gillard and Wong, 2007). 
The National Compact – the problem stream 
Through the 1970s and 1980s, the contribution of Australia’s NFP sector to policy 
development and delivery was valued and supported by state and federal governments 
(personal communication, 11 May 2011). From the late 1980s, however, Australian 
governments – Labor and Liberal – adopted a largely instrumentalist view of the NFP 
sector as a useful, but ultimately substitutable, input into the delivery of public policy 
and the production of services, while at the same time extolling the virtues of 
voluntarism and philanthropy.  
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By the time of the 2007 general election the relationship between the Howard 
government and parts of the NFP sector was fraught with tensions. 
There were a number of contributing factors, including: the absence of 
a coherent regulatory framework (which contributed to uncertainty and inequitable 
taxation treatment of organisations); the inherent social conservatism of the Howard 
government’s social policy (which clashed with the values of the ‘progressive’ elements 
of the NFP sector); and the government’s tendency towards selectivity when inviting 
NFP sector input into the formulation and delivery of policy.  
As a consequence, the sector became disenchanted with the ‘unequal’ nature of its 
engagement with government and the ‘disconnect’ between how the government and 
the sector viewed the relationship (Productivity Commission, 2010a:309). One 
interviewee characterised the relationship thusly: 
Figure 7.1 – Timeline and synopsis, Australian government-NFP sector relationship 
1980s 1990s 2000s 
Hawke/Keating Labour 
government elected in 1983 
initiates major structural and 
micro-economic reforms 
entailing de-regulation of the 
financial sector and monetary 
system. At the federal level, 
support for micro-economic 
reform is assured via a 
corporatist Accord with unions 
and industry. Federal and 
state/territory governments 
commence an incremental 
process of public sector 
management reform. In the 
federal sphere, this comes to be 
known as ‘economic 
rationalism’. The relationship 
between NFP and public sector 
service providers is still largely 
symbiotic: the privatisation and 
marketisation of public sector 
functions is in its infancy.  
 
Managerialist discourses in the 
form of NPM exert increasing 
influence on public policy during 
the 1990s at all levels of 
government. Further structural 
reforms of the economy in the 
form of competition policy drives 
the privatisation of public utilities 
and subjects government 
functions to business logics in 
order to introduce elements of 
choice, performance, 
responsiveness and competition. 
Reform gathers pace with the 
election in 1996 of the 1st Howard 
Coalition government. Both 
federal and state governments 
press community and voluntary 
organisations into service as 
contracted service providers. A 
‘contract state’ emerges, 
governed by the precepts of 
principal-agent theory. NFP 
organisations are enlisted as 
state service delivery agents and 
have little input into either public 
or operational policy.  
During the 11 years of the 
Howard Coalition government 
relations with the NFP sector 
are strained. In the federal 
sphere public sector 
‘purchasers’ are paternalistic 
and focussed on compliance 
regimes that impose operational 
burdens and transaction costs 
on NFP sector service 
providers. Although the 
experience is similar at the 
state and territory level, from 
2001 Labor governments begin 
to initiate dialogue with the NFP 
sector about formal relationship 
frameworks. Federally, the 
Labor opposition promises to 
repair the relationship and 
offers the prospect of a 
compact. The Rudd Labor 
government elected in 2007 
commissions the Productivity 
Commission to produce a study 
of the NFP sector and 
simultaneously initiates 
consultations about a compact. 
The National Compact is 
launched in 2010 and the 
Gillard Labor government 
commits to a program of further 
legislative and structural reform 
for the sector. 
 
 
 
 227 
[G]overnment was colonising the sector as more and more of the services 
[were] being devolved to the sector to run, but with government still 
wanting to have total control, and not respecting the autonomy, or the 
independence, or the democratic processes within the organisations 
themselves (personal communication, 13 September 2011a). 
Said another: 
[The sector] just wanted the goal posts not to keep shifting; they wanted 
to have a sense of understanding what the government wanted from them; 
they wanted to be listened to, and consulted with appropriately. 
Consultation under the previous government had got to the stage of 
‘We’re consulting on the new arrangements – and here it is. This is what’s 
going to be coming today on the first of July’, and that was consultation! 
So it was never actually participation by the sector in shaping-up a policy 
or a program (personal communication, 29 September 2011). 
Concerns frequently canvassed by the NFP sector throughout the Howard years 
included: 
• A lack of trust, open communication mutual respect between government and parts 
of the sector; 
• A perception that government gave little credence to the knowledge and expertise of 
NFP organisations when formulating policies and designing programs; 
• Problems of isomorphism as NFP providers take on the practices and behaviours of 
the government organisations they deal with, thus subverting the very qualities that 
commended them as service providers; 
• The corrosive effects of competitive tendering upon relationships within the sector, 
including tendering practices that favoured larger organisations; 
• Inconsistencies and conflicts between government agencies and levels of 
government seen to contribute to high transaction costs and leading to 
administrative burdens and impaired service provision; 
• Problems of ‘mission-drift’ as NFP service providers seek to be responsive to their 
government ‘clients’, and as a consequence become distracted from their founding 
purpose; 
• Failures to fund the full cost of service provision coupled with a failure to factor 
administrative overheads into the ‘price’ paid for services; 
• Perceptions that NFP service providers are virtually an arm of government; and 
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• The erosion of NFP organisations’ independence through over-regulation, a lack of 
a transparency, and overly-prescriptive approaches to contracting – including 
contractual provisions limiting the ability of organisations to engage in systemic 
advocacy (Australia, 2010a, Productivity Commission, 2010a:309-310).  
The greatest source of tension, however, was competitive tendering and contracting for 
mandated public services and the manner in which it was practiced by the Howard 
government (Productivity Commission, 2010a:308, Butcher and Freyens, 2011). As 
expressed by one interviewee, the Howard government’s contracting practices were ‘the 
lightning rods for a whole lot of dissatisfaction in the sector’ (personal communication, 
29 September 2011).  
Whilst government and the bureaucracy employed ‘partnership rhetorics’, NFP 
organisations with a long-standing presence in particular human services industries felt 
as though they had been frozen-out of policy formulation and service design processes 
(Goddard, 2006, Melville, 2008). ‘Government knows best' was the dominant mantra: 
‘[government] had the answers, that they could in fact determine how, what, when and 
by whom service delivery would occur’ (personal communication, 11 May 2011). One 
interviewee observed that governments traditionally see themselves as the 
policymakers, and described the situation as follows: 
The policy is made within the government: ‘we only want you to tell us, 
just in case we aren’t the fount of all wisdom, that there might be no 
unintended consequence here. We don’t want you to tell us whether you 
like the policy or not – whether you like it or not, this is the policy or, 
whether you like it or not, this is the problem (we determine what the 
problem is) and we are telling you this is THE solution (not A solution, 
this is THE solution) and all we want to know is if there’s going to be 
some big problem for someone that we might have missed.’ (personal 
communication, 13 September 2011a). 
Another, recalling the dissonance in messaging emanating, respectively, from 
government and the NFP sector, observed: ‘I’ve never seen such a disconnect – never!’ 
(personal communication, 11 May 2011). 
That some intermediary organisations found themselves outside the policy ‘tent’ while 
others were invited in heightened discord and division in a sector that prized 
organisational autonomy while at the same time striving to preserve collegiality. The 
lack of a single entry point to government resulted in a pattern of ‘learnt behaviour’ in 
the form of ‘forum-shopping’:  
 
 
 229 
[Y]ou know, if you don’t get what you want from one minister, go to the 
next. [This occurred] because there was no overarching strategy, or rules 
of engagement, or anything (personal communication, 29 September 
2011). 
In a 2006 essay the then Labor Opposition Leader (and soon to be Prime Minister) 
Kevin Rudd castigated the Howard government’s pursuit of ‘free market 
fundamentalism’ in which the ‘ruthless economic utilitarianism’ of an ‘unrestrained 
market capitalism’ runs roughshod over traditional social values of family and 
community (Rudd, 2006:46-47). Calling upon Labor to ‘reclaim the centre of Australian 
politics’, Rudd foreshadowed the opportunity to ‘form fresh political alliances with 
other groupings alienated by this new form of market fundamentalism, which is blind 
and indifferent to its social consequences’ (Rudd, 2006:50). Rudd called on a ‘new 
coalition of political forces’ to join in the task of humanising markets and ‘fostering 
new forms of social capital’ (Rudd, 2006:50). 
The marketisation of services, together with procurement and contract management 
regimes that accentuated competitive pressures between erstwhile collaborators in the 
NFP sector, represented to some in the NFP sector a debasement of earlier time when 
the sector complemented government as a partner and not regarded a merely an agent. 
Whatever the objective truth of those halcyon days of government-NFP sector 
partnership, what was clear was that the NFP sector wanted to place the relationship on 
a better, more equal footing. And this is what the Labor opposition announced it would 
work towards should it win the 2007 general election (Gillard and Wong, 2007). 
The National Compact – the policy stream 
By the time of the 2007 election the Australian public was palpably weary of the 
decade-long policy preoccupation with economic ideology (Brown, 2007, Langmore, 
2008). Rudd’s critique of neoliberalism seemed to have captured ‘the vibe’121 of the 
dying days of the Howard era, characterised by the oft-cited catchphrase ‘we live in a 
society, not an economy’. It is possible to see in Rudd’s call-to-arms the nascence of 
Labor’s future policy agenda for the NFP sector. In a later essay (published after 
becoming Prime Minister) he characterises neoliberalism as ‘that particular brand of 
free-market fundamentalism, extreme capitalism and excessive greed which became the 
economic orthodoxy of our time’ (Rudd, 2009:26) and castigates neoliberals as being 
‘intrinsically suspicious of all forms of multilateral governance’ (Rudd, 2009:28). 
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The Rudd government’s policy announcements in relation to social inclusion and the 
compact were redolent of the ‘Third Way’ agenda charted in the United Kingdom by 
Blair’s ‘New Labour’ a decade previously. Even the language was similar: the term 
‘compact’ was a direct borrowing from the UK, and while the Blair government spoke 
about the problem of ‘social exclusion’, the Australian policy rhetoric spoke about 
strategies to promote ‘social inclusion’.  
However, it would be simplistic to suggest that the policy framework proposed by 
Australian Labor was a direct appropriation of the Blair-era policy framework. 
Certainly, the ALP’s 2007 commitment to a national compact is in some respects a 
product of policy transfer via exchanges of people and ideas between British Labour 
and Australian Labor (personal communication, 29 September 2011). This is hardly 
surprising given the ALP’s deep historical, political and ideological ties with the British 
Labour Party (Frankel, 1997, Scott, 2000, James and Markey, 2006).122  
Also, as we have already seen, the diffusion to Australia of ‘Third Way’ policy thinking 
had by that time already been well under way for almost a decade. The strong ties 
between the ALP and the British Labour Party – including exchanges of policy ideas 
and campaign expertise during general elections (Button and Murphy, 2007, Wilson, 
2008) – coupled with half a decade of prior experience with compacts initiated by state 
Labor governments123 – meant that by 2007, a national compact was a ‘ready to go’ 
policy solution awaiting the right political conditions (Lyons, 2001a, Casey et al., 
2008c, Casey et al., 2008b, Casey et al., 2010, Edgar and Lockie, 2010, Butcher, 2011, 
2012, Butcher et al., 2012). As observed by one interviewee: 
[The National Compact] came around political connections and political 
discourse around options and alternatives. You had a lot of work going on 
in the Bracks [Labor] government around the relationship with the sector 
and repositioning the sector, so at the time I would have said in the 90s 
under [Premier] Carr, New South Wales was leading the thinking around 
service delivery, and then in the 2000s it then went to Victoria and the 
‘head space’ was Victoria. We’re a pretty small country and we don’t 
have … that big a ‘brains trust’ really. Once it was indicated that there 
was a willingness, and an interest, and an appetite [for] moving to this 
more collaborative approach, those people who’d been interested – and 
frustrated – for a while, surfaced (personal communication, 29 September 
2011). 
A number of persons interviewed for this study confirmed that the views of sub-national 
policy actors indeed cascaded upwards to inform discussions at the national level. One 
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interviewee, citing the successes of state and territory Councils of Social Service in 
getting compacts on the agenda sub-nationally, suggested that much of the impetus 
behind a national compact would have come from peak organisations in the welfare 
sector (personal communication, 11 May 2011). Another observed that the eventual 
form of the National Compact was strongly influenced by the 2008 Queensland 
Compact (personal communication, 14 April 2011). 
As for federal Labor’s decision to frame its policy in terms of social inclusion, one 
interviewee suggested that: 
[The] notion of social inclusion, and the use of the words social inclusion 
rather than social exclusion, came directly from [Social Inclusion 
Commissioner] David Cappo and the [SA Premier, Mike] Rann 
experience in South Australia where they had been actually working on 
an agenda for about three years. They were looking to an ‘asset-based 
model’ rather than a ‘deficit/exclusion model’, so they were trying to 
create a different kind of mind-set around the issue of inclusion. So, the 
narrative was pretty thin and the language was pretty ‘clunky’ [and] 
poorly defined … so then, to try and frame what social inclusion was 
about, there was a decision taken by Julia [Gillard] and Penny [Wong] … 
that social inclusion would find its traction in the issue of workplace 
participation … what was a ten-point plan became a stronger narrative 
around participation … (personal communication, 29 September 2011). 
Despite the tense relationship between the Howard government and the NFP sector, the 
NFP policy space was the site of lively discussion, debate and research. The era of the 
Howard government produced a vast grey literature in the form of official inquiries, 
studies and working papers addressing the relationship between government and the 
NFP sector contributed to the evidentiary base upon which Labor would craft the value 
proposition for a national compact.  
Among the major inquiries in the federal sphere up until 2007 were: an Industry 
Commission report on charitable organisations (1995); an inquiry into the definition of 
a charity (Charities Definition Inquiry, 2001); a report by the Board of Taxation on the 
definition of charity (Board of Taxation, 2003); and a report by the Productivity 
Commission on social capital (Productivity Commission, 2003). These inquiries also 
stimulated much discussion amongst NFP organisations, many of which would have 
invested significant effort in the preparation of formal submissions – mostly with little 
expectation that their representations would be heeded (personal communication, 13 
September 2011a). 
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To these might be added various state government reports, including reports by state 
auditors general addressing issues associated with contracted service provision (Auditor 
General Western Australia, 2000, PAEC, 2002, QAO, 2007, VAGO, 2010) and a range 
of material emanating from ‘think tanks’ and university-affiliated research centres 
(Melville, 2003, Maddison et al., 2004, Edgar, 2008, Sidoti et al., 2009). 
Thus one can see in the policy stream evidence of significant discussion and 
deliberation within and between various policy communities about the nature and role 
of the NFP sector and about the kinds of policy responses necessary to give effect to a 
more productive relationship between the sector and government. This raised the 
temperature in social policy circles around finding solutions to pressing problems in 
Australia’s NFP policy space.  
The National Compact – the politics stream 
By the middle of the last decade, policy interest in collaborative approaches to 
governance was growing steadily (Huxham et al., 2000, Entwistle and Martin, 2005, 
Huxham, 2005, Agranoff, 2006). Wanna suggests that by the turn of the century, the 
vocabulary of governments – particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world – had begun to 
change in anticipation of a ‘new era of public administration’ in which collaboration 
would be ‘the next wave of public-sector reform’ (Wanna, 2008:7).124  
In the Australian policy scene collaboration with the NFP sector has often been framed 
in social capital terms, although proponents sometimes offer diametrically opposed 
constructions of the concept (Butcher, 2006). Collaboration discourses paralleled and 
complemented discourses in the NFP policy space around the capacity of the sector to 
contribute to policy formulation and to ‘co-produce’ service delivery. ‘Collaboration’ 
could not only answer the ‘disconnect’ between the NFP sector and government, it also 
offered a core principle around which a national compact might be framed.  
According to Johnson (2010), Rudd presented as someone who was both ‘economically 
conservative’ and ‘influenced by social democratic ideology, particularly in regard to 
his critique of extreme neoliberalism’. The notion of cross-sector collaboration lay at 
the heart of the proposed compact and, by extension, the broader social inclusion 
agenda. This offered the ALP an opportunity to differentiate its political brand from that 
of the incumbent government (but without a major commitment of expenditure). That 
collaboration discourses were broadly consistent with so-called ‘Labor values’125 and 
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had a strong precedent in the experience of the British Labour Party enhanced their 
appeal to the ALP leadership.  
Like Blair’s New Labour – whose communitarian agenda devoted considerable policy 
attention to the voluntary sector (Kendall, 2003:56) – the ALP’s policy conversation 
with the NFP sector began while in opposition. In November 2006, the then Leader of 
the Opposition, Kim Beazley, invited a cross-section of NFP sector leaders to attend a 
Community Sector Forum to coincide with the launch of Labor’s ‘Strong Communities 
Partnership’ policy statement (Staples 2008). The statement included commitments 
about consultation on policy, sustainable funding, capacity building, consistency in the 
sector’s dealings with government, recognition of sector diversity and an 
acknowledgment of its advocacy role (Staples 2008:279). The policy statement was a 
product of the ALP’s National Policy Forum earlier that year, and was welcomed by the 
sector (Welfare Rights Centre, 2006:5). 
However, at the same time as Beasley was offering to consult the sector about the likely 
form of a partnership with government, the leadership of the Labor Party was in the 
balance. Less than a fortnight after the Forum, Beazley was replaced by Kevin Rudd. 
Although the immediate aftermath of the leadership spill deflected attention away from 
the issues raised at the forum, and both Beasley’s speech and the Strong Communities 
Partnership quietly consigned to obscurity, Rudd would nevertheless appropriate 
Beasley’s core commitments in a re-branded policy. 
In January 2007, Rudd requested New South Wales (NSW) Labor Senator, Ursula 
Stephens to distil the recommendations arising from the forum and map out a plan. 
Appointed by Rudd as his Shadow Parliamentary Secretary, Stephens was a sound 
choice for such a task. She was familiar with the challenges of cross-boundary and 
cross-sector coordination by virtue of her previous work in the NSW Premier’s 
Department and her PhD research on issues of regional service delivery.126 By May 
2007 Stephens had laid out a strategy to establish the foundations for cooperation and 
trust in the government’s relationship with the sector. 
The broad dimensions of that strategy were subsequently outlined by the then Shadow 
Minister for Social Inclusion, Julia Gillard, in a speech to the Sydney Institute in July 
2007. Gillard set out a framework for social inclusion in which a traditional ‘welfarist 
approach’ would be replaced with a focus on investing in human capital in order to 
 
 
 234
bring disadvantaged Australians into the mainstream market economy (Gillard, 
2007:103). Gillard acknowledged the provenance of Labor’s approach to social 
inclusion with references to the record of the Blair Labour government in the UK and to 
Canadian efforts (Gillard, 2007:108).127 She also cited social inclusion policy 
frameworks operating in other Australian Labor jurisdictions, most notably South 
Australia and Victoria, crediting them with providing the needed ‘direction and drive’ 
(Gillard, 2007:108).  
Gillard built upon Beasley’s earlier overtures by undertaking to ‘form new partnerships 
with the community sector’ (Gillard, 2007:111). She affirmed that Labor wanted to 
‘modernise’ policy thinking in this space by acknowledging the NFP sector as an 
important driver in the social economy, and by committing to a model of governance 
exhibiting both vertical and horizontal integration (Gillard, 2007:111).  
In the lead-up to the November 2007 general election, the Federal Labor Party released 
its policy platform document, An Australian Social Inclusion Agenda (Gillard and 
Wong 2007: 5-6). Labor pledged to take a ‘whole of government approach’ in which 
‘partnerships with State and local governments, the not for profit and private sectors’ 
would be the modus operandi of government (Gillard and Wong, 2007:6). 
Labor acknowledged the capacity pressures on the NFP human services resulting from 
an increased reliance on purchaser provider contracts (Gillard and Wong, 2007:10) and 
asserted the necessity of ‘rebuilding trust and reciprocity’ while criticising the Howard 
government for having: 
... attacked both the right and capacity of community sector organisations 
to advocate and [rejecting] their contribution or role in public policy 
development or debate. The breakdown of the relationship between the 
community sector and government diminishes Australia’s democracy but 
also undermines our capacity to effectively combat disadvantage (Gillard 
and Wong, 2007:11)  
Labor undertook to remove restrictive clauses in funding agreements that constrain the 
sector’s advocacy role and to establish ‘a truly independent and effective voice for the 
community sector’ (Gillard and Wong, 2007:11). Labor also promised to ask Australia’s 
premier publicly-funded economic advisory body, the Productivity Commission, to 
‘construct a new tool to measure the contribution of third-sector organisations to our 
economy as the starting point for maximizing the sector’s contribution to social 
inclusion, employment and economic growth’ (Gillard and Wong, 2007:11) – an 
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emphasis that some interpreted as indicative of the ‘neoliberal’ underpinnings of 
Labor’s policy, one in which ‘the worth of the sector is measured in relation to its 
economic productivity, rather than its democratic/social value’ (Staples, 2008:281). 
Labor argued that under Howard there had been a ‘breakdown’ in the relationship 
between government and the sector (Gillard and Wong, 2007:10). To repair the 
relationship, Labor offered to consult the sector about whether ‘a compact, such as those 
that operate in Canada and the UK, could or should be developed in Australia, and what 
might be included in such a partnership’ (Gillard and Wong, 2007:11). Following the 
election of the Rudd government in 2007, Senator Stephens, now federal Parliamentary 
Secretary for Social Inclusion and the Voluntary Sector, confirmed Labor’s 
commitment to, ‘building (and in some cases re-building) trust, strong relationships and 
partnerships’, adding: 
We want to be partners in this journey, not contract managers (Stephens, 
2008a)  
The institutional and cultural challenges faced by those making the journey was 
encapsulated by former head of the Prime Minister’s department, Peter Shergold, in the 
following terms: 
My experience has been that too often bureaucrats behave as if they are 
managing a contract rather than a relationship (Shergold, 2008a:7)  
Not only did the bureaucracy have a poor understanding of the NFP sector (personal 
communication, 11 May 2011, 29 September 2011), the new government was to some 
extent hamstrung by a legacy of federal government departments’ incapacity to think 
and act collaboratively across portfolios, and by institutional resistance to change 
(personal communication, 29 September 2011). As one interviewee observed of the 
Howard era: 
… each department, or each agency was highly competitive in its own 
space – they were all competing for funds. There were agencies 
contracting to each other to do work, so the whole model of government 
was not around collaboration, it was actually competition, and that 
‘competition is good and it drives costs down’ – it was kind of ‘the 
market rules’. But in a policy space the challenge for actually trying to get 
anything up was extraordinary – just too difficult (personal 
communication, 29 September 2011). 
After 11 years of the Liberal/National Coalition government it came as ‘a bit of a shock’ 
to senior ranks of the public service when Labor won the 2007 election: there was also a 
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sense that senior echelons of the bureaucracy believed that ‘the “natural order” would 
be restored in 2010 when everything went back to normal’ (personal communication, 29 
September 2011):  
That level of resistance existed [for] quite a long time. And the perfect 
example of that was when FaHCSIA was providing the secretariat support 
to the Compact and the Compact Working Group and they arrived at one 
of these Expert Panel meetings with a draft Compact: written! Composed! 
For the sector Panel to sign-off on! [In November 2008]. So, in their mind 
the behavioural shift had not occurred at all. They really hadn’t embraced 
the notion of ‘it would be done collaboratively’ (personal communication, 
29 September 2011). 
Implementation, issues and impact 
During its first two years in office the Rudd Labor government consulted widely on the 
form and content of the proposed national compact. As mentioned previously, the 
government was assisted in this task by the Australian Council of Social Service 
(ACOSS), the national peak body representing the community services and welfare 
sector and ‘the national voice for the needs of people affected by poverty and 
inequality’. On the government side, the policy lead for the consultation phase was 
assigned to the federal Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA), itself a an important commissioning agency with a 
significant portfolio of funding and service agreements with the NFP sector.  
The choice of ACOSS and FaHCSIA as the key interlocutors in the consultations served 
to confirm in the minds of many stakeholders that the proposed compact was primarily 
concerned with managing the government’s funding relationship with the community 
services sub-sector. In fact, ACOSS was the obvious entry point to the NFP sector 
because there was at the time no other national organisation or grouping capable of 
facilitating a broad dialogue about the compact. For its part, FaHCSIA was assigned the 
policy lead largely because of its legacy of engagement with the community and welfare 
sector and the absence at the time of an appropriate central coordinating agency within 
government (personal communication, 14 April 2011, 29 September 2011).  
Overcoming NFP sector distrust 
The proposal to develop a compact was initially greeted with some cynicism in parts of 
the sector. One interviewee said the challenge was ‘to empower a sector that had been 
disempowered for a decade’ (personal communication, 29 September 2011). The same 
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person suggested that: ‘in fact, you have to teach people that advocacy is not saying 
‘no’’, and pointed to a loss of collaborative skills within the sector ‘because they’ve 
been working against government for so long’ (personal communication, 29 September 
2011).  
Eventually, however, due in no small part to the efforts of Senator Stephens – a 
‘passionate advocate’ for and ‘driving force’ behind the compact (personal 
communication, 13 September 2011a, 14 April 2011) – support for the compact began 
to build to the point where ACOSS, in its final report on the results of consultations, 
found ‘overwhelming interest’ in improved relationships ‘with and across Government 
and within the Sector’, ‘a strong desire for a changed relationship with Government’ 
and ‘substantial momentum’ in both awareness of and support for the development of a 
compact (ACOSS, 2008:9). 
As described by one close observer, Stephens’ overtures to the NFP sector were: 
… a real refreshing change from the previous Howard government 
ministers just barking at the sector … I think it was a reconciliation 
process with the sector, after the Howard years really, which is quite 
lovely. She spoke with respect, she spoke with acknowledgement of all 
hard work that people do. You know, there’d been some pretty hard years 
there, where you had to sit in meetings and just get barked at by people 
who are just rude and obnoxious, and there was more than one of those 
Howard government ministers that was just rude and disrespectful and 
obnoxious … So that process was quite a nice little reconciliation sort of 
thing around telling people that the government had changed (personal 
communication, 15 April 2011). 
Productivity Commission study 
One of the Rudd government’s first acts in this policy space was to make good on a 
promise foreshadowed in the Labor Party’s pre-election platform (Gillard and Wong, 
2007) and reaffirmed after the election by the Parliamentary Secretary for Social 
Inclusion, Senator Ursula Stephens (2008b), to commission a comprehensive study of 
the economic contribution of the NFP sector. Terms of reference for the study, led by 
Commissioner Robert Fitzgerald – himself a highly regarded and respected figure in the 
NFP sector – were transmitted in March 2009. The study would focus on ‘improving the 
measurement of the sector's contributions’ and ‘removing obstacles to maximising its 
contributions to society’ (see Appendix 4, Figure A4.1).128 
 
 
 238
The Commission’s report (Productivity Commission, 2010a) exerted a major influence 
on the eventual form and content of the Labor government’s NFP reform agenda. One 
interviewee said of the report that it ‘was highly regarded by the sector and by 
government as being a very measured and strategic way forward … when the Compact 
was signed in March 2010, there was a massive sense of achievement, but that was the 
beginning, not the end’ (personal communication, 29 September 2011). The report 
contained 14 major recommendations and all recommendations were accepted ‘in 
principle’, apart from those requiring actions by other levels of government (House of 
Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2008b). 
Drawing on the experience of other jurisdictions the report suggested that while ‘top 
down’ processes have value in setting the ‘tone’ of engagement, complementary 
‘bottom up’ measures are necessary to build support and gain buy-in from the sector and 
other stakeholders (Productivity Commission, 2010a:375). Importantly, the report 
recommended the establishment of an ‘Office for Not-For-Profit Sector Engagement’ to 
support the implementation of the proposed compact and other reforms. Although the 
Commission refrained from commenting on the advisability of a compact, it did 
recommend that compacts needed to be supported by ‘well documented plans of action’ 
and ‘practical measures including monitoring and evaluative processes that give 
concrete expression to the proposed relationship’ (Productivity Commission, 
2010a:378). 
The Commission supported proposed reforms ‘necessary’ to reduce the ‘uncertainty and 
tension that characterises the underlying relationship between governments and 
[NFPs]’. It also noted that government would need to drive a cultural change agenda to 
address the legacy of ‘attitudes, norms, and values’ that ‘are corrosive to the underlying 
relationship between government and NFPs’ (Productivity Commission, 2010a:378). 
The Commission also suggested that the sector would need to re-think commonly held 
views that government should ‘get out of the way’ and allow NFP organisations to 
pursue their own formulations of community interest without regard to taxpayer’s 
expectations of accountability for the expenditure of public funds (Productivity 
Commission, 2010a:384-385). 
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The National Compact 
The National Compact was launched originally in March 2010 and re-issued in 2011. In 
addition to a foreword and separate messages from the Prime Minister and the Minister 
for Social Inclusion, the document is divided into a number of sections, summarised 
below: 
• Context – the Compact is an agreement setting out how the government and the NFP 
sector want to work together to achieve their shared vision and a starting point for a 
stronger, more productive relationship. 
• Shared vision – government and the NFP sector will work together to improve 
social, cultural, civic, economic and environmental outcomes, building on the 
strengths of individuals and communities. 
• Shared principles – including working for a fair, inclusive society; demonstrating 
mutual respect and trust; striving towards genuine collaboration; valuing diversity as 
a significant strength of the sector; promoting engagement with marginalised and 
disadvantaged Australians; ensuring the availability of culturally responsive 
services; making thoughtful decisions using sound evidence; accountability for the 
effective, pragmatic use of available resources; investing in the development of an 
innovative, appropriately resourced and sustainable NFP sector; and investing in 
accountability and developing appropriate measures to demonstrate the effectiveness 
of joint endeavours. 
• Shared aspirations – the Compact is a starting point for a stronger, more productive 
relationship in which government and the sector will work together to achieve 
nominated goals pertaining to the relationship; improving engagement and 
consultation; achieving better results; and work towards a more sustainable NFP 
sector. 
• Priorities for action – through engagement and collaboration address the following 
eight priorities: document and promote the value and contribution of the NFP sector; 
protect the sector’s right to advocacy; recognise NFP sector diversity; improve 
information sharing and access to publicly-funded research and data; reduce red tape 
and streamline reporting; simplify and improve consistency of financial 
arrangements; improve paid and unpaid workforce issues; and improve funding and 
procurement processes. (The full text of the National Compact is reproduced in 
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Appendix 6, Figure A6.1). 
Compact reception 
Unlike framework documents in many other jurisdictions, the National Compact is not 
countersigned by intermediary NFP sector representative organisations – such as 
ACOSS – or any of the other NFP organisations that had contributed to its development. 
Instead, NFP organisations were invited to voluntarily sign up online ‘to show their 
support and commitment to the Compact’s shared vision, purpose and principles’ 
(Office for the Not-for-profit Sector, 2013c) – a model since adopted by the New 
Zealand government for its own Relationship Accord. As at the end of June 2013 – just 
over three years since the launch of the National Compact – over 920 organisations 
representing a wide variety of sub-sectors have signed up as National Compact Partners.  
All Commonwealth government portfolio departments are signed up to the National 
Compact and Compact Advocates have been appointed at the Deputy Secretary level ‘to 
ensure that their agency adopts the principles of the Compact and commits to 
implementing the Compact’s priority action areas’ and to ‘foster a culture that considers 
the impacts and opportunities for NFP organisations when developing and 
implementing policies and programs and oversee any mediation processes where 
complaints have been made by not-for-profit organisations regarding non-compliance 
with the National Compact’ (Office for the Not-for-profit Sector, 2013a). 
Although the National Compact was warmly welcomed when it was announced in 
March 2010, and the major building blocks of the reform package are being put into 
place, many in the NFP sector have expressed impatience for change. That impatience 
breeds frustration, especially in the light of anecdotal reports from the coalface about 
the stubborn persistence in government departments of the very attitudes, behaviours 
and practices that the compact was meant to address. That frustration is evident in the 
following response from a national peak organisation to a request for an interview about 
the National Compact:  
In truth, there is far more academic activity in relation to the contribution 
of the National Compact than there is activity from governments in 
reshaping their relationships with not-for-profits, at least in terms of the 
community sector that we represent. This is very frustrating, particularly 
given the time and effort that [name of peak organisation] and many of 
our members invested in the process. But given that this is the case, we 
are trying to conserve our limited energies to focus on areas of sector 
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reform that are underway. As a result we are limiting our involvement 
with the Compact (and the number of projects relating to it that are 
underway) to a watching brief only at this time. (Email correspondence, 
03-11-2011) 
One interviewee commented that the National Compact was seen by the sector as a 
‘sign of good faith’ from the government, however, they also remarked that in parts of 
the sector, the compact was seen as an ‘outcome’ whereas, in reality, it is simply an 
‘output’: 
It’s a framework document – that’s what compacts are, they set up a set of 
principles; at best, they are a guiding framework for the way in which 
governments should engage (personal communication, 11 May 2011). 
The same informant suggested that cynicism can be self-fulfilling and added that the 
sector needs to ‘start the conversation differently’ by using the framework document as 
the starting point, rather than focusing primarily on funding and contracting issues.  
A broad reform agenda 
Government officials interviewed for this study point out that the staging of reforms has 
been of necessity sequential and cumulative. They stress that the National Compact is, 
in fact, the ‘foundation stone’ for the reform measures now in train and argue that there 
is logic in the sequencing of policy implementation (personal communication, 19 
August 2011, 29 September 2011). The National Compact, or to be exact, the 
consultation process upon which it is founded, provided the platform required to support 
the broader reform agenda: 
… the investment of the three years in relationship-building was a really 
necessary precursor to the institutional changes and the structural changes 
that we’ll start to see play out. So it’s like a maturing of the relationship 
now and we can actually talk like big boys and girls about some of the 
hard stuff (personal communication, 29 September 2011). 
Conversations with the sector about the ‘hard stuff’ are being facilitated by the 14-
member Not-for-Profit Sector Reform Council. Established in December 2010 and 
chaired by former Queensland (Labor) Attorney-General, Linda Lavarch, the Council’s 
membership is drawn from across the sector and includes as an ex officio member 
Robert Fitzgerald (who had previously headed the Productivity Commission’s study of 
the economic contribution of the sector). The Council reports to the Minister for Social 
Inclusion in accordance with broad terms of reference.129  
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In order to manage its workload the Council has established five working groups to 
progress the following key components of the reform agenda: 
• the implementation of a national regulator (the Australian Charities and Not-for-
profits Commission, or ACNC) and harmonising fundraising legislation 
• red tape reduction 
• the National Compact and other reforms 
• better targeting tax concessions and financing the sector, and 
• not-for-profit future workforce issues.130 
Other important elements of the implementation apparatus for these reforms are an 
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) Advisory Board (Chaired 
by Robert Fitzgerald), and the ACNC Taskforce comprised of officers seconded from 
the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), The Treasury, the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet (DPMC,) and the Charity Commission of England and Wales 
(ACNC, 2012).131 In addition, an Interdepartmental Committee on Not-For-Profit 
Reform chaired by the DPMC is focusing on cross-portfolio issues arising from the 
National Compact and the government’s volunteering policy. 
As to the impact to date of Labor’s reform agenda, one needs to look to the National 
Compact itself, which enunciates a series of eight ‘priorities for action’. A cursory 
survey of the government’s actions to date against these action statements both confirms 
the foundational nature of the compact and the government’s resolve to pursue an 
ambitious reform agenda (see Figure 7.2 below).  
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Figure 7.2 – Mapping policy actions against Compact Priorities for Action 
National Compact 
(March 2010) Priorities 
for Action 
NFP sector Reform Initiatives 
Document and promote 
the value and 
contribution of the Sector. 
Productivity Commission Report into the Contribution of the NFP 
Sector, published in January 2010. 
The government accepted ‘in-principle’ all but one of the 
recommendations relating to the Commonwealth. The one 
exception being recommendation 9.5 to establish social 
innovation funds at the program level. While innovation is 
critical, the government believes it should be pursued in other 
ways. 
Protect the Sector’s right 
to advocacy irrespective 
of any funding 
relationship that might 
exist. 
The government encouraged the establishment of a new peak 
organisation, the Community Council for Australia, to act as a 
voice for the sector (launched March 2010). 
In fulfilment of the Labor government’s pledges to remove 
restrictive ‘gagging clauses’ from federal government contracts, 
the Not-for-profit Sector Freedom to Advocate Bill 2013 was 
passed on 28 May 2013, and received Assent on 13 June 2013. 
The Act is retrospective, and removes any ‘gagging clauses’ 
from existing contracts. In her second reading speech, Senator 
Jacinta Collins confirms that the legislation: ‘protects the rights 
of the not-for-profit entity to engage in debate and advocate on 
Commonwealth policy. It recognises and supports the critical 
role that the not-for-profit sector has in developing public policy 
and advocating on behalf of the community.’ (The Senate, 
2013). 
Recognise Sector 
diversity in consultation 
processes and Sector 
development initiatives. 
The Not-for-Profit Sector Reform Council was appointed in 
December 2010 with a membership representing diverse 
perspectives.  
The Council led the co-creation of a Code of Best Practice for 
Engagement with the not-for-profit sector to ‘provide a 
framework for how the government and the NFP sector should 
work together to achieve better outcomes for all Australians’. A 
draft of the Code was released for final comment in March 2013 
(Office for the Not-for-profit Sector, 2013b) and approved in 
August 2013 for use as ‘an operational tool for Government and 
NFP organisations to support the work of the National Compact’. 
Improve information 
sharing including greater 
access to publicly funded 
research and data. 
The new national regulator (the ACNC) will establish and 
maintain a public information portal. 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics commenced work with the 
Reform Council on improvements to statistical data on the NFP 
sector including a framework for measuring the contribution of 
the sector. 
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Reduce red tape and 
streamline reporting. 
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed a 
Standard Chart of Accounts for commencement on 1 July 2010. 
The Department of Finance and Deregulation has developed a 
standard short form contract template for procurement purposes 
and is developing streamlined funding processes and simplified 
funding agreement templates for low risk grants. 
The ACNC will implement a ‘report-once use-often’ reporting 
framework for charities. 
Simplify and improve 
consistency of financial 
arrangements including 
across state and federal 
jurisdictions. 
The ACNC commenced operation on 3 December 2012 (an 
exposure draft of the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits 
Commission Bill was released in December 2011 and was 
assented to in December 2012). 
A discussion paper on the harmonisation of Charitable 
Fundraising was released in February 2012.  
Negotiations with state and territory governments on national 
regulation are to be progressed through the COAG. 
A consultation paper on a legislative definition of charity was 
released in 2011, followed by the release of an exposure draft of 
the Charities Bill 2013 on 8 April 2013. The final version of the 
Charities Bill 2013 passed both Houses on 27 June 2013, thus 
putting into place a statutory definition intended to provide 
greater clarity and certainty for charities, the public and 
regulators in determining whether an entity is charitable. 
Act to improve paid and 
unpaid workforce issues. 
A National Volunteering Strategy (30 November 2011) set the 
direction for volunteering and supports organisations to adapt to 
and accommodate emerging forms of participation. 
In May 2011, Fair Work Australia, the national workplace 
relations tribunal, concluded that employees in the Social and 
Community Services industry do not enjoy remuneration for 
work of equal value by comparison with workers in state and 
local government employment.  
On 10 November 2011, the Gillard government announced its 
preparedness to provide over $2 billion to fund its share of any 
wage increases awarded. 
On 1 February 2012, Fair Work Australia made an order for 
equal remuneration for work of equal or comparable value to be 
phased in from 2012 to 2020. 
Improve funding and 
procurement processes. 
The Appointment of Compact Advocates at the Deputy 
Secretary level in all federal government departments is 
intended to ensure adoption by all agencies of Compact 
principles and commitment to priority action areas. 
In 2012 the Department of Finance and Deregulation 
commenced work with stakeholders to develop a whole-of-
government grant agreement template, to be used by agencies 
when entering into low-risk grants. The template is currently 
being piloted. 
Source: based on Butcher 2012b 
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Implications 
In a 2007 essay, Tom Bentley – a former adviser to the Blair government and a former 
director of DEMOS – set out as a possible scenario for the future of ‘British’ politics: 
A period of instability, minority government and electoral 
disenchantment, in which Prime Ministers of different parties fail to 
establish working majorities or electoral respect … (Bentley, 2007:113). 
Bentley could not have known as he wrote these words that they would so presciently 
foreshadow the political fortunes of his soon-to-be employer, Julia Gillard. Bentley had 
come to Australia in 2006 to work for the Bracks Labor government in Victoria. He 
subsequently took up a position as a senior adviser to Julia Gillard when she was still 
Deputy Prime Minister, before going on to become her Deputy Chief-of-Staff when she 
seized the leadership from Kevin Rudd in June 2010. 
Political instability 
Within the Rudd government’s first year in office the deepening global financial crisis 
(the GFC) loomed as an existential threat to the Australian economy. Fortunately, the 
fundamentals of the Australian economy were sound, and these provided a strong 
platform from which to mount a response to the worsening global economic downturn. 
Firstly, the government had a healthy balance sheet by virtue of having inherited a $21 
billion+ surplus from the previous Liberal-National Coalition government (Wanna 
2009:584). Secondly, as the United States’ sub-prime mortgage market began to 
collapse in February 2007 Australian GDP rose against the global trend to a high of 
4.2% in the September quarter of 2007 and unemployment fell to a low of 4.1% in the 
March quarter of 2008 (McGregor-Lowndes 2011:1). 
On the domestic front, the government announced an initial stimulus package in 2008 of 
$10 billion, followed by a second stimulus package in 2009 of $42 billion132 – in the 
process incurring a deficit – the second since 1997 (the Coalition government incurred a 
deficit of 0.1 per cent in 2002). The resultant deficit of 4.3 per cent of GDP exceeded a 
previous high of 4.0 per cent in 1993 (also under a Labor administration), a fact 
exploited by the Opposition, which portrayed the government’s stimulus measures as 
gross profligacy and the Labor administration ‘addicted to tax and spend’ government 
(Hockey, 2011b, a).133The mobilisation of the GFC stimulus task was a major 
distraction for the new government and quickly became the centre of policy concern, to 
some extent crowding-out other aspects of its legislative and policy program. The scale 
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of the stimulus package and speed with which it was rolled out severely stretched the 
capacity and capability of federal government departments, their state government 
partners and affected industry sectors.  
Throughout 2009 and 2010, despite having ‘saved’ Australia from the worst effects of 
the GFC, controversy about apparent deficiencies in the administration of high profile 
components of the stimulus package, coupled with the political ‘optics’ of a rapid return 
to budgetary deficit and the inability to secure support for a number of the Rudd 
government’s signature policies,134 fed an opposition narrative of a confused and inept 
Labor administration (Abbott, 2011).  
By mid-2010 the government had reached a point of policy and political paralysis and 
Rudd’s approval ratings were described as being ‘in free-fall’. At the urging of 
influential members of the Labor caucus his then Deputy, Julia Gillard challenged Rudd 
for the leadership . Realising he did not have the numbers to win a caucus ballot, Rudd 
resigned and on 24 June 2010, Julia Gillard became Australia’s first female Prime 
Minister. Gillard explained her decision to challenge the leadership by saying that, ‘a 
good government was losing its way’ (Levy, 2010, Rodgers, 2010, McKew, 2012). 
Twenty-three days later, amid rising public unease over the unseating of a sitting Prime 
Minister in only his first term – another ‘first’ for Australia – Gillard called a general 
election for 21 August, 2010. 
Continuing commitment to NFP sector reform 
During the campaign, the government announced its intention to pursue important 
reforms for the NFP sector. A re-elected Gillard Labor government would: 
• establish a Not-for-Profit Sector Reform Council made up of representatives from 
across the sector to ‘provide an important government-to-sector interface through 
which those most affected by these reforms can help shape their implementation’, 
• establish an Office of the Not-for-Profit Sector within the DPMC ‘to drive and 
coordinate the policy reform agenda within government’ and provide secretariat 
support to the Reform Council, 
• commission a ‘scoping study’ for a national ‘one-stop-shop’ regulator for the NFP 
sector to remove the complex regulatory arrangements currently in place and 
streamline reporting arrangements, 
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• build on work already underway through the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) in relation to the implementation of a National Chart of Accounts ‘to 
improve consistency in financial reporting by organisations to funding agencies and 
departments, and harmonising fundraising legislation across States and Territories’, 
and  
• cut ‘red-tape’ by streamlining tendering and contracting processes, in part by 
developing ‘a new, common form contract or “master agreement” for use between 
the Australian Government and non-profit organisations’ and through a cross-agency 
review ‘of the efficiency and effectiveness of tendering, contracting and acquittal 
arrangements between the Australian Government and non-profit organisations’ 
(ALP, 2010). 
Continuing instability 
During the election campaign, Labor struggled in the face of damaging leaks that tainted 
Gillard’s role in the Rudd government and the leadership challenge. Said Gillard’s 
Treasurer, Wayne Swan, ‘We had a hard campaign where everything that could go 
wrong did go wrong’ (Ellis, 2011). The election resulted in a hung Parliament, in which 
the balance of power in the House of Representatives rested with the cross-benches, 
including one Greens MP and four independents. After 17 days of tough negotiation, the 
Greens MP and three of the independents opted to support Labor by guaranteeing 
supply.  
A ministerial re-shuffle following the election saw Ursula Stephens stripped of her role 
as Parliamentary Secretary for Social Inclusion and the Voluntary Sector. Credited with 
leading consultations with the sector ‘at a time where some big thinking about the sector 
was needed’, and praised as an architect of the NFP sector reform agenda, her demotion 
came as a shock to many in the sector (Woodward, 2010).  
Gillard had herself held the Social Inclusion portfolio in the Rudd government but 
passed the portfolio to senior Labor stalwart, Simon Crean shortly after the leadership 
coup. In her second ministry, Gillard awarded the social inclusion portfolio, along with 
the Human Services portfolio, to former Minister for Housing and Minister for the 
Status of Women, Tanya Plibersek, which also had the effect of removing social 
inclusion to the outer ministry. In this role, Plibersek also inherited responsibility for 
overseeing the implementation of the National Compact.  
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At the same time, former Parliamentary Secretary for Disabilities and Children's 
Services, Bill Shorten, (previously a Parliamentary Secretary) was appointed Assistant 
Treasurer (also in the outer ministry) in which capacity he would have responsibility for 
what might be thought of as structural elements of the reform agenda. Former 
Parliamentary Secretary for Social Inclusion and the Voluntary Sector, Ursula Stephens, 
was later brought in from the cold as a ‘specialist adviser’ to assist Shorten with 
consultations on a new definition of charity (Shorten and Plibersek, 2011). 
Between October 2010 and February 2011 Shorten invited comment on a series of 
discussion papers concerning the roles and functions of a national regulator (The 
Treasury, 2011d), a proposed statutory definition of charity (The Treasury, 2011b), 
options for better targeting NFP tax concessions (The Treasury, 2011c) and NFP 
governance arrangements (The Treasury, 2011a). Some in the sector regarded an 
expanded role for Treasury as marking a shift in the reform emphasis from collaboration 
towards compliance. Others took comfort in the fact that both Plibersek and Shorten are 
well regarded in the sector by virtue of their previous ministerial roles in relation to 
homelessness (Plibersek) and disability (Shorten).  
Amid the sudden flood of discussion papers emanating from The Treasury, there was a 
concern within the sector that the National Compact had been left behind. Shorten, 
perhaps sensing the unease in a sector overwhelmed by the pace of change, offered the 
following assurances: 
… further big reform in the not-for-profit space is long overdue because 
too many reforms have previously been considered a low priority or been 
put into the too hard basket. ... [T]he sector has lacked some unity in 
purpose and voice, and the reform agenda has lacked necessary 
leadership. But I'm standing here now to say that this Government is 
ambitious to be the champion the sector has patiently waiting for. 
... That we ‘get it’ is why we've put so much energy into developing better 
public policy in this space and have, with a road map of independent and 
sector-supported recommendations, moved so quickly since the August 
2010 election. It's why we stood by the sector in tough times, why we 
stood beside you during the global financial crisis. We were right 
alongside you in the tough times because you are right beside ordinary, 
modest Australians every day (Shorten, 2011)  
A further ministerial re-shuffle in December 2011 saw Plibersek appointed to the Health 
portfolio and Shorten given the portfolios of Financial Services and Superannuation as 
well as Employment and Workplace Relations. Responsibility for social inclusion was 
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added to the Mental Health and Aged Care portfolio held by Mark Butler, who was also 
elevated to cabinet. A new Assistant Treasurer, Senator Mark Arbib, would be 
responsible for matters pertaining to the taxation and regulation of the NFP sector 
(although he would resign amid further leadership controversy just over a year later). 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer, David Bradbury, would take the running on 
the harmonisation of charitable fund-raising legislation (The Treasury, 2012). 
The leadership question 
Meanwhile, the minority Labor government continued to be dogged by political 
blunders and controversy about the prime minister’s leadership (for a comprehensive 
account of the Labor government's travails see Wanna, 2012). In late 2011, respected 
political journalist for the Sydney Morning Herald, Lenore Taylor wrote: 
When Gillard knifed Kevin Rudd she said she was doing it because ‘a 
good government had lost its way’ but eight months later, it wasn't so 
much lost as hopelessly mired, with seemingly intractable policy 
problems still hanging, a minority government to manage and an 
opposition that had smelt political blood (Taylor, 2011).  
On 22 February 2012 a maelstrom of rumour and speculation about active internal 
destabilisation of Gillard’s leadership culminated in the dramatic resignation of 
Australia’s Foreign Minister, former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. In response Gillard 
called for a leadership ballot on 27 February, which she won convincingly with 71 votes 
to Rudd’s 31. Rudd’s resignation, together the subsequent caucus ballot and a post-
ballot announcement by Assistant Treasurer Mark Arbib of his intention to resign from 
Parliament, triggered yet another portfolio re-shuffle on 2 March, 2012. In the re-
shuffle, Mark Butler retained the Social Inclusion portfolio while David Bradbury took 
Arbib’s place as Assistant Treasurer. The sector was, therefore, largely spared the pain 
of having to break-in a new set of ministers. 
Instability within the governing Labor Party did not cease. On 30 January 2012, Gillard 
took the unprecedented step of announcing that the next general election would occur 
on 14 September that year. Although this was possibly intended to ‘settle the troops’ 
and focus the Party’s attention on preparing the groundwork for the election, 
speculation about the leadership persisted. On 21 March 2013 in the wake of 
anonymous ‘backgrounding’ to journalists about disquiet within the Labor Party, 
Gillard again called for a leadership ballot to settle the matter. On this occasion, perhaps 
 
 
 250
sensing that he could not command a majority of the Labor Caucus, Rudd failed to 
stand, resulting in Gillard being re-elected unopposed.  
Again Gillard and her supporters asserted that the instability was at an end. However, 
polling results steadily worsened as the date of the election drew nearer, as did 
confidence in Gillard’s ability to turn the situation around. On 26 June 2013, three years 
and two days after replacing Rudd as Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd defeated Gillard in a 
leadership ballot by 57 votes to 45. Rudd would now lead his party and his government 
to an election on 7 September, 2013. 
Labor’s policy narrative on the NFP sector 
Like New Labour in Britain, Australian Labor under both Rudd and Gillard has sought 
to distance its approach to civil society from that of its predecessors. Driver and Martell 
(1997:36) suggest that New Labour’s emphasis of on civil society gave the Blair 
government a ‘post-Thatcherite edge’, although its ‘brand’ of communitarianism leaned 
towards the individual, conservative and morally prescriptive ‘at the expense of less 
conditional and redistributional, socioeconomic, progressive and corporate 
communitarianisms’ (Driver and Martell, 1997:43). Similar observations have been 
made of the Rudd-Gillard formulation of social inclusion and its ‘near identical 
embrace’ of the Blair government’s social inclusion agenda (Wilson, 2008:8).  
The policy rationale for the Labor government’s pursuit of social inclusion and NFP 
sector reform (including the National Compact) has been founded on two contrasting 
political narratives. On the one hand is Rudd’s discourse of civil society, joined-up 
government, cross-sector cooperation and participatory governance – aspirations never 
fully realised by a government whose decision-making and policy formulation was 
highly centralised and hierarchical (Marsh et al., 2010:157). On the other is Gillard’s 
emphasis on a ‘participatory economy’ (as opposed to participatory government) – an 
idea she has consistently espoused since her time in opposition and which became a 
central organising theme of her government (personal communication, 11 May 2011).  
The NFP sector has been guarded in its appraisal of the policy emphases inherent in the 
Gillard government’s NFP reform agenda. In addition to the sector’s concerns about the 
reform agenda being ‘hijacked’ by Treasury and infused with a compliance agenda, the 
NFP sector was apprehensive that the Gillard government represented a ‘turn to the 
right’ for Labor (Johnson, 2012). Although a member of the ALP’s Left faction, Gillard 
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was less antagonistic to neoliberalism and market capitalism than was Rudd (Johnson, 
2012). 
Gillard’s policy thinking bears the traces of her Baptist upbringing and the working 
class sensibilities of her Welsh migrant family (Malkin, 2010). In her 2007 speech to the 
Sydney Institute, Gillard declared that in order to meet Australia’s future economic 
challenges, ‘we're going to need every Australian on board pulling their weight, re-
joining the workforce, gaining new skills’ (Gillard, 2007:111). As Prime Minister she 
employed populist messaging directed at ‘working families’ and offered a prescription 
of welfare reform and workforce participation to ‘break persistent cycles of social and 
economic exclusion’.  
Claiming the ‘dignity of work’ as ‘a deep Labor conviction’, Gillard declared: 
The party I lead is – politically, spiritually, even literally – the party of 
work … The party of work not welfare, the party of opportunity not 
exclusion, the party of responsibility not idleness (Gillard, 2011). 
This appears to signal a contemporary Australian analogue of the shift in (British) 
Labour ideas away from social democracy towards ‘liberal conservatism’, characterised 
by Driver and Martell as an adherence to a ‘conservative prescriptive moral 
communitarianism’ coupled with a ‘positive celebration of the dynamic market 
economy’ (Driver and Martell, 1997:43). 
Bentley (2007) makes similar observations about British politics and these too resonate 
with the Australian scene. Bentley argues that while Blair and Brown decisively shifted 
British politics away from the ‘operating framework’ traditionally dominated by the 
right (personal taxation, economic management and national sovereignty) they did not 
succeed in establishing ‘deep, strong institutional underpinnings’ for their new 
communitarian framework, making it vulnerable to fragmentation, loss of coherence, 
public cynicism, disillusionment and non-participation (Bentley, 2007:111-112).  
It might be said that Australian Labor has not been able to sustain either a coherent 
political narrative or establish the deep institutional underpinnings of which Bentley 
speaks. Although the Labor government, first under Rudd and then under Gillard, has 
attempted to articulate a broad ‘fairness agenda’ (Carey et al., 2012:54) and 
commentators, such as former Labor Premier of Western Australia, Geoff Gallop, argue 
that in the aftermath of the GFC, ‘[t]he idea of redistribution in the interests of a fair go 
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for all is back on the agenda’ (Gallop, 2011), others point to the difficulty inherent in 
‘so many social policy promises and a budget so squeezed’ (Taylor, 2012a). 
 
Source: adapted from Butcher 2012b 
 
Figure 7.3 – Political and policy trajectory of Rudd/Gillard governments 2007-2013 
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There are numerous possible explanations for Labor’s inability to gain political and 
policy traction with the electorate. First, federal Labor has had to carry a share of the 
weight of incumbency with long-standing state Labor governments that reached their 
use-by date (guilt by association). Second, federal leadership ructions undermined the 
authority and legitimacy of the prime minister and by extension, the government. Third 
is the persistence of economic unease in the community, despite having been spared the 
worst of the GFC and the country having enviable economic fundamentals.135 And 
fourth, the minority government’s need to appease a range of interests – not least the 
cross-benches – has distracted the electorate from its core messages (see Figure 7.3 
above for a diagrammatic representation of the trajectory of the Rudd/Gillard 
governments to date).  
Conclusions 
The Gillard Labor government continued the ambitious, complex reform agenda in the 
NFP policy space begun under Kevin Rudd. Some would suggest that Rudd’s ‘Third 
Way’ communitarianism (or at least his profession of it) has been de-emphasised along 
the way. Johnson, for one, concluded that there was at the 2010 election ‘less explicit 
differentiation on social issues’ between Labor and the Coalition, and described Gillard 
as ‘Rudd-lite’ in relation to certain policy issues (Johnson, 2012:53). Another possible 
reading is that, lacking Rudd’s flamboyance, Gillard’s approach has been pragmatic and 
workmanlike, designed to steer a middle path and present a ‘small target’ electorally.  
Working with a fragmented NFP sector 
The NFP sector is fragmented, variegated and diffuse and therefore a challenging space 
within which to achieve policy traction. The sector is susceptible to distrust in 
government, which makes it an uncertain bedfellow. This distrust arouses doubts and 
second-guessing about the government’s motives and a lack of confidence in the 
government’s determination to achieve reform. Confidence in government is sometimes 
compromised by the persistence of the very behaviours and practices intended to be 
remedied by reforms.  
The bureaucratic ‘juggernaut’ has been slow to turn, and this has proved vexing for 
many in the sector. There is, however, some recognition within the public sector of the 
need for cultural change: 
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... bureaucrats don’t often get it to be honest … and the fact that their 
ministers want things all happening today or tomorrow morning, not in 
six months time. You know, it is the bureaucracy sometimes (personal 
communication, 19 August 2011). 
The NFP sector also labours under the weight of public indifference. As one interviewee 
pointed out, despite its civic and economic contributions, the public is not generally 
aware of the NFP sector as a sector:  
Most people in some way are touched by a third sector service that is paid 
for by government, by a government program whether it’s state or federal 
… and [do] not know it. It’s a real interesting dilemma – it’s the intrinsic 
ignorance around how the system in our country works (personal 
communication, 14 April 2011). 
NFP sector reforms do not generate headlines or rank high on the list of issues of 
immediate concern to electors. Although the NFP sector touches the lives of thousands 
of Australians every day and is often cited by the policy cognoscenti as an invaluable 
pillar of Australian society, there has been little public discussion of Labor’s NFP sector 
reform initiatives. The diversity of civil society in Australia is one of its great strengths 
(personal communication, 29 September 2011). However, the fact that the NFP sector 
has not one voice but many, impairs its ability to be heard (personal communication, 14 
April 2011). 
The fragmented nature of the NFP sector also impairs its ability to act collectively in its 
own interests. If the NFP sector is to be taken seriously as a partner by government, it 
needs to collaborate more effectively within its ranks, and to share knowledge and 
expertise. As one interviewee said: 
Government, for all its faults, can harness and direct [effort] across 
agencies – the sector doesn’t do it, and it can’t do it and won’t take 
responsibility for it (personal communication, 14 April 2011). 
At various times, NFP sector actors have exhibited a capacity to simultaneously 
entertain apparently contradictory positions: expressing impatience with the amount of 
consultation (too much) and the roll-out of reform measures (too slow) (personal 
communication, 19 August 2011). This has been a source of frustration for a 
government striving to work constructively with the NFP sector and hamstrung by the 
uncertainties of minority government. Remarking on the one-sided nature of the NFP 
sector’s expectations of the government, a senior policy actor observed: 
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The big challenge for the sector is to understand that with the signing of 
the Compact comes some responsibilities for them … (personal 
communication, 29 September 2011). 
Another observer commented that it might take ‘an awful lot of time’ to rebuild trust 
between the NFP sector and government, and added that it sometimes suits an 
organisation’s membership to ‘be at loggerheads with government’ (personal 
communication, 13 September 2011a). The same observer pointed to a danger that ‘the 
sector’s cynicism gets in the way and the government loses its enthusiasm’ and 
underlined the need for culture change ‘on both sides’, subject to the following note of 
caution: 
For Labor governments, if you have a sector – that you were fully funding 
and fully supporting in both philosophy and resources – turn on you and 
were forever critical, then it wouldn’t be too hard to imagine some 
ministers asking the question ‘why are we paying these organisations to 
turn on us?’ (personal communication, 13 September 2011a). 
Using the National Compact 
Although the visibility of the National Compact has diminished somewhat in the face of 
an ambitious federal reform agenda in the NFP policy space, the Labor government 
nevertheless asserts that the National Compact provides the ‘foundation for action to 
improve working relationships, strengthen sector viability, and develop and deliver 
better policy and programs’ (Australia, 2011).  
To many in the NFP sector the National Compact has been of lesser importance than the 
Productivity Commission’s recommendations. Said one interviewee:  
I remember the COSS directors all had a teleconference and we said ‘we 
don’t really care what the compact does, just tell ‘em to do what the 
Productivity Commission says needs to happen, you know, just 
implement their recommendations we don’t want another set of 
recommendations to implement’ … our writing instruction … was just 
make sure that the PC inquiry report gets implemented, we don’t' really 
care about the rest of the wording, and no we don’t want to give feedback 
on this draft that draft because it felt like ‘fine words’ and there was a bit 
of cynicism as to where it was all going. So to be honest, I'm more 
interested in the creation of a regulator than I am in the fine words and the 
oversight arrangements (personal communication, 15 April 2011). 
However, an interviewee who is very close to the reform process cautioned against 
complacency or over-reaching: 
I have a view that this was is a once in a generation opportunity to join 
with a government that is passionate about reforming the sector for the 
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positive benefit of the sector and the Australian community as a whole, 
but may have limited time to do it. So, like holding onto mum’s skirt if 
she’s in a hurry, we’ve just gotta keep up. We may not come this way 
again (personal communication, 13 September 2011a). 
Another key policy actor offered the view that a professed lack of interest in the 
National Compact is symptomatic of an NFP sector that is generally not very good at 
using bilateral policy frameworks: 
You’ve got to use it. If you’re going to have a meeting about contracts 
you’ve got to pull the compact out: ‘Before we start, what are the 
principles in the compact that’s going to guide this discussion, going to 
guide these funding arrangements, going to guide this program design?’ 
Well, I can tell you, nobody does that.  
… So if you’ve got a government that’s at best disinterested in the 
process and you don’t use it, well, frankly, what do you think is going to 
happen? 
… The skilled operators understand that the compact has to become a 
living document, and if it is a living document you have to have the 
means and mechanisms to ensure that that life is sustained, and then I 
think, compacts have relevance … Compacts are valuable, but not in and 
of themselves. 
… The smart operator says, ‘well, we’re going to keep this alive’ and you 
do it formally and informally – it is true to say that the sector, however, is 
waiting for the reforms highlighted in [the Productivity Commission 
report] and other reports, and they see the compact as a sign of good faith, 
but frankly, nobody’s very excited about the Compact itself, I can tell you 
... [and] why should they? It’s a framework document – that’s what 
compacts are, they set up a set of principles, at best they are a guiding 
framework for the way in which governments should engage, but the 
really substantive issues are the issues that [the Productivity Commission] 
and others have addressed in multiple reports (personal communication, 
11 May 2011). 
The fortunes of political turbulence 
The Rudd and Gillard Labor governments have pursued a comprehensive suite of 
reforms in the NFP policy space that are unprecedented in Australia and ambitious even 
by international standards. Despite being supported for the most part by the NFP sector, 
the longevity of the reform agenda ultimately depends on the government’s political 
fortunes. Should the Liberal-National Coalition win the 2013 election, as it has been 
widely predicted to do, many of Labor’s policy initiatives in this area will likely be 
reversed. 
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Ironically, the internal political turbulence that has been a hallmark of the minority 
Labor government since 2010 has its roots in the first Rudd government's successful 
response to the global economic downturn. Despite the fact that the economic stimulus 
package almost certainly prevented Australia going into recession, the opposition has 
successfully purveyed the impression of a government beset by policy and 
implementation failure – impressions that the messy spectacle of leadership struggles in 
the Labor Party have done nothing to allay. Rudd’s sacking, followed by near defeat at a 
general election in 2010 and three years of constant political brinksmanship, severely 
damaged the Labor 'brand'.  
On 30 January 2013 Prime Minister Gillard made an unprecedented advance 
announcement that the next general election would be held on the 14th of September that 
same year (ABC, 2013). With polling consistently showing the Labor government in a 
losing position, few political observers believed Gillard could win the election. 
Persistent leadership speculation continued to fuel perceptions of dysfunction (Griffiths 
and Atherton, 2013). Although a leadership spill on 22 March 2013 saw the Prime 
Minister and her Deputy returned unopposed, on-going instability finally led to Rudd 
making a further, and successful, challenge to the leadership. On 26 June 2013, Rudd 
was elected Leader by a majority of the Labor Caucus. Although Labor’s standing in the 
polls revived, the government would still have to come from behind to win the next 
federal election, now brought forward by one week to 7 September 2013. 
Liberal-National Coalition policy 
The Opposition has announced that a future Coalition government would reverse key 
Labor reforms. For example, that it will dismantle the ACNC and repeal the Charities 
Act 2013 if it gains office (Andrews, 2011, 2012, Pro Bono News, 2013).  
In a June 2012 speech Shadow Minister for Families, Housing and Human Services 
(and a former Howard government minister) Kevin Andrews signalled the opposition’s 
intention to ‘reverse the nanny state’ (Andrews 2012). Andrews described Labor’s 
ACNC as ‘monolithic’, and a ‘power grab by government’, and derided the rationale for 
its establishment as ‘mischief’. The Coalition would instead establish ‘a small 
Commission as an educative and training body’, attached, initially, to the Australian 
Taxation Office. The new body would have no regulatory role.  
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Andrews also sounded a warning about ‘unnecessary state control of the civil sector’ 
and the danger that a sector dependent on government funding would be politicised and 
co-opted as ‘another arm of government’. A future Coalition government would 
promote philanthropy, ‘restore a culture of personal responsibility’ and simplify 
reporting and contractual requirements, government would support and empower the 
work of NFP organisations, not direct them ‘as an arm of the State’ (thus signalling, 
possibly, some relaxation of the Coalition’s past embrace of marketisation). This 
messaging suggests a ‘smaller government’ agenda comprising a generous portion of 
state paternalism with just a dash of principal-agent theory. 
As was widely expected, the Coalition won majority government in the 7 September 
2014 federal election. The new government’s first act in the NFP policy space was to 
disband the Social Inclusion Unit and the Office for the Not-for-Profit Sector in the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Office for the Not-for-profit Sector, 
2013d). This was followed by an attempt to defer the commencement of the Charities 
Act 2013 (Parliament of Australia, 2013) (although a Bill including provisions to delay 
commencement passed in the House of Representatives, it was defeated in the Senate). 
In early 2014, the government introduced the first of two bills aimed at abolishing the 
ACNC (Parliament of Australia, 2014a). Again, the bill passed the House of 
Representatives, but was referred to the Senate Economics Legislation Committee for 
inquiry and report (Parliament of Australia, 2014b). 
An Australian ‘Big Society’? 
The Leader of the opposition, Tony Abbott, sees the political discourse in Australia as a 
contest between advocates of ‘bigger government’ (i.e. Labor) and ‘empowered 
citizens’ (Abbott, 2012). The opposition has flagged its intention to repeal key structural 
reform measures (principally, Labor’s carbon and mining taxes) and to focus on the 
‘bottom line’ by accelerating debt retirement, delivering successive budget surpluses, 
and the consolidating the federal public sector (Hockey, 2012).  
In August 2012, Phillip Blond, the purported ‘driving force’ of the Cameron 
government’s ‘Big Society’ agenda (Hennessy, 2010), briefed Coalition members of 
Parliament on developments in the UK (Kelly, 2012), leading to speculation that a 
future Coalition government led by Tony Abbott might pursue its own version of ‘Big 
Society’ (Adams, 2012, Whelan, 2012). In an April 2013 speech to the centre-right 
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think tank, the Centre for Independent Studies, Kevin Andrews offered views with a Big 
Society flavour: 
Philanthropic endeavors (sic) strengthen and empower communities, 
harness the inherent virtue of Australians and encourage a greater sense of 
purpose and belonging across communities and incomes. Our volunteer 
services, welfare, environmental, sporting and community groups are 
living testimony to the Coalition’s belief in empowered communities. We 
believe that a community that freely gives of its time and its financial 
resources is a community with a stronger social fabric and more social 
capital. 
We don’t necessarily want government to do less for people but we 
certainly want people to have the capacity to do more for themselves 
because that’s the way that stronger communities are built (Andrews, 
2013). 
Interestingly, there is support within the Australian NFP sector for the ideas embodied 
by ‘Big Society’, with the socially conservative Christian community service 
organisation, Mission Australia, reported to be actively promoting the adoption of a Big 
Society model in Australia (Karvelas, 2013).  
There is also evidence of the adoption by non-Labor state governments of 
‘conservative’ social policy prescriptions being implemented in the UK – such as social 
impact bonds (CSI, 2012) – thus continuing a ‘tradition of policy exchange between 
Australia and the UK’ (Sullivan, 2012). The transfer to Australia of these building 
blocks of Cameron’s Big Society can be viewed as the neoliberal analogue to the 
adoption by Labor governments of Blair’s Third Way. 
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Chapter Eight – New Zealand’s Relationship 
Accord 
By comparison with Australia, New Zealand has moved cautiously with regard to a 
framework agreement between government and the NFP sector. Although New Zealand 
is often cited as a policy laboratory in which successive governments have 
experimented with radical public sector reforms (Castles et al., 1996, Sherborne, 2008), 
it did not rush into a compact despite shared desire to ameliorate sources of tension 
between government and the NFP community services sector. 
The New Zealand government under former Labour Prime Minister Helen Clark (1999-
2008) supported close engagement with the NFP sector, however, for a variety of 
reasons a bilateral framework agreement between government and the sector was never 
formalised. It was not until May 2011 that a cooperation framework document – Kia 
Tūtahi (Standing Together): The Relationship Accord between the Communities of 
Aotearoa New Zealand and the Government of New Zealand – was ratified by the 
National Party government led by Prime Minister, John Key, thus marking the 
culmination of a decade-long national discussion.  
Throughout much of the period of the Clark Labour government, the centre-right 
Liberal/National Coalition governed nationally in Australia (1996-2007). Although 
national governments in both countries embraced market-based approaches to the 
delivery of public services, the policy discourse around the nature of the relationship 
between government and the NFP sector differed markedly. Whereas the Australian 
government policy and practise emphasised government’s contractual relations with the 
sector, the New Zealand government ostensibly accepted the desirability of a settlement 
with civil society sectors. That the Relationship Accord was over a decade in the 
making was largely a consequence of the reticence of the principal national umbrella 
organisations operating in the NFP policy space rather than reluctance on the part of 
government. 
New Zealand offers an interesting contrast to Australia: it is a unitary state with a 
unicameral system of governance, compared to Australia’s federal state and bicameral 
system of governance;136 New Zealand has become a genuinely bi-cultural nation in 
which indigenous peoples – the Iwi/Māori, enjoy both a special status in the polity and 
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exhibit a greater degree of political and social integration by comparison with the 
original inhabitants of Australia; and its electoral system – mixed member proportional 
representation (MMP) – consistently delivers minority/coalition governments reliant 
upon confidence agreements with minor political parties, unlike Australia where, until 
recently, majority government has been the norm. 
As another important point of difference, New Zealand’s political system has been 
described as an ‘elected dictatorship’ (Mulgan, 1990, Bray and Walsh, 1998). Similarly, 
Evans et al. have observed that:  
In New Zealand a governing party with a clear parliamentary majority can 
legislate its program with few constitutional impediments. The major 
nonconstitutional constraints on the executive are internal party unity, 
electoral support, and the disciplines imposed by external financial flows 
(Evans et al., 1996:1856-1857). 
The unitary nature of the state and the absence of institutional checks and balances in 
the form of an upper house or a robust committee system (as exist in Australia) leads to 
a concentration of power in executive government and a tendency towards ‘control’ that 
has often resulted in an adversarial relationship with the sector (personal 
communication, 13 December 2010a). 
As with the Australian cases examined for this study, the broad policy and political 
narrative contained in the primary and secondary literatures has been corroborated with 
in-depth interviews conducted with elite policy actors working at senior levels in the 
national NFP policy space. The interviewees represent a range of views from within the 
New Zealand public sector and the NFP sector. Interviews were conducted with senior 
officers from the Office of the Community and Voluntary Sector and the Department of 
Internal Affairs. In addition, interviews were conducted with representatives from five 
national umbrella organisations. To protect the confidentiality of interviewees none are 
identified by name or, in the case of the NFP sector, by organisation. 
New Zealand – The Relationship Accord in context 
The broad trajectory of public sector management reform in New Zealand over the last 
three decades is similar to that observed in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia 
(Coddington, 1993, Castles et al., 1996, Nowland-Foreman, 1997, Shaw and Allen, 
2006). As occurred elsewhere in the Anglo-Saxon world, the dominant governance 
paradigm in New Zealand has evolved from one of state-interventionism under the 
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National government of Sir Robert Muldoon (1975-1984) and its post-WWII 
predecessors, to one having a distinctly neoliberal caste, commencing with the extensive 
microeconomic reforms initiated by the Lange Labour government (1984-1989) and 
continued by its successors.  
New Zealand was an early and enthusiastic adopter of the suite of neoliberal approaches 
to public administration that would come to be called, collectively, ‘new public 
management’ (Larner, 2000). The economy-wide reforms initiated by the Lange Labour 
government also laid a platform for major public sector reform (Evans et al., 1996). 
These included an increased reliance on market-oriented strategies such as deregulation, 
privatisation, outsourcing, the structural separation of purchasers and providers, an 
enhanced emphasis on performance measurement and management, a shift from input 
to output-based funding, and the performance of publicly mandated functions – such as 
the delivery of public services – by third parties under contract (Boston et al., 1996, 
Boston et al., 1999, Boston, 2008).  
The reformist zeal of Labour governments under prime ministers Lange, Palmer and 
Moore137 (1984-1990) was somewhat constrained by the Party’s historical, institutional 
and political ties with the labour movement – at least in relation to labour market 
deregulation (Bray and Walsh, 1998:368-369).138 Succeeding National governments 
under prime ministers Bolger and Shipley (1990-1999) were not similarly constrained, 
however, and responded to calls for further radical deregulation of labour markets (Bray 
and Walsh, 1998:371-372, Cheyne et al., 2005, Perry, 2008:12). This was, according to 
Larner, a more recognisable ‘authoritarian version of neoliberalism and neo-
conservatism’ (Larner, 2000:17).  
The implementation of contracting and tendering regimes for the provision of health 
and human services also gathered pace during this period. The express aim was to 
leverage market forces to encourage greater competition among service providers, 
including those in the NFP sector (Smith, 1996, Nowland-Foreman, 1997, Ashton et al., 
2004, Larner and Craig, 2005). An increased emphasis on contracting was accompanied 
by the application of intrusive contract management practices (Larner and Craig, 2005, 
Cribb, 2006, Aimers and Walker, 2008). 
By the late 1990s, however, it appears that the National government had cause to 
reconsider its embrace of principal-agent approaches to public service delivery. An 
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incoming government brief prepared by the Department of Social Welfare in 1996 set 
out the following note of caution: 
It has been argued elsewhere in this paper that a strong and viable not-for-
profit sector also offers innovation, flexibility in service provision, and a 
public good externality as a result of the voluntary nature of some of its 
activities. 
If this argument is accepted, current arrangements with the sector based 
on purchase-of-service contracting may not, in themselves, be sufficient 
to maintain a healthy not-for-profit sector, and other mechanisms to 
promote and secure the capacity of the sector may need to be considered 
(cited in Nowland-Foreman, 1997:22, Department of Social Welfare, 
l996). 
This proposition reflected a (then) prevalent view that the use of competitive tendering 
and contracting for the provision of social services – especially when coupled with the 
persistence of departmental ‘silos’ and a rigid application of contractual compliance 
regimes – might lead to greater fragmentation of both policy and service delivery; the 
co-optation of NFP service providers as mere agents of the state; and a lack of focus on 
the needs of citizens (Smith, 1996:16, Nowland-Foreman, 1997:34, Aimers and Walker, 
2008:48). 
The ground was thus prepared for a resurgent opposition Labour Party to foreshadow 
proposals for a new settlement with New Zealand’s NFP sector in the lead-up to the 
1999 general election. On taking office in December 1999, the Clark minority 
Labour/Alliance government (1999-2002) signalled a shift away from the ‘free market 
purism’ of the Nationals towards a ‘social development’ approach based on partnership, 
inclusion and joined-upness (Small, 1999, Larner and Craig, 2005, Aimers and Walker, 
2008, Prestidge, 2010).139 In the 1999 Speech from the Throne, the voluntary sector was 
recognised as ‘an essential component of social services’ and as ‘a sign of a healthy 
civic society’ and signalled a determination to develop partnerships with local 
government, businesses, communities, and the voluntary sector. Singling out the latter 
out for special mention, Clark said: 
My government wishes to develop a compact with the voluntary sector to 
facilitate and guide the relationship between us (Clark, 1999). 
The Labour/Alliance government acted quickly to raise the policy profile of the 
government-NFP sector relationship by establishing a working party comprised of 
community, NFP sector and state services sector representatives ‘to consider the scope 
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of a proposed agreement between government and Iwi/Māori community and voluntary 
organisations’ (CVSWP, 2001).  
The term of the Labour/Alliance coalition government (1999-2002) was a period of 
intense examination of the government-sector relationship by two high-level, 
government-sanctioned working groups with a broad remit to consult across the 
voluntary and community sector as well as across the Iwi/Māori community about the 
matters that should be taken into account in any formal relationship framework. During 
this time the government also established a ministerial portfolio for the community and 
voluntary sector, and enunciated a Statement of Government Intentions (SoGI) (New 
Zealand, 2001) setting out a range of undertakings with regard to the relationship.  
The Labour/Progressive coalition government that followed (2002-2005) sanctioned on-
going policy review and implementation. During this time there were clear signs of 
divergence between the sector view articulated by the working groups and the 
government’s preferred direction. While the responsible minister and the government 
clearly wanted to develop a framework document along the lines of the compacts then 
in place in the UK, the NFP sector hedged, having concluded that the time was not right 
for a formal agreement on an equal footing with government (CVSWP, 2001).  
A Community Sector Taskforce was established to consult with the sector and to 
provide independent advice to government about progressing recommendations flowing 
from the earlier working groups (O'Brien et al., 2009). The relationship between the 
Taskforce and the government was sometimes difficult, owing in part to the former’s 
firm commitment to embedding the government-sector relationship within a broader 
Tiriti/Treaty of Waitangi framework (O'Brien et al., 2009:20). In 2004, then Minister 
for the Community and Voluntary Sector, Tariana Turia quit the Labour government 
over proposed legislation affecting Māori title to New Zealand’s foreshore and seabed. 
Turia went on to co-found the Māori Party. 
Following the 2005 general election, the Labour/Progressive coalition government 
continued to address cross-cutting issues of practical concern to the sector. By 2007, 
perhaps sensing a possible change of government at the next election, the community 
sector signalled that as ‘our “official” knowledge of the tangata whenua, community 
and voluntary sector is very much greater now than it was when the Statement of 
Government Intent was released’, it was now time for the SoGI to ‘become a formal 
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basis for action and accountability and a reflection of genuine partnership’ (ANGOA, 
2009). The government funded the Association of Non-Governmental Organisations of 
Aotearoa (ANGOA) to undertake an assessment of government responsiveness to the 
SoGI (O'Brien et al., 2009). ANGOA’s final report was not completed until 2009, after 
the election of the Key National-led government. 
The change of government saw Tariana Turia returned to the Community and Voluntary 
Sector portfolio – this time as the deputy leader of the Māori Party under the terms of a 
coalition agreement with the National Party. It was Turia who received ANGOA’s 
report (ANGOA, 2009) and who observed at the time that: 
… eight years on [from SoGI] it is entirely appropriate that we reflect on 
the structures and the processes that have been built to create strong and 
respectful relationships with each other – and evaluate progress made, and 
developments yet to occur (Turia, 2009). 
In March 2010, with Cabinet approval, Turia established a joint community-government 
steering group to oversee the development of a relationship agreement and to lead an 
associated consultation process (Cabinet, 2009, Cabinet Social Policy Committee, 
2011).  
The resultant Relationship Accord, launched in 2011, does not take the form of a 
bilateral framework agreement. Although developed by a steering group comprising 
appointed government and sector representatives, and finalised following a period of 
public consultation, the document is ‘Signed by the Government of New Zealand’ (New 
Zealand, 2011).140 Following the Australian formula, individuals and organisations are 
invited to sign the Accord online (OCVS, 2012b). The following sections will discuss in 
greater detail the nature of the problem, the substance and tenor of the discussion within 
influential policy communities, and those aspects of the political environment that 
favoured the elevation of a relationship framework to the public policy agenda.  
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The Relationship Accord – the problem stream 
 
From the mid-1980s onwards the modus operandi of government in New Zealand 
conformed to neoliberal approaches to governance and public administration. Along the 
way NFP organisations – once ancillary to the state – were progressively 
‘neoliberalised’ and embedded within the broader apparatus of marketised service 
delivery. Financial support of non-profit sector activity now occurred primarily through 
service contracts, thereby signalling a fundamental change in the nature of the 
relationship between the sector and government (O'Brien et al., 2009:26).  
This new dispensation for the sector introduced a range of problems. The administrative 
and compliance apparatus of contracting imposed operational burdens and practical 
constraints on the sector (O'Brien et al., 2009:28-29). NFP service providers were also 
challenged to ‘fill the gaps’ created as a consequence of changes to programs, 
entitlements and eligibility criteria whilst at the same time needing to create the new 
capacity needed to participate in newly established quasi-markets for public services. 
Although government came to depend on NFP sector providers as never before, the 
influence of the sector as a collective policy actor was simultaneously eroded by 
procurement and contracting practices. Effectively, the organisational mission of NFP 
service providers became subservient to the policy priorities of government.  
Figure 8.1 – Timeline and synopsis, NZ government-NFP sector relationship 
1980s 1990s 2000s 
Lange Labour government 
elected in 1984 embarks on 
economy-wide structural and 
micro-economic reforms leading 
to the ‘neoliberalisation’ of the 
state services sector, including 
extensive privatisation and the 
marketisation of a range of 
public services. Community and 
voluntary organisations, once 
ancillary to state-provided public 
services, are enlisted as state 
service delivery agents. 
 
Neoliberal reforms continue 
under the Bolger and Shipley 
National governments, but with 
a more ‘authoritarian’ caste. 
Community and voluntary 
organisations are pressed into 
service as contracted service 
providers with little input into 
either public or operational 
policy. State service 
‘purchasers’ are paternalistic 
and focussed on compliance. 
Compliance regimes impose 
operational burdens and 
transaction costs on NFP 
sector service providers. 
Clark Labour government 
introduces a partnership 
narrative to government’s 
relationship with the NFP sector 
and sponsors working groups 
comprised of sector 
representatives to advise on a 
way forward. The sector 
concludes that it is not ready to 
engage with government 
around a formal framework. 
Although progress is made over 
the course of the Labour 
government, a formal bilateral 
framework is elusive. In 2011 
the National government 
presses forward with a largely 
unilateral Relationship Accord, 
much against the wishes of 
national umbrella organisations. 
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During the 1990s the relationship between central government and the NFP sector 
deteriorated, as did relationships within the sector owing in part to the pressures of 
competition and resource scarcity. The election in 1999 of a Labour government led by 
Helen Clark presented an opportunity to re-set government’s relationship with the 
sector. Reflecting on the problems that beset the relationship between government and 
the NFP sector, New Zealand’s inaugural Minister responsible for the Community and 
Voluntary Sector, Steve Maharey said: 
In opposition we noted with concern the steady decline of the relationship 
between Government and civil society as embodied by the community 
and voluntary sector. 
The health of the sector is a good barometer of the health of our society. 
Unthinking adherence to a rigid contracting model, centralised needs 
identification and programme specification, and an unwillingness to 
acknowledge the independence of sector groups over the last decade. 
All this led to an almost complete breakdown of the relationship. 
Fundamentally, the government failed to recognise the character of the 
community and voluntary sector (Maharey, 2000d). 
Shortly after coming to power, the Clark government established a Community and 
Voluntary Sector Working Party ‘to consider the scope of a proposed agreement 
between government and Iwi/Māori, community and voluntary organisations’ within 
broad terms of reference (CVSWP, 2001). In its report, Communities and Government – 
Potential for Partnership Whakato-pu-Whakaaro, the working party concluded that 
‘[A]lhtough we believe the time is not right for some sort of overarching “agreement”, 
there could be steps towards such an agreement or some kind of agreed framework over 
the next year’ (CVSWP, 2001).  
In her letter of transmittal the Chair noted that the working party had found ‘deep levels 
of frustration, mistrust, cynicism, anger and burnout’ arising from ‘community 
experience of dealing with governments over the past two decades’ (CVSWP, 2001:3). 
The Chair went on to observe that ‘people wanted to see the state supporting, enabling 
and facilitating, rather than dominating, demanding and standing aloof’ (CVSWP, 
2001:3).  
A Community-Government Relationship Steering Group was subsequently established 
‘to oversee a work programme to develop strategies and practical solutions to the 
concerns identified’ in the first report (CGRSG, 2002). In its report, He Waka Kotuia – 
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Joining Together on a Shared Journey, the Steering Group reiterated the observation 
that ‘[t]hroughout the 1980s and 1990s the community sector felt it was bearing the 
brunt of the economic market reforms, picking up an ever-increasing load with little 
recognition and support from government’ (CGRSG, 2002). The Steering Group also 
noted that the relationship-building process initiated by the Clark Labour government 
‘provided an opportunity to begin to effect a fundamental change in that relationship 
and in the culture of central government’ (CGRSG, 2002).  
Although progress has been made towards an improved relationship, commentary from 
the NFP sector suggests that some problems still persist. The Association of Non-
Governmental Organisations of Aotearoa (ANGOA), for example, complains that 
inconsistency, both in terms of the quality of relationships with government entities and 
administrative practices, has resulted in ‘fragmentation’, thereby impairing the sector’s 
ability to respond to community needs and concerns (ANGOA, 2009:35-36).141 In the 
same vein, representatives of national umbrella organisations142 interviewed for this 
study commented that the New Zealand public sector ‘has a chronic silo problem’ and, 
as a consequence, the sector observes little in the way of deliberative dialogue within 
government. In many ways, the sector considers itself to be ahead of government in this 
regard: 
The sector is less ‘siloed’. It is still segmented, but it’s less siloed than is 
government ... so, there’s no point in my view, in engaging with 
government if you can’t get ... the New Zealand Transport agency to be 
part of it, you’re wasting your bloody time! (personal communication, 13 
December 2010a). 
Sector representatives acknowledge that the Clark Labour/Alliance government in its 
first term accepted the need to strengthen the capacity of the NFP sector to enable a 
conversation with government about a formal relationship framework (personal 
communication, 13 December 2010b). The government did commit to implementing a 
number of the recommendations set out in Potential for Partnership (CVSWP, 2001) 
and the follow-up report Joining Together on a Shared Journey (CGRSG, 2002). 
Although work was undertaken in a number of areas, momentum gradually stalled and 
specific recommendations concerning processes for monitoring and accountability of 
government-sector relationship were not acted upon (Nowland-Foreman, 2010). 
Sector representatives point out that although some ministers in the National-led 
government do recognise the value of building positive relationships with the voluntary 
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and community sector, this is not always reflected in relationships with portfolio 
agencies, some of which prefer to adhere to their own historical legacy of practice 
(personal communication, 13 December 2010a).143 Sector representatives also observed 
that some state sector agencies neither accept the relevance of whole-of-government 
initiatives nor consider themselves to be bound by cross-portfolio policy guidelines,144 
let alone consider themselves obliged to provide explanations for seemingly arbitrary 
decisions to depart from those guidelines (personal communication, 13 December 
2010a). According to sector representatives, this is part of the legacy of public sector 
reforms undertaken in the 1980’s and 90’s that reduced the oversight role of key central 
agencies such as Treasury and the State Services Commission (personal 
communication, 13 December 2010a) – an observation supported by Larner and Craig 
(2005). 
The countervailing narrative within the public sector is that NFP organisations are 
deficient when it comes to financial management, governance, or the achievement of 
outcomes:  
They’re not wildly capable. They are high maintenance relationships. In 
other words, they moan and they whinge, they demand ... anything but 
focus on the business (personal communication, 15 December 2010). 
The fundamental power imbalance inherent in the contracting regime has allowed an ‘us 
and them’ situation to emerge (personal communication, 15 December 2010). Over the 
years, it has become the default position of New Zealand’s NFP sector that it is 
incumbent upon government to make all the accommodations in relation to a range of 
entrenched grievances associated with the contracting model: ‘government has got to fix 
it – it is all their problem and all their fault … you hear that in the discourse over and 
over again’ (personal communication, 15 December 2010). According to one senior 
official, the national umbrella organisations accept no responsibility for their own 
behaviour or their contribution – good or bad – to an effective relationship (personal 
communication, 15 December 2010). 
The same official offered a cogent portrayal of the dilemmas of engagement on public 
policy. Government agencies operate under significant resource, capability and time 
constraints and this sometimes militates against effective engagement with non-
government actors. Meaningful engagement is very time consuming, and government 
typically has an ambitious policy program. Not only are agencies given very short lead 
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times within which to implement new policy measures, but also policy development 
often occurs under conditions of secrecy. For example, before an agency can consult on 
a policy measure, it is first required to obtain cabinet clearance on the consultation 
document, meaning that the agency will have already developed its preferred policy 
framework before consultation has even commenced, a situation that is hardly 
conducive to effective engagement (personal communication, 15 December 2010). 
The NFP sector does not itself have the critical mass to engage effectively, in particular 
because funding for advocacy must be raised entirely from donations/subscriptions and 
other non-government income streams. In this regard, the unwillingness of governments 
to fund advocacy is an impediment to effective government-sector partnering (personal 
communication, 15 December 2010). The task of engagement is even more difficult 
when one takes into account that the New Zealand NFP sector is made up of a large 
number of relatively small organisations that do not have the capacity to engage in a 
policy discourse requiring vast amounts of time and discussion (personal 
communication, 15 December 2010). 
The Relationship Accord – the policy stream 
By the late 1990s policy actors within and outside government were cognisant of the 
impact of NPM-inspired reforms on New Zealand’s NFP sector and of the implications 
of continued policy neglect of the relationship between government and the NFP sector 
(Nowland-Foreman, 1997). They were also aware of policy initiatives afoot in the UK 
and Canada to bring a measure of civility into a troubled relationship (Maharey, 2000d, 
Prestidge, 2010).145  
Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector (1999-2002), Steve Maharey, was an 
enthusiastic advocate of Blarite ‘Third Way’ approaches to governance, confirming that 
‘[p]artnership is set to become the defining characteristic of the fifth Labour 
Government’ (Maharey, 2000b). Ranked number four in Clark’s cabinet, a former 
academic sociologist and regarded as Labour’s ‘ideas man’, Maharey had in opposition 
been Labour’s spokesperson for social welfare and employment (New Zealand 
Parliament, 2008). 
Maharey publicly repented New Zealand Labour’s embrace of neoliberalism and 
articulated the New Zealand analogue of Blair’s departure from British Labour’s statist 
traditions thusly: 
 
 
 
 
272
[T]he Fourth Labour Government … lost its way in trying to find an 
alternative between the heavy handed statism of Muldoonism, and the 
free market anti-statism of the new right. 
In one sense the Fourth Labour Government failed to meet the challenge 
of finding a ‘Third Way’ beyond these two extremes (Maharey, 2000c). 
As for his embrace of the ‘Third Way’ Maharey offered the following: 
In the 1990s as a first term parliamentarian I began to look a lot harder for 
the kinds of policy prescriptions that represented a social democratic 
response to New Times.146 
The answer, it seemed to me lay in the kinds of ideas debated by people 
around Bill Clinton, Tony Blair and a range of European social 
democratic parties. For convenience let’s call these ideas the Third Way. 
These people were not united by a single version of the Third Way. What 
they had in common was an understanding that new times demand new 
answers from social democratic politicians. They could see that right 
wing neo-liberal politics had dominated the 80s and 90s by appearing to 
respond to social change and they wanted to ‘modernize’ their own 
parties. 
During its period of renewal, New Zealand Labour did not consciously 
decide to become a Third Way party. However, there is a great deal of the 
Third Way in former Labour leader Mike Moore’s approach and Helen 
Clark has talked of Labour being a Third Way party (Maharey, 2003). 
As Social Services and Employment Minister, Maharey advocated a ‘genuine and active 
partnership’ with community-based social service providers, noting the ‘mistrust and 
insecurity’ that had characterised government relations with the community sector prior 
to Labour winning government (Maharey, 2000a). He observed the existence in other 
countries of formal agreements and compacts, and outlined the task ahead in the 
following terms: 
The challenge for this Government, and for community-based providers, 
is to build a strong professional relationship based on trust, accountability 
and respect. We need to clearly assign accountabilities and 
responsibilities and to secure the right of both parties to hold independent 
views (Maharey, 2000a). 
He encouraged the sector to ‘seize this opportunity to work in genuine partnership with 
the Government’ (Maharey, 2000a). Referring to similar initiatives overseas, Maharey 
said: 
If we look at the Canadian, United Kingdom and Australian developments 
in this area we get a clear idea of some of the issues we, too, will have to 
address. 
• Recognition of the independence of the sector 
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• Ensuring effective service delivery 
• Expectations of consultation on policy development 
• Improving funding arrangements 
• Reducing compliance costs 
• Promotion of volunteering 
From these recommendations, the Government will develop policy and a 
process to bring about a meaningful relationship with the community 
sector (Maharey, 2000d). 
Maharey was in every sense a powerful policy entrepreneur within the Labour Party – 
one well-positioned to advance his ideas and place his personal stamp upon social 
policy. That he was strongly influenced by Blarite thinking is beyond question, and 
indeed his ‘Third Way’ inclinations possibly ran even deeper. Rather than being merely 
policy borrowings, Maharey’s convictions appear to have a genuine intellectual basis. 
Concerning the provenance of his thinking, Maharey offered the following:  
[S]uffice to say I found the work of such people as Stuart Hall, Geoff 
Mulgan, Goran Therborn, Charlie Leadbeater, Mark Latham, David 
Marquand, Robert Reich, Tony Giddens, Amitai Etzioni, Robert Putnam 
and many others to be moving in a promising direction (Maharey, 
2003).147 
The sector, however, harboured reservations about the prospects for a compact. One 
sector representative interviewed for this study dismissed the government’s overtures as 
an attempt to ‘smooth-over contracting issues’ in the social services sector (personal 
communication, 13 December 2010a). From their contacts with various policy actors 
involved in the development of policy frameworks in the UK and Canada, New 
Zealand’s national umbrella organisations had come to the view that the organisations 
in those countries (such as the NCVO in Britain) who were the main interlocutors with 
government were not, in fact, reflective of the broader NFP sector (personal 
communication, 13 December 2010b). For the New Zealand NFP sector, this was 
problematic.  
The extent to which intermediary organisations are ‘representative’ of a much broader 
NFP or third sector (let alone their membership) is a perennial question that has 
sometimes troubled the sector’s partners in government. Moreover, it is a consideration 
that has led intermediary organisations to place caveats on their endorsement of cross-
sector policy frameworks (lest they be seen to be making commitments on behalf of 
member organisations without authority). Such reservations are felt even more keenly in 
a small country like New Zealand. As one sector representative put it: 
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New Zealand’s too small – you can’t have a Stuart Etherington148, at 
NCVO, who does nice deals with the politicians and says ‘here it is’ … 
The sector wasn’t ready... [W]as the Federation [of Voluntary Welfare 
Organisations] or was ANGOA going to sign off on something with a 
government and then look around and get beaten about the head and ears 
by everybody else in the sector? High risk, no way, not achievable’ 
(personal communication, 13 December 2010a). 
Thus, in 2001 the principal national umbrella organisations in New Zealand were 
hesitant to commit to an agreement-making process with government because the civil 
society space was at that time not well-defined and was comprised of a number of 
disparate elements, including Iwi/Māori, small community-based organisations and 
larger, more corporate entities. Not-for-profit community services and voluntary 
organisations and their representative bodies did not at that time conceive of themselves 
as a ‘sector’ and it was felt that any organisation signing an agreement would be a 
tokenistic gesture. This view was strongly expressed to the Minister of the time, Steve 
Maharey, who in the words of one sector representative was ‘really disappointed 
because this was going to be the thing he did’ (personal communication, 13 December 
2010a).  
Although the NFP sector in New Zealand has matured over the last decade, and ‘there is 
a much stronger sense of being a sector than there was in 2003’, there is still a view 
amongst the national umbrella organisations that ‘we’re still a long way from being at a 
point where it would be easy to sign a compact’ (personal communication, 13 
December 2010a). In part, this reflects a prevalent view within the New Zealand NFP 
sector that no one organisation, or even a coalition of organisations has the authority to 
make commitments on behalf of the broader sector. There are natural lines of 
demarcation within the New Zealand NFP sector between consumer-based 
organisations and industry representative bodies; between Iwi/Māori and ‘Pākehā’149 or 
mainstream organisations; and between national organisations in Wellington and those 
in the regions. The fault lines within the sector militate against the emergence of elite 
groupings with a mandate to negotiate with government. One sector representative 
observed that, ‘it’s harder in a small country for a group to operate in isolation’ 
(personal communication, 13 December 2010a). 
The difficulty of articulating of a collective sector identity is further compounded by 
confusion on the part of the political class and the bureaucracy. An NFP sector 
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representative pointed out that ‘the sector’ is often taken to be synonymous with ‘social 
services and charities’: 
That’s what most politicians think you’re talking about … Most 
politicians do not know, they haven’t read the Johns Hopkins’ Reports, 
they haven’t looked at the satellite accounts, they don’t know that we 
contribute 5 percent of GDP and so forth (personal communication, 13 
December 2010a). 
A number member-based organisations claim a remit to make representations to 
government in relation to policy, legislation and operational practices affecting the NFP 
sector and the communities they serve. However, New Zealand’s national umbrella 
organisations are constrained in their capacity to undertake advocacy and 
representational functions, and to mobilise organisations around sector-wide issues. As 
a case in point, Twyford (2008) makes the following observation of the New Zealand 
Council of Social Service (NZCOSS): 
Like other umbrella organisations, NZCOSS has been perpetually under-
resourced, and almost constantly in survival mode. It has also suffered 
from lack of clear mechanisms by which to gather a strong mandate for 
action from its membership (Twyford, 2008:5). 
Umbrella organisations like NZCOSS compete for influence and relevance in a crowded 
and increasingly competitive policy space. For example, the website of the New 
Zealand Office for the Community and Voluntary Sector (OCVS) lists sixteen national 
umbrella groups – many of which will have overlapping memberships and 
constituencies (and this in a country of around 4.4 million).  
Twyford (2008) observes that NCOSS and its counterparts the NZ Federation of 
Voluntary Welfare Organisations and the NZ Council of Christian Social Services: 
… have struggled at times to maintain their roles as effective policy 
advocates. Unlike many groups, they have continued to be funded at least 
to some extent for their representational roles. Yet arguably, an increasing 
emphasis on their contractual roles as service providers, combined with a 
dependence on continued government funding, has squeezed their ability 
either to effectively represent their members or to lead the national 
discourse on social policy (Twyford, 2008:6-7). 
Although it has been argued that the ability of umbrella organisations in New Zealand 
to wield policy influence has been affected by competition over contracts and funding, 
their policy capability has also been compromised by a long history of personality 
conflicts and ‘patch protection’ issues (Twyford, 2008:7).150 Umbrella organisations 
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have at times defined themselves in opposition, rather than in relationship, to one 
another, leading to intense rivalries, particularly during the late 1990s (Twyford, 
2008:6-7).151 
Despite these tensions, national umbrella groups have demonstrated a capacity for 
effective cooperation in relation to policy advocacy and capacity building (Twyford, 
2008, Prestidge, 2010). Each of the national umbrella organisations is able to draw upon 
the insights of a diverse, localised member base in formulating representations to 
government, and for its part, government’s recognition of their legitimacy in this policy 
space has been affirmed by its preparedness to continue funding them in part for their 
representational roles (Twyford, 2008:9). 
Nevertheless, it became clear in 2001 that the pre-conditions for a formal agreement 
were lacking, owing in large part to the absence of ‘a clear consensus across Māori, 
community and voluntary organisations that they constitute a sector’ (Lyons, 2001a). 
The Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party, reporting in May 2001, therefore 
concluded that ‘the time is not right for a formal agreement between government and 
the community sector’ and instead proposed that the Labour government ‘demonstrate 
its commitment to a new way of working with the sector’ through the articulation of 
‘clear objectives for government agencies in restoring an improved relationship with the 
community sector’ in a ‘formal Government Statement of Intent’ (CVSWP, 2001:143).  
Accordingly, the Clark government published a unilateral Statement of Government 
Intentions for an Improved Community-Government Relationship (SoGI) (New Zealand, 
2001). As with the Canadian Accord, also promulgated in December 2001, the SoGI 
had symbolic resonance in that it was published during the International Year of 
Volunteers. Jointly signed by the Prime Minister, Helen Clark, and Minister Maharey, 
the SoGI set out in about 600 words the overriding goal of achieving ‘strong and 
respectful relationships between government and community, voluntary and Iwi/Māori 
organisations’ in recognition of their ‘unique and vital role in New Zealand society’ (see 
Figure 8.2). The SoGI took the form of an aspirational mission statement: it encouraged 
state sector agencies to developed better relationships with their NFP sector partners, 
but lacked concrete actions or measures to ensure compliance (Prestidge, 2010:75-76).  
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Although there is evidence of broad concurrence between government and the sector 
about the nature of the problems endemic to the government/NFP sector relationship 
(and their causes), there appears to have been a divergence of view about preferred 
solutions and pathways.  
There was a strong preference within the NFP sector to couple any future framework 
agreement with ‘political and constitutional issues relating to the Iwi–Crown Treaty 
relationship’ (CGRSG, 2002:7-9). 
According to the sector the ‘vexed’ relationship between government, the NFP sector 
and the indigenous peoples of New Zealand, or tāngata whenua,152  is: 
[a] very important reason why we haven’t made more progress ... and it’s 
so disjointed at the moment because we’ve never had a government 
accept that agenda as an agenda to work on: they’ve always resisted it and 
in our sector it’s a point of great tension because there’s a wide range of 
opinions about how to do that. (personal communication, 13 December 
2010a). 
Figure 8.2 – 2001 Statement of Government Intentions 
The Statement of Government Intentions committed the government ‘to creating a genuine partnership 
with community, voluntary and Iwi/Māori organisations’ and expressed the role of the state as ‘a facilitator 
of a strong civil society based on respectful relationships between government and community, voluntary 
and Iwi/Māori organisations.’ In pursuit of this goal the SoGI undertook to: 
1. ensure that the culture of government reflects ‘a good understanding of the values, governance 
arrangements and working realities of the community, voluntary and Iwi/Māori organisations with 
whom they interact’, 
2. adopt a ‘whole of government’ approach, in part by giving ‘priority to working together, breaking 
down ‘silos’ and establishing co-ordinated, inter-sectoral policies and programmes, 
3. ensure that departments and ministries ‘recognise and apply the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi’, 
4. encourage participation in decision-making by working together with the community sector to 
‘develop and improve consultation processes through sharing good practice, guidelines, 
workshops and training’, 
5. undertake, with the community sector, a program of work to address concerns about Government 
funding to community organisations, including ‘funding arrangements, effectiveness, compliance 
costs and related matters’, and 
6. work alongside community, voluntary and Iwi/Māori organisations to support and strengthen the 
community sector. 
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The Steering Group also advocated a longer development and implementation phase for 
more ‘holistic’ reform, whereas the government  preferred to focus its efforts on the 
community services sector.153  
In his initial response to the Steering Committee’s 2002 report, Maharey committed 
Labour to ‘a full consideration of the report's recommendations’ while reaffirming that 
priority would be given to ‘practical and workable steps that will make a real difference 
for people who work in the community sector’ (Maharey, 2002). He went on to say: 
… Labour in government over the next three years will: make 
government services more co-ordinated and more flexible - so that 
common-sense solutions are found for people when they need them; 
continue to invest in the community and voluntary sector; continue to 
improve funding arrangements for community organisations so they can 
get on with their real work of helping people; and make it easier for 
volunteers to get on with the important work they do without unnecessary 
barriers from government (Maharey, 2002). 
According to sector representatives, the Labour government resisted any conflation of a 
settlement between government and the community sector with the relationship between 
the Crown and Iwi/Māori because, ‘government was running scared for awhile of losing 
New Zealand public support because it [the public] was unfriendly to Māori’ (personal 
communication, 13 December 2010a). 
In New Zealand’s policy stream can be seen a complex tug-of-war between ministers 
with strong personal agendas and policy convictions (Maharey and Turia) and a set of 
actors associated with national umbrella organisations with equally strong convictions. 
This might be characterised as a struggle between the satisficing tendencies of 
politicians and the optimising tendencies of leaders in the community sector. There is 
little direct evidence that the NFP sector in New Zealand had collectively thought 
through the ramifications of a relationship framework prior to the 1999 election.  
And while a consensus did emerge from the various deliberative bodies commissioned 
by government to provide advice, that consensus seems to have asked more of the 
Labour-led government than it was prepared to risk. New Zealand thus pursued a 
decade-long dialogue about a relationship framework without the principal policy 
communities (NFP sector leaders and the Labour-led government) reaching agreement 
about how to go about it. Following the 2008 general election, as will be seen, the 
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National-led government opted to go over the heads of the national umbrella groups to 
engage directly with communities and community-based organisations. 
The Relationship Accord – the politics stream 
Until the 1980s, New Zealand had a reputation as an archetypal ‘welfare state’ and a 
pioneering ‘social laboratory’ characterised by generous social payments, industry 
subsidies and high levels of regulation (Tennant et al., 2008). The tradition of state 
intervention that began in 1898s with the introduction of a pension for persons ‘of good 
character’ aged 65 and older, accelerated during the inter-war period with the relaxation 
of conditionality attached to benefits and an extension of income support programs 
(Carpinter, 2012). 
Measures such as these were soon followed by state intervention in employment 
markets and economic development (Tennant et al., 2008, Carpinter, 2012). As 
occurred in Australia, the reach of the state was reinforced by the necessities of wartime 
regulations and by a strong post-war faith in Keynesian centralised planning (Tennant et 
al., 2008:20-21, Wanna et al., 2010:21-22). The consolidation and extension of New 
Zealand’s welfare state from the 1950s through the 1970s was accompanied by financial 
transfers to the NFP sector, greatly expanding both the number and diversity of NFP 
organisations in the process (Tennant et al., 2008). 
The 1970s in New Zealand saw an expansion of new NFP organisations to fill perceived 
gaps in service provision or to advocate on behalf of particular groups or causes 
(Tennant et al., 2008). These newer organisations reflected a new wave of self-help and 
advocacy groups that were more prepared than the older established charitable bodies to 
challenge the status quo and offer criticisms of government policy (Tennant et al., 
2008). This was a new generation of politically assertive non-profit organisations linked 
with specific social causes prepared to critique the welfare state, either for failing to 
meet particular needs or for being excessively interventionist (Tennant et al., 2008:27-
29).  
Meanwhile, a sector-wide voice failed to coalesce, possibly owing to a general 
acceptance at that time of the central role of the state in ensuring the welfare of citizens 
(Twyford, 2008). Thus in 1975 the New Zealand Council of Social Service (NZCOSS) 
was established under the Department of Social Welfare Act 1971 as a quasi-
governmental organisation to provide advice to the Minister for Social Welfare and to 
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encourage the formation and coordination of regional councils of social service 
(Twyford, 2008). It was not until 1986 that NZCOSS became a fully independent 
national umbrella organisation alongside others such as the New Zealand Federation of 
Voluntary Welfare Organisations (formed in 1969) and the New Zealand Council of 
Christian Social Services (formed in the 1960s) (Twyford, 2008:2). 
In the late 1970s New Zealand was buffeted by the twin shocks of Britain’s entry into 
the European Economic Community (EEC) – thereby removing the principal market for 
New Zealand’s agricultural produce – and the OPEC oil crisis. The National Party 
government of Robert Muldoon, then in its third term and increasingly unpopular, was 
defeated at the 1984 general election by a resurgent Labour Party led by David Lange. 
Labour, elected with an absolute majority, initiated successive waves of profound 
structural and public sector reform that eventually thrust the NFP sector into the 
frontline of service delivery. According to Tennant et al.: 
From the late 1980s, Aotearoa New Zealand reprised its late nineteenth-
century role as the ‘social laboratory of the world’, but in reverse, as the 
state withdrew from many activities. A trend apparent in many western 
countries was taken further, earlier. A radical reshaping of the economy 
and the attempted ‘winding back’ of the welfare state was enabled by the 
country’s small size, limited constitutional checks on the executive, and a 
first-past-the-post electoral system (which gave power to the political 
party with the largest single number of seats in the country’s unicameral 
parliament) (Tennant et al., 2008:30). 
Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s state financial support of NFP organisations took the 
form of grants-in-aid, through the 1980’s and 1990s POSCs became the preferred 
mechanism for transferring resources from the state to non-profits (Tennant et al., 2008, 
O'Brien et al., 2009). The shift from untied grants to contracts signalled changes in the 
focus and behaviour of NFP organisations, many of which felt that state requirements 
increasingly shaped their priorities and subverted their mission and values (Tennant et 
al., 2008:31, O'Brien et al., 2009:15). Although the relationship between government 
and the NFP sector had deteriorated by the 1990s,, the advent of partnership discourses 
in the UK and Canada awakened interest in a reappraisal of the sector’s relationship 
with the state (O'Brien et al., 2009:14). 
The election of the Labour/Alliance government in 1999 provided the policy window 
that enabled case for just such a re-appraisal to be placed on the policy agenda. Early in 
the term of new government Steve Maharey set out Labour’s case: 
 
 
 
 
281 
In recent times Government relationships with [the] community and 
voluntary sector have been characterised by mistrust and insecurity. We 
want to move past the narrow focus on what is in the contract and develop 
strong relationships that ensure the provision of effective programmes 
meeting real needs (Maharey, 2000e). 
It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which representations from the sector influenced 
Maharey’s thinking about the nature of any new partnership with New Zealand’s NFP 
sector. Certainly, there were indications that the Bolger national government had, by the 
end of the 1990s, begun to accept the importance of improving the relationship with the 
NFP sector and the potential for government-community partnerships to leverage the 
creation of social capital and social cohesion (O'Brien et al., 2009).154 It is also clear 
from his own account that Maharey already held policy convictions derived from, or at 
least strongly influenced by the ‘Third Way’ discourses emanating from Britain’s New 
Labour (Maharey, 2003).  
According to Obrien et al., ‘developments post the 1999 election focusing on new 
relationship-building initiatives had their origins, at least in part, in lobbying by key 
national and umbrella groups before the 1999 election’ (O'Brien et al., 2009:36).155 
However, Maharey’s language – for example, his frequent use of the terms ‘Third 
Way’, ‘social exclusion’ and ‘compact’ – together with his early references to 
developments in the UK and Canada, are suggestive of a conscious ‘policy borrowing’. 
It also seems that the NFP sector in New Zealand was receptive to just such a policy 
narrative. 
Following the 2002 general election which saw the formation of a Labour/Progressive 
coalition government156 Tariana Turia was appointed Minister for the Community and 
Voluntary Sector. On becoming Minister, Turia reiterated the government’s intention to 
‘continue to develop a more effective relationship with volunteers, and the communities 
they support’ (Turia, 2002b).  
Although not as senior in the Labour hierarchy as Maharey157, Turia was active in her 
new role. She oversaw the development of a government policy on volunteering (Turia, 
2002a); the establishment of the OCVS in 2003 which would ‘work across the whole of 
government to ensure that official policies promote community development’ (Turia, 
2003a) and ‘play a lead in working with other government agencies to develop 
relationship plans with the NGOs they work with’ (Turia, 2003b); as well as the 
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creation of the Good Practice Participate website158 containing guidance for public 
servants on good community engagement practices (Turia, 2003c). 
Prior to assuming the Community and Voluntary Sector portfolio, Turia had been 
Associate Minister in the Maori Affairs, Corrections, Health, Housing and Social 
Services and Employment portfolios. Following her elevation as a full Minister, she 
continued as Associate Minister for Maori Affairs, Health, Housing and Social Services 
(Beehive, n/d). Turia brought to her role a long-standing commitment to Iwi/Māori 
affairs and she sought to make a closer connection between community and voluntary 
sector issues and issues affecting Tāngata whenua.  
In 2004, Turia broke with the Labour Party over proposed legislation to vest ownership 
of the country's foreshore and seabed in the Crown – a move which she asserted 
‘confiscates what little Māori have left’ (Hansard, 2004).159 Turia was dismissed from 
the Ministry in April 2004 and resigned from the Labour government in May (Clark, 
2004, Beehive, n/d). She went on to co-found the Māori Party and was re-elected to the 
Parliament at a by-election in July 2004 (Beehive, n/d). 
When the National/Māori Party coalition government led by John Key was formed after 
Labour’s defeat at the 2008 general election, Turia – as deputy leader of the Māori Party 
– was once more appointed Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector (as well 
as Minister Responsible for Whānau Ora,160 Minister for Disability Issues, Associate 
Minister of Health and Associate Minister of Social Development and Employment) 
(National Party and Maori Party, 2008, Beehive, n/d). Among the other matters 
addressed in the coalition agreement between the National Party and the Māori Party 
was a commitment to ‘a review of the application of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 
to ascertain whether it adequately maintains and enhances mana whenua’161 – hardly 
surprising given this was the issue that caused Turia to split from the Labour Party 
(National Party and Maori Party, 2008).162 
The Māori Party requested the Community and Voluntary Sector portfolio as part of its 
coalition agreement with the Nationals (Māori Party, 2008). It was also agreed that 
ministerial posts held by Māori Party members would be outside cabinet. Turia is said 
to have wanted the portfolio (personal communication, 14 December 2010b) and 
because she both knew the terrain and had a pre-existing relationship with the sector, 
the move made ‘political sense’ insofar as it provided a ready platform as a minority-
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party member of the National-led government (personal communication, 13 December 
2010a). Nevertheless, some in the sector consider that the portfolio might have enjoyed 
a higher policy profile if held by a member of the National Party (personal 
communication, 13 December 2010b).  
The countervailing position is that a minister working outside cabinet is less likely to 
have major portfolio responsibilities that might prevent them from giving full attention 
to lower ranked policy issues (personal communication, 14 December 2010a).163 As 
deputy leader of the Māori Party, the National-led government had a vested interest in 
working with Turia – at least in its first term – by ‘helping out with some of her 
objectives that are relatively uncontroversial’ (personal communication, 14 December 
2010a). In addition, Turia is credited with having constructive relationships with 
ministerial colleagues and with cabinet: 
Minister Turia has always made a point of speaking to her colleagues, 
whether they’re in cabinet or not and putting across her views quite 
strongly about the community and voluntary sector and her beliefs, and 
what she thinks their role could be and in that respect, just because she’s 
not in cabinet doesn’t necessarily mean that her influence isn’t as strong 
(personal communication, 14 December 2010a). 
Persons interviewed for this study also observed that a minister’s capacity to exert 
influence depends as much on their personality and interests as whether or not they are 
in Cabinet (personal communication, 14 December 2010b). There was general 
agreement amongst sector representatives and government officials that Turia had a 
strong interest in community (personal communication, 13 December 2010b, 14 
December 2010b), pointing out her interest in ‘grassroots and hard to reach 
communities’: 
... she’s got a very strong desire to see people all around the country being 
able to feel involved and respected and regarded and appreciated for what 
they do in terms of volunteering and unpaid contributions (personal 
communication, 14 December 2010a). 
After being dismissed from her ministerial posts in 2004, the Community and Voluntary 
Sector portfolio was held by a succession of three Labour MPs (judging by the absence 
of any record of statements of policy consequence, none of Turia’s immediate 
successors appear to have made any lasting impression). 
Turia’s re-appointment as minister helped to give a new lease of life to the policy goal 
of a relationship framework and it was she who received ANGOA’s review of the SoGI. 
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According to one observer, the National-led government was happy to receive the report 
– even though it was initiated and funded by the Labour-led government – because the 
National Party bore no responsibility for the policy (personal communication, 13 
December 2010a). 
NFP sector representatives interviewed for this study name Turia as the prime champion 
of a relationship framework within the National-led government and speculate that 
without her the Relationship Accord might not have eventuated (personal 
communication, 13 December 2010b). Despite this acknowledgement, New Zealand’s 
national umbrella groups have been highly critical of the National-led government’s 
approach and campaigned against the proposed relationship agreement (later renamed a 
relationship accord).  
Following a Community-Government Forum convened in late 2009 to stimulate 
thinking about how best to progress a relationship framework, Turia invited 
nominations for a Kia Tutahi Standing Together Steering Group (KTSG) to oversee 
development of a draft relationship agreement and to lead a national consultation 
process (KTSG, 2011). The Steering Group comprised equal numbers of senior officials 
from key statutory sector agencies and persons with diverse experience working in the 
community and voluntary sector, and was co-chaired by Hori Awa, Chief Executive of 
Waahi Whaanui Trust and Don Gray, Deputy Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social 
Development (OCVS, 2012a). 
However, representatives of national umbrella organisations interviewed for this study 
maintain that the sector representatives appointed to the steering group had little 
authority to speak on behalf of the sector generally (personal communication, 13 
December 2010a). Community and voluntary sector members of the steering group 
were described as ‘non-mandated’, as not having standing or broad legitimacy within 
their communities, and bringing insufficient knowledge or strategic policy overview to 
the process: ‘some of them think it’s about their contract’ (personal communication, 13 
December 2010a).  
One said, ‘she seems to expect us to accept that as being OK’, adding, ‘they’re not 
representatives of the community sector ... and they do not represent any major 
organisations’ (personal communication, 13 December 2010a). It was suggested that 
‘she [Turia] doesn’t like the national bodies’ (personal communication, 13 December 
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2010a) while conceding that the minister might not consider umbrella organisations to 
be representative of grassroots communities (personal communication, 13 December 
2010a). In all probability, Turia’s decision to by-pass the national umbrella 
organisations was a deliberate strategy to move beyond what had become an intractable 
policy stalemate about the scope of any framework agreement. 
On 7 April 2011, almost one year to the day from its announcement, the KTSG 
submitted its final report in which the Relationship Accord was commended as ‘both a 
base from which the future community-government relationship can be developed and 
another step forward in a continuing conversation’ (KTSG, 2011). The KTSG 
acknowledged the Relationship Accord as an aspirational document and recommended 
medium and longer-term actions to build good practice and embed the Accord, 
including three yearly reviews of its implementation. The Accord received cabinet 
approval in June and was launched by Prime Minister John Key at a signing ceremony 
on 1 August 2011 (OCVS, 2012a).  
At the November 2011 general election, the National Party won a second term in office, 
forming government through confidence and supply agreements with ACT, United 
Future and the Māori Party. Following the election, National Party MP, Jo Goodhew 
was appointed as the new Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector.164 In a 
2012 speech Goodhew affirmed the government’s commitment to the Accord:  
I see Kia Tūtahi as a lever for positive change where some government 
organisations may be lagging behind others to engage and work with the 
non-government sector. Many agencies will find, as some have already 
found, that the Accord is easily embraced into the way they do things 
from developing policies right through to the delivery of services to 
people around New Zealand (Goodhew, 2012a). 
Later that same year the Minister again affirmed that the Accord establishes a 
framework and sets expectations for how the government and community groups can 
work together more effectively. Goodhew also offered the following reflections: 
The development of New Zealand’s welfare state post-1938 had a large 
role in shaping New Zealand’s robust non-profit sector. It led to close 
cooperation between the government and key non-profit organisations, 
and the sector has, in recent decades, drawn increasingly on government 
funding (Goodhew, 2012a). 
She went on to say that the Department of Internal Affairs had been asked to ‘focus on 
improving efficiencies for community organisations by providing better access to 
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grants, reducing compliance costs, and streamlining grant funding processes’ 
(Goodhew, 2012b). Goodhew also drew attention to a cross-government project led by 
the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (MBIE) aimed at streamlining 
compliance standards for NFP organisations that receive funding from multiple 
government agencies, and reducing ‘duplication in compliance costs and contract 
management processes’ (Goodhew, 2012b).165 
In New Zealand’s politics stream successive windows of opportunity have arisen, each 
keeping alive the objective of a formal framework agreement between government and 
the NFP sector. As with most of the other cases examined in this study, these windows 
coincide with elections and the policy agenda is shepherded by key policy 
entrepreneurs. The first such policy window was the 1999 general election that saw the 
return of a Labour-led government after a period of tumultuous economic and public 
sector reform. Steve Maharey, a staunch Blairite, was instrumental in placing a 
framework agreement on the policy agenda. However, New Zealand differed from other 
jurisdictions in one significant respect: the sector itself was immature and the key 
national intermediary organisations felt themselves unable to enter into an agreement. 
Nevertheless, Maharey persevered with the Statement of Government Intentions and 
initiated a range of practical reform measures. 
The policy window was kept wedged open once more when Tariana Turia took over the 
portfolio in 2002. Although Turia was not driven by adherence to ‘Third Way’ ideology 
in the same way as her predecessor, she nevertheless continued the reform path begun 
by Maharey and kept alive the prospect of an agreement. Towards the end of Labour’s 
reign the principal national umbrella organisations felt the time might be right to enter 
into an agreement. The policy window might well have closed with the change of 
government in 2008 had Turia not split with the Labour Party in 2004 to help form the 
Māori Party, thus allowing her to resurrect her ministry within a National-led 
government. 
However the national umbrella organisations, owing either to naïveté or a rigid 
adherence to policy purity, once again appeared to overreach by seeking to bind the 
government to a comprehensive settlement that included treaty issues and 
institutionalised mechanisms for compliance and monitoring. As a result, Turia by-
passed the national umbrella organisations and sought a new consensus by pitching the 
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proposed Relationship Accord directly to communities and organisations working at the 
coalface. Thus one finds in New Zealand a formal framework document to which the 
national umbrella organisations are not reconciled. 
Implementation, issues and impact 
Despite the slow progress towards a formal framework agreement New Zealand 
governments have been very active in the NFP policy space (see Appendix 7, Figures 
A7.1 and A7.2). And despite their frequent criticisms, national umbrella organisations 
acknowledge that dialogue between government and the sector has been generally 
constructive, with many examples of strong positive relationships in some policy 
domains (personal communication, 13 December 2010b). This view is supported by 
Sanders et al. who have observed ‘a more positive and constructive working 
relationship with non-profit organisations across all fields, with recent emphasis on 
development of collaborative relationships, including partnerships’ (Sanders et al., 
2008:29).  
Office for the Community and Voluntary Sector (OCVS) 
From the time of its establishment in September 2003, the Office for the Community 
and Voluntary Sector (OCVS) played an important role in laying the groundwork for 
stronger relationship between government and the community sector. Speaking at its 
launch, then Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector, Tariana Turia, said:  
 An important agenda item for this Government has been a determination 
to improve the relationship between government agencies and 
community, voluntary and tangata whenua organisations. We are putting 
a lot of energy into making things work better, and to building greater 
harmony and stronger, healthier relationships (OCVS, 2003)  
The OCVS commenced with an ambitious work program: 
Underpinning the work of the Office will be a focus on supporting 
government departments to develop relationship plans with the 
community, voluntary and tangata whenua organisations they work with. 
These plans will reinforce the Government’s Statement of Government 
Intentions for an Improved Community-Government Relationship, signed 
in December 2001. Office staff will be available to help develop the 
plans, with an emphasis on good practice and identifying generic issues. 
The Office will also support the development of online resources to 
promote good practice (OCVS, 2003). 
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Although originally situated within and administered by the Ministry of Social 
Development, the OCVS enjoyed a degree of relative autonomy in its early years. Over 
time its autonomy gradually gave way to increased oversight by the Ministry, possibly 
as a result of the revolving door of ministerial appointments in the portfolio after 
Turia’s dismissal and subsequent resignation from the Labour Party. 
While the sector generally welcomed its creation, the OCVS was not without criticism. 
It was described in a recent report prepared by ANGOA as ‘a small, low-level unit’ with 
‘neither the status, nor the resources to address the New Zealand public sector’s lack of 
capacity for collaboration and coordination across agencies and departments’ nor the 
‘levers’ to achieve a ‘whole of government’ approach (ANGOA, 2009). Furthermore, 
ANGOA contended that being situated (initially) within the Ministry of Social 
Development (MSD) ‘reinforced, in the minds of the public as well as government, a 
very narrow understanding of the sector as charities delivering social services to the 
needy’ (ANGOA, 2009:4).  
The scope and variety of projects undertaken by the OCVS grew since its inception. The 
Office exercised its role largely by identifying and promoting the take-up of good 
practice. OCVS staff interviewed for this study reported that the Office struggled at 
times to elicit engagement with the senior management of critical agencies (personal 
communication, 14 December 2010b) – an observation echoed by the national umbrella 
groups (personal communication, 13 December 2010b). 
The OCVS was sensitive to this perception, and stressed that it is impossible for small 
agencies166 – especially when they’re located in a larger entity – to ‘influence strongly’: 
If you’ve got a tiny agency of eight people – even if it was a single 
agency and not a third tier level in another Ministry – it would be hard to 
have a significant level of influence and you’re really dependent in any 
case on Ministerial support (personal communication, 14 December 
2010a). 
However, staff also pointed out that the OCVS was regarded by some as ‘punching 
above its weight’ and they noted encouraging signs of ‘take-up’ by public sector 
employees of policy guidance, attendance at seminars and access to web-based 
resources:  
There are limitations, but I don’t think we are without impact – I just 
would like to have more! (personal communication, 14 December 2010a). 
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Harder to achieve is gaining the interest and active support of senior executives in the 
public service (personal communication, 14 December 2010b). In 2008-09 the OCVS 
enjoyed a degree of success with the Building Better Government Engagement project 
where it managed to both establish greater clarity about its role and strengthen the hand 
of public servants wishing to move in the direction of more collaborative engagement 
(personal communication, 13 December 2010b). Although the initiative was welcomed 
by the sector, the difficulty of getting senior bureaucrats with ‘real clout’ to the table 
remains an on-going challenge (personal communication, 13 December 2010a). As one 
sector representative ruefully observed: 
Who are your champions within the bureaucracy? If you’ve got fourth tier 
managers trying to tell a top tier CEO to change his behaviour, good luck! 
It ain’t gonna happen! (personal communication, 13 December 2010a). 
These questions also troubled the OCVS. OCVS staff observed that getting ‘traction’ on 
issues of cultural and behavioural change is difficult when the reality is that the 
relationship with the community and voluntary sector is not ‘number one’ on the policy 
agenda, especially when chief executives are coming under pressure to ‘do more with 
less’ (personal communication, 14 December 2010b). 
OCVS staff pointed out that successive ministers serving in the Community and 
Voluntary Sector portfolio have struggled with the fact that its functions are split 
between the Ministry for Social Development and the Department of Internal Affairs, as 
are the associated funds voted by Parliament (personal communication, 14 December 
2010a). This has resulted in confusion and duplication of reporting (personal 
communication, 14 December 2010a).  
Thus, in late 2010 the State Services Minister, at the request of the Minister for the 
Community and Voluntary Sector, undertook ‘a machinery of government review’ of 
the institutional and appropriation arrangements for the portfolio (Minister of State 
Services, 2010). Accepting arguments in favour of administrative simplicity, Cabinet 
agreed to transfer the staff, resources and functions of the OCVS from the MSD to the 
DIA effective from 1 February 2011 (personal communication, 14 December 2010b). 
Being located within the MSD had strategic benefits for the OCVS: the Ministry has a 
powerful executive, which can be helpful, but overall, its emphasis on social 
development was not entirely consistent with the broader whole-of-government charter 
of the OCVS (personal communication, 14 December 2010a). In contrast, the DIA, 
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engaged across the breadth of the NFP sector and with extensive links in communities 
and regions, offered an enhanced platform for the work of the OCVS. As observed by a 
senior OCVS staff member:  
We’re actually about the non-profit sector in its widest context and the 
Department of Internal Affairs in its interest in communities also has a 
complete focus that isn’t just about social services (personal 
communication, 14 December 2010a)  
During the course of the 2011-12 financial year, and not long after the transfer to the 
DIA, the OCVS ceased to exist as a separate office and its functions were integrated 
within existing operational areas of the DIA. 
Kia Tutahi/Standing Together Relationship Accord 
In 2009, on the heels of the Building Better Government Engagement project and 
ANGOA’s review of the SoGI,167 Tariana Turia sought approval from the Cabinet 
Social Policy Committee to enter into discussions with a view to developing a draft 
relationship agreement. Cabinet responded by inviting Turia ‘to seek endorsement of a 
community-government Relationship Agreement, and principles for Effective 
Engagement with citizens and communities’ (Cabinet Social Policy Committee, 2010).  
Although Turia noted that there had been ‘a sustained conversation between the 
community and voluntary sector about what constitutes a healthy, strong relationship’ 
since the promulgation in 2001 of the SoGI, she also drew attention to indications that 
‘community-government interactions do not sufficiently reflect good engagement 
practices’ (Cabinet Social Policy Committee, 2010). The Minister also linked the 
‘principles and intent’ of the relationship agreement to ‘strengthening trust’ in central 
government services as well as ‘clarifying the Government’s approach to social sector 
issues’ (Cabinet Social Policy Committee, 2010). 
In March 2010, Tariana Turia established a Steering Group comprised of key 
government officials and a selected cross-section of nominees from community and 
voluntary sector to oversee the development of, and lead public consultation on a draft 
relationship agreement.168 In a June 2010 Cabinet Paper, Turia described the draft 
agreement as ‘an aspirational document that lays a foundation for building strong 
relationships between the communities of Aotearoa New Zealand and the Government’: 
one which ‘provides a platform for enhancing community-government relationships 
across a wide range of portfolios’ (Cabinet Social Policy Committee, 2010).  
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An exposure draft of the proposed relationship agreement was released for public 
consultation from July to September 2010. The consultation process included 17 
regional assemblies, or ‘hui’ convened by the Steering Group; an invitation to make 
written submissions; on-line forums. The draft agreement was revised in light of 
feedback obtained during the consultation process and reissued for final comment in 
November 2010.169 The revised document provided to the Minister received cabinet 
approval in May 2011 (Cabinet, 2011, Cabinet Social Policy Committee, 2011).  
Whilst the Steering Group reported expressions of support for the agreement at local 
and regional forums, national and umbrella organisations were generally dismissive, 
arguing that the agreement lacked substance and represented a significant departure 
from the reform directions and priorities signalled by the sector in previous reports. The 
Steering Group offered the following acknowledgment: 
There was a level of frustration expressed by national and umbrella 
community organisations that the agreement did not reflect concerns 
discussed over a long period, in particular, funding and government 
consultation practices (Kia Tutahi Standing Together Steering Group, 
2010)  
Although national and umbrella organisations generally considered that a relationship 
agreement might do no harm, the prospect excited little enthusiasm among their ranks 
(personal communication, 13 December 2010b). In their view, the relationship 
agreement as written would do little to address persistent structural and systemic issues 
of long-standing concern to the sector such as the lack of government financial support 
for advocacy; short-term versus multi-year contracting; and full-cost funding for service 
delivery (ComVoices, 2010).  
One representative from a national umbrella organisation interviewed for this study 
dismissed the proposed relationship agreement as ‘an irrelevance’ and a ‘waste of time 
– a nothing’ (personal communication, 13 December 2010a). Concern was also 
expressed about the lack of a clear articulation of respective roles, processes for 
implementation, dispute resolution mechanisms or affirmations of the role of advocacy 
(personal communication, 13 December 2010a). Others expressed similar misgivings: 
My feeling about this relationship agreement however, is that it’s a ‘feel 
good thing’ that people who’ve never had any contact with government 
suddenly feel like they’ve got some kind of a connection. I don’t see that 
it has any other major value for people across the board because it’s too 
wide, but if it was a relationship agreement that was specifically stating 
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what the relationship would be like between government and the people 
government contracts with, then it might have some value (personal 
communication, 13 December 2011). 
National umbrella organisations might have feared that the language of the relationship 
agreement would serve to marginalise their legitimacy within the broader third sector 
and undermine their strategic position with respect to government. At least one sector 
representative felt that the draft agreement did not adequately capture the tension 
inherent in the state-sector relationship: 
We have a position which is around the role of the sector being civil 
society, or being voluntary, being based on action and change and a push 
for social change. The government has a position about being there to 
maintain services. And until we see some sort of relationship agreement 
that reflects the fact that we’re not ‘buddies together’ I think we’re 
doomed. There must be a way of expressing the inherent tension in that 
relationship, which find a way to more than manage it, create the 
opportunities for that tension to be understood (personal communication, 
13 December 2010a). 
ComVoices, an informal coalition of national community sector organisations, 
expressed misgivings about the government’s proposal to frame an agreement between 
‘the communities of Aotearoa New Zealand and the Government of New Zealand’, 
asking ‘can our sector have a strong relationship agreement, when one party is 
effectively all the people in New Zealand? (ComVoices, 2011). Social Development 
Partners,170 representing a network of community sector organisations, expressed 
disappointment: 
The draft Relationship Agreement is very high level – as promised – but 
it’s actually less strong and less clear than the previous Statement of 
Government Intentions for an Improved Community-Government 
Relationship (the SOGI). We would like a document that spells out the 
respective roles and responsibilities of parties, and has considerably more 
substance than this draft (Social Development Partners, 2010). 
The Steering Group acknowledged an ‘apparent difference in view on who comprises 
the parties’ and noted national and umbrella community organisations’ preference for an 
agreement between the government of New Zealand and the ‘community and voluntary 
sector’ (KTSG, 2010).  
The Steering Group accepted that the issue of the parties to the agreement is ‘extremely 
important’ but asserted that a more ‘inclusive definition’ of the parties – the 
‘Communities of Aotearoa New Zealand’ – neither dilutes nor diminishes ‘the 
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significant role of the national organisations and umbrella groups’ (Kia Tutahi Standing 
Together Steering Group, 2010):  
A broader definition of ‘parties’ aligns with the Steering Group’s two 
phase approach. First, getting an overarching agreement in place. Second, 
working on the specifics of implementation in respect of particular 
relationships with parties that are already positioned to act (Kia Tutahi 
Standing Together Steering Group, 2010)  
Moreover, the Steering Group claimed that those attending local and regional forums 
expressed a clear preference for the term communities because it ‘encompasses 
organisations, families and individuals’ (Kia Tutahi Standing Together Steering Group, 
2010). A senior official with the OCVS echoed this view:  
It’s not what a lot of people expected, but, it did get a lot of support 
around the country ... quite a few people have an affinity with the word 
communities and feel more allied to that concept, in terms of their 
contributing to their communities, than they do to the term community 
and voluntary sector (personal communication, 14 December 2010a). 
The same official observed that people and organisations located outside New Zealand’s 
metropolitan centres, or situated within Maori and Pacific communities, would not 
necessarily recognise themselves as being part of a community and voluntary sector: 
they see themselves as a community rather than as a sector (personal communication, 14 
December 2010a).171 
The OCVS observed the tensions inherent in two parallel, but quite different 
conversations about the proposed relationship framework: one in the regions about 
operational issues and another at the centre (i.e. in Wellington) with a more 
strategic/political focus. The latter, it was suggested, reflects a history of ‘a whole other 
discussion’ infused with the legacy of earlier stages of work towards a relationship 
framework (personal communication, 14 December 2010a).  
The OCVS contended that in the regions government officers and local community and 
voluntary sector organisations know each other very well – indeed they enjoy closer 
relations with each other than with either the national bodies or head offices in 
Wellington (personal communication, 14 December 2010a). It was suggested, therefore, 
that because the national umbrella organisations are not sufficiently resourced to travel 
to the regions they might not be as aware of local sentiment in the regions as they think 
they are (personal communication, 14 December 2010a). 
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National umbrella organisations were clearly expecting a form of agreement tailored 
more to their core concerns (personal communication, 14 December 2010a). However, 
notwithstanding the importance of particular issues that frequently arise in sector 
commentary (e.g. funding, policy engagement and/or advocacy) the proposed 
relationship framework would be all about the relationship between people on the 
ground, as opposed to relationships between agencies or entities (personal 
communication, 14 December 2010a). The purpose of the relationship framework 
would be to ‘keep the conversation going’ in the expectation that an improved 
relationship would contribute to the longer-term resolution of structural and systemic 
issues (personal communication, 14 December 2010a): 
Unless you keep the conversation going, the actions that you want to 
happen are not going to happen at all – it will stop, and that’s where the 
will sort of breaks down (personal communication, 14 December 2010a). 
On 1 August 2011, the Kia Tūtahi Standing Together Relationship Accord (the Accord) 
was signed on behalf of the government by the Prime Minister, the Minister for the 
Community and Voluntary Sector and the Associate Minister for the Community and 
Voluntary Sector at a ceremony in the Grand Hall of the New Zealand Parliament. At 
the ceremony a number of government officials endorsed the Accord and persons from 
‘communities’ were invited to sign (OCVS, 2012b). The Accord adopted an ‘opting-in’ 
mechanism – such as that used for the Australian National Compact – whereby non-
government signatories could elect to ‘sign-on’ to the agreement, thereby signalling 
their endorsement.  
It was expected that the Chief Executives of government entities would also ‘sign-on’ to 
the Accord and the heads of Crown Entities and State Owned Corporations would be 
‘encouraged to do so’ (OCVS, 2011). The expectation that agency heads will sign-on to 
the Accord is an important point of difference between it and the SOGI, which had no 
similar mechanism. A senior official remarked: 
As soon as the government adopts [the Accord], it is a public policy and 
as a public servant I am bound to public policy. Well, it’s not going to be 
enough if we want this to work for just the Minister to adopt and sign it. I 
expect my Chief Executive to sign it, because why wouldn’t he want his 
department to engage to treat with people in this way? Now, if he’s not 
prepared to sign up to it, there’s a problem. And then he needs to drive it 
down through the organisation saying, ‘we treat with one another in this 
organisation this way, we’re also treating with members of the New 
Zealand public in our functions … all the time, and this is how we treat 
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with the public.’ And I would be gob-smacked if any of the people who 
worked with me seriously didn’t believe this is the way they ought to go 
about their daily work (personal communication, 15 December 2010). 
A Kia Tūtahi Reference Group comprised of nine community and government members 
was established to guide implementation of the Accord. The reference group, which 
held its first meeting in March 2012, will provide advice on Accord communications 
and document examples of good practice (OCVS, 2011).  
Implications 
The decision to frame the Accord as a covenant between the government and 
‘communities’ is, in part, a reflection of New Zealand’s distinctive political culture in 
which central government is dominant and national umbrella organisations are 
relatively weak. This is not to suggest that there is not a vibrant civil society sector in 
New Zealand. However, it appears that many NFP organisations consider that they have 
a direct relationship with central government unmediated by peak organisations 
purporting to represent the collective views and positions of the sector. This is both a 
legacy of New Zealand’s bold experiment with orthodox principal-agent contracting 
and a reflection of the practical reality of the ‘coalface’ relationships between civil 
society actors and central government functionaries in regions and local communities. 
It was clear throughout the consultation period that key national umbrella organisations 
had no great love for this the proposed framework. Certainly, the form and direction 
taken by the agreement-making process departed significantly from what was envisaged 
by previous cross-sector working groups. It has been suggested that national umbrella 
organisations wanted an agreement that would set out an implementation framework in 
the form of an action plan to resolve a checklist of historical grievances in a way that 
binds ministers and the government (personal communication, 15 December 2010). 
Indeed, one representative of a national umbrella organisation said that a ‘good 
relationship agreement’ could enable organisations to engage constructively with 
government about issues such as three year contracts, adding that the relationship 
agreement on the table was ‘a nothing’ (personal communication, 13 December 2010a). 
Another suggested that the Accord invoked a ‘romantic notion of working for the social 
good, with no idea how to do it’ (personal communication, 13 December 2010a). 
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Government officials contend that the Accord was never intended to serve as a vehicle 
for systemic and structural reform. Rather, its purpose is expressed in aspirational 
terms: 
Communities and government are increasingly working together to 
navigate the cultural, social, environmental and economic challenges for 
our society. In this context, the Relationship Accord supports the building 
of strong relationships between communities and government, with 
benefits accessible to all, so that we can jointly achieve our vision 
(OCVS, 2012a). 
By invoking principles for individual and collective conduct that transcend the 
government-NFP sector relationship the Accord goes beyond the narrow instrumentalist 
aims of relationship frameworks in other jurisdictions. Yet, the aspirational terms in 
which it is expressed might render it ineffective as a policy lever.  
Although the 2001 SoGI and the 2011 Relationship Accord are roughly similar in length 
(the Accord is about 100 words longer than the SoGI), if anything, the Accord is 
expressed at an even greater level of generality (see Appendix 7, Figures A7.3 and 
A7.4). In a submission on a draft of the Accord (then referred to as a relationship 
agreement), Nowland-Foreman offered the following comment: 
The 2001 Statement was already at a relatively high level of 
generalisation on these commitments, allocating just a brief summary 
paragraph to each, and needed to be put into more specific and hence 
accountable commitments. However, in most cases they disappear, or (at 
best) are reduced to even more vague sentences in the Draft Relationship 
Agreement (Nowland-Foreman, 2010). 
Observing that the draft ‘notably fails to take up any of the 15 recommendations from 
the 2009 Review [by ANGOA]’, Nowland-Foreman concluded that ‘we are no further 
forward than the 2001 Statement’ (Nowland-Foreman, 2010). 
The core differences between the two documents are subtle. As might be expected, the 
SoGI outlines a communitarian project in which government, community, voluntary and 
Iwi/Māori organisations work together to achieve shared goals. In contrast the Accord 
does not even use the words ‘partner’ or ‘partnership’. Although the Accord does talk of 
government and communities working together to navigate cultural, social, 
environmental and economic challenges, overall it tends to reinforce the hegemony of 
government.  
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Whereas the SoGI recognises community sector leadership, the Accord de-emphasises 
community and voluntary sector organisations whilst elevating the value of voluntary 
effort. The SoGI contains broad commitments to achieve change in areas such as the 
culture of government, a whole-of-government approach, participation in decision-
making, funding and building sector capacity. Apart from a undertaking to ‘jointly 
resolve longstanding matters of concern, such as, participation in decision-making 
around policy and service delivery issues, and funding arrangements’ the Accord sets 
out no priorities for action. Neither document makes any commitment to a process for 
implementation or on-going stewardship/governance of the framework. The Accord 
contains undertakings to be respectful and honest, act in good faith, work cooperatively 
and pursue good practices, and in this respect it more resembles a guide for good 
manners than a bilateral (or multilateral) agreement. 
The SoGI was an unapologetically unilateral document intended to bind the government 
to a set of propositions about how it ought to conduct a constructive relationship with 
the sector. The Accord, on the other hand, emphasises reciprocity and mutuality by 
inviting any party perceiving themselves to be a stakeholder in a shared endeavour with 
government to ‘sign-on’. However, as of 1 May 2012, only 82 individuals and 
representatives of organisations had signed the Accord. In addition, 16 officials and two 
members of Parliament (apart from the Prime Minister and portfolio Ministers) had 
endorsed the Accord as of 16 December 2011. This does not suggest that the Accord 
has been enthusiastically embraced. 
According to Nowland-Foreman (2010), it is ‘unclear who “the Communities of 
Aotearoa New Zealand” are and how they could ever commit themselves to any 
Agreement.’ He goes on to say: 
Legally the relationship between a government and its people might be 
described as its Basic Law or Constitution (which this document plainly is 
not). Some governments, including of note governments in the UK which 
have separate and high profile compacts with the sector, have also 
developed different versions of (so called) Citizens’ Charters – especially 
to describe the rights and obligations of people as ‘consumers’ of public 
services. However, this document also plainly does not attempt to outline 
anything like a (so called) Citizens’ Charter. Indeed, the particular 
principles outlined in the Draft Relationship Agreement plainly, 
overwhelmingly only make sense as a part of some organised activity, 
most commonly by organisations such as those that make up the Tangata 
Whenua, Community and Voluntary Sector, rather than with passive 
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collections of people who happen to share a common locality, or other 
affiliation but have not organised to work together. While there are 
various terms and ways to describe the Sector, this is not an excuse for 
ignoring the key place of the Sector as a party to such an Agreement 
(Nowland-Foreman, 2010). 
Despite a degree of preoccupation with historic grievances, representatives of national 
umbrella organisations are capable of looking beyond the Accord to the bigger picture. 
For example, one interviewee offered the following view:  
... negotiating the agreement is more important than the agreement … 
This is a process – the Relationship Agreement isn’t actually all that 
important – because in the process we have made huge gains … So you 
can just keep this bloody thing going, you don’t need an end-point 
because relationships are improving (personal communication, 13 
December 2010a). 
These sentiments echo a widely shared view that the need for a formal relationship 
framework has been gradually overtaken by real improvements in the government-
sector relationship (personal communication, 13 December 2010a). 
Meanwhile the New Zealand Labour Party is in the process of formalising its preferred 
approach to cross-sector working ahead of the 2014 general election. The Party’s draft 
2012 policy platform revisits the Clark Labour government’s ‘commitment to a new 
way of working with communities based in partnership in social development’ through 
which ‘[n]ew relationships, some restored trust, and a deeper understanding of 
government and community roles did emerge’ (New Zealand Labour Party, 2012:36). 
However, it also acknowledges that ‘overall the partnerships didn’t achieve the kinds of 
results they might have’ and that ‘[f] or all this, community and voluntary sector and 
government relationships remain fragmented’ (New Zealand Labour Party, 2012:36). 
Elsewhere in its draft platform, Labour commits to: 
… developing a comprehensive ‘Government and Community 
Partnership Charter’ to inform future decisions about how to ensure 
effective and accountable government, based on public participation and 
new forms of engagement. We acknowledge that the changes this will 
require will be challenging to some parts of government, and to the 
existing operational approach of the public sector (New Zealand Labour 
Party, 2012:53). 
Despite being naturally aligned on many policy matters, the Labour Party and the sector 
are sometimes uncomfortable bedfellows. One sector representative said that Labour 
perceives itself as having strong historical roots in civil society (e.g. through the trade 
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unions and the community sector). It was suggested that a tendency towards ‘knowing it 
all already’, coupled with Labour’s more ‘centrist’ leanings, can adversely affect the 
quality of the relationship. Said one representative of a national umbrella group: 
The Labour Party here thinks they understand and have more alliances 
with third sector organisations than does the National Party ... and the 
difficulty there is that it can be more difficult to deal with your friends 
(personal communication, 13 December 2010a). 
Another said: 
They [Labour] think they know us … With Labour we do get the, sort of, 
uh, ‘we can do it all from the centre’ stuff, and with Nats we get the sort 
of language of ‘personal responsibility’, which is basically, ‘you tell us 
what you’re trying to achieve and we’ll see how we can work together.’ 
(personal communication, 13 December 2010a). 
For example, one senior representative of a national umbrella organisation recounted an 
occasion when the (then) newly appointed Minister for Social Development, National 
Party MP Paula Bennett, called together a select group of representatives from national 
organisations to offer ideas about how best to allocate unspent monies associated with 
the former government’s Pathway to Partnership program. This kind of ad hoc 
consultation had never occurred before and, because it proved successful, the following 
year the Minister called together an expanded group of community sector 
representatives to provide input into priority-setting: 
It’s unheard of! Never happened before! Never happened with Labour 
who’s supposed to be a friend to us! ... It’s just something that’s 
happening with this government that’s never happened with any 
government before, where the sector and the Minister have actually been 
in very close and cordial contact ... So this is a very new side to 
relationships with government and it’s bizarre that it’s happening with a 
National government!’ (personal communication, 13 December 2011). 
Conclusion 
It is clear that by the end of the 1990s the NFP sector and the opposition Labour Party 
were in broad agreement that the relationship between the sector and government had 
become dysfunctional and concurred that the solution to the problem lay in a new and 
revitalised settlement.  
The Clark Labour government took immediate steps to give effect to its commitments 
around addressing the problems with the relationship, including the creation of a new 
Ministry for the Community and Voluntary Sector. In a speech to the Auckland 
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Chamber of Commerce in June 2000, then Prime Minister Helen Clark made the 
following proclamation:  
... ours [is] a classic Third Way government – committed to a market 
economy, but not to a market society. New Zealand is, after all, a nation, 
not just an economy. And advanced nations must address broader hopes 
and aspirations for inclusion, participation, empowerment, fairness, 
opportunity, security, and identity – as we are doing (Clark, 2000). 
The inaugural minister for the voluntary and community sector, Steve Maharey had 
strong Blairite convictions, and saw a compact with the community and voluntary sector 
along the lines of the UK compacts as both a ready solution and an important political 
deliverable in the first term of the Labour/Alliance government.  
However, it emerged through the consultation processes initiated by the government 
that the sector and government diverged around the model and the scope of the 
settlement. The NFP sector – whose views were distilled through two wide-ranging 
working groups over many months – also wanted a settlement, but drew two important 
conclusions that placed a compact out of immediate reach: first, it was concluded that 
the NFP sector in New Zealand was not sufficiently developed to enter into a compact 
on equal terms with government; and second, that any settlement with the NFP sector 
must occur as part of a broader settlement with Iwi/Māori and would entail a long-term 
program culminating in profound institutional reform. The previous Labour government 
chose not to conflate a compact with treaty issues and focussed instead on practical and 
practicable measures affecting the NFP sector.  
It would be left to a centre-right government to reinvigorate progress towards a formal 
relationship framework based on foundations laid over a number of years by previous 
Labour-led governments. Along the way, Labour’s  aspirational ‘Third Way’ rhetoric 
has given way to an emphasis on pragmatism (although it must also be said that the 
Accord’s evocations of community are infused with a kind of conservative 
romanticism). 
Ironically, it was the election of the National-led government that created the policy 
window that allowed a framework document to achieve policy salience.  As the Deputy 
Leader of the Māori Party and a signatory to a Confidence and Supply Agreement with 
the government, Tariana Turia was in a unique position to influence the policy agenda 
of the National-led government. Credited as the driving force behind the Relationship 
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Accord, Turia seized the opportunity to finish the job begun when she held the same 
portfolio in the Clark Labour government (Māori Party, 2008). 
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Chapter Nine – Discussion and conclusions 
This dissertation has examined the phenomenon of cross-sector policy frameworks in 
the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. The ‘English’ Compact and 
the Canadian Accord have both been subject to extensive scholarly analysis by policy 
researchers such as Brock (2004b, a), Elson (2006, 2007, 2009, 2012), Phillips (2003a), 
Kendall (2003, 2009, 2010), Taylor (2012b), Zimmeck and Rochester (2011, 2011), and 
many others.  
Relatively little has been written to date about the Australian National Compact 
(Butcher, 2011, Casey, 2011b, Butcher, 2012, Butcher et al., 2012) and although there 
is a small scholarly literature devoted to government-NFP sector relations in New 
Zealand (Nowland-Foreman, 1997), thus far it appears scholarly analyses of that 
country’s Kia Tūtahi Relationship Accord have not been undertaken.  
To date, only a few researchers have given any attention to comparative studies of 
cross-sector policy frameworks (Bullain and Toftisova, 2005, Toftisova, 2005, 
Murdock, 2006, White, 2006, Elson, 2009, Casey et al., 2010, Casey, 2011b, Laforest 
and Acheson, 2012). Similarly, there have been few studies of the diffusion of 
frameworks from Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions to non-Anglo-Saxon countries (Johansson 
and Johansson, 2012, Reuter et al., 2012).  
Even less scholarly attention consideration has been given to comparative accounts of 
cross-sector policy frameworks the United Kingdom’s devolved ‘countries’ of Scotland 
or Wales or the province of Northern Ireland (Morison, 2000, 2001, Murdock, 2005, 
Acheson et al., 2006, 2007, Acheson, 2009, Alcock, 2009, 2010a, 2012). Finally, there 
have been very few studies of sub-national cross-sector policy frameworks in 
federations such as Canada (Carter and Speevak Sladowski, 2008, Campbell and 
Speevak Sladowski, 2009, Elson, 2010, 2011a, 2012) and Australia (Butcher, 2006, 
Baulderstone, 2008, Casey et al., 2008a, Casey et al., 2008c, Dalton et al., 2008, Edgar 
and Lockie, 2010, Butcher et al., 2012). 
The research set out in this dissertation, therefore, marks an important advance on 
scholarship on the subject both in terms of coverage (by presenting comprehensive 
analyses of cross-sector policy frameworks in 15 separate jurisdictions), topicality (in 
that it addresses recent and in some cases ‘live’ policy developments), and in the case of 
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Australian and New Zealand frameworks, analytical depth (by combining extensive 
documentary research with in-depth interviews with elite policy actors engaged in the 
development and implementation of cross-sector policy frameworks). 
The research framework 
This study employed the ‘process streams’ model articulated by Kingdon (1995) as a 
heuristic framework through which the processes of agenda setting at work in the 
formulation of cross-sector policy frameworks (such as compacts) might be understood. 
Kingdon’s model hypothesises the existence of three nominally independent process 
streams, a problem stream, a policy stream and a politics stream. Under certain 
circumstances, the three streams converge and create a time-limited ‘policy window’ 
that can allow particular problems and preferred solutions to those problems to be 
elevated onto the formal policy agenda.  
Specifically, the research addressed the following:  
• In the Problem stream the thesis examined those aspects of the relationship between 
government and the NFP sector acknowledged by either sector as being problems 
requiring a policy response.  
• In the Policy Stream the thesis considered how it was that policy actors and policy 
communities converged on a formal cross-sector policy framework as a preferred 
policy response and to what extent influential policy actors were instrumental in 
elevating awareness of the problems affecting the government/NFP sector 
relationship and the preferred policy response. 
• In the Politics stream the thesis investigated the prevailing political factors that 
allowed for the problems and preferred policy response to be elevated to the formal 
policy agenda and/or conversely, the political factors that have allowed particular 
policy responses to lose policy salience.  
In order to contextualise the decisions taken and pursuant actions in each jurisdiction 
the thesis also took the following matters into consideration: 
• The history of government/NFP sector relations and the key policy drivers/policy 
constraints affecting the choices available to and made by state and non-state policy 
actors. 
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• The nature of policy frameworks that have existed in the past, exist now, or are being 
developed for the purpose of governing the relationship between government and the 
NFP sector. 
• The broader institutional and political context within which policy decisions 
affecting the government/NFP sector relationship have been/are being played out, 
including consideration of factors such as capacity constraints, the economic 
environment, and/or the electoral cycle. 
The case for process streams analysis 
Kingdon’s (1995) process streams model offers a useful lens through which to view 
compacts and other forms of cross-sector policy frameworks. Indeed a number of 
scholars with a strong research profile on the subject of cross-sector policy frameworks 
have used Kingdon’s model to explain how and why compacts have emerged in the UK 
and Canada (Kendall, 2003, Phillips, 2003a, Brock, 2008, Elson, 2011a). 
It was not, however, the object of this dissertation to ‘prove’ Kingdon’s process streams 
model. Rather, the model was employed as a means for coherently structuring the 
narrative in such a way that comparisons might be drawn between the cases. In this the 
process streams model has proved to be useful. Of course other theoretical frameworks 
could have been employed.  
For example the policy stages heuristic model as described by Sabatier et al. (2007) 
would have us examine the adoption of cross-sector policy frameworks in terms of a 
series of logical stages. However, such a linear heuristic model would not adequately 
capture the ‘messiness’ of the policy and political environments in which the 
frameworks under study came into being.  
On the other hand, the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) developed by Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith (Sabatier, 1988, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) might have allowed 
for richer and more explicit contextualisation at a high level of granularity. However, 
high granularity comes at a high cost: therefore, ACF was considered to be 
impracticable for a multi-case study.  
Utility of the process streams model 
The process streams model has proved to be useful as a means to explain retrospectively 
why and how particular policy events came about. Its selection as the primary analytical 
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framework for this study was based on fairly utilitarian considerations. Kingdon’s 
model is not overly prescriptive and allows the researcher considerable latitude to 
triangulate the analysis with other, complementary analytical approaches. It could be 
argued that Kingdon intended the process streams model to allow the researcher to see 
the world as it is, rather than how it ought to be.172  
The process streams approach also allows the researcher to obtain a ‘helicopter view’ of 
the policy landscape and this in turn supports the broad-brush comparison of multiple 
jurisdictions intended by this dissertation. The fact that other researchers in this field 
have also used process streams as a means of framing their analysis offers analytical 
continuity when comparing those jurisdictions in which original empirical work has 
been undertaken with those overseas examples where fieldwork was not possible.  
Limitations of the process streams model 
The process streams model assists the researcher to ‘unpack’ the social, political and 
policy dynamics that combine to predispose decision-makers to entertain the notion of 
formal cross-sector policy frameworks and is capable of sensitising the researcher to the 
kinds of circumstances or events that might cause a policy to lose its high agenda status. 
Still, it must be acknowledged that even thoroughly laudable policies can lose political 
salience. At best the process streams model might assist the researcher to speculate 
about the likely trajectory of policy in the event of a major change in the political 
environment, such as a change in leadership or a change of government, but it is not 
sufficiently systematic to be used predictively.  
This points to one of the frequent criticisms of the process streams approach: that it a 
good predictor only of past events (and is therefore always true). This observation does 
not detract from the utility of the process streams model as a tool for historical analysis. 
Historians of any stripe need a conceptual framework for the purposes of ordering past 
events and in this regard Kingdon’s framework is particularly useful. However, other 
tools are required to understand the success or failure of policy implementation, or to 
evaluate the effectiveness or otherwise of implementation. 
Two research questions 
This study sought answers to two broad research questions (RQs) for each jurisdiction 
studied: 
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RQ1.  How and why did the policy framework for cross-sector cooperation come into 
being?  
RQ2. How were the policy frameworks implemented; what issues arose from the 
implementation process (e.g. was it done well or poorly), and what were the 
observed impacts (if any) of the frameworks (e.g. to what extent were the stated 
policy objectives fulfilled)?  
RQ1 – Summary of key observations 
The problem stream 
First, in the problem stream, in Australia and elsewhere a broad consensus has emerged 
among policy practitioners and researchers about the range of tensions, contradictions 
and externalities associated with the ‘contract state’. These include failures to fund the 
full cost of service delivery, burdensome reporting and compliance requirements, and 
the substitution of competitive behaviours for collegiality among NFP service providers. 
From the mid-1990s governments in Anglo-Saxon countries have been attracted to 
neoliberal approaches to governance (embodied in New Public Management or NPM) 
that involved the use of market mechanisms for the purpose of leveraging greater 
economic and technical efficiency, choice, responsiveness and innovation in the 
delivery of selected mandated public services. Competitive tendering and contracting 
with non-state providers was the primary mechanism for the realisation of these aims. 
However, the absence of mature markets in many of the human services industries 
subject to outsourcing, the presence of substantial capacity deficits amongst potential 
non-state providers, and the low levels of economic return available to for-profit 
enterprises in these industries saw governments turn mainly to NFP providers.  
Public sector commissioners, seeking to obtain the best possible return on social 
investment and concerned to provide assurance to governments about the expenditure of 
public monies, were inclined initially to impose restrictive provisions and onerous 
compliance requirements on NFP service providers. Micro-management by public 
sector contract managers had the effect of eroding sector capacity and capability whilst 
the competitive pressures of contracting created divisions amongst NFP sector 
providers, contributed to mission-drift and acted to dilute social capital.  
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Moreover, adherence by governments to classical principal-agent contracting served to 
devalue the role of NFP organisations as civil society actors and as sources of policy 
advice and legitimacy. As the public sector ‘hollowed’ and as NFP providers’ reliance 
on contract funding grew the relationship between the two became one of mutual 
dependence. The relationship was also beset with tensions, especially around the 
contracting practices of government. By the late 1990s the NFP sectors across the 
Anglo-Saxon world were looking for a new settlement with governments that would 
give greater emphasis to partnership and place the relationship on a more equal footing 
(whilst accepting a fundamentally asymmetric relationship in terms of financial and 
political power).  
The policy stream 
Second, in the policy stream, since 1998 energetic policy discourses have emerged 
within various policy communities concerned with ‘cross-cutting’ or ‘joined-up’ policy 
and implementation, social capital, public value, co-production, boundary-spanning, 
network and relational governance, and so on. Policy entrepreneurs within these same 
policy communities have at various times promoted compacts or similar instruments as 
a means to realise ‘cross-cutting’ policy aims. 
In the UK a number of ‘think tanks’ emerged in the 1990s from the left of political and 
policy spectrum to engage with the then Labour Opposition around alternative 
formulations that would give assign a greater role to civil society organisations as a 
source of knowledge and advice in framing and delivering social policy. ‘Think tanks’ 
such as Centris and Demos were influential contributors to a policy discourse that 
provided an intellectual basis for the ‘Third Way’.  
However, by far the most influential policy community in the UK context was the 
National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) which established the ‘Deakin’ 
Commission whose 1996 report (Deakin, 1996) first mooted the establishment of a 
concordat with government. Important too was the part played by a key policy 
entrepreneur, Labour MP Alun Michael, who with Nicholas Deakin crafted what would 
become a policy commitment by Blair’s ‘New Labour’ to a compact with the voluntary 
and community sector in England. 
A coalition of NFP sector interests similar in scope and function to the NCVO emerged 
in Canada: like the NCVO, the Voluntary Sector Roundtable (VSR) established the 
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Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector. Chaired by a former 
national leader of the centre-left New Democratic Party, Ed Broadbent, the panel’s ain 
was to formulate recommendations ‘to enhance the effectiveness and credibility of the 
voluntary sector in its on-going role of strengthening civil society’ (PAGVS, 1999). 
Noting developments in the UK, the panel recommended the investigation of compacts 
between federal and provincial governments and Canada’s NFP sector. 
At the sub-national level, compacts bequeathed by the UK central government to the 
newly devolved constituent jurisdictions of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
provided a platform for shaping cross-sector policy frameworks consistent with the 
social, political and ‘nationalistic’ aspirations of those communities. In this regard, the 
NCVO’s sister organisations, the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations 
(SCVO), the Wales Council for Voluntary Action (WCVA) and the Northern Ireland 
Council for Voluntary Action (NICVA) have each played an important role as the voice 
of the NFP sector – engaging as the primary NFP sector interlocutors with the fledgling 
administrations in order to establish new settlements that in some respects transcend the 
intentions of the original compacts framed by the former Scottish, Welsh and Northern 
Ireland Offices. 
So too, the Australian counterparts of these organisations have played a major role in 
helping to shepherd the policy discourse around cross-sector policy frameworks. 
Nationally, the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) has traditionally been at 
the frontline of social policy debate – advancing a sector view (especially those parts of 
the sector concerned with social welfare) and advocating on behalf of individuals and 
communities experiencing social disadvantage. ACOSS sits at the apex of a wider 
coalition of representative organisations. Separately constituted councils of social 
service (COSS) fulfil a similar mission to that of ACOSS in each state and territory. The 
COSS network is an important clearinghouse of sector viewpoints, praxis knowledge 
and policy research. And it has been the COSSs that have broken trail for the national 
government by brokering cross-sector policy frameworks with sub-national 
governments. 
In New Zealand a contrasting situation is observed in which national peak bodies – 
including the New Zealand Council of Social Service (NZCOSS) have considerably less 
capacity and ultimately less sway with the national government. In that country the path 
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towards a cross-sector policy framework and a framework document has taken a far 
more circuitous route on a journey spanning over a decade. There the ability of national 
peak organisations to influence the form and content of the framework has been limited. 
The politics stream 
Third, in the politics stream, it is clear that the right political conditions needed to exist 
in order for cross-sector frameworks to enter onto the public policy agenda in any given 
jurisdiction. Yes, there was a broad consensus in the NFP sector and within research 
communities – and even within parts of government – that the application of principal-
agent contracting had rendered the government-sector relationship problematic and 
served to compromise the very qualities of nimbleness, innovativeness and 
responsiveness that commended the NFP sector as an appropriate partner for 
government in the business of service delivery. And yes, awareness of cross-sector 
policy frameworks – including relationship framework agreements – had by the early 
2000s diffused transnationally via NFP policy communities and were being actively 
promoted as a preferred response to the range of problems troubling the relationship. 
However, developments in the problem stream and in the policy stream were not alone 
sufficient to elevate a compact to the public policy agenda – or, having got it onto the 
agenda, keep it there.  
The ‘politics’ have to be ‘right’ for a compact – or any other policy proposal – to be 
accorded high agenda status. In Kingdon’s ‘policy primeval soup’ some ideas float 
briefly to the surface only to sink from view, others come around again and again, and 
some survive and prosper (Kingdon, 1995). Momentous political change – such as the 
accession of New Labour in the UK, the Clark Labour government in New Zealand and 
the Rudd Labor government in Australia – can allow the opening of a ‘window’ through 
which a policy proposal can enter onto the formal policy agenda. 
‘Policy windows’ can close again and thereby preclude proposals from being taken up. 
Such was the case in New Zealand when the NFP sector in that country concluded that 
the time was not right for a compact. Once closed, it took another decade for the policy 
window to re-open. Sometimes policy windows do not arise simply because the 
proposals do not generate sufficient political capital for incumbent governments. And 
sometimes other emergent issues ‘push’ proposals down, or off the policy agenda, or the 
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policy framework is jettisoned by an incoming government (as appears to have occurred 
in Queensland with the 2012 election of the Newman LNP government). 
Since the early 1990s the approach to governance and public administration by centre-
right and centre-left political parties throughout the Anglo-Saxon world has been 
influenced by the tenets of New Public Management. In Australia, for example, it is 
often observed that there is ‘barely a cigarette paper’s width of distance’ between the 
core policies of the two major parties. Even so, the idea of a compact resonated with the 
social democratic and corporatist traditions of centre-left parties such as the British and 
New Zealand Labour Parties and the Australian Labor Party. Compacts became 
embedded in the communitarian rhetoric of joined-up-government, social inclusion and 
community engagement in order to provide a clear point of policy differentiation with 
the ‘market fundamentalism’ of centre-right and conservative parties (Kendall, 2003, 
Rudd, 2009). 
Just as in the UK a fruitful dialogue did not exist between the NFP sector and the 
conservative governments led by Thatcher and Major, the relationship between the parts 
of the sector and Australia’s last Coalition government was fraught with tensions – 
especially around the government’s contracting practices. And just as the Blair Labour 
government made a compact with the NFP sector a key element of its broader social 
policy agenda, so too the in-coming Australian Labor government led by Kevin Rudd 
undertook to pursue a compact as an important cornerstone of a comprehensive NFP 
reform agenda. There is undoubtedly an element of imitation in the rush of centre-left 
governments abroad to emulate that first ‘English’ compact. There is also little doubt 
that in considering formal framework agreements governments were trying to formulate 
a policy response to an increasingly problematic relationship with parts of the NFP 
sector upon which they were dependent, as well as a political response to voices in the 
NFP sector calling for a new settlement with government.  
However, it would be wrong to assume that a change from a centre-left to a centre-right 
administration axiomatically means reversion to the strict application of the neoliberal 
policy toolkit that marked conservative administrations in the last decade of the 20th 
century and the first decade of the 21st. Societies change over time and so do political 
parties. Thus the British Conservative Party re-wrote and adapted the Compact to fit 
with its ‘Big Society’ agenda; New Zealand’s National Party drove the formalisation of 
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that country’s Relationship Accord, in the process underscoring the government’s 
commitment to encouraging individuals, families and communities to help themselves; 
and the Liberal-led government of Western Australia, recognising its dependence on 
NFP service providers, worked closely with the sector on a new policy framework and 
financial package for sector development. In other jurisdictions such as Canada and 
Queensland, the transition to conservative administrations saw the abandonment of 
frameworks strongly associated with an out-going regime. 
Policy entrepreneurs 
Policy entrepreneurs are persons capable of exploiting political junctures in order to 
place their pet solutions on the formal policy agenda. It has been possible to identify a 
few high profile individuals are attributed with having exercised policy 
‘entrepreneurship’ in relation to various cross-sector policy frameworks. In the UK 
Nicholas Deakin and Alun Michael stand out; in Canada, the so-called Broadbent Panel 
helped contributed to the creation of a platform for influential policy actors in the NFP 
sector and in the federal public service (Floyd, 2009, Johnston, 2013); in Australia, 
Senator Ursula Stephens carried the compact agenda on behalf of the Rudd Labor 
government. In New Zealand Steve Maharey – New Zealand Labour’s chief proponent 
for ‘Third Way politics’ – tried (but failed) to achieve a compact. In the states and 
territories influential non-state actors such as Gary Moore (New South Wales) and Peter 
Shergold (Western Australia) assisted in elevating formal relationship frameworks to 
the policy agenda. In some cases these frameworks were supported and championed by 
first ministers such as Jon Stanhope in the Australian Capital Territory, Anna Bligh in 
Queensland or Colin Barnett in Western Australia. 
In most jurisdictions however, the precise role played by policy entrepreneurs is harder 
to fathom and is complicated by the fact that a number of the policy frameworks under 
consideration have been in place for a number of years. The turn-over of personnel in 
both the public and NFP sectors coupled with the passage of time make it difficult in all 
cases to identify particular individuals within each of the jurisdictions under study who, 
acting as policy entrepreneurs, were instrumental in mobilising support within the NFP 
sector.  
Although the phrase ‘policy entrepreneur’ conjures impressions of charismatic, 
maverick individuals deftly using their connections, policy knowledge and political 
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nous to exploit opportunities in the policy market place, the reality is likely to be far 
more prosaic. In most cases cross-sector policy frameworks appear to be the work of 
many hands and it appears that support for cross-sector policy frameworks has built 
almost organically via the gradual accretion of knowledge about frameworks in other 
jurisdictions.  
Whether cross-sector frameworks are presented in a positive or negative light can be 
subject to the influence of persons in either sector who are strategically positioned to 
facilitate flows of information. In Tasmania, for example, interviewees attributed earlier 
bureaucratic support for a compact and for the establishment of an office for the 
community sector to the influence of staff recently recruited from the Victorian public 
service by the Department of Health and Human Services. Interviewees suggested that 
these persons brought with them policy ideas then current in Victoria and were in a 
position to introduce those ideas into the policy stream.173 When they moved on, support 
for the policy ideas waned (the Office for the Community Sector was disestablished 
after only a year in operation) only to re-build a few years later. 
As attractive as the idea of policy entrepreneurs is for what it adds to the policy 
narrative, it is perhaps advisable not to place too great an emphasis on the roles played 
by high profile individuals. There is the risk that the contribution of particular 
individuals might be aggrandized and amplified in the memories of participants in the 
policy process – especially for those ‘larger than life’ individuals. There is after all a 
collective aspect to decision-making in the NFP sector and in government: consensus 
around particular policy preferences can build slowly through discussion and debate in a 
gradual process of convergence. Policy entrepreneurs can help to steer the discourse and 
exert influence on the policy agenda, but they are not the whole story. 
Where policy entrepreneurs have been instrumental in building institutional support for 
formal cross-sector relationship frameworks they might also become overly-identified 
with the policy. To the extent that policy entrepreneurs also become the ‘champion-in-
chief’ for the policy (once adopted), its fortunes are contingent upon what they do next. 
It is in the nature of policy entrepreneurs to be intellectually restless. Should they ‘move 
on’ to other things before the framework is institutionally embedded its high agenda 
status might be threatened. Examples include the New South Wales compact that lost 
policy salience following the resignation of Premier Bob Carr, or the Western 
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Australian Industry Strategy, which languished in the policy doldrums following the 
departure of Premier Geoff Gallop. 
RQ2 – Summary of key observations 
Policy-makers in various jurisdictions have looked to cross-sector policy frameworks as 
a means to supplant the adversarial approach so often associated with contractual 
governance with a ‘cooperative capacity-building approach’ (Rawsthorne and Shaver, 
2008:152-153). A decade after the introduction of the English Compact, Carter and 
Speevak Sladowski declared that formal deliberate relationships between government 
and the NFP sector had ‘become a policy tool of choice’, although they might be 
pursued ‘for different reasons and in different contexts’ (2008:7).  
The success of formal cross-sector policy frameworks rests on their implementation. As 
early as 2005, after reviewing initiatives in the UK, Canada, Croatia, Estonia, Denmark, 
France and Hungary, Toftisova concluded that cross-sector policy frameworks might be 
easier to draft than they are to implement: 
The initial period of enthusiasm following the adoption of a compact 
often gives way to difficulties in implementation that far exceed the 
problems associated with preparation and signing of the policy document 
itself (Toftisova, 2005:20). 
However, Toftisova also noted that the ‘history of compacts is too brief to provide a 
complete picture of a good, effectively implemented compact’ (Toftisova, 2005:12). 
Even with this caveat in mind, Toftisova pointed to the beginnings of a new focus on 
the practical effects of compacts: 
Seven years after the first compacts, the focus has changed. It is no longer 
on compact initiatives themselves, although several countries are starting 
negotiations or preparing draft documents. Rather, what deserves 
particular attention today is the effect of compacts. Did they achieve the 
intended outcomes, and, if so, how? What facilitated that process? What 
hampered or obstructed it, and how can these challenges be overcome? 
(Toftisova, 2005:12). 
The cases examined for this study support the contention that the formal cross-sector 
policy framework is a policy tool of choice for governments seeking to resolve long-
standing tensions in their relationship with the NFP sector. However, despite the 
number of cross-sector policy frameworks that have existed there is no coherent or 
systematic documentation of better practice to guide compact design and 
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implementation apart from a handful of papers in the third sector literature (Liiv, 2001, 
Bullain and Toftisova, 2005, Toftisova, 2005, Zimmeck et al., 2011).  
For the most part, policy-makers have been obliged to rely on mostly anecdotal 
accounts set out in the grey literature (such as non-peer reviewed commissioned reports 
that often re-cycle similarly anecdotal accounts contained in other reports) or the first-
hand accounts of policy actors from other jurisdictions (when they bother to ask). 
Although the format and the text of framework documents are generally consistent 
across most jurisdictions, the cases strongly suggest that implementation processes and 
governance arrangements are largely bespoke.  
National framework documents 
The English Compact was for many years regarded as the ‘gold standard’ in compact 
design and implementation (Casey et al., 2008b, Edgar and Lockie, 2010, Johnston and 
Stapleton, 2010). Despite early enthusiasm – especially in overseas jurisdictions like 
Canada (Elson, 2006, 2007) and Australia (Lyons, 2002, 2003) whose NFP sectors 
looked on with envy – aspects of compact implementation were found wanting by a 
number of reviews (Treasury, 2002, House of Commons Public Administration Select 
Committee, 2008a, Zimmeck et al., 2011, NAO, 2012).  
The English Compact is, if nothing else, a study in durability (not immutability). By the 
time Labour lost government in 2010 the English Compact had been thoroughly 
decontested in policy terms (Kendall, 2010, Alcock and Kendall, 2011) and had become 
sufficiently institutionally embedded that the incoming Conservative-led government 
vowed to keep it (Conservative Party, 2008). In a November 2012 blog, James Allen, 
the former head of Compact Voice – the organisation representing the voluntary sector 
on the Compact – expressed his frustration with ‘reading with depressing regularity 
about the Compact’s demise’ (Allen, 2012). ‘The Compact’, he said, ‘is not perfect’: 
Nor is it the complete solution or a panacea to the sector’s woes. What it 
is, however, is a tangible, useful, practical tool. It can act as a means of 
leverage for the sector when it’s used well, but a constant drip of stories 
about its death, in the face of considerable evidence to the contrary, 
makes things harder for our sector and not easier (Allen, 2012). 
Allen went on to say: 
Locally, of course it is a mixed picture. It’s always been a mixed picture 
and some areas implement and embed the Compact in decision making 
far better than others. Where it is most successful, this is down to 
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dedicated, tireless work. That hard work is a lot harder, incidentally, than 
climbing aboard the old hobby horse to tweet/blog/text/write that it’s all 
pointless and that we might as well give up (Allen, 2012).  
In a later post, Allen offered the view that ‘selling the Compact is not, to put it mildly, 
always the easiest of tasks’, especially in the face of major challenges flowing from 
funding cuts, a rapidly changing policy landscape, and increasing cross-sector working 
with the private sector (Allen, 2013). 
Allen’s remarks offer testimony to the fact that cross-sector policy frameworks are hard 
work. This should come as no surprise given the inherent difficulty of the problems they 
are intended to address: problems that are not merely systemic or structural, but also 
deeply embedded in institutional and organisational values and cultures. Sometimes lost 
in policy actors’ fixation on framework documents is the realisation that they are only 
intended to be a starting point of a longer-term change management journey.  
As Lindquist observes, it is one thing to design and launch new regimes for cross-sector 
cooperation and collaboration, it is quite another to work under them (Lindquist, 
2008:164). Policy actors understandably (but naïvely) look for a return on the effort and 
political capital invested in reaching agreement about the format and form of words of 
the framework document but give insufficient attention to creating the on-going 
mechanisms necessary to achieve change. Of necessity, this requires the engagement of 
a wider range of actors than the ‘drafting group’. 
Few jurisdictions that have looked to the example of the English Compact when 
drafting their own framework documents have gone so far as to fully replicate either the 
extent of its outputs (such as the codes of good practice) or its institutional apparatus 
(such as Compact Voice, the Office for the Third Sector or the Commission for the 
Compact).  
The Canadian Accord went some distance with the accompanying Voluntary Sector 
Initiative under which CDN$95 million was committed over five years for capacity-
building projects. However, the Canadian government did not create a durable and 
embedded institutional framework that would sustain the Accord (Phillips, 2003a, 
Brock, 2004b, 2008). As Phillips observes, there was never a commitment on the part of 
the Canadian government – even under the Liberal government – to actively use the 
Accord for relationship-building: 
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Such commitment never existed because it was never clear to government 
exactly what it wanted to achieve with the Accord, other than to produce a 
quick deliverable in the VSI (Phillips, 2009:23). 
Of the national framework documents the Australian National Compact has come 
closest to the English Compact in terms of the breadth of the structural reform agenda 
built around the framework (Butcher, 2011, 2012, Butcher et al., 2012). The National 
Compact itself is the cornerstone of a much broader policy framework including a 
national one-stop-shop regulator (the ACNC), a legislated definition of ‘charity’, 
regulatory harmonisation, tax reform and other measures (Butcher, 2011, 2012, Butcher 
et al., 2012). However, like the English Compact whose institutions, outputs and 
language have proved malleable over time (Kendall, 2009, Zimmeck and Rochester, 
2011, Taylor, 2012b), the National Compact and its associated policy apparatus are 
likely to change under a future Coalition government (Butcher, 2012).  
In New Zealand the situation was quite different. There the NFP sector resisted Labour 
government efforts to implement a compact claiming the time was not right and 
appealing to the need to first resolve the relationship of Iwi/Māori to the New Zealand 
state. Unresolved issues associated with the historic settlement between the state and 
Iwi/Māori, the Treaty of Waitangi or Tiriti o Waitangi, shape much of New Zealand 
politics and, as has been seen, Treaty matters have intruded forcefully into the NFP 
policy agenda.  
Nevertheless the New Zealand government pursued administrative reforms to reduce the 
burden of red tape and simplify contracting processes, established (then disestablished) 
a Charities Commission and an Office for the Community and Voluntary Sector. Unlike 
Canada, where an enduring legacy of the Accord was a new sense of sector identity, the 
New Zealand NFP sector occupies a relatively weaker position in the polity. National 
peak organisations are politely listened to, but wield little real influence. Despite having 
an electoral system that virtually guarantees minority government, New Zealand’s 
unitary and unicameral state has none of the checks and balances of federal or bicameral 
systems. (Figure 9.1 offers a cross-comparison of the contextual factors within each of 
the three process streams that drove the adoption of each of the national ‘compacts’ 
considered in this study.) 
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Sub-national framework documents 
At the sub-national level there is a marked difference between the political and policy 
dynamics observed in the devolved jurisdictions of Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland and those of Australia’s states and territories.  
In the former the relationship between the state and the NFP sector is not only about 
forging a new administrative apparatus necessary to assume functions once performed 
by Whitehall, it is also about the state drawing upon the strong associational 
foundations of the NFP sector in the creation of national identity (Acheson, 2009, Burt 
and Taylor, 2009, Day, 2009a) – a national identity counterposed to the Conservative-
led government at Westminster (Adams, 2011, Ainsworth, 2012, Alcock, 2012).  
Until devolution in 1999 there was, apart from local governing bodies, no distinctively 
Scottish or Welsh entity capable of engaging with the NFP sector in either jurisdiction. 
The situation in Northern Ireland was quite different for historical reasons. Although 
provision already existed for a local parliament, apart from brief periods of ‘home rule’, 
‘direct rule’ from Westminster had been the norm for decades. In all three jurisdictions, 
therefore, the NFP sector’s primary relationships would have been via central 
government and local authorities.  
In anticipation of devolution – along with a commitment to a compact, the Blair 
government had promised a referendum on devolution – ready-made compacts were 
bequeathed to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. These compacts were modelled 
after the English Compact and, in essence, were formulated partly as a response to the 
historic central government-NFP sector relationship and partly as a means to set the 
initial conditions for a future relationship between the NFP sector and the newly formed 
devolved administrations.174 
In Scotland and Northern Ireland these ‘received compacts’ were eventually supplanted 
with ‘home-grown’ settlements that more closely reflected the aspirations of the 
community. Wales was another story. The establishing legislation for a devolved 
assembly in Wales, the Government of Wales Act 1998, enjoined Welsh ministers to 
work cooperatively with the NFP sector in the making of a Voluntary Sector Scheme 
(VSS). The VSS effectively replaced the Welsh Compact drafted by the Wales Office in 
Westminster.  
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Wales is unique in the UK and the rest of the Anglo-Saxon world in having such a 
provision in its founding legislation – owing in some measure to the fact that its 
inaugural First Secretary, Alun Michael, had been a principal architect of the English 
compact and minister responsible for the voluntary sector in Blair’s first government. 
Apart from amendments contained in the Government of Wales Act 2006 that clarify the 
role of the Executive relative to the Assembly, the VSS continues to operate largely as it 
was originally designed. 
Although the evolving cross-sector policy frameworks Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland are seldom cited as examples of model practice, the approaches taken in each 
jurisdiction appear to enjoy cross-sector support and they offer useful insights with 
potential relevance for other jurisdictions. Similarities between the electoral systems in 
Scotland and Wales and those in the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania, for 
example, commend them as useful policy comparators.  
The evolving relationships between the devolved administrations of the ‘constituent 
countries’ and their respective NFP sectors has to date been studied by a small number 
of researchers (Plowden, 2001, Burt and Taylor, 2002, Murdock, 2005, Acheson et al., 
2006, Fyfe et al., 2006, Henderson, 2006, Acheson et al., 2007, Acheson, 2009, Alcock, 
2009, Burt and Taylor, 2009, Dacombe and Bach, 2009, Day, 2009a, Alcock, 2010a, 
Ainsworth, 2012, Alcock, 2012). Although the secondary literature is relatively sparse, 
there is a rich primary literature that can be drawn upon in order to document the broad 
outlines of emerging cross-sector relationships.  
Cross-sector policy frameworks in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are to varying 
extents ‘works in progress’. The Scottish Compact inherited by the Scottish Executive 
has long since ceased to figure in the policy discourse. Instead successive SNP-led 
governments have focussed on building the ‘social economy’ (Fyfe et al., 2006) and 
have effectively delegated cross-sector working to local government via a concordat 
with local government and a Joint Statement on the Relationship at Local level between 
Government and the Third Sector (Scottish Government, 2009). The Scottish 
government has also concentrated on structural reforms to the public sector to ensure 
continued service delivery in an environment of fiscal constraint (Christie, 2011).  
In Wales the VSS continues to provide surety to the government-NFP sector 
relationship, as it has since devolution (Welsh Government, 2012). And in Northern 
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Ireland, during long periods of direct rule from Westminster, the original 1998 compact 
(Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 1998) guided the state-sector relationship until 
such time as a stable Northern Ireland Assembly could enunciate a concordat with the 
sector in its own right (Department for Social Development, 2011). 
While the Scottish, Welsh and Stormont administrations have looked to their NFP 
sectors to confer legitimacy upon their nationalist and communitarian policy agendas, 
the approach of Australian states and territories to cross-sector relations have been 
plainly utilitarian in their focus on narrow instrumentalist purposes. This is true at a 
practical level even in jurisdictions like the Australian Capital Territory, which under 
former Chief Minister Jon Stanhope (2001-11) consciously pursued a progressive 
rights-based social policy agenda.  
For Australia’s state and territory governments the relationship with the NFP sector 
embraces a more prosaic set of challenges. In Australia there was no equivalent transfer 
of authority from a hegemonic central state: there was instead the historic legacy of a 
constitutional division of labour in which states and territories have primary 
responsibility for the delivery of costly and labour-intensive health and human services. 
This legacy is compounded by long-standing vertical fiscal imbalance that reinforces 
state and territory dependence upon transfer payments from the federal government to 
fund the provision of those services. Simply stated, states and territories deliver most of 
the services and the national government raises most of the revenue (Parliamentary 
Library, 2002). 
As growth in demand put greater pressure on state and territory treasuries, governments 
looked to contracting with the NFP sector as a means for more cost-effective service 
delivery. This also coincided with a period of intensive micro-economic reform focused 
on wresting greater productivity and efficiency from the national economy and from 
Australia’s public sectors (APSC, 2003, Wanna et al., 2010:27-28, 257-59). It was 
structural reform and fiscal constraint – not ‘nation-building’ or even civic renewal – 
that provided the primary impetus for closer attention to the relationship between 
governments and the NFP sector (although civic renewal was frequently cited in support 
for engaging the NFP sector in service delivery).  
While it is true that relations between the NFP sector and the (Australian) federal 
Coalition government were problematic, relations between the NFP sector and state 
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Labor governments were problematic for similar reasons. Australian state and territory 
compacts, unlike their Scottish, Welsh or Northern Ireland counterparts had not 
cascaded from central government: instead they were initiated locally to address issues 
endemic (but not necessarily unique) to each subnational jurisdiction. For both the 
public and the NFP sector cross-sector policy frameworks presented an opportunity for 
a structured response to the constellation of issues around contracted service delivery. 
For their part, NFP organisations also looked to cross-sector policy frameworks to 
create a space within which the NFP sector might have formal input into the policy 
process. 
Awareness of the English Compact rippled through the NFP policy community across 
the Anglo-Saxon world in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Nominally centre-left social 
democratic governments were in place nationally (in Canada and New Zealand) and 
sub-nationally (in all Australian states and territories by 2004): this meant that the seeds 
of Blair’s ‘Third Way’ communitarian agenda fell on fertile soil. State and territory 
governments and the community/human services sector were quick to seize on 
compacts as a possible solution to the perceived problems with the relationship. 
However, while the bureaucracy tended to perceive the problems in terms of sector 
accountability, capacity and capability, the sector saw the problems in terms of 
democratic deficit, resource insufficiency and overbearing contract management. 
This misalignment of expectations about what cross-sector policy frameworks might 
achieve contributed to the failure of compacts to make a positive impact in jurisdictions 
such as New South Wales and South Australia. As important, if not more so, were 
failures to put into place serviceable structures for the implementation of the 
frameworks. In other jurisdictions, such as Queensland and Western Australia, attention 
was given to the creation of cross-sector governance forums with strong terms of 
reference and delegated authority to commission projects designed to address agreed 
priorities for operational reform and sector development.  
In the Australian Capital Territory the Social Compact slowly disappeared from view 
only to be revived by a reinvigorated cross-sector governance group, whereas in 
Victoria, a more pragmatic approach has favoured agreements between particular 
agencies and the parts of the NFP sector with which they work. It is too soon to tell 
whether the recent Tasmanian framework agreement – which is something of a hybrid 
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between the approaches taken by the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria – will be 
effective.  
One possible explanation for the differences observed between what has occurred in the 
UK’s devolved jurisdictions and Australia’s states and territories is that in the former 
the administrative apparatus of the state was newly created to give effect to the 
ambitions of self-government and self-determination. Any explicit or implicit 
commitment to cross-sector cooperation by the devolved assemblies175 would ipso facto 
be incorporated into the values of the newly established organs of public administration. 
In Australia, by contrast, one would expect to observe the path dependent legacy effects 
of public service traditions that reach back to the era (and ethos) of public sector 
predominance.  
Stream dominance and the fortunes of compacts 
A criticism of Kingdon’s process streams model is that it is not ‘refutable’. And indeed, 
this thesis has been express in its intent to use Kingdon’s framework as a heuristic 
device whose main strength lies in assisting the organisation of a coherent narrative of 
observed events rather than as a means for generating testable hypotheses (see RQ1, 
page 5). Even so, the process streams model does allow the researcher to interrogate 
events. Although such interrogation might lead to conclusions that are circumstantial 
and inferential, the test here is whether it yields a plausible account that accords with the 
common understandings of participants in the events under study. 
Although Kingdon considers that each of three process streams is largely independent of 
one another, he also acknowledges that they are not ‘absolutely independent’ (Kingdon, 
1995:88-89). Kingdon emphasises that the ascension of an issue to the decision agenda 
is ‘due to the joint effect of several factors coming together at a given point in time’ 
(Kingdon, 1995:179). He suggests that: 
Generally, no one factor dominates or precedes the others. Each has its 
own life and its own dynamics. The combination of these streams, as well 
as their separate development, is the key to understanding agenda change 
(Kingdon, 1995:179). 
Kingdon dwells on the question of how the odds that policy proposals will achieve 
agenda salience are enhanced by the ‘coupling’ of the three streams (an evident 
problem, an available solution, and political receptivity) into a ‘single package’. Apart 
from discussing the effects of ‘precedent’ and possibility for policy to ‘spillover’ into 
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adjacent policy arenas (Kingdon, 1995:190-195) Kingdon does not examine the relative 
importance of the streams or the impact of each stream on observed policy outcomes.  
Nevertheless, a close examination of the cases presented in this thesis does suggest that 
the relative influence of each of the policy streams might have had considerable bearing 
on the durability of cross-sector frameworks in each jurisdiction. This is most clearly 
demonstrated in relation to the ‘national’ cross sector policy frameworks in the UK, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
The English Compact: stream equilibrium = compact durability 
In the UK, the problem and policy streams were of roughly equal importance in helping 
to inspire the notion of a compact. The problem stream focussed on the consequences of 
an increasingly dysfunctional relationship between central government and the NFP 
sector. This in turn stimulated considerable policy debate within civil society by civil 
society organisations such as CENTRIS and Demos – some of whose executives would 
go on to have important roles in the Blair Labour government. The Deakin Commission 
established by the NCVO was particularly influential with its recommendation for a 
‘concordat’ between government and the sector.  Of course, the politics of the time 
favoured a marked departure from the policy nostrums of both the incumbent 
Conservative government and from the statist traditions of ‘Old Labour’. A proposal for 
a compact was adopted a key element in Labour’s policy platform leading up to the 
1997 general election. In this regard, the politics stream was critical to the opening of 
the policy window. 
The relative equilibrium of the three streams helps to explain the durability and 
qualified success of the English Compact.  In the UK Labour succeeded in politically 
‘de-contesting’ and institutionally embedding the Compact. Under the Blair and Brown 
Labour governments the Compact came to be accepted by the major political parties as 
providing a viable basis for cross-sector working. Moreover, the role of the NFP sector 
as a valued and legitimate policy partner became broadly accepted, at least in principle.  
Although the implementation of the Compact has been found wanting on occasion, it 
nevertheless survived the transition to Coalition government in 2010 (albeit in a revised 
form and re-framed within a ‘Big Society’ narrative). The Compact’s institutional 
architecture has changed along the way, but it remains a valued touchstone for the NFP 
sector in England.  
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Moreover, in what might be terms a ‘spillover effect’ Labour’s attempts to bequeath an 
appetite for cross-sector working to the devolved jurisdictions of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland appear to have taken root. Although the original compacts bequeathed 
by central government have been replaced by new structures and policy discourses, a 
culture of cross-sector working has survived. 
The Accord: political opportunism and symbolism trumps policy 
In Canada the problem stream was primarily focussed upon the impact upon the sector 
and communities of reductions in government outlays. Not only did voluntary and 
community sector organisations not see themselves as a coherent ‘sector’, but they were 
also reeling in the face of a deteriorating fiscal environment. The Voluntary Sector 
Roundtable brought some focus to sector-wide concerns, but its core themes were 
accountability and governance, not a compact. Similarly, the politics stream was less 
critical than in the UK. In Canada the prospect of a policy initiative with symbolic 
resonance proved attractive to an incumbent government seeking re-election after a first 
term marked by an aggressive program of cuts to social expenditure. In a real sense, the 
policy stream dominated insofar as a fully formed solution was already available, albeit 
one originating in the UK. This was a clear case of a ‘solution looking for a problem’. 
The practical impact of the Accord itself is difficult to ascertain. There is a view that the 
advent of the Accord and the five-year Voluntary Sector Initiative (VSI) contributed to 
a more coherent view of voluntary organisations as constituting a ‘sector’. However, it 
also seems that the incumbent Liberal government saw the Accord as a largely symbolic 
gesture.  
Over the ensuing years the Accord gradually lost policy salience. This was due in part to 
a ‘revolving door’ of officials (with a resultant loss of continuity and corporate 
memory) and to a declining interest on the part of relevant ministers. In 2003 Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien retired in favour of Paul Martin who it was reported had little 
understanding of the NFP sector or interest in the Accord.  
The Canadian government’s embrace of the Accord was politically opportunistic, and 
there was no enduring support for comprehensive policy reform. Unlike the Compact, 
no durable institutional architecture was established to carry the Accord forward, nor 
was the role of the NFP sector as a policy partner to government ‘politically 
decontested’. The election of a Conservative government in 2006 coincided with the 
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end of the VSI, which was not renewed. The policy window was now closed closed, and 
the Accord consigned to the status of a ‘dead letter’. 
The National Compact: government can’t go it alone 
In some respects, the Australian case is an amalgam of the UK and Canada. As in the 
UK there was a strong consensus about the corrosive effects of the contracting regime 
upon the NFP sector, however, as in Canada, the sector view was somewhat fragmented 
and concerned more with the practical redress of issues relating to the compliance 
burden and capacity development than with a compact. As in the UK an antagonistic 
relationship with a conservative central government was a galvanising issue and, as in 
Canada, the Australian government looked to the UK and to the states and territories 
(themselves inspired by Third Way policy formulations) for ready-made solutions that 
could be adapted to the federal domain. In Australia the politics stream predominated 
insofar as Labor was poised to win government in 2007 under the leadership of Kevin 
Rudd who had cloaked himself in a mantle of Third Way rhetoric borrowed from New 
Labour. After winning office Labor’s policy agenda in the NFP space proved to be more 
ambitious than many in the NFP sector might have hoped, albeit imperfectly 
implemented. 
In opposition Labor sought to frame a Third Way inspired social policy agenda based 
upon social inclusion and a fundamentally new settlement with the NFP sector. Labor 
offered the prospect of a compact and reforms informed by a study to be undertaken by 
the Productivity Commission. A compact was never high on the sector’s list of priorities 
– compacts had been part of the policy toolkit at the sub-national level since 2001, and 
despite early enthusiasm, most had ‘disappointed’. Rather, the sector looked to 
government to address a number of long-standing concerns in relation to regulatory 
reform, limits on advocacy and the contracting practices of federal agencies.  
In addition to the National Compact, the Labor government also implemented ambitious 
legislative and structural reforms. However, a turbulent period of minority government 
undermined the government’s credibility and the confidence of the NFP sector. The 
inability of the NFP sector to speak with one voice, institutional inertia in public sector 
agencies, and Labor’s inability to obtain bipartisan commitment to a fundamentally 
reformed settlement with the sector provided a platform for a new Coalition government 
to commit to the unravelling of the reform agenda. 
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Kia Tutahi: a revolving door of policy windows 
In New Zealand, the politics stream predominated, both under Labour and National 
governments. The problem stream was in most respects similar to that of the UK, 
Canada and Australia in that the transfer to the NFP sector of service delivery functions 
via the nexus of contracts gave rise to profound tensions in the relationship between the 
state and the NFP sector. The NFP sector in New Zealand is historically weak relative to 
the state, and the agenda for reform of the cross-sector relationship became 
compromised by conflation with the unresolved grievances of Iwi/Māori. In this 
environment, Labour in 1999, in anticipation of re-taking government after nine years of 
National Party rule, appropriated elements of Blair’s ‘Third Way’, including a compact. 
Labour was unable to reach agreement with a fragmented and immature NFP sector. 
Again, in the politics stream, the notion of a compact was given new life under a 
National government as a consequence of a coalition agreement with the Māori Party. A 
fairly innocuous compact was simply the price of governing under New Zealand’s 
mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system. 
New Zealand Labour came to government in 1999 with a clear ideological commitment 
to pursue a Blairite ‘Third Way’ policy agenda with regard to the NFP sector. The 
sector had welcomed the thaw in relations with central government and the prospect of a 
new settlement based on an enhanced role in policy-making. However, NFP sector 
working groups established to advise the government concluded that the time was not 
right for a compact – much to the frustration of the inaugural Minister for the 
Community Sector, Stephen Maharey. Despite failure to agree on a compact, the 
government implemented a number of policy measures designed to place 
government/NFP sector relations on a more constructive footing.  
The National-led government elected in 2008 revived the idea of a framework 
agreement as a concession to its coalition partners the Māori Party. Still, national 
representative organisations felt increasingly marginalised and were dismissive of the 
government’s approach. In 2001 the government transferred the Office for the 
Community and Voluntary Sector to the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) and 
disestablished the Charities Commission whose functions were transferred to DIA as a 
machinery of government change. The 2011 Kia Tutahi ‘Relationship Accord’ between 
the New Zealand government and the communities of New Zealand emphasises 
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‘community-led’ approaches. In this respect, it is in nature more akin to a ‘mission 
statement’ than it is to an agreement. 
Australian states and territories? 
What can be said about the states and territories where formal cross-sector frameworks 
first took root in Australia?  
The first observation to be made – an observation that applies across each of Australia’s 
eight states and territories – is that from the late 1990s NFP providers of human services 
were increasingly drawn into performance-based funding and purchase-of-service 
contracting regimes. For the most part, contracting regimes favoured by state and 
territory governments provided the context for the framing of issues within the problem 
stream.  
Interviews with NFP sector executives revealed considerable commonality about issues 
of greatest concern: a high compliance burden; multiple reporting and accountability; 
income uncertainty as a consequence of short-term (i.e. one year) contracts; financial 
risk (e.g. sunk costs for the establishment of services without assurance of continued 
funding); high transaction costs (e.g. associated with tendering); overly prescriptive 
service specifications and micromanagement; failure to fund the true cost of service 
delivery; failure to co-invest with the sector in capacity-building; the corrosive effects 
of competition and the associated risk of mission-drift; failure by government agencies 
to consult with the sector in the formulation of policy or the design of contracted 
services. 
There was less unanimity of view in the policy stream when it came to preferred 
solutions. Policy entrepreneurs within the community sector in NSW mooted the 
possibility of a formal cross-sector framework as early as 1995, anticipating the 
proposal for an English Compact by at least two years. However, it was not until 1999 
that the NSW government committed to a framework document loosely based on the 
English Compact and it was not until 2006 that the NSW compact – Working Together 
for NSW – was finally launched.  By this time not only the Premier, but many of the 
early proponents of a compact in the NFP sector and the bureaucracy, had moved on.  
In other jurisdictions too – the ACT (2001, 2004, 2012), South Australia (2004, 2009), 
Queensland (2008) and Tasmania (2012) – policy actors from both sectors looked 
primarily to the English Compact as a template for their framework documents. What 
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most did not do (and the same is true of NSW) is put into place a robust institutional 
architecture to sustain these frameworks. Although formal cross-sector policy 
frameworks have been considered from time to time by policy communities within the 
NFP sector, civil society (e.g. ‘progressive’ think tanks) and academia, in the main the 
search for solutions to problems associated with sustainability, capacity and contracting, 
have given greater emphasis to adaptive strategies and administrative reform.  
In Queensland and Tasmania the impetus towards a compact came from both the NFP 
sector and from government. There was, in the case of the Queensland Compact, an 
apparently genuine attempt to establish a workable governance framework through 
policy dialogue with the NFP sector. In Victoria, a compact was considered and rejected 
in favour of more narrowly cast memoranda of understanding (MOU) between portfolio 
departments and relevant parts of the NFP sector, an approach now favoured by the 
NFP sector in that state. Western Australia has gone a different route with government 
and the NFP sector co-producing a policy (as opposed to a non-binding bilateral 
agreement) codifying the manner in which government engages with the funded 
community sector organisations upon which government depends. Indeed, it is perhaps 
in Victoria and Western Australia that the policy stream has exerted the greatest 
influence insofar as the solutions preferred by policy actors in both jurisdictions were 
‘home grown’ and did not owe their provenance to solutions applied elsewhere. 
Of course, the politics stream has been critical in every state and territory. In most 
jurisdictions the three process streams aligned and policy windows opened on the 
occasion of a change in government (ACT, Victoria, Western Australia) or a change in 
leadership (Queensland). In some cases, an incumbent government looking to revitalise 
its policy messaging has embraced the idea of a compact mid-term (NSW, Tasmania), 
and in others a change of leadership (Western Australia, South Australia, NSW, 
Northern Territory) or a change of government (NSW, Queensland) has either crowded 
compacts off the policy agenda or prevented them rising to the formal policy agenda.  
What makes for a successful compact? 
What insights might be drawn from the process stream analysis of the cases that might 
differentiate ‘symbolic’ from ‘successful’ cross-sector policy frameworks, and to what 
extent might the trajectory established at their formulation be a predictor of their future? 
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One might reasonably infer that cross-sector policy frameworks primarily serve 
symbolic purposes when: 
• The decision to adopt a cross-sector policy framework – usually in the form of a 
compact – originates with government, rather than the NFP sector (e.g. where 
government acts unilaterally, with the NFP sector coming along as a ‘passenger’); 
• The framework does not specifically address problems of primary concern to the 
NFP sector, or the relevant sub-sector(s) and the ambit of the framework is unclear 
(e.g. where the policy lead is ambiguous or so situated as to be ineffective); 
• Insufficient effort is invested in building broad coalitions of support for the 
framework, including across party lines and within the NFP sector across sub-
sectors/industries; 
• The framework is not accompanied by the creation of relevant institutional or 
administrative architectures for the purposes of guiding implementation or providing 
assurance to stakeholders; and 
• There is little or no demonstrable ‘follow-through’ in relation to the purpose, aims 
or principles set out by the framework and contradictions persist in relation to 
‘principles’ and ‘practice’. 
Thus, solutions that do not address relevant problems and do not enjoy strong backing 
from relevant policy communities are almost certainly intended to serve political 
purposes and are, ergo, largely symbolic gestures.  Each of these factors are present in 
the following cases: the Canadian Accord (2001), the NSW Compact Working Together 
for NSW (2006), the South Australian frameworks Common Ground (2004) and 
Stronger Together (2009) and New Zealand’s Kia Tutahi/Relationship Accord (2011). 
Among the jurisdictions considered, these are the clearest cases of ‘symbolic’ 
frameworks. 
On the question of what makes for a ‘successful’ cross-sector policy framework, four 
cases stand out: the English Compact, the Welsh Voluntary Sector Scheme, the Western 
Australian Delivering Services in Partnership Policy (2011) and the ACT Social 
Compact (2004, 2012). Each of the aforementioned cases exhibit offers a stark contrast 
with those cases where the cross-sector policy framework serves primarily symbolic 
purposes in that: 
 
 
 
 
333 
• The decision to adopt a cross-sector policy framework originates with the NFP 
sector and enjoys broad support in relevant policy communities in civil society, the 
public sector and government; 
• The framework specifically addresses problems of shared concern to the NFP sector 
and the public sector and the ambit of the proposed framework is clearly articulated 
and the  policy lead is unambiguous and has the necessary authority to lead change; 
• Effort is invested by all parties in building broad coalitions of support for the 
framework, including across party lines and within the NFP sector across sub-
sectors/industries; 
• The framework is accompanied by the creation of relevant institutional or 
administrative architectures for the purposes of guiding implementation and 
providing assurance to stakeholders; and 
• There is demonstrable ‘follow-through’ in relation to the purpose, aims or principles 
set out by the framework and clear efforts are made to align ‘practice’ with 
‘principles’.  
Notably, the durability of both Queensland Compact (2008) and the Australian National 
Compact (2010) foundered mainly on the failure of compact proponents to ‘decontest’ 
either the frameworks or the principles upon which they were founded by building 
broad coalitions of support for the policies. Thus the framework documents and their 
supporting structures were vulnerable in the event of a change of government. And, 
although the NFP sectors in both jurisdictions were broadly supportive of the compacts 
and associated reforms, they proved to be reticent in advocating a continuation of the 
previous government’s policy. 
The importance of advocacy 
The issue of limits imposed by government upon systemic advocacy – usually via 
contract provisions – arises as a contextual factor in some of the cases. For example, the 
literature reveals that in the UK under past Conservative governments the shift to 
purchase-of-service contracting resulted in the imposition of prohibitions on policy 
commentary as a condition of funding (Lloyd, 1990). In New Zealand too, policy actors 
in the NFP sector have noted restrictions on advocacy via ‘gagging provisions’ in 
government contracts personal (personal communication, 13 December 2010a). In 
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Australia especially restrictions on advocacy was a contentious issue for the NFP sector 
during the life of the last Coalition government. This included attempts to define 
‘charitable purpose’ in such a way as to exclude some forms of systemic advocacy, and 
the inclusion of so-called ‘gag clauses’ in contracts. Sector disquiet about the perceived 
hostility of the Howard government to systemic advocacy led to Labor’s undertaking to 
do away with restrictions on advocacy and the eventual passage of legislation that 
specifically protects the right of NFP organisations to engage in advocacy without 
repercussion (the Not-for-profit Sector Freedom to Advocate Act 2013). More recently, 
in Queensland), a new conservative government has re-imposed contractual limits on 
policy commentary by funded organisations.  
The capacity of NFP organisations to engage in advocacy – either in the form of 
representations to government or public campaigns – is much cherished by the NFP 
sector. Quite apart from any formal restrictions or limitations upon advocacy that might 
be imposed by government, there are also concerns within the sector that greater 
engagement in competitive markets for statutory services might lead to self-censorship 
or mission drift (Lloyd, 1990, Evans et al., 2005, Onyx et al., 2008). Analysis of the 
contents of the 24 cross-sector framework documents examined in this thesis (including 
multiple iterations of framework documents in some jurisdictions) reveals that each 
acknowledges the role of NFP organisations to undertake advocacy on behalf of their 
constituents. Some documents offer explicit undertakings to the effect that 
government’s NFP sector partners have the right to criticise government decisions and 
policy without fear of repercussions. Others – such as New Zealand’s Kia Tutahi 
Relationship Accord – simply acknowledge that NFP organisations engage in advocacy 
on behalf of their constituents and communities, and are silent on specific protections of 
the advocacy function. A table has been compiled containing relevant extracts from 
each of the framework documents and is included at Appendix 8. 
The ability to freely engage in advocacy on behalf of clients, groups and/or 
communities, and to lobby or make representations to government in relation to policy 
and decisions of government, is a prerogative the sector is keen to protect. Most – but 
not all – governments in jurisdictions considered in this thesis have accepted that the 
NFP sector is not content to be a passive or silent partner. In addition, many NFP 
organisations have also come to realise that the, sometimes confrontational, lobbying 
strategies of a pre-contracting age are no longer useful or effective (Onyx et al., 2010). 
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To some extent, the in which NFP organisations engage with government contains an 
element of ‘theatre’ – there is ‘politics’ in the NFP sector and the leaders of NFP 
organisations can be as conscious of playing to their constituents as are elected 
politicians. 
Conclusions 
This study has drawn upon a broad array of sources, and has generated a rich store of 
observation and insight from in-depth elite interviews with 43 policy professionals in 
government, the public sector and the NFP sector. As concerns the two core research 
questions posed at the outset, the researcher is led to draw the following broad 
conclusions.  
RQ1 – Conclusions 
This study finds that in each of the jurisdictions examined, formal proposals for 
compacts or similar frameworks have: (a) been preceded by a broad recognition that 
aspects of the relationship between government and the NFP sector have become 
problematic; (b) been promoted within various policy communities as a feasible 
solution to acknowledged problems; and (c) entered onto the public policy agenda at 
politically propitious moments. The study also confirms that cross-sector policy 
frameworks arise in response to problems associated with the contractual relationship 
between government and the NFP sector – problems frequently attributed by the NFP 
sector to the rigid application of NPM doctrines. 
RQ2 – Conclusions 
The study found that the implementation and impact of cross-sector policy frameworks 
is highly variable. Nevertheless, cross-sector frameworks still form part of the policy 
toolkit in this space. The study confirms that public sector policy actors and NFP sector 
policy actors commonly bring different expectations to the table. To the former, cross-
sector policy frameworks are largely symbolic gestures of good faith, whereas the latter 
desires them to enunciate binding actions to redress perceived problems in the 
relationship. The study also finds support for the proposition that only those frameworks 
with a coherent institutional and policy architecture are capable of becoming 
institutionally embedded. Moreover, the influence of path-dependent effects is clearly 
visible in the comparative experiences of subnational jurisdictions in the UK and 
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Australia. In the former, cross-sector policy frameworks have evolved in step with the 
newly established administrative and policy apparatus of the devolved administrations. 
In the latter, the effectiveness of cross-sector frameworks has been constrained by the 
cultural, institutional and operational legacies of long-standing state and territory 
governments. 
Further research 
The research described in this dissertation no doubt raises as many questions as it 
answers, if not more. Some of the questions requiring further investigation would justify 
a PhD dissertation in their own right. Certainly, most would be grounded in literatures 
quite different from those relied upon in this study and would have different theoretical 
underpinnings and utilise different methodologies. Among the questions that warrant 
further investigation are: 
1. From the early 1990s warnings were sounded about the possibility that the 
marketisation of social services might lead to changes in the modus operandi of 
NFP organisations that might distract them from their founding purposes (Smith and 
Lipsky, 1993, Young, 2000, Minkoff and Powell, 2006). Since that time a body of 
literature has emerged documenting the ways in which NFP service providers have 
adapted and changed in response to the creation of competitive human services 
markets (Spall and Zetlin, 2004, O'Shea et al., 2007). It would be interesting to 
investigate whether the interests, priorities and practices of NFP service provider 
organisations have diverged over time from those of NFP organisations primarily 
concerned with expressive, affiliative and/or representative roles, and what 
implications any divergence might have for the manner in which NFPs engage with 
government.    
2. A capacity to give ‘voice’ to the voiceless is one of the most valued roles claimed by 
NFP organisations and civil society generally. The NFP sector is often portrayed as 
a pillar of a democratic culture and as a champion of participatory decision-making 
(Boris, 2006, Hendriks, 2006). Yet, it has sometimes been observed that engagement 
in highly competitive social services markets can corrode social capital (Lyons, 
2000, Butcher, 2006, O'Shea et al., 2007) and contribute to a loss of collegiality 
amongst NFP service providers (Butcher and Freyens, 2011). Vernis et al note that 
the characteristic dispersion and fragmentation of the NFP sector acts as a hindrance 
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to the effectiveness of NFP organisations as political agents, and contributes to an 
image of a disorganised and uncoordinated sector (Vernis et al., 2006). Questions of 
representation and representativeness frequently arose in the context of cross-sector 
negotiations around framework agreements. In the absence of formal democratic 
structures, how do intermediary organisations exercise formal and/or informal 
authority to mobilise opinion and build consensus in the broader sector? To what 
extend is the mobilisation of ‘voice’ hindered or aided by new social media? 
3. There is an abundant literature addressing issues of leadership, governance, strategic 
management and change management in the public and NFP sectors. Proposed 
reforms sometimes meet with internal resistance both in public sector and NFP 
sector organisations, especially where they represent a departure from the status 
quo. This thesis has revealed instances of public sector organisations either 
disregarding or selectively applying cross-sector policy frameworks, and a 
propensity for scepticism or disengagement from cross-sector policy processes by 
NFP organisations. Low expectations of cross-sector policy frameworks in the 
public and NFP sectors are suggestive of institutional or behavioural resistance to 
change. What are the sources of such resistance in the NFP policy space and what 
strategies can be employed by change agents to obtain ‘buy-in’? 
4. The NFP sector is a diverse and variegated organisational and institutional space – a 
sector referred to by Kendall and Knapp(1995) as a ‘loose and baggy monster’. 
Although the sector’s diversity is frequently cited as strength – giving voice to 
marginalised groups, offering choice and promoting innovation – but it can also 
contribute to fragmentation and a lack of policy coherence. In Australia, the primary 
focus of policy concern has been the delivery of NFP organisations of contracted 
human services. Yet, as we know, the NFP sector has a presence in almost all 
industry sectors. Moreover, the history, institutional drivers, regulatory frameworks 
and structural characteristics of each industry sector might be quite different with 
different traditions and legacies of public-NFP sector engagement. What might be 
revealed by a comparative analysis of the relationship dynamics between public 
sector entities and NFP organisations in different industry subsectors? 
5. In federated states such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, and in unitary 
states such as New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Sweden and France, NFP 
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organisations might be engaged simultaneously with more than one level of 
government – central, state/province/prefecture or local/municipal. NFP 
organisations might also operate across sub-national boundaries and be subject to 
different regulatory requirements and policy regimes in multiple jurisdictions. This 
greatly increases the level of complexity of their operating environment. How well 
to NFP organisations – particularly those engaged in the delivery of statutory public 
services – navigate this complex terrain and what are the implications of cross-
jurisdictional cross-sector working in an era of ‘borderless’ organisations? 
6. In recent years discourses around social enterprise have gained significant traction 
in policy circles in a number of national and sub-national jurisdictions. Micro-
finance, social impact bonds, the ‘mutualisation’ of public sector agencies and other 
forms NFP enterprise serving a social purpose have been championed by policy-
makers as a means for leveraging private investment in social purposes. Social 
enterprise approaches are currently being trialled in Australia for example, a social 
benefit bonds in New South Wales (NSW Treasury, 2013) – and the devolution of 
public services to ‘employee mutuals’ is a key plank in the Cameron Government’s 
Big Society Agenda (Birchall, 2011). Social enterprise is not universally embraced 
and critics suggest that there is a powerful political impetus behind it (Schofield, 
2005). Just how well do Australian policy-makers understand social enterprise and 
are the Australian financial sector, key institutions and regulatory environment 
‘social enterprise ready’?  
7. Finally, as noted by Young (2012) and Casey (2011b), formal cross-sector policy 
framework have transcended national boundaries and have been adopted in 
countries as diverse as Australia, Estonia and Spain. More recently, Sweden has 
adopted a compact based on the English model to achieve quite different ends: 
whereas the English Compact offered a means for resolving the tensions arising 
under the ‘contract state’, the Swedish government looks to a compact as a means of 
enlarging the role of NFP organsiations in the delivery of public policy. Although 
compacts are strongly associated with Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, there is in fact a 
parallel history of deliberate cross-sector engagement in countries with quite 
different traditions of government-NFP sector relations. Yet, apart from occasional, 
cursory descriptions, there are no systematic studies of cross-sector frameworks in 
other polities, either as single cases or in comparative perspective (at least none in 
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the English language literature). What might a close examination of cases from 
disparate traditions reveal about the determinants of effective cross-sector working? 
The research set out in this dissertation placed a high value on obtaining broad coverage 
of cross-sector policy initiatives in comparable Westminster-style English-speaking 
jurisdictions. Notable exceptions include frameworks in place or in prospect in the 
Canadian provinces (although these are the subject of recent and on-going comparative 
research by Elson (2010, 2011a, 2012)) and government-NFP sector relations in the 
Irish Republic (the situation in Ireland is the focus of on-going research by Donnelly-
Cox and others at Trinity College, Dublin (Donnelly-Cox and Cannon, 2010, Donnelly-
Cox, 2011, Donnelly-Cox and McGee, 2011, Donnelly-Cox et al., 2012)).  
In total the case studies span four national and 11 subnational jurisdictions with 
empirical fieldwork having been undertaken in two national and seven sub-national 
jurisdictions. This breadth of coverage has come at the cost of investigative depth within 
each of the jurisdictions covered. Although the empirical component of the research was 
unable to capture the perspectives of a wider range of policy actors the content of the 
interviews was wide-ranging, insightful and authoritative. Therefore, there are grounds 
for some confidence that the interviews conducted with a number of elite policy actors 
have provided a reliable portrayal of the events and circumstances surrounding the 
implementation of cross-sector frameworks in each jurisdiction. 
It is possible that a narrower focus on a much smaller number of cases might well have 
yielded a more nuanced understanding of the motivations and actions of a wider range 
of policy actors as well as the processes leading to the development and implementation 
of cross-sector framework agreements. The extent to which such understandings could 
be generalised to other jurisdictions is an open question. It is hoped that the current 
study provides a useful baseline for future researchers wishing to investigate individual 
jurisdictions in much greater depth, perhaps utilising research methods that 
accommodate a much higher level of granularity, such as the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (Sabatier, 1988, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, Jenkins--Smith and 
Sabatier, 1994, Sabatier and Weible, 2007). 
Cross-sector policy frameworks in Australia and New Zealand have been the primary 
focus of this research. It is hoped that the empirical component of this study will have 
made an original, and substantive contribution to the understanding of cross-sector 
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framework agreements, both in this part of the world and elsewhere. Although much has 
already been written about both the English Compact and the Canadian Accord, the 
accounts of these frameworks provide valuable comparators for the later frameworks 
they inspired. Likewise, the trajectory of cross-sector policy frameworks in the 
devolved jurisdictions of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland provide useful 
comparators for Australia and New Zealand. These too have been little studied and 
although it was not possible to carry out empirical investigations, this is compensated 
for by a rich documentary record from which one might obtain a nuanced understanding 
of the cross-sector dynamics at work in each of those jurisdictions. Given the different 
trajectories each has taken in the NFP policy space since devolution, further elucidation 
of the circumstances in these jurisdictions would be very instructive. 
Final thoughts 
The desire to have cordial and constructive relations with the NFP sector is not the sole 
preserve of centre-left administrations. Regardless of the political caste of governing 
parties, it is incumbent upon governments to respond to social problems. The demise of 
welfare statism and the sometimes painful progress of neoliberalism have confronted 
the traditional values and modus operandi of the public and NFP sectors, forcing them 
to adapt and evolve to new demands and new ways of fulfilling their aims. In the 
contemporary policy environment, responding to social problems requires close 
engagement with non-state actors, especially the NFP sector. As Smith (2012) observes: 
The intertwined relationship between government and the voluntary 
sector is today marked by increasing organizational and political 
complexity. Governments face on-going pressure and responsibility for 
the adequate accountability and performance of voluntary agencies, and 
more generally to meaningfully address urgent social and health problems 
(Smith, 2012). 
The expansion of contracting, increased fragmentation, growth in the number of 
enterprises engaged in new social service markets and an escalation in competition for 
public and private resources create strong incentives for the NFP sector and government 
to work together to resolve issues of mutual concern (Smith, 2012:2). 
What do the public/NFP sectors want? 
The public and NFP sectors might very well have divergent expectations of formal 
policy frameworks for engagement and cooperation. NFP sector leaders sometimes 
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accuse public sector agencies of adopting an instrumental approach to cross-sector 
policy frameworks, contending that the way in which compacts are framed and 
implemented by government is in effect a means for reinforcing the role of NFP 
organisations as providers of contracted services and in the process diminishing their 
expressive or affiliative roles. In this light, cross-sector policy frameworks are 
sometimes regarded as just another mechanism employed by government to ‘colonise’ 
and render the NFP sector subordinate to its interests.176  
On the other hand, governments might legitimately look to formal cross-sector policy 
frameworks as a means for regularising and/or normalising relations with its NFP sector 
partners in complex and highly contested policy spaces in which multiple sector voices 
clamour for attention. That government also seeks to manage its relationships with those 
parts of the NFP sector upon which it relies for contracted service delivery is not in 
itself unreasonable. Government understandably sees policy value in having orderly, 
predictable processes for engagement with non-state stakeholders in order to improve 
transparency and accountability, better manage the policy agenda, ensure ‘value-for-
money’, and reduce the scope for gaming and rent-seeking behaviours.  
For its part, the NFP sector is also prone to viewing cross-sector policy frameworks in 
instrumental terms as a means to resolve aspects of the relationship considered to be 
problematic. A number of public sector executives interviewed for this study 
commented that some in the NFP sector saw a compact as a means for addressing 
accumulated grievances. These might include issues associated with operational policies 
related to the funding or contractual relationship with government, consultation in 
relation to policy development or implementation, the framing of government priorities 
and funding allocations, or any of the broad range of matters that might arise at the 
intersection of government and NFP sector interests. 
Just as the relationship between government and the NFP sector is beset with 
asymmetries of formal power, organisational capability and financial resources, so too 
there is a corresponding asymmetry in public sector and NFP sector expectations of 
cross-sector policy frameworks. As one senior public sector manager from New South 
Wales observed: 
We’ve talked a lot about what government should deliver through a 
compact to the sector ... the return back is not always clear (personal 
communication, 18 November 2010a).  
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Similar reflections were offered by a senior New Zealand government official: 
I think that one of the things that has happened is that it became all the 
responsibility of the government side of the partnership to behave in 
certain ways. And you hear that in the discourse over and over again, you 
know: ‘we’re not treated with respect’; ‘we’re given contracts to sign with 
no discussion’; ‘they make changes to it’; ‘they enforce prices and there’s 
no real negotiation’ (personal communication, 15 December 2010). 
This same official went on to contextualise her observations: 
The contracting environment and inequality inherent in the pure 
contracting model that we’ve implemented in New Zealand has allowed 
an ‘us and them’ – because it got rid of the partnership – to develop and 
it’s had enough time to cement a number of very real grievances which 
has then allowed the community and voluntary sector …  to develop a 
sense that ‘government has got to fix it – ‘it’s all their problem and all 
their fault’ (personal communication, 15 December 2010). 
Whilst government might look to compacts as a means of disciplining or rationalising 
its relationship with the NFP sector, the sector looks to framework agreements to gain 
effective access to decision-makers and to legitimise its ‘partner’ status and its role as 
an independent civil society actor. The issue of ‘respect’ was a consistent theme arising 
in the interviews with NFP sector policy actors, and was neatly summed up by one NFP 
CEO: 
…a  certain amount respect please, you know, stop just behaving as 
though we’re, sort of, lackeys and, you know, give us some respect for the 
knowledge we have and the job we do (personal communication, 20 
December 2010a). 
Is there a future for compacts? 
Have cross-sector policy frameworks reached their logical ‘use-by’ date? Were 
compacts so tied to the shift in governance paradigm from NPM to relational 
governance that they have lost all relevance? The cases considered in this thesis would 
suggest the answer to both questions is ‘no’. While the frameworks examined in this 
study have all, in one way or another, arisen as responses to problems associated with 
aspects of ‘neoliberal’ governance, the relationship between neoliberal 
governance/NMP and the emergence of compacts is not strictly speaking causal in 
nature. Rather, the desire to codify roles, operational practices and rules of behaviour – 
whether through compacts or some other policy response – reflects the need for greater 
certainty.  
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Cross-sector framework agreements, therefore, are fundamentally about restoring or 
establishing certainty in uncertain times, and for this reason, they are fundamentally 
associated with the notion of transition. This might be a transition from pure principal-
agent contracting to more relational contracting, or a transition from an authoritarian 
state to a pluralist democracy (as in the case of compacts in Eastern European 
countries), or a transition from state provision to a mixed economy of service provision 
(as in the case of contemporary Sweden) – the common denominator is an acceptance of 
the need to manage change during times of transition and uncertainty. 
Young (2012) notes that in the years since the first compact was implemented by the 
Blair Labour government in 1998 similar instruments have been adopted in many more 
countries, including in local jurisdictions within federally structured countries. In 
addition, Young points out that:  
…the compact idea has crossed over the boundaries of British 
commonwealth countries into countries with other policy and governance 
traditions, including Scandinavia, where the concept has taken on new 
directions and meanings (Young, 2012:1). 
Such observations point to a broad acceptance by policy actors in both government and 
the NFP sector that constructive, collegial relationships between the two sectors 
contributes to the public good. Young suggests that at one level, the idea of a formal 
agreement defining the roles of the NFP sector and government and their relationships 
to one another is ‘deceptively simple’ (Young, 2012:1). However, he also acknowledges 
that the purpose and content of a compact in any one country is ‘complex, multifaceted 
and variable over time’:  
…when it crosses from one national context to another or from one level 
of government to another, it can mutate in interesting ways, reflecting the 
particular venue (Young, 2012:1). 
For Young, ‘the particular results or impacts of existing compacts are not as important 
as the idea of the compact in facilitating the conversation and serving as a catalyst for 
appropriate actions, programs and policies’ (Young, 2012:1). Of greatest interest to 
Young is the capacity of compacts to: 
… offer frameworks and processes through which government and 
nonprofit institutions can collectively work out their differences and 
develop solutions to address, multiple complex social problems and issues 
which neither sector can successfully accomplish by itself. (Young, 
2012:1-2). 
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Young thereby draws attention to the explicit coupling of cross-sector policy 
frameworks with the desire to find solutions to ‘wicked’ policy problems. In the UK, 
Australia and New Zealand for example, cross-sector policy frameworks have been 
presented as integral to broader policy discourses such as social exclusion/inclusion and 
joined-up government. 
Casey observes that countries as diverse as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Hungary, 
Estonia, France, and Spain – each with very different histories of nonprofit development 
– have sought to strengthen deliberate relations with their NFP sectors through bilateral 
agreement, unilateral policy statements or through the establishment of new flagship 
coordinating structures (2011b:4). Yet, in the United States, that most liberal of the 
liberal welfare states, there are no direct equivalents of compacts and few other 
structures or processes for deliberate relations between government and the NFP sector 
(Casey, 2009, 2011a, b). By way of explanation, Casey observes that in the US, 
‘Government matters less to the collective organizational psyche of U.S. nonprofits than 
to nonprofits in other, more State-centric, polities’ (2011b:7). Among the reasons cited 
for the failure to work towards closer institutional ties between government and the NFP 
sector are: 
• A tradition of independence, a preference for small government and a distrust of 
closer ties with government, 
• A long history of privatisation and marketisation of service delivery which has 
resulted in NFP organisations being more accustomed to functioning under 
marketplace rules, 
• The difficulty of determining which levels of government should be party to the 
development of sector-level agreements, and identifying appropriate interlocutors to 
represent the NFP sector, given the multi-layered national, state and local funding 
streams and oversight responsibility, and the the size, diversity, and complexity of 
the NFP sector, and 
• The prominence of private philanthropy and the much greater role of corporations, 
foundations and individual donors in funding NFP endeavours (2011b:7-8). 
Casey cautions that such explanations ‘should not be interpreted as evidence that U.S. 
exceptionalism has provided alternative pathways to resolve the concerns that have 
 
 
 
 
345 
emerged in other countries’ (2011b:8). There is, he says, ‘broad recognition that the 
growing salience of the third sector in the last decades has outstripped the capacity of 
existing structures to manage the interactions between the sectors’ (2011a) and he notes 
a ‘(re)surfacing’ of interest in strengthening relationships between governments and 
NFP organisations (2011b:10,14).  
Decontestation through dialogue 
Kendall (2003, 2009, 2010) and Morison (2000) suggest that compacts create a space 
within which a discourse can occur. Even Brock, who considers that the Canadian 
Accord fell well short of achieving a genuine paradigm shift in government-NFP sector 
relations, concedes that it provided the foundation for ‘inexorable’, albeit unpredictable 
change (Brock, 2004b, 2008). Given time, political and bureaucratic commitment and 
the creation of self-sustaining mechanisms for framework governance cross-sector 
policy frameworks have the capacity to both endure and mature, although Lindquist 
suggests that ‘a decade or two’ might be required (Lindquist, 2008:164).  
Bullain and Toftisova (2005:66) assert that a compact is ‘a process not a paper’. The 
legitimacy of that process stems from the credibility of the actors engaged in giving 
effect to it (Phillips, 2003b). Compacts are not intended to be static documents; rather, 
they are intended to authorise on-going processes that provide the catalyst for systemic 
reform such as oversight, formal review and the dissemination of good practices (Craig 
et al., 2005, Rawsthorne and Christian, 2005, Toftisova, 2005). 
There are examples among the cases of framework documents that lost legitimacy, 
credibility and relevance precisely because they became static. Others have exhibited 
varying degrees of adaptability and genuine stakeholder attachment. It has also been 
observed that framework documents are often viewed in politically partisan terms by 
incoming governments and are therefore vulnerable to relegation even where they 
appear to be working well. For its part the NFP sector often appears to passively assign 
the ‘ownership’ of framework documents to government, accepting with resignation or 
equanimity when they fall by the wayside rather than defending the ‘equity’ represented 
by their investment of political capital. 
There are many commonalities in the policy narratives for each of the jurisdictions 
examined in this thesis. In each, the NFP sector has gone from playing a complementary 
role to that of government – essentially filling in the gaps left by state provision – to 
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being an essential partner in the delivery of mandated public services. It is now 
generally accepted in each of the jurisdictions studied that the achievement of social 
policy objectives requires government departments and agencies to work collaboratively 
across sector boundaries. Although governments still pay the bills when it comes to 
policy and program delivery, it is accepted that the state is no longer the sole repository 
of knowledge, legitimacy or capacity.  
Increasing dependence on NFP sector service providers has prompted governments 
around the world to regularise relations with the third sector – in particular those parts 
of the sector with which the state has formal contractual relations. Government 
relationships with the sector have not always been plain sailing and the capacity of 
public sector commissioners to engage in constructive relationships with NFP sector 
service providers has, on many occasions, been found wanting. The ‘contract state’ 
introduced a range of tensions, contradictions and externalities into its relationship with 
the NFP sector, including failures to fund the full cost of service delivery, the 
uncertainty of year-to-year contracts, burdensome reporting and compliance 
requirements, and the sometimes corrosive effects of competition.  
Heavy-handed contract management eroded NFP sector capacity and capability while 
the competitive pressures of contracting contributed to burnout, mission-drift, 
diminished collegiality and the dilution of social capital. In the process, the roles played 
by NFP sector organisations as civil society actors and as sources of policy advice and 
legitimacy were devalued. Although many NFP sector service providers prospered as a 
result of contracting, some would argue that they were inadequately compensated for 
the credibility, legitimacy capacity and economy they brought to the transaction.  
There is ample evidence of a continuing – and sometimes unfulfilled – desire by 
governments and the NFP sector for a more constructive and effective relationship. 
Once considered a policy oddity, formal cross-sector framework documents such as 
compacts have now been part of the social policy landscape for almost two decades. 
During this period state and NFP sector actors in a number of Australian and overseas 
jurisdictions have at various times looked to compacts or similar framework documents 
to codify their relationship, thereby placing it on a more predictable footing. Despite 
reservations in some quarters about their relevance and effectiveness, framework 
agreements continue to form a part of the social policy toolkit. However, a compact is 
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not a ‘magic bullet’. Both sectors need to have realistic expectations and the resolve to 
work-through their differences in a collegial manner.  
At their best, cross-sector policy frameworks can create a ‘de-contested’ space within 
which state and NFP sector actors can build relationships based upon trust, mutual 
respect and reciprocal flows of accountability. At their worst, they serve only to 
perpetuate and reinforce cynicism and distrust. Unsurprisingly, compacts work best 
where there is already a history and culture of cross-sector cooperation. They also 
appear to work best when they have been initiated by third sector leaders and 
extensively co-developed with government through bottom-up as opposed to top-down 
processes.  
A persistent difficulty lies in the seeming inability for the NFP sector to clearly 
articulate what it wants from a renewed settlement with government. As observed by 
one senior Australian policy actor: 
on the one hand [the NFP sector] say we’re not consulted well and on the 
other they’re saying we’re being consulted to death (personal 
communication, 29 September 2011). 
This comment is revealing insofar as it hints strongly that a significant barrier to the 
realisation and durability of effective cross-sector policy frameworks is in fact the 
fragmented nature of that ‘loose and baggy monster’, the NFP sector (Kendall and 
Knapp, 1995). 
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Endnotes 
                                                
1 The compact idea has so far not taken root in the United States whose historical and 
2 A recent and potent example in Australia is the Australian government’s contracting of the 
Salvation Army and Save the Children to deliver services to asylum seekers in off-shore 
immigration detention centres. 
3 Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd made precisely this case in two essays 
published in The Monthly (Rudd, 2006, 2009). 
4 Human services are often referred to colloquially as ‘welfare services’, meaning services 
mandated by statute for provision by the state. In Britain, these are often referred to as ‘statutory 
services’ and in the United States they are generally referred to as ‘publicly mandated services’. 
It should be noted that the relatively recent advent of what Australian political observers call 
‘middle class welfare’ has resulted in broadening access to publicly funded programs to those 
who arguably can afford to pay (Wanna et al., 2010:129-130). 
5 The vast majority of (mainly small and highly localised) NFP organisations undertake their 
work without significant material support from government. They are instead reliant on 
donations, fund-raising and the efforts of volunteers. A minority of larger NFP organisations 
have experienced a growing dependence on income earned from government contracts to carry 
out their mission. Governments not unrealistically expect their NFP contractors to provide 
services in a manner consistent with public policy and operational policy frameworks, including 
being accountable for the expenditure of what are, after all, public funds. Sometimes, 
government funders expect their NFP providers to adopt a uniform branding, including 
standardised signage, livery and communications – thereby extending to the government-sector 
relationship elements of the ‘agencification’ applied within government under NPM (Moynihan, 
2006). 
6 Australian NFP research does not figure prominently in the international literature and has few 
domestic outlets in the form of dedicated academic journals (Onyx, 2011). Nevertheless, 
Australia’s NFP sector has deep historical roots and, in population adjusted terms, is 
comparable in size to the sector in the United States and larger than that of the United Kingdom 
(Lyons, 2001b:99).6 Australia is also largely in step with other parts of the developed world in 
terms of the extent to which federal and state/territory governments have elected to deliver a 
wide range of public services indirectly via NFP service providers (Hoatson et al., 1996, 
Productivity Commission, 2010a:297-302). 
7 Lewis (1999) offers a succinct and compelling account of the history of government and 
voluntary endeavour in Britain from the 19th century through to the end of the 20th century. 
Elson (2007) offers a similar account of the government-sector relationship in Canada. 
8 Anheier and Salamon place Australia, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), 
in the ‘liberal model’ owing to a ‘sizable urban middle class’ which has historically held urban 
working class elements at bay, thereby constraining social welfare spending and encouraging a 
relatively large NFP sector. The authors claim that the UK departed from this liberal pattern 
after WWII owing to ‘a surge of working class pressures’ – especially in the area of health care 
– and resulting in the UK exhibiting a mix of the liberal and social democratic models (Anheier 
and Salamon, 2006:107). However, the emergence in the UK of a ‘systematic and highly 
centralised’ attempt by government to enlist the NFP sector in social service delivery has lead to 
an expansion of the sector through the flow of public sector funds via ‘competitive contract 
schemes and engineered quasi-markets’ (Anheier and Salamon, 2006:109). 
9 Grønbjerg suggests that it is government’s dependence on the NFP sector, not the NFP sector’s 
dependency on government that determines which of these patterns predominate in particular 
service domains (Grønbjerg, 1987:77-78). 
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10 This is consistent with Corry (2010:12) who observes that attempts to define and theorise the 
‘third sector’ can be subdivided into an American and a European view. The former views the 
sector as discrete and separate from the market or the state and possessed of certain qualities 
while the latter adopts a view of third sector organisations as ‘hybrid’ mixes of ‘public and 
private, or hierarchic and anarchic’ (Corry, 2010:12). 
11 Henman and Fenger (2006:263) propose a similar three-way categorisation for models of 
welfare administration: bureaucratic; new public management; and governance. 
12 Henman and Fenger (2006:263) propose a similar three-way categorisation for models of 
welfare administration: bureaucratic; new public management; and governance. 
13 Although public management reforms based upon NPM had the superficial appearance of a 
‘global’ phenomenon, the practical expression of NPM-inspired reform was in fact highly 
differentiated amongst jurisdictions (Hood, 1991, 1995, Pollitt and Bouckaert, 1999, 
McLaughlin et al., 2002, Goldfinch and Wallis, 2009). Moreover, since the term ‘new public 
management’ was first conceptualised by Hood (1991) successive waves of public sector reform 
have brought about generational shifts in emphasis (Hood and Peters, 2004), leading some, like 
Rhodes (2008) to conclude ‘there is no such thing as NPM’. While the creation and 
reinforcement of market-oriented mechanisms for the delivery of public policy has been a 
consistent feature of public sector reform in liberal welfare regimes – what Ferlie et al (1996) 
refer to as the 'three Ms' of markets, managers and measurement - the impact upon the NFP 
sector of NPM-inspired policies varied across jurisdictions and through time (Anheier and 
Salamon, 2006, Paulsen, 2006). Whilst acknowledging that NPM-inspired reforms were 
implemented differently in the principal jurisdictions studied in this dissertation – the UK, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand – it has not been possible to elucidate the precise points of 
difference as that would unduly complicate an already complex narrative and distract our focus 
on the phenomenon of primary interest, cross-sector policy frameworks. 
14 ‘Animal spirits’ is a term first used by John Maynard Keynes ((1936:61-62) Pages 161-162) 
and refers to the spontaneous optimism of humans trying to do something positive, preferring 
action to inaction. The term was resurrected by Akerlof and Shiller (2009) as part of a broader 
Keynesian revival in the face of the global financial crisis of 2008-09. 
15 Kay defines a structured policy narrative as a ‘chronicle’ organised by some interpretive 
frame so as to make sense as an overall story (Kay, 2006:71-74). Although as a minimum, a 
policy narrative must at least be intelligible, it is also necessary to accept variations in what 
makes sense to different people. There is no objective standard or test of the validity of narrative 
explanations, and different interpretations and explanations of the evidence presented are 
possible. For the purposes of this dissertation, Kingdon’s multiple streams framework provides 
a significant part of that interpretive framework. See Kay’s discussion of structured policy 
narratives (Kay, 2006:59-74). 
16 It is important to reflect on the fact that policy communities can transcend national 
boundaries, thereby allowing paradigms and specific alternatives to spread at the international 
level (Be ́land, 2005:9). 
17 Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies has been updated and re-issued as recently as 
2010. This more recent edition features a new epilogue, Health Care Reform from Clinton to 
Obama, and is published by Longman. 
18 Many of the framework documents reviewed in this thesis incorporate the term ‘compact’ in 
their formal title. Yet, there is no accepted standard nomenclature to refer to formal policy 
frameworks for cross-sector cooperation (Casey et al., 2010). They have been referred to 
variously as ‘policy documents for cooperation’ (Bullain and Toftisova, 2005), ‘deliberate or 
formal government-sector relationships’ (Carter and Speevak Sladowski, 2008) and ‘partnership 
frameworks’, or ‘framework agreements’ (White, 2006). Other terms are sometimes used, both 
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as a title and a descriptor: these include accord, concordat, relationship agreement, 
memorandum of understanding or partnership agreement. Whereas some of these terms might 
be more accurate descriptors, they can be unwieldy. Therefore, this dissertation will, in some 
cases, bow to conventional usage and employ the term ‘compact’ as a shorthand generic 
descriptor except when referring to a specific policy framework, in which case it will be referred 
to by its title, or a short form of that title (e.g. the Accord, when referring to the Canadian 
framework document, or the Relationship Accord, when referring to the New Zealand 
framework document, and so forth). 
19 It should be noted that in some instances governments have acted unilaterally to articulate a 
set of guiding principles governing relationships with the NFP sector and other parts of the 
broader civil society (Bullain and Toftisova, 2005:69-70, White, 2006). Examples include the 
Clark Labour government in New Zealand which, in 2001, issued a Statement of Government 
Intentions (SOGI); the Québec provincial government which, in the same year, introduced its 
Politique gouvernementale sur l'action communautaire (Governmental Policy on Community 
Action) to ‘introduce some order into its growing and rapidly diversifying relations with the 
sector’ (White, 2006:58); and more recently, the state government of Western Australia which, 
in 2011, launched its Community Services in Partnership Policy. It is important to note that, 
while these are not ‘compacts’ or even ‘agreements’, this does not mean that the content of the 
policy is not agreed and supported by the sector, or that the sector was not actively involved in 
its development. Certainly, as discussed in Chapter Eight, the policy statement in Western 
Australia was ‘co-produced’ by the NFP sector and state central agencies. 
20 In Australia these are usually referred to as ‘peak’ organisations, occupying as they do a 
position at the apex of a broader community of member organisations. Peak organisations might 
represent the special interests of organisations with particular ‘industry’ affiliations (e.g. 
providers of residential care for the aged) or they might also pursue a broader advocacy mission 
(e.g. social justice).  
21 The NFP sector is both a contested concept and a complex social and political sphere. The 
sector exhibits a variety of organisational forms and, like any other productive sector in the 
economy; the NFP sector is both vertically segmented (market-share, resources and influence 
are not equitably distributed) and horizontally segmented (by industry grouping and/or policy 
domain). 
22 The term ‘social license’ is commonly used and understood in relation to the extraction or 
utilisation of natural resources, where access to those resources occurs with the common 
consent of a community. This is a concept that is capable of being applied more broadly. A 
social license might be said to exist when an initiative (say, the negotiation of a compact) enjoys 
the ongoing approval or broad social acceptance of a local community and other stakeholders. 
Social licenses are intangible, and in most cases it is more accurate to describe the entity 
granting the license as a 'network of stakeholders’, rather than a community per se. A social 
license has three normative components: social legitimacy based on legal, social and cultural 
norms accepted within the community; credibility established through negotiation and 
maintained by formal agreements about roles and responsibilities of the parties the rules 
governing their behaviour; and the trust created by opportunities to collaborate, work together 
and generate shared experiences (SocialLicense.com, 2013).  
23 The institutional architecture for the English Compact included: 
• An annual ministerial review meeting reporting directly to Parliament  
• Compact Voice, a national body representing voluntary and community sector interests 
(first proposed as a Compact Working Group on Government Relations by the NCVO 
in 1997) 
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• The appointment of high-level ‘Compact Champions’ in each government department 
(commencing in 2002) 
• The establishment of special units for third sector-related policy in the Home Office, 
Treasury and Trade and Industry, later merged into an Office for the Third Sector 
within the Cabinet Office (2006) 
• The appointment in 2006 of the first Minister for the Third Sector (Ed Milliband, now 
Leader of the Opposition) 
• A Compact Advocacy Programme offering support and advice to voluntary and 
community organisations in their dealings with public bodies, and 
• The Commission for the Compact, a non-departmental public body established in 2007 
to promote and monitor Compact implementation (Alcock, 2012, Taylor, 2012b). 
Establishing the Compact infrastructure was not without its ‘false starts’, limitations and failures 
(Kendall, 2010, Zimmeck et al., 2011, Taylor, 2012b), but as Plowden observes, the complexity 
and the difficulty of communicating and embedding the Compact across the breadth and depth 
of government, including departments and non-departmental bodies cannot not be 
underestimated (Plowden, 2003:427-428). 
24 Unlike post-devolution Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, there is in England no 
devolved parliament or territorial legislative body in which elected representatives exercise 
separate decision-making powers for voters in England (House of Commons Justice 
Committee:50-69, Kumar, 2010:477-478). 
25 Similar observations have been made about the Howard Government’s relationship with 
Australia’s NFP Sector.  
26 These reforms had their antecedents in earlier (1970s) critiques of the failings of state 
bureaucracies which, when combined with growing support for ‘pluralist provision’ within the 
modern welfare state, laid a platform for the delivery of mandated public services using systems 
organised in accordance with market principles (Lewis, 1999:260-261). 
Hudson suggests that it was in the UK under Conservative administrations ‘where the revival of 
the free-market ideology of Hayek and Friedman has enjoyed its longest, most clearly 
articulated, and consistently pursued run (1979–97)’, leading government to ‘graft the qualities 
attributed to the marketplace onto social welfare provision’ (Hudson, 1998:253). As early as 
1979 – the same year the Thatcher government was elected – the Secretary of State for Social 
Services, Patrick Jenkin, announced: 
As the government sets about tasks for which it was elected—cutting income 
tax, cutting public spending and curbing the burgeoning bureaucracies of the 
public sector—we shall be looking to the voluntary movement to take up the 
running (as quoted in Finlayson, 1994:358, cited in Hudson, 1998:454). 
The community and voluntary sector was regarded by government as a major vehicle for 
promoting choice and was praised for its ‘practical grass roots experience’ and its capacity for 
innovation, flexibility and responsiveness (Hudson, 1998:457). Ironically, the replacement of 
‘grants-in-aid’ with ‘purchase of service agreements’ had the effect of tying the sector even 
more closely to state policies and priorities, thus constraining many of the very qualities that 
commended the sector as a viable substitute for the state (Hudson, 1998:456-457). 
27 Alcock observes that much of the growth in public funding for the sector in the UK has come 
from an increase in the scale of government contracting (Alcock, 2012:229). 
28 As will be seen elsewhere in this dissertation, these remarks prefigure similar statements 
made a decade later by Australian Labor politicians when addressing the need for a renewal of 
the government-sector relationship. 
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29 Kendall also notes the important roles played by unheralded policy actors such as career civil 
servant Sir Kenneth Stowe who acted as the ‘indispensible facilitator of the Compact 
negotiation’ (Kendall, 2003:62). 
30 Indeed Alcock (Alcock, 2012:222) suggests that the very notion of a unified voluntary sector 
is a product of then emerging policy discourses informed by influential reports such as the 
Wolfenden Committee (1978) and the Deakin Commission (1996). This notion was later 
cemented by government policy actions in the form of formal relations with sector 
organisations, including the provision of financial support (Alcock, 2012:225). Until the 1990s, 
there was little awareness in the ‘balkanised’ policy landscape occupied by voluntary 
organisations of being part of a coherent ‘sector’ and thinking about how to address social 
problems was overwhelmingly framed in terms of ‘public’ versus ‘private’ (Kendall, 2000:545). 
31 The Cross Cutting Review had the following terms of reference: 
To examine the relationship between the voluntary sector and the Government in 
service delivery, taking account of the key role the sector can play in 
strengthening civil society and building capacity in local communities. The 
review will do this by: 
i. mapping the extent and the variety of means by which the voluntary sector is 
already involved in overseeing and delivering services; 
ii. examining best practice in effective partnership between the voluntary sector 
and the public sector, suggesting practical ways in which the principles of the 
Compact can be applied in the delivery of services; 
iii. drawing common lessons to guide the public sector in working in partnership 
with the voluntary sector; 
iv. establishing whether and how barriers to voluntary sector involvement, and 
lack of capacity, might be overcome to promote successful partnership with the 
public sector and how the Government might be able to assist to that end (HM 
Treasury, 2002:35)  
32 The rationale for refreshing the Compact was given in the introduction to the consultation 
paper prepared for the Compact Partnership: 
... If there is a lesson to be learnt from the first 10 years of the Compact, it is that 
policies, however admirable and widely agreed, need support to be implemented. 
A significant part of refreshing the Compact documents is to improve 
implementation of both the specific commitments which the documents set out 
as well as the broad principles on which they are based, so that the benefits of 
partnership working between the public sector and the third sector can be more 
fully realised (Commission for the Compact, 2009:9). 
33 Compact Voice is co-signatory to the 2010 ‘revised’ Compact. 
34 The promotion and dissemination of the Compact by the Labour government served to: (a) 
persuade the political Right to commit to the Compact in the event of a future change of 
government; (b) ‘shore up the consensus’ in favour of the Compact and against ‘dissenting 
voices’ in the ‘market fundamentalist political Right’ and the ‘social libertarian Left’; (c) 
generalise an inclusive ‘third sector friendly policy stance’ through dialogue and debate with 
‘relevant representative groups’; and (d) ‘embed these general claims in the complex machinery 
of the state and within the variegated landscape of the third sector itself’ (Kendall, 2010:248-
249). Kendall notes that the Conservative Party first committed to the Compact in 2008, thereby 
effecting a ‘U-turn from its position when in power’ (Kendall, 2009:19, fn. 6). Macmillan, 
reflecting on a convergence of Conservative and Labour Party thinking since 2008, speculates 
about ‘the possibility of a cross-party consensus on new institutional structures’ that will set the 
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stage for ‘the newly emerging political and policy configuration’ resulting from the 2010 
general election (Macmillan, 2010:8-9). 
35 Kendall refers to New Labour’s pursuit of engagement with the NFP sector as an exercise in 
‘ideological double differentiation’: differentiation on the Left from unreconstructed statist 
traditions, and on the Right from neoliberal market fundamentalist traditions (Kendall, 
2010:244). The Compact was the result of a ‘carefully choreographed’ policy discourse through 
which public sector and NFP sector policy entrepreneurs in concert with New Labour 
articulated an ‘apparent consensus’ that the NFP sector should have a greater role as a partner in 
delivering public services, fostering civic engagement (Kendall, 2009:6-7). 
36 Currently Deputy Chief of Staff to Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard. 
37 As will be discussed in chapter seven, the pre-election undertakings of Australia’s 
Liberal/National Coalition opposition closely echo the actions of the coalition government in the 
UK. 
38 These are the views of the Bow Group, a conservative think-tank whose President is former 
Prime Minister, John Major, and whose senior patrons are current Members of the House of 
Lords (and former Conservative Cabinet Ministers) Michael Heseltine, Geoffrey Howe, Norman 
Lamont and Cameron’s predecessor as leader of the Conservative Party, Michael Howard. 
39 In Canada, only about 7 per cent of NFP revenue derives from the federal government 
(Thériault, 2009, Elson, 2011a:65-66). In federal systems such as Canada (and Australia), the 
constitutional division of powers confers responsibility on provincial and territorial 
governments for funding, commissioning and delivering a wide range of public services (Elson, 
2011a:136). 
40 Laforest (2009:165) comments that while most claims by the sector have been articulated 
within the federal arena, most innovation has in fact occurred at the provincial and local levels. 
41 The Blair government separately negotiated compacts for each of the constituent countries 
and mandated the adoption of compacts by local government in England. Although a significant 
share of NFP sector income in the UK derives from local authorities the system of delegated 
authority in the UK allows central government to directly influence local government 
expenditure for social services. 
42 It should be noted that these pressures were being exerted at both the national (federal) and 
sub-national (provincial/territorial) levels. 
43 The JW McConnell Family Foundation’s mandate is ‘to improve the quality of life in Canada 
by building communities that help people develop their potential and contribute to the common 
good’. Founded in 1937, the Foundation’s ‘proactive mission’ involves supporting initiatives ‘to 
promote community economic development, to support innovation in higher education and to 
widen the impact of successful local innovations’. In 1993 the Foundation played an important 
role in encouraging the establishment of the Voluntary Sector Roundtable as a common front for 
national voluntary organisations representing a variety of policy domains (McConnell 
Foundation, 2012).  
44 The PAGVS recommended that immediate priority be given to four actions: 
1. The development and dissemination of a good practice guide for the effective 
stewardship of voluntary organisations to improve transparency and accountability 
2. The creation by the federal government of a new Voluntary Sector Commission as an 
essential element in improving accountability and building capacity in the sector 
3. That the federal government, in collaboration with the provinces and the sector, create a 
Task Force to begin the process of establishing legislated definition of which 
organisations should qualify for access to the benefits of the federal tax system, and 
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4. That federal and provincial governments enter into discussions with the sector with a 
view to negotiating a ‘compact of good practice or creation of other means for 
enhancing on-going dialogue, understanding and genuine partnership’ (PAGVS, 
1999:viii-ix). 
45 Of course it was not within the power – or necessarily in the political interests – of the federal 
government to enjoin the provinces to participate in such a discussion. 
46 Despite a history of policy indifference and antagonism towards the NFP sector (Phillips, 
2003b:26, Elson, 2007:54), the government made a number of policy commitments in its 1996-
97 and 1997-98 Budgets aimed at enhancing the capacity of the sector. These included 
amendments to tax provisions for charitable donations, the provision of assistance to expand the 
sector’s technological capacity and promoting understanding of the sector by encouraging the 
direct participation of government employees in voluntary and exchange programs (PAGVS, 
1999:15). This signalled an opportunity to make the case for a new framework for cooperation 
(Phillips, 2003a:20-25). 
47 The similarities with the UK experience are striking: recall that in the UK the Deakin 
Commission was able to influence the direction and content of New Labour policy through 
informal discussions between Nicholas Deakin and Alun Michael, and were ultimately reflected 
in the ‘Building the Future Together’. 
48 Social and health programs delivered by Canada’s provinces and territories are dependent 
upon cash transfers from the federal government (Advisory Panel on Fiscal Imbalance, 
2006:36). Like Australia, the division of labour between the federal and provincial spheres in 
Canada is accompanied by a degree of ‘vertical fiscal imbalance’ or VFI. In Australia, VFI sees 
the federal government collect around 82% of all national taxation revenues while the states and 
territories account for around 40% of all public spending for which they are dependent upon 
federal transfers (about 50% on average) (Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2002). 
Although the existence in Canada of VFI is contested, a 2006 Report to the Council of 
Federation observed: ‘The federal government has more money than it requires to discharge the 
functions for which it is responsible. The governments of the provinces have insufficient 
resources to accomplish the tasks for which they are constitutionally responsible ’ (Advisory 
Panel on Fiscal Imbalance, 2006:14). This is especially true in relation to health and social 
spending which saw cash transfers rise from about CA$13 b in 1998-99 to about CA$28 b in 
2005-06 (Advisory Panel on Fiscal Imbalance, 2006:36). 
49 The governing Liberal Party held 177 out of 295 seats in the House of Commons. 
50 In December 2003, the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) responsible for implementing the 
Accord published its first report on progress in relation to a range of practical measures 
announced in 2001. In its report ‘Taking the Accord Forward’ (VSI, 2003c) the JSC outlined the 
following achievements: 
• Processes for monitoring Accord implementation and performance – By 2003, each 
sector had put into place monitoring processes and a reporting framework to support 
implementation. In addition, two national surveys had been undertaken to provide 
baseline data on the voluntary sector and identify priorities. The Voluntary Sector 
Initiative also commissioned a number of research projects focussing on issues of 
capacity building. Among them was ‘Funding Matters: The impact of Canada’s New 
Funding Regime on Nonprofit and Voluntary Organisations’ (Scott, 2003), a study 
assessing the impact ‘on the capacity and long-term sustainability’ of changes in the 
funding regime for non-profit and voluntary organisations.50 
• The development of standards and codes of good practice – By 2003, two codes of good 
practice had been published: A Code of Good Practice on Funding (VSI, 2002a) and a 
Code of Good Practice on Policy Dialogue (VSI, 2002b).  
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• The creation of appropriate organisational structures to support implementation – By 
2003 a Ministerial Consultative Committee (MCC) was established with a mandate to 
meet annually with the voluntary sector to review the implementation of the Accord and 
associated policy and administrative frameworks. An Assistant Deputy Minister Steering 
Committee comprised of key departments and central agencies provided advice to the 
MCC and offered strategic direction to government agencies. In addition, a Voluntary 
Sector Forum (comprised of 22 voluntary sector leaders) was set up to oversee the 
implementation of the Accord and associated Codes of Practice and a Joint Steering 
Committee (comprising 6 government and 6 voluntary sector representatives) was 
established to guide the implementation and monitoring of the Accord and Codes of 
Practice.  
A Policy Internships and Fellowships program (PIAF) was also established (initially as a pilot 
program) for the purposes of placing interns and fellows in host federal government 
departments or voluntary sector organisations.50 The PIAF’s objectives were to ‘develop policy 
knowledge, experience and skills in both sectors’ and ‘enable the voluntary sector to become a 
more viable partner in the development of public policy’.50 As noted in a 2004 report of the 
program:  
In its first year, the PIAF program showed considerable promise as an innovative approach to 
developing policy knowledge, experience and skills in both the voluntary sector and the federal 
government and to enabling the voluntary sector to become a more viable partner in the 
development of public policy. Despite PIAF funding limitations and financial barriers to the 
participation of voluntary sector employees as interns and fellows in 2003–04, the second year 
of the PIAF program was successful in bringing benefits to all parties concerned—the 
interns/fellows, host organizations and home departments (CVSRD, 2004:19)  
Over the course of its five years (2000-05), the Voluntary Sector Initiative (VSI) produced 
and/or commissioned over 100 reports, practice guides, workbooks, policy documents, studies 
and on-line resources on diverse topics such as the government-sector relationship; NFP sector 
funding and financing; policy development; information management and information 
technology; regulation; sector identity; working and volunteering; and sector research. In 
addition to the Codes of Good Practice, these included: 
• Resources for Accountability and Financial Management in the Voluntary Sector which 
provided ‘medium-sized organizations with resources, including website links, to advance 
their financial management knowledge and skills as well as enhance their accountability’ 
(VSI, 2003b)  
• Inventory of Effective Practices in Financing and Resourcing of Voluntary Sector 
Organizations in Canada, a database of best practices drawn from case studies around 
Canada and published on-line, and 
• Participating in Federal Public Policy: A Guide for the Voluntary Sector’ which aimed to 
‘help voluntary organizations participate in the federal public policy development 
process’ as well as give ‘federal government departments insight into how to involve their 
voluntary sector counterparts more effectively’ (VSI, 2003a). 
51 The summative evaluation of the VSI published in 2009 describes the initiative as a unique 
undertaking between government and the voluntary sector in that: 
• its scope was beyond anything undertaken to date in terms of the broad objectives 
covering relationships, capacity and regulatory reform 
• the joint nature of the work undertaken was unique in that the joint tables and the joint 
coordinating committee were comprised of members from both the Sector and the 
government, and  
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• it was differentiated by its scale in attempting to engage the entire Sector and the entire 
Federal government (Canada, 2009:iii). 
The evaluation offered the following salutary conclusion: 
Overall, evaluation results demonstrate that the most positive impacts of the VSI 
are concentrated in the areas of intersectoral relationships, co-ordination and 
coherence in the interaction between government and the voluntary sector, 
knowledge of the Sector, and regulatory reform. While the evidence is limited, it 
points to the difficulties in achieving desired impacts in the following areas: 
awareness and engagement, increased capacity for the Sector as a whole, and 
challenges in achieving a full integration between the government and the Sector 
in undertaking policy development (Canada, 2009:ix)  
Among the successes attributed directly and indirectly to the VSI by the evaluation are: 
• the production of research outputs which were important in developing the sector’s 
identity and which indirectly promoted increased collaboration and networking within 
the voluntary sector 
• the development a range of tools and resources for the sector’s use  
• the initiation of a dialogue within the sector, and the creation of a united and 
strengthened voice for the sector  
• an improved dialogue and relationship between the sector and the government, and 
• the development of a Satellite Account, funded through the VSI, to ensure the 
availability of official economic statistics on the voluntary sector in Canada. 
Aspects of the VSI found to be less successful were: 
• Although the Joint Regulatory Table (JRT) was generally regarded as a ‘collaborative, 
inclusive, and progressive model’ a lack of clarity regarding mandates, roles, and 
responsibilities was identified as a significant process flaw. Also, to date it has not been 
possible to reliably evaluate the realisation of regulatory reform objectives pursued by 
the VSI owing to the fact that the implementation of the regulatory reform initiative did 
not begin until 2004 and continued until 2009.  
• The VSI’s impact on capacity issues in the voluntary sector was not easily discernible. 
Although there were widespread improvements in relation to information technology 
(IT) and, to a lesser extent, observable improvements in relation to human resources 
(HR), the VSI was not widely credited with these changes and the take-up by the sector 
of tools developed by the HR Council of the Capacity Joint Table (CJT) was low (9% of 
voluntary organizations surveyed in 2007 had used the tools and resources of the HR 
Council, and for those users 74% reported a positive impact). 
• The Sectoral Involvement in Departmental Policy Development (SIDPD) was a $28.5 
million program aimed at creating a closer policy development relationship between the 
federal government and the voluntary sector. Although it aimed to improve the 
opportunities for input within federal departments by voluntary sector organisations and 
strengthen their capacity to contribute to policy development, an evaluation undertaken 
in March 2004 found a number of ‘process flaws’, including: ‘a significant lack of 
planning and design work leading up to the creation of SIDPD’; unclear lines of 
accountability; the lack of a governance framework delineating the division of 
responsibilities between the Voluntary Sector Task Force (VSTF) in the Privy Council 
Office (PCO) (which had overall responsibility for managing VSI activities, including 
SIDPD) and the 16 federal departments administering funding for 67 SIDPD projects; 
and a lengthy and overcomplicated administrative process for soliciting, reviewing and 
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approving proposals and delivering funding. There was a failure to engage across the 
breadth of the sector and poor dissemination and transfer of knowledge. 
• Although one quarter of NFP organisations surveyed believe that the role of the sector 
in assisting the with the development and delivery of federal government programs and 
services increased over the VSI period, this was largely attributed to cuts to social 
programs that necessitated the involvement of the sector and a recognition by 
government of the necessity of sector engagement in service delivery (Canada, 2004:v-
vi, Canada, 2009:v-viii). 
52 After the public and private sectors (PAGVS, 1999:56). 
53 This observation is given credence by Brock who comments that, ‘[w]hile the provinces and 
the territories were informed of the VSI proceedings, they did not actively engage in them and 
federal officials were respectful of the jurisdictional limits’ (Brock, 2008:18). 
54 Phillips makes a number of additional observations about Accord/VSI processes that 
contributed to their falling short of expectations: 
• the various ‘Joint Tables’ established to progress key elements of the VSI were 
hampered by unclear mandates; uncertainty about representation and the capacity of 
representatives from either sector to accept or approve commitments54; and a lack of 
organisational/institutional leadership; 
• although the practical agenda was ambitious, the timelines for implementation were 
unrealistic and often ‘events driven’ (e.g. 2001 was the International Year of 
Volunteers, and a number of VSI deadlines were timed to maximise their symbolic 
impact); 
• unlike the English Compact, which reached out to Black and minority communities 
through a targeted Better Practice Guide, the express inclusion of ethnocultural and 
Aboriginal communities was not a demonstrated strength of the VSI, and this 
contributed to scepticism in parts of the NFP sector about the whole package; 
• although the government had no clear idea of what it wanted from an Accord, it clearly 
did not want to be ‘unduly bound by commitments it could not live with from a political 
or financial perspective’: as a result the Accord was ‘long on principles but quite short 
on specific commitments’ while the VSI pursued objectives that were ‘politically 
viable’; 
• differences arose between a government culture focussed on deadlines and deliverables 
and an NFP culture that is ‘flatter’ and more diverse54and these differences at times 
detracted from the collegial spirit in which Joint Table discussions were undertaken; 
and 
• even though the VSI initially had considerable support from within the senior ranks of 
the federal bureaucracy, the base of this support was narrow and was diluted by the high 
levels of professional mobility within the public service (Phillips, 2003a:32-51). 
55 Brock, on the other hand, concluded that ‘crowding out’ does not alone account for the failure 
of the Accord/VSI to achieve ‘paradigmic policy change’. Rather, she attributes the lack of 
substantive reform to a clash of values (Brock, 2008:16). Brock argues that ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ had succeeded in ‘hijacking’ and re-defining the core ‘problem’ originally 
identified by the Broadbent committee – namely, perceived problems of accountability and 
governance in the voluntary sector – and supplanting it with a focus on the relationship between 
government and the sector (Brock, 2008:16). This change in focus and emphasis paved the way 
for a preferred solution – the Accord – that did not address the core problem as originally 
defined (Brock, 2008). Although Brock accepts that positive change occurred ‘where a values 
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match existed’, with the result that ‘the concerns of policy actors who focused on accountability 
and governance issues as primary were not squarely addressed’ (Brock, 2008:16): 
... policy change is most likely when there is a convergence among the policy 
problem, political receptivity and an existing policy alternative or solution ... this 
convergence occurred in the case of the VSI. The problem emerged, the political 
actors recognized it as important and the policy actors offered a solution. The 
policy solution (VSI with a focus on the Accord and relationship building) had 
sufficient support among a key group of hidden policy actors and entrepreneurs 
who were able to mobilize and drive it forward but lacked support among a 
different set of policy actors and entrepreneurs who adhered to the problem in its 
original form of accountability and governance. As a result, the process was one 
of clashes between these two sets of values and the final product bore traces of 
both sets of concerns and were necessarily circumscribed where no agreement 
was possible.(Brock, 2008:19) 
Brock (2004b:178-179, 2008:21-22) suggests that the ‘embedded nature’ of the state apparatus 
in Canada – one ‘tied down’ by its multiple linkages with society – means that substantive 
reform of state-sector relationships will be slow to change, except at the margins. Accordingly, 
the VSI showed greater success in obtaining improvements in existing processes and practices 
than in promoting either genuine innovation or challenging institutional norms (Brock, 
2004b:176). Nevertheless, Brock observes that incremental policy and regulatory change can 
precipitate larger changes over the longer term and concedes that there had been a gradual 
embedding of awareness and acceptance of the Accord and its Codes of Practice in government 
and in the sector, accompanied by a ‘psychological shift’ in the form of a recognition that the 
NFP sector exists and is owed certain obligations by government (Brock, 2004b:177-178). 
56 The Action Plan is the government’s response to the 2006 report of an Independent Blue 
Ribbon Panel on Grant and Contribution Programs (IBRP), ‘From Red tape to Clear Results’ 
(IBRP, 2006). The IBRP was established to ‘to recommend measures to make the delivery of 
grant and contribution programs more efficient while ensuring greater accountability’. Phillips 
(2009) and Graham (2009) have referred to the administration of grants and contributions in 
Canada as ‘sclerotic’ and ‘ossified’, noting the severe capacity constrains on NFP organisations 
flowing from the transaction costs associated with an operational infrastructure excessively 
focused on accountability and compliance measures – views supported by the findings of a 2006 
review by the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) which reported concerns about the heavy 
financial and administrative burden associated with applying for funding and meeting the 
compliance requirements of funding programs (OAG, 2006a). A 2012 audit carried out by the 
OAG found that the government’s Action Plan to reform to the $37 billion program of transfers 
to external organisations had been ‘adequately implemented’ but that neither the Treasury Board 
of Canada Secretariat nor the five organisations examined by the audit were able to determine 
‘how much, if at all, their actions have led to streamlined administrative processes within 
federal organizations or a reduced administrative burden on recipients’ (OAG, 2012). 
57 Phillips also suggests that a lack of investment by either governments or foundations in policy 
capacity and capability within the sector has impaired its ability to build strong vertical and 
horizontal linkages (Phillips, 2009:13). And while she concedes that some initiatives of the 
Conservative government are of benefit to the sector, such as reforms to Canada’s ‘incredibly 
inefficient and frustrating administration and accountability requirements for grants and 
contributions’57, she points to a waning policy interest in investing in the social economy and a 
‘distinct lack of innovation’ in the range of financing instruments available to the Canadian NFP 
sector (Phillips, 2009:15, 27).  
58 Differences in the constitutional form of the state in the UK and Canada also have 
implications for the longevity of the countries’ respective framework agreements. To the extent 
that in England local compacts were actively promoted by central government (admittedly with 
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variable success) the potential existed to embed the broad principles of the Compact nearer the 
point of service delivery where they might be sustained even in the event of a change in the 
central government (Zimmeck and Rochester, 2011). Moreover the Blair government also 
attempted to bequeath its ‘Third Way’ policy approach to the newly devolved polities in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (next chapter).  
By contrast in Canada – a federal state – central government had no constitutional authority to 
require lower levels of government to adopt the Accord model (Elson, 2011a). As with 
Australian states and territories, Canadian provinces and territories are significant 
commissioners of public services in their own right and have a larger interface with the NFP 
sector than central government. Although sub-national cross-sector agreements have 
subsequently emerged in some provinces, these have only been indirectly inspired by the 
Accord (Carter and Speevak Sladowski, 2008, Lindquist, 2008, Elson, 2011a, 2012). 
59 Although a recent study of Canadian sub-national policy frameworks for cross-sector 
cooperation suggests that the political ideology of governing parties appears to have little 
influence on whether such frameworks are pursued. Source: (Elson, 2011a) 
60 Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd made precisely this case in two essays 
published in The Monthly (Rudd, 2006, 2009). 
61 Most of the functions of the Scottish and Welsh Offices transferred to the Scottish Executive 
and the National Assembly for Wales at devolution. The Scottish and Welsh Offices were 
replaced, respectively, by the Scotland Office and the Wales Office, which have retained 
responsibility for those functions that are normally handled centrally by a nation-state. A 
Northern Ireland Office continues to exist to oversee the process of devolution and support the 
establishment of a functioning legislature, although it has progressively transferred functions to 
the Northern Ireland Executive. 
62 It is important here to add a note about nomenclature. Although a matter of some contention, 
a number of writers use the term ‘countries’ when referring collectively to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. In sporting contexts, the use of the terms ‘home nations’ or ‘home countries’ 
is of long standing. The term ‘constituent countries’ is often used in the UK (and is sometimes 
contentious when used in reference to Northern Ireland) although it has no precise legal 
definition. When referring collectively to any combination of England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland this thesis will follow the practice of using the term ‘countries’ unless the 
context suggests otherwise. 
63 The NCVO estimates that in 2010 there were around 900,000 civil society organisations in 
the UK, including 163,763 general charities and around 600,000 ’below the radar groups’ 
(Alcock, 2012, Clarke et al., 2012). In Scotland there were (in 2007-08) 45,000 formal 
voluntary organisations and another 20,000 charities regulated by the Scottish Charity 
Regulator. In Wales there are over 30,000 voluntary and community based organisations while 
in Northern Ireland there are around 4,700 voluntary and community organisations (both 2007-
08, Hopkins, 2010:18). 
64 Alcock points out that dependence on statutory income is a distinguishing feature of the NFP 
sectors in the three devolved jurisdictions. In Scotland NFP organisations statutory funding 
accounts for 39% of income on average, compared to 44% in Wales and 61% in Northern 
Ireland. The average for the UK is 38% (Alcock, 2012:224-225). This suggests challenges 
ahead for both the sector and government in light of spending reductions being driven by central 
government (further compounded in Northern Ireland by the loss of European Union peace 
initiative funding which peaked at £60 million in 2005, but subsequently declined to £10.8 
million in 2008) (Alcock, 2012:224-225). 
65 The Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Offices were cabinet-level ‘territorial’ departments 
with responsibilities for policy implementation in their respective jurisdictions (Mitchell, 2006). 
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66 A number of sources were consulted in compiling the tables set out in Figures 5.1 – 5.3. 
These are Acheson (2006, 2007, 2009), Alcock (2010a), Birrell (2009), Burt and Taylor (2002, 
2009), Day (2009a), Fyfe (2006), Jeffrey (2010), Jeffrey and Wincott (2006), Lodge, 
Schmuecker and Coutts (2010), McCrone (2001), Mitchell (2006), Plowden (2001), and 
Wincott (2006). 
67 The Scottish Compact Good Practice Guides may be viewed at: 
http://scotland.gov.uk/library2/doc16/cgpg-00.asp  
68 Although funded by the SCVO, the Chair, former editor of The Herald newspaper Arnold 
Kemp asserted the Commission’s independence, saying in his report ‘I can testify that in our 
meetings we took a robust and even sceptical view of some of the SCVO evidence’ (Kemp, 
1997:1). 
69 Although a large proportion of Scottish NFP organisations belong to generalist intermediary 
organisations such as the SCVO (Vincent and Harrow, 2005:385-386) intra-sector relations can 
be ‘somewhat fractious’ (Osborne and Super, 2010:9). 
70 A cursory survey of the official announcements of successive Scottish Governments suggests 
that the parliament, the national government, local government and civil society see themselves 
as partners in a national project, an endeavour described by Scottish Finance Secretary John 
Swinney as the building of a prosperous, fair and well-governed country (Swinney, 2012). In 
this the Scottish Government appears to look more to European countries and the European 
Union to benchmark its progress than it does to London. Seen in this light it is understandable 
that Scotland appears to have so thoroughly re-branded its inherited pre-devolution policy 
framework for cross-sector cooperation. 
71 In a 2005 Parliamentary debate the Deputy Minister for Communities, Johann Lamont, asked: 
‘How do we debate the voluntary sector without being cosy, precious or patronising and without 
focusing merely on the funding issues that face voluntary organisations?’ He spoke to the 
challenge of capturing and developing the ‘essence’ of the sector (Scottish Parliament, 2005). 
The session ended with the adoption of a motion recommending ‘the development of a 
differentiated strategy to meet the specific needs of the social enterprise sector of the social 
economy’ to be ‘developed in partnership with social enterprises and their networks beyond the 
voluntary sector’ (SENSCOT, 2005). In 2007 the Scottish Executive published a social 
enterprise strategy and action plan (Scottish Executive, 2007) that highlighted the contribution 
‘a social enterprise business model’ might make to ‘economic growth and business development 
while at the same time meeting social objectives’ (Scottish Government, 2007b). 
72 Scottish elections use the ‘Additional Member System’ (AMS) under which voters are given 
two ballots: one to elect 73 constituency Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) under a 
‘first-past-the-post system’, and a second to elect 56 additional MSPs (seven for each of eight 
regions) (House of Commons Library, 2011c). 
73 The ‘Scottish National Party & Scottish Green Party Cooperation Agreement’ can be accessed 
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_05_07_agreement.pdf 
74 The SNP was followed by Labour with 37 seats and the Conservatives with 15. Eight seats 
were won by the Liberal Democrats (five seats), the Greens (two seats), and one independent 
(House of Commons Library, 2011c). 
75 The Scottish Compact was not launched into a policy vacuum: in 1995, as a consequence of 
local government reorganisation in Scotland, the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
(CoSLA) and the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations (SCVO) released a ‘Positive 
Partnership’ statement outlining a number of commitments by the new Councils and voluntary 
organisations (Scottish Executive, 2003c:3). A 2006 review of local compacts in Scotland found 
that while they were slower to develop than in England, progress was being made (Henderson, 
2006). 
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76 A later 2006 review remarked that ‘The experience of the original 1998 Compact was that it 
was, to all intents and purposes, invisible to most of the staff and organisations nominally 
covered by it’ (Henderson, 2006:52). 
77 Futurebuilders Scotland provided for £16 million in ‘direct investment’ comprising: 
• £12 million in grants to ‘medium to large sized social economy organisations that have 
established a reputation as service providers’ in order to encourage capital investment, 
encourage them to operate in a more business-like fashion, thereby assisting them to 
achieve financial sustainability; and 
• £4 million in grants to ‘emerging organisations’ for the purpose of developing new ideas 
and enlarging existing schemes that will contribute to their growth and sustainability 
(Scottish Executive, 2004a:4).  
Of the remainder, £1 million would provide access to skills development and training and £1 
million would be used to improve the effectiveness of support services that underpin the growth 
of the social economy and the capability of organisations (Scottish Executive, 2004a:4). 
78 The Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR) is responsible for the regulation of 
charities in Scotland. The OSCR is a non-ministerial department of the Scottish Government 
and reports directly to the Scottish Parliament (see http://www.oscr.org.uk/about-oscr/). 
79 Relationships between the NFP sector and local authorities have long had a special 
importance in Scotland. However, these relationships were severely disrupted by local 
government re-organisations undertaken by the Major government in 1994-96 (Bamford, 1997). 
80 A review of local compacts in Scotland commissioned by the Scottish Executive in 2006 
found that progress on the development of local compacts had been relatively slow with less 
than half of the potential partnerships in Scotland having commenced the development of some 
form of compact and only a small number having been published (Henderson, 2006:51). 
81 Although the Local Government in Scotland Act allows for CPPs to ‘establish the Partnership 
as a legally distinct corporate body’, at the time of writing none have done so (Scottish 
Government, 2010b). 
82 SOLACE (Scotland) is the Scottish Branch of the Society of Local Authority Chief 
Executives & Senior Managers, the representative body for senior strategic managers working 
in local government. Source: http://www.solacescotland.org.uk/ 
83 The Scottish Government accepts that building capacity and capability in third sector will 
require investment in, and the availability of training opportunities. To this end, in 2009, the 
Scottish Government’s Third Sector Division and the SCVO entered into a ‘strategic 
partnership’ under which a Third Sector Skills Framework – ‘designed by the third sector for 
the third sector’ – has been developed to support ‘collaborative and partnership working 
between third sector intermediary organisations’ as well as promote ‘formal partnership 
working and collaboration between the third sector and the skills bodies in Scotland’ (Scottish 
Government, 2010c: Action 4.3). 
84 On 17 April 2008, the Scottish Parliament passed the following resolution: 
That the Parliament applauds the vital contribution made to society and the 
economy by the third sector; believes that co-operation between the third sector, 
local authorities and the Scottish Government is vital in ensuring a strong role 
for the third sector; recognises that the Scottish Government is funding Project 
Scotland and has made clear to Project Scotland that further resources may be 
available for projects it runs in terms of the Scottish Government's employability 
agenda, and believes that the exemption from payment of water rates extended 
by the previous administration to 2010 should be further extended; calls on the 
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Scottish Government to work with the third sector to reduce the burden of 
regulation affecting the sector; recognises the problems facing the voluntary 
sector caused by short-term funding and re-tendering; believes that there is a 
pressing need to review the system to provide more stable funding for the sector 
including longer-term contracts and a national contracts framework; notes the 
establishment of the voluntary sector compact under the last administration and 
calls for a revitalised compact between local government and the voluntary 
sector; believes that this compact must ensure greater dialogue between councils 
and voluntary groups as to the operation of the local government Concordat and 
the single outcome agreements, and calls for a review of the operation of the 
Concordat including its key outcomes and performance indicators following the 
first year of its implementation (Scottish Parliament, 2008).  
85 Michael subsequently became the inaugural First Secretary for Wales (later re-titled First 
Minister) as leader of the Welsh Labour Party (1999-2000). 
86 The original Government of Wales Act 1998 required the Voluntary Sector Scheme to address 
the following matters: 
(a)  how the Assembly proposes to provide assistance to relevant voluntary 
organisations (whether by grants, loans, guarantees or any other means), 
(b)  how the Assembly proposes to monitor the use made of any assistance 
provided by it to relevant voluntary organisations, and 
(c)  how the Assembly proposes to consult relevant voluntary organisations 
about the exercise of such of its functions as relate to matters affecting, or 
of concern to, such organisations (Government of Wales Act 1998:s114)86 
The Act also required that, ‘After each financial year the Assembly shall publish a report of how 
its proposals as set out in the VSS were implemented in that financial year’, and that the 
Assembly ‘shall keep the scheme under review and in the year following each ordinary election 
(after the first) shall consider whether it should be remade or revised’.86 
87 Although the process of administrative devolution to Wales had begun in 1907 with the 
creation of the Welsh Board of Education, it was not until 1964 that the post of Secretary of 
State for Wales was created and the Welsh Office established (Mitchell, 2006, National 
Assembly for Wales, 2013). 
88 A previous referendum in 1979 had failed to gain majority support for ‘home rule’. 
89 Mitchell points out that differences in ‘allocative distributive policies’ across the UK resulted 
in a larger public sector in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (than in England) than would 
have merited by ‘a strict population-based allocation’ (Mitchell, 2006:162-163).  
90 Under the terms of devolution, most of the powers of the Welsh Office and Secretary of State 
for Wales were transferred to the Assembly although, initially, it had no powers to initiate 
primary legislation. Limited law-making powers were subsequently conferred by the 
Government of Wales Act 2006 and, following a referendum held in March 2011, the Assembly 
gained primary law-making powers, making it possible for it to legislate in areas such as health, 
education, social welfare, local government, the environment and transport without having to 
consult either the UK parliament or the Secretary of State for Wales (BBC, 2011, Skully, 2011). 
91 From 2007 a Board Member for the Charity Commission for England and Wales (reappointed 
in 2010 by Minister for Civil Society Nick Hurd) (Cabinet Office, 2010).  
92 The Strategy represented the culmination of work begun in 2002 with the creation by the 
Welsh Assembly Government of a Joint Working Group including the Social Economy 
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Network and the Wales Council for Voluntary Action ‘to develop an Action Plan to encourage, 
develop and sustain social enterprises in Wales’ (Welsh Assembly Government, 2004). 
93 Although such efforts might have been complicated by the intention, announced in 2004 by 
Welsh First Minister Rhodri Morgan, ‘to shrink and reform the quango state in Wales’ in order 
to ‘to simplify the shape of Wales’s public sector post-devolution’ (Morgan, 2004). 
94 The average voter turnout over the last four Welsh Assembly elections has been about 42 per 
cent (Electoral Commission, 2011a). 
95 The evaluation concluded that Partners for Change was but one factor amongst several 
contributing to the development of the relationship and that isolating its impact was difficult 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004:iii). The evaluation found that there had been progress towards 
achievement of each of the four common aims, and that there were many examples of good 
practice that could be disseminated (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004:iii). 
96 Positive Steps, published in March 2005, was the Government’s response to ‘Investing 
Together’, the 2004 report of the Task Force on Resourcing the Voluntary and Community 
Sector. In Positive Steps the government undertook to provide £23m over three years to help 
support the changes recommended by the Task Force (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2007). 
97 Details of the 2011 ministry can be viewed at the Northern Ireland Executive website at: 
http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/index/work-of-the-executive/ministers-and-their-
departments.htm  
98 See the Department for Social Development website at: 
http://www.dsdni.gov.uk/index/voluntary_and_community.htm and 
http://www.dsdni.gov.uk/index/about_dsd  
99 The effects of the current SNP government’s push for independence on the social policy space 
remain to be seen. 
100 The legitimacy that attaches to services provided on behalf of government by NFP 
organisations – which might also be expressed as ‘trustworthiness’ – represents a form of value 
capture by state service commissioners. Conversely, being in receipt of government funding 
confers legitimacy – in the form of both authority and perceived solvency – on funded 
organisations. 
101 The Australian Constitution makes no explicit reference to local government. State and 
Territory governments have exclusive powers over the supervision of local government. 
102 This not to suggest that central government does not also have a stake in forging constructive 
relations with the NFP sector. For example, the Commonwealth has a major investment in 
labour market programs ($3.9b between 2009-12) and family relationship services ($444m 
between 2008-11) delivered by non-government (including NFP) service providers. The 
Commonwealth also invests indirectly in the NFP sector through tax expenditures ($2.7b for 
2008-09) and via tied funding to state and territory governments (Productivity Commission, 
2010b). Here it should be noted that in Australia’s federal system central government has few 
levers with which to influence the relationship between sub-national governments and the NFP 
sector. It is also noteworthy that Australia exhibits the largest vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) of 
any federated nation owing to the fact that the Commonwealth government has constitutional 
responsibility for the collection of tax revenue while states and territories have responsibility for 
the direct provision of costly health, education and other community services (Department of 
the Parliamentary Library, 2002). VFI exists where: (a) the national government share of 
revenues is disproportionately larger than its share of direct outlays, and (b) the sub-national 
government’s share of revenues is disproportionately smaller than its share of outlays. Although 
the Australian Constitution allows both the federal and sub-national governments to raise 
revenue, constitutional interpretation and political factors have combined over the years to 
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constrain the capacity for states and territories to exercise taxation powers. States and territories 
are therefore reliant on the Commonwealth to distribute funds, thus imposing some limitations 
on their autonomy. This, combined with the fact that states and territories have primary 
responsibility for the direct provision of costly health, education and other community services 
has led to the emergence of vertical fiscal imbalance (Department of the Parliamentary Library, 
2002).  
103 State and territory primacy in the social policy domain also contributed to the rapid 
expansion of Australia’s NFP sector through the 1970s and 1980s. Growth in both the number 
and variety of NFP organisations has been underwritten by investment by state and territory 
governments attempting to provide for a plurality of ‘voice’ and ‘choice’. State and territory 
governments also exercise regulatory functions in relation to the NFP sector. The regulatory 
environment is complex and varies from one jurisdiction to the next. 
104 Pascoe would in 2011 be appointed Chair of the federal government’s NFP Reform 
Implementation Taskforce and in 2012 was nominated as the as inaugural Commissioner of the 
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission. 
105 NFP employers have experienced significant workforce pressures during Australia’s mining 
boom.  
106 As recalled by a Victorian NFP sector representative, ‘You know, there’d been some pretty 
hard years there, where you had to sit in meetings and just get barked at by people who are just 
rude and obnoxious, and there was more than one of those Howard government ministers that 
was just rude and disrespectful and obnoxious’ (personal communication, 15 April 2011). 
107 Attributed to former Minister for Communities under Premier Peter Beattie, Warren Pitt 
(2004-2007). 
108 In New South Wales Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia there are 
state government departments with responsibility for community development and fostering 
community cohesion. In South Australia community development is coupled with a focus on 
social inclusion. In New South Wales an Office of Communities located within the Department 
of Education and Communities exists to support the development of ‘vibrant, sustainable and 
inclusive communities’. In Tasmania a Community Development Division located in the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet focuses on ‘building community capacity, addressing social 
disadvantage and facilitating active citizenship’. 
109 The Office for the Community Sector (OCS) was intended to provide an interface between 
the Department of Health and Human Services and the community sector. The OCS was 
notionally time-limited and was tasked to create a quality framework; address the funding 
relationship; and develop a compact or partnership agreement with the community sector. 
Shortly after its creation the OCS was overtaken by a broader departmental fiscal management 
policy focussing on program reductions and ceased to exist as a separate entity. Its functions 
were dispersed to mainstream business units within DHHS dealing with policy, purchasing and 
commissioning (personal communication, 3 October 2011b) 
110 In the NFP sector the vertical dimension is most commonly associated with the vertical 
segmentation of organisations ranked from the largest (being those most likely to have a 
privileged perspective on the nature of the framework) to the smallest (and most likely to have 
had little direct engagement in the development of the framework). In the public sector, the 
vertical dimension is most commonly associated with the hierarchical segmentation and/or 
geographical dispersion of organisations. 
111 Almost one quarter of respondents simply skipped the question, possibly suggesting they too 
were unaware of the Social Compact. Of those responding, 48 per cent of those identifying as 
public sector employees were unaware of the Social Compact compared to 27 per cent of 
workers in the community sector. 
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112 The Tasmanian Partnership Agreement, however, states that a Peaks’ Network and 
Government Strategic Forum – the body established for the purposes of governing the 
agreement – ‘will resolve any disputes in the implementation of the Partnership Agreement’ 
whilst affirming that both sector are accountable for their performance against the agreement 
(Tasmanian Government, 2012). 
113 Wales is the only jurisdiction in the English speaking world where there is a statutory 
requirement to table a plan for government-NFP sector relations (Government of Wales Act 
2006: s74:1). 
114 The ‘hollowing out’ thesis advanced by Rhodes, Di Francesco and others describes a state 
that has moved beyond the logics of ‘command and control’ to a greater reliance on networks 
and ‘diplomacy’ (Rhodes 2007). The hollowed-out state is characterised by external dependence 
and internal fragmentation that both weaken the central organising capacity of the state and 
challenges the executive’s ability to ‘steer’ (Rhodes 2000: 350, Di Francesco 2001: 106). 
Characteristic of the ‘contracting state’, hollowing out raises normative questions about both the 
role of the state and the ability of the state to influence the direction and coherence of policy, 
and outcomes (Di Francesco 2001: 104-106). 
115 The exceptions are (at the time of writing) the Australian Capital Territory, South Australia 
and Tasmania. 
116 NPM Australasian style is sometimes also referred to as ‘economic rationalism’. Although 
the term has been appropriated in some quarters as an epithet of scorn, it is simply refers to a 
structural policy framework in which deregulation, downsizing government, restructuring public 
services along managerialist (or quasi-private sector) lines and the privatisation of government 
businesses (and some services) figure strongly in the public policy discourse (Castles et al., 
1996:9).  
117 In Australia and New Zealand, social democratic labour governments (Hawke/Keating in 
Australia, Lange in New Zealand), according to Castles et al. (1996:215), embodied ‘the policy 
vigour of economic rationalism intertwined with an almost comparable predisposition to radical 
social innovation’. 
118 Although, as Considine (2001:119-120) points out, the establishment of a competitive quasi-
market for publicly-funded employment services commenced in 1994 under the Keating Labor 
government, with one third of public assistance for the long-term unemployed contracted to 
both for-profit and NFP providers in the expectation that competition would lead to service 
improvement. 
119 It should be noted that the federal government was not necessarily leading the charge in this 
regard—Australian state governments, which have constitutional responsibility for the provision 
of a wide range of health and human services, had also made major forays into third party 
service provision.  
120 Growth in social expenditure through the mid-2000s, coupled with the increased utilisation 
of third party service delivery, saw a net expansion in both the reach and impact of social 
programs, although, as Norton (2006-07:22) observes, a significant proportion of that expansion 
reached deep into the middle class.  
121 To borrow a term from the iconic Australian film, The Castle (1997), in which a bumbling 
suburban lawyer arguing (ineptly) before the High Court bases his representations on the ‘vibe’ 
of the Australian Constitution. The term has since passed into the contemporary Australian 
parlance and has even been invoked in recent legal proceedings (Marsden's Law Group, 2012). 
122 At various times over recent decades, the British and Australian Labor/Labour Parties have 
looked to the other for policy and tactical inspiration (Scott, 2000:1-10). 
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123 Wilson (2008) points out that South Australia was a proving ground for social inclusion 
strategies drawing on the British model as early as 2002. 
124 O’Flynn, however, cautions that governments tend to label a wide spectrum of engagements 
with non-state actors as ‘collaboration’, and questions whether commercial-style contracts for 
the delivery of public services can be regarded as being inherently ‘collaborative’ (O'Flynn, 
2008:187-188). 
125 The Platform for the Australian Labor Party’s 46th National Conference states, ‘Labor is a 
party of community. As a nation we are at our best when we are working together for the 
common good. Individual self-interest alone does not create a fair and decent society. We are 
committed to a society in which every person is treated with respect and dignity and can 
actively participate and contribute to the life of their community. Labor believes a strong and 
resilient not for profit sector is part of the nation’s social economy, working to provide services 
and opportunities that enrich Australian lives. We will work to strengthen them and improve 
their skills and capabilities. We recognise the contribution of philanthropy and will work to 
foster a regulatory environment, which fosters a culture of giving. We celebrate diversity and 
respect the rights and responsibilities of Australian citizenship.’ (ALP, 2011, article 16) 
126 Stephens’ thesis, Bridging the service divide: new approaches to servicing the regions, 1996-
2001 (2005), examines Australian policy responses to issues of regional service delivery in an 
environment in which many institutional arrangements have been transformed by reforms based 
on the precepts of new public management. 
127 Gillard characterised the Canadian experience as ‘an experiment which is currently being 
unpicked by a Howard Government-inspired counter-revolution in social policy, which is 
meeting with huge public resistance.’ (Gillard, 2007:108). 
128 Source: Productivity Commission, http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/not-for-profit 
129 Source: Terms of Reference for the Not-For-Profit Reform Council, available at: 
http://www.notforprofit.gov.au/about-us/terms_reference 
130 Source: Reform Council Working Groups, available at: 
http://www.notforprofit.gov.au/about-office/not-profit-sector-reform/not-profit-sector-reform-
council/reform-council-working-groups 
131 David Locke is seconded from the Charity Commission of England and Wales as Chief 
Adviser to the Taskforce. Source: 
http://acnctaskforce.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=about/advisor.htm 
132 Source: http://www.economicstimulusplan.gov.au/pages/theplan.aspx 
133 Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/australia/government-budget 
134 Key among these were a radical overhaul of hospitals funding, the establishment of an 
emissions trading scheme, and the imposition of a resource super profits tax. The former met 
trenchant resistance from some state governments, and the latter saw the mobilization of a 
vociferous campaign on the part of climate change skeptics and Australia’s largest mining 
companies. 
135 Source: Roy Morgan Research, Consumer confidence falls to 113.4 (down 2.3pts in a week) 
lowest in 2012. Available at: http://www.roymorgan.com/news/polls/2012/1590/ 
136 With the exception of Queensland – whose upper house, the ‘Legislative Council’, was 
abolished in 1922 – the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. 
137 David Lange’s Labour government succeeded Robert Muldoon’s National Party government 
in 1984. Leadership changes in the Labour party saw Lange succeeded by Geoffrey Palmer 
(1989-90) and Michael Moore (1990). 
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138 Martin argues that by the mid-1990s, ‘the traditional boundaries of New Zealand's labor 
movement have been dismantled by the radical reforms of the 1980s and 1990s’ (Martin, 
1996:177). However, even David Lange, who with Roger Douglas had initiated New Zealand’s 
radical neo-liberal reforms, seemed to have harboured reservations towards the end of his Prime 
Ministership. He signalled a pause to reform when he said to an Australian audience in Canberra 
in August 1988, ‘But what say we sort of have a little breather here and then set off on the road 
again after we have picked up the casualties and had a cuppa’ (citing Pope, 2011, Stone, 2011). 
139 Larner and Craig caution that the rhetoric of ‘partnership’ might simply mark a form of 
‘hybridisation’ through which an increasing ‘bureaucratised’ NFP sector is further co-opted 
within a neo-liberal paradigm of market-based governance (Larner and Craig, 2005). They 
suggest that ‘[p]artnerships have only recently explicitly entered into policy discourse in 
Aotearoa New Zealand and are most commonly understood to be an integral aspect of the third 
phase of neoliberalism: a response to the fragmentation of services associated with the earlier 
phases of neoliberal reforms’ (Larner and Craig, 2005:407). 
140 The Accord is signed by Prime Minister, John Key, Minister for the Community and 
Voluntary Sector, Tariana Turia, and the Associate Minister for the Community and Voluntary 
Sector, Hekia Parata. 
141 It should be noted that the charge of ‘fragmentation’ to some extent flies in the face of 
practical realities. As noted by the Controller and Auditor-General, procedural guidance ‘cannot 
be applied equally in all circumstances’ and attempts to apply uniform processes can 
‘sometimes be counter-productive’ (OAG, 2006b). 
142 'National umbrella organisations' is the preferred term for what, in Australia are usually 
called ‘peak organisations’, and in the UK are called ‘intermediary organisations’. 
143 Silos can prevail between New Zealand government ministers as well as departments: sector 
representatives recounted occasions of being quizzed by ministers about the positions or actions 
of ministerial colleagues – a situation the sector attributes, in part to the dynamics of multi-party 
coalition government (personal communication, 13 December 2010a). 
144 A prime example being the Guidelines for Contracting with Non-Government Organisations 
for Services Sought by the Crown produced by the Treasury (The Treasury, 2009). 
145 Steve Maharey, Minister for Social Services and Employment from 1999-2003 made the 
following observations: ‘In the United Kingdom, high level agreements have been achieved 
between the Government and the voluntary and community sectors in England, Wales, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland. Each of these agreements (called ‘compacts’) has been developed along 
similar lines but through consultation processes better suited to each region. The 
implementation of these ‘compacts’ has been dropped down to the local government level and it 
is there that their future will be determined. Canada has taken a different route to consultation 
by establishing Joint Tables, which have outlined a series of methods to encourage development 
of the sector and promote collaboration with government. Community and voluntary 
organisations in both countries have been drawn to these approaches in response to central 
Government’s withdrawal from providing a range of services. Along with this expanded role for 
the not-for-profit sector has come the demand for increased accountability from government and 
the pressures that brings. These pressures have placed substantial strain on the whole voluntary 
sector infrastructure. In New Zealand, the Government has already flagged a need to re-examine 
the nature of contracts in dialogue with community and iwi organisations. In addition, a project 
to find practical ways to minimise funding compliance costs is also in progress.’ (Maharey, 
2000d) 
146 Elsewhere in the speech from which these remarks are extracted, Maharey defines ‘New 
Times’ as follows: ‘Stated succinctly, the New Times argument was that the world had changed 
and that societies like our own were increasingly characterised by diversity, differentiation and 
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fragmentation rather than homogeneity, standardization and the economies of scale that 
characterised 20th century society.’ (Maharey, 2003) 
147 It is interesting to note here the Australian connections with Mulgan, who with Tom Bentley 
and John McTernan, have influenced contemporary Australian Labor policy, and Mark Latham, 
a former leader of the Australian Labor Party who has written extensively on social capital 
(Butcher, 2006).  
148 Sir Stuart Etherington has been the Chief Executive of Britain’s National Council of 
Volunteer Organisations since 1994. 
149 Pākehā is a Maori term for New Zealanders of predominantly European descent, although it 
is sometimes it is applied more widely to include all non-Māori. The term has largely passed 
into common usage. 
150 Twyford cites personal communications with sources in New Zealand umbrella 
organisations, some of whom were also interviewed for this study. 
151 In 1998, amid concerns that the funding model employed by government ‘promoted a lack of 
trust and goodwill’, the National government threatened a forced merger of the three principal 
umbrella organisations under a single, substantially reduced, funding contract (Twyford, 
2008:6-7, Prestidge, 2010:70-71). 
152 Tāngata whenua is a Māori term referring to the indigenous peoples of New Zealand that has 
now entered into formal policy and political usage. 
153 The Steering Group’s report and recommendations might have been seen by the government 
as a case of letting the genii out of the bottle as they seemed to go beyond the initial brief to 
address three priority areas: improving participatory processes around developing and making 
policy; reviewing resourcing and accountability arrangements; and strengthening the 
community sector itself (Maharey, 2001). 
154 Similar forays into social capital research were initiated in Australia by the Howard 
Government – social capital being a concept that can be interpreted in support of conservative 
conceptualisations of civil society as standing apart from the state (Butcher, 2006).  
155 O’Brien et al. contend that that part of the Labour Party manifesto committing to address 
concerns about the relationship between the government and the NFP sector were ‘drafted in 
response to lobbying by key national and umbrella community organisation leaders before the 
November 1999 General Election’ (O'Brien et al., 2009:17). 
156 Labour had called an early election on the pretext of the collapse of its junior coalition 
partner the Alliance Party. Following the election, Labour governed with the support of the left-
wing Progressive Coalition, and with a supply and confidence agreement with the United 
Futures Party. 
157 Although Maharey relinquished the Community and Voluntary Sector portfolio in 2002, he 
continued to hold senior cabinet-level portfolios. In October 2007 Maharey announced his 
intention to resign from cabinet to take up a position as the Vice Chancellor at Massey 
University (Trevett, 2007). 
158 Work on the Good Practice Participate website was begun in 2002 as a result of discussions 
between community and government representatives. The aim of the website is to promote good 
practice ideas across the whole of government. See 
http://www.goodpracticeparticipate.govt.nz/tools/about-this-site.html  
159 The object of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 was to ‘to preserve the public foreshore 
and seabed in perpetuity as the common heritage of all New Zealanders in a way that enables 
the protection by the Crown of the public foreshore and seabed on behalf of all the people of 
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New Zealand, including the protection of the association of whānau, hapū, and iwi with areas of 
the public foreshore and seabed.’  
160 In a 2010 speech, Tariana Turia described whānau ora as being ‘about transforming social 
service delivery so that services are focused on the needs of whānau [family or extended family] 
rather than only responding to the specific issue that an individual has presented with at a 
service … That means taking an all-of- whānau approach; demonstrating a spirit of 
collaboration between funders, providers, practitioners and Whānau to enable coherent service 
delivery, effective resourcing and competent and innovative provision’. She added that, ‘In 
policy-speak, I am expecting a transformation from output based, tick-box contracts to outcome 
based relational contracts’ (Turia, 2010). 
161 Mana whenua refers to the exercise of traditional authority over an area of land: see Te 
Kāhui Māngai (Directory of Iwi and Māori Organisations) http://www.tkm.govt.nz/glossary/  
162 The Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 contributed to the co-founding of the Māori Party by 
Turia and former academic Pita Sharples. The Act was subsequently repealed in 2011 by section 
5 of the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, which restored ‘customary 
interests’ extinguished by the Foreshore and Seabed Act. 
163 It was suggested that the 2010 appointment of National ‘List’163 MP, Hekia Parata, as 
Associate Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector might be indicative of a desire by 
the National Party to forge a more direct link with the sector (personal communication, 13 
December 2010a). Sector representatives also noted that Parata has substantive Cabinet level 
responsibilities and is, therefore, senior to Turia. This, it was suggested, might be a sign of some 
dissatisfaction with Turia’s performance (personal communication, 13 December 2010b). One 
sector representative pointed to rumours that Parata had been tasked to ‘get on the tail’ of the 
Minister because ‘the Prime Minister is getting “stick” from the sector and he doesn’t like it’ 
(personal communication, 13 December 2010a). 
164 Goodhew is a minister outside cabinet and, in addition to the Community and Voluntary 
Sector portfolio she holds the portfolios of Minister for Senior Citizens and Minister of 
Women's Affairs, as well as Associate Minister of Health (Littlewood, 2011). 
165 MBIE is due to report back to Cabinet on this in November 2013. The contract management 
framework will be ‘suitable for bilateral and integrated contracting arrangements’ and will 
incorporate ‘performance measures that are linked to NGOs’ contributions to the Crown 
purchaser’s desired outcomes’ (Goodhew, 2012b). 
166 OCVS staff interviewed for this study pointed out that just making the unit bigger would not 
give it more influence. Where the agency ranks in the hierarchy of government priorities and 
governance is more important, and the functions of the OCVS were not at the time considered to 
be of major importance to government (personal communication, 14 December 2010a). The fact 
that the OCVS was accountable through the Chief Executive of the department in which it is 
situated (currently the DIA) rather than to the Minister directly also had obvious and 
unavoidable implications insofar as the Office needed to be mindful of its host department’s 
perspectives and priorities when framing its advice (personal communication, 14 December 
2010b). 
167 It should be noted that funding for the review was approved by the then Labour Minister for 
the Community and Voluntary Sector, Ruth Dyson, in mid-2008, not long before the change of 
government. ANGOA’s report, Good Intentions (ANGOA, 2009) set out 15 recommendations 
to which Minister Turia responded – together with the report of the BBGE reference group – in 
her Cabinet Paper (Cabinet Social Policy Committee, 2009). Among its recommendations, 
ANGOA advocated the establishment of a ‘Treaty of Waitangi Commission’. The National-led 
government announced in 2010 that it would undertake a wide-ranging review of constitutional 
matters, including the size of Parliament, the length of the electoral term, Maori representation, 
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the role of the Treaty of Waitangi and whether New Zealand needs a written constitution. The 
review would occur over three years (English and Sharples, 2010). 
168 The name of the framework document would eventually change from ‘relationship 
agreement’ to ‘relationship accord’. 
169 The Minister’s original intention was to finalise the agreement and seek Cabinet approval by 
October 2010. It was proposed that government ministers would sign the agreement in 
November 2010 at an inaugural event convened for the purpose. 
170 Formerly the New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations. 
171 The relationship between government, the NFP sector and the ‘tāngata whenua’ is a ‘vexed’ 
one with constitutional and sovereignty implications for Māori. Although there has been strong 
community sector support for ‘separate and related Maori and non-Maori work streams’ in 
relation to government-sector relationships this has ‘always been resisted by the government’ 
(personal communication, 13 December 2010a). According to the sector, it is only with the 
advent of contracting that one sees the emergence of Māori organisations that are not ‘iwi 
based’ (personal communication, 13 December 2010a). And although some Māori engage with 
policy processes via Pakeha organisations, more ‘traditional’ Māori regard the Treaty of 
Waitangi as their primary relationship with the Crown – a relationship that in the eyes of Māori 
is about shared governance (personal communication, 15 December 2010). In that light, 
instruments such as the Relationship Accord are considered to be largely irrelevant to their 
interests (personal communication, 13 December 2010b). 
172 This phrase is a fairly free borrowing from American humourist, Ambrose Bierce’s 
definition of a cynic, being: ‘A blackguard whose faulty vision sees things as they are not as 
they ought to be.’ (From the Devil’s Dictionary, by Ambrose Bierce, University of Georgia 
Press, 2002, first published 1911). 
173 The names of the persons in question could not be recalled, and the story might well be 
apocryphal, however it has a ring of authenticity in a state much subject to social and cultural 
influences from the mainland state of Victoria. 
174 With regard to Scotland, Cairney points out that the system of devolved government was to a 
large extent designed from a ‘blank slate’, thereby allowing new practices, norms and 
expectations to evolve over a relatively short time (Cairney, 2013 (forthcoming)). The same 
could be said of the Welsh and Northern Ireland Assemblies. The new administrations were 
therefore relatively unencumbered by political ‘baggage’ from Westminster. 
175 And in the case of Wales, enshrined in its enabling legislation. 
176 In an article that pre-dated the first compacts, Lloyd (1990) pointed to the emergence of two 
contrasting discourses that had arisen in response to the contemporary welfare state: one, the 
‘liberal’ discourse argued for breaking the state monopoly on the policy-making process through 
increased opportunities for popular participation; the other, the ‘conservative’ discourse argued 
against what its proponents see as an excessive dependence on the state and excessive state 
intrusion into the lives of citizens. Notwithstanding the obvious differences between the two 
discourses, Lloyd observed that when translated into policy recommendations, both extolled the 
virtues of the informal sector (informal family and social networks) and the voluntary sector. 
Lloyd asks whether voluntary sector organisations can sustain a role as critic and innovator 
while at the same time serving as a junior partner to the state.   Lloyd considered that the 
independence of voluntary sector organisations would inevitably be threatened as a consequence 
of an increased dependence upon government funding, citing prohibitions on policy 
commentary as a condition of funding from statutory sources in the UK at the time of writing. 
Lloyd warned of a ‘colonisation’ of the voluntary sector by government, rendering NFP 
organisations subordinate to statutory agencies and resulting in their losing sight of their 
original objectives (Lloyd 1990:252). 
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<NAME> 
<TITLE> 
<ORGANISATION> 
<ADDRESS> 
«COUNTRY» 
 
Dear <NAME> 
I am conducting research for a PhD dissertation on the subject of the National Compact 
between the Australian Government and the not-for-profit sector.  
The National Compact represents an important development in the national policy framework 
governing the relationship between the Australian Government and the broad range of not-for-
profit organisations that comprise Australia’s Third Sector.  
It is my intention to chart the history and assess the prospects of the National Compact and will 
proceed, in part, by comparing the Compact with policy instruments in place, or in prospect, in 
other Australian and overseas jurisdictions. The National Compact will be compared along 
various dimensions including: the process through which it was developed and ratified; the 
resources and administrative arrangements allocated for its implementation; and, its likely 
practical effects on the relationship between government and the not-for-profit sector. 
This research is expected to make an important contribution to the understanding of institutional 
and organisational behaviour within collaborative frameworks. The benefits of this research will 
flow to decision-makers and policy practitioners in government and the not-for-profit sectors and 
will build on knowledge available to researchers in public policy and administration. 
I wish to invite the participation of the <ORGANISATION> in this research project. I seek your 
approval to interview an employee of your organisation – nominated by you – who has authority 
to represent the organisation and who possesses relevant knowledge of the policy frameworks 
governing relationships between the government and not-for-profit sectors. 
The interview will take the form of a guided discussion and is expected to take about one hour. 
At the interview I will confirm both orally and in writing the consent of interviewees to: (a) 
participate in the interview; and (b) to have a voice recording made of the interview as an aide 
memoire. It will be made clear that the interviewee is completely free to decline either request. A 
written report of the interview will be provided in draft form to interviewees for confirmation or 
correction. Attached to this letter is an Information Sheet that more fully describes the research 
project together with a Consent Form. 
If you agree to participate, please sign and return the attached consent form together with the 
name and contact details of your nominee(s) to the following address: 
John Butcher 
School of Politics and International Relations 
Old Canberra House 
Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200 
or via email to: john.butcher@anu.edu.au   
I look forward to your response. 
Kind regards, 
John Butcher 
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CONSENT FORM 
1. I, <NAME> «POSITION», consent to the <ORGANSATION> taking part in the National 
Compact research project. I have read the information sheet for this project and understand the 
nature and purpose of the research project, so far as it affects the <ORGANISATION>. This 
consent is freely given.  
2. I understand that by agreeing to participate in the research project such agreement will entail 
my nominating a person or persons employed by this organisation to participate in an interview 
of approximately one hour in duration.  
3. I understand that the interview will involve questions about this organisation’s participation in 
government/not-for-profit policy initiatives.  
4. I understand that while information gained during the research project may be published in 
academic journals or books, the name and position title of interviewees will not be used in 
relation to any of the information they have provided, unless the interviewee explicitly indicates 
that they are willing to be identified when quoted.  
5. I understand that any personal, sensitive or potentially incriminating information will be kept 
confidential so far as the law allows. This form and any other data collected throughout the 
duration of the interview will be stored separately in a locked office at the Australian National 
University. Data entered onto a computer will be kept in a computer accessible only by 
password by the researcher, John Butcher.  
6. I understand that although any comments made by interviewees will not be attributed to them 
in any publication; it is possible that others might guess the source of information, and 
interviewees should therefore avoid disclosing information which is of confidential status or 
which is defamatory of any person or organisation.  
7. I understand that this organisation and its nominated interviewees may withdraw from the 
research project at any stage, without providing any reason and that this will not have any 
adverse consequences for this organisation. If this organisation withdraws, the information 
provided at interview will not be used by the project.  
8. I understand that my nominees will be asked to verbally indicate their consent to participate in 
interviews and that their consent will be sought in relation to making a voice recording of the 
interview and that interviewees will be completely free to decline to participate and/or to have a 
voice recording made of their interview. 
  
 
Signature: ___________________________________ 
 
Date ______ / _______ / 20_______ 
 
Position/Title: _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Name of organisation: __________________________________________________________ 
 
Telephone: _______________________ Email: ______________________________________ 
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Cooperation Agreements Between Governments and 
the Not-for-Profit Sector – experience and prospects 
Project Overview 
The object of this doctoral research is to assess the processes leading to, and the prospects for 
a National Compact between the Commonwealth Government and the not-for-profit sector. This 
research will entail a review of strategies and processes established by the Commonwealth 
Government to give effect to the National Compact together with a comparative analysis of the 
policy frameworks pursued in other national and sub-national jurisdictions for ostensibly similar 
purposes: viz. to encourage and support more effective collaboration between the government 
and not-for-profit sectors. This examination of the national government’s efforts will take into 
account the comparative experience of state and territory governments.  
Why am I carrying out this research?  
The research project aims to chart the history and assess the prospects of a Commonwealth 
government policy initiative – the creation of a National Compact. The research will consider:  
• the rationale and drivers of this initiative;  
• the respective roles, priorities and perceptions of the parties to the Compact;  
• the political and process dimensions of the policy and its implementation;  
• the comparative experience of other Australian and overseas jurisdictions; and  
• the expectations and experiences of those with a stake in the implementation of the 
policy.  
This research will proceed, in part, by comparing the Australian Government's National 
Compact with policy instruments in place, or in prospect in other Australian and overseas 
jurisdictions. The National Compact will be compared along various dimensions including: the 
process through which it was developed and ratified; the resources and administrative 
arrangements allocated for its implementation; and, its likely practical effects on the relationship 
between government and the not-for-profit sector. 
The benefits of this research will flow to decision-makers and policy professionals in 
government and the not-for-profit sectors and will build on knowledge available to scholarly 
researchers in public policy and administration. 
What does this research involve?  
This research will depend heavily on a thorough analysis of primary and secondary 
documentation. This will be supplemented by fieldwork comprised of semi-structured interviews 
with selected informants in government and the not-for-profit sector.  
There are two broad target groups for interviews. The first is comprised of senior officials of 
national and sub-national government agencies that have a significant interface with not-for-
profit organisations. The second is comprised of senior personnel of national and sub-national 
peak not-for-profit organisations. 
Confidentiality 
Participation in interviews is purely voluntary and there will be no adverse consequences from 
any decision not to participate. Participants may withdraw and, if they choose to withdraw, any 
information provided by them will not be used. The results of this research will be reported in a 
doctoral thesis and may be published in academic journals or books. The names of individuals 
or their position titles will not be reported in connection with any of the information collected 
during interviews, unless they have explicitly consented to be identified.  
Transcripts/summaries of responses will be provided to participants for further comment or 
correction as soon as possible after the interview. Once published, the results of this research 
will be made available upon request. The interview instrument has not been designed to elicit 
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any information that is personal, confidential, sensitive or potentially incriminating in nature. It is 
important to stress that participants may refuse to answer any given question without 
consequence. Should participants have any further concerns about confidentiality and 
anonymity, please raise the issue prior to, or during the course of the interview so that 
assurances can be made that specific information is not reported or published. 
Consent 
The Chief Executive Officer of organisations contacted to participate in this study (or their 
delegate) will be asked to confirm their agreement in writing (including email) either by letter or 
using the attached Consent Form. CEOs will also be asked to nominate a primary point of 
contact in the organisation for the purposes of arranging an interview. All interviews, unless 
indicated otherwise by participating organisations, will be conducted on the organisation’s 
premises. It is expected that interviews will take approximately one hour. At the time of the 
interview, the interviewer will: 
a. obtain the written consent of the interviewee to participate in the interview 
b. obtain the written consent of the interviewee to make a voice recording of the 
interview 
c. confirm verbally and in writing that the interviewee has read and understands the 
information sheet and the purpose of the interview 
d. confirm the interviewer’s undertaking to provide a written record of the interview to the 
interviewee for confirmation or correction. 
It is expected that most interviewees will be interviewed once, although it is possible that 
supplementary questions or clarification might be required on occasion. 
Contact names and phone numbers  
If you have any questions, comments or complaints about this research, please do not hesitate 
to contact:  
John Butcher, School of Politics and International Relations, Research School of Social 
Sciences, The Australian National University, Australian Capital Territory, 0200. Tel. 0438 630 
561 Email. john.butcher@anu.edu.au  
Professor John Wanna, School of Politics and International Relations, Research School of 
Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Australian Capital Territory, 0200.  Tel. 61 
2 6125 2134 Email john.wanna@anu.edu.au  
Dr Janine O’Flynn, Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National 
University, Australian Capital Territory, 0200.  Tel. 61 2 6125 9825  Email 
janine.oflynn@anu.edu.au  
If you have any concerns regarding the way the research was conducted you can also contact 
the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee: Human Ethics Officer Human Research Ethics 
Committee, The Australian National University Tel. 61 2 6125 7945  Email: 
human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au   
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SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR SELECTED COMMONWEALTH 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND NATIONAL NOT-FOR-PROFIT PEAK BODIES 
Title: The National Compact: An examination an Australian initiative to re-
set the terms of engagement between government and the not-for-profit 
sector  
Respondents:  nominated representatives of selected Commonwealth government 
agencies and national not-for-profit peak bodies 
Preamble: The object of this research is to assess the processes leading to and the prospects for 
a National Compact between the Commonwealth Government and the not-for-profit 
sector. The following questions are intended to elicit information about: the history 
of this initiative; the processes guiding its development; the resources and strategies 
applied; key capability and capacity issues affecting its implementation; and 
participants’ perceptions of both the process and its prospects. 
Interview: The interviews will follow a semi-structured approach, using nine broad questions to 
guide general conversation.  
Confidentiality: Participation in this interview is purely voluntary and there will be no adverse 
consequences if you decide not to participate. You may withdraw from participation 
and, if you choose to withdraw, any information you provide will not be used. The 
results of this research will be reported in a doctoral thesis and may be published in 
academic journals or books. The names of individuals or their position titles will not 
be reported in connection with any of the information collected during interviews, 
unless they have explicitly consented to be identified. Transcripts/summaries of 
responses will be provided to participants for further comment or correction as soon 
as possible after the interview. Once published, the results of this research will be 
made available upon request. The interview instrument has not been designed to 
elicit any information that is personal, confidential, sensitive or potentially 
incriminating in nature. It is important to stress that you may refuse to answer any 
given question without consequence. Should you have any further concerns about 
confidentiality and anonymity, please raise the issue prior to, or during the course of 
the interview so that assurances can be made that specific information is not 
reported or published. 
Contact names and phone numbers  
If you have any questions, comments or complaints about this research, please do not hesitate to contact:  
John Butcher, School of Politics and International Relations, Research School of Social Sciences, The 
Australian National University, Australian Capital Territory, 0200. Tel. 0438 630 561 Email. 
john.butcher@anu.edu.au  
Professor John Wanna, School of Politics and International Relations, Research School of Social 
Sciences, The Australian National University, Australian Capital Territory, 0200.  Tel. 61 2 6125 2134 
Email john.wanna@anu.edu.au  
Dr Janine O’Flynn, Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University, 
Australian Capital Territory, 0200.  Tel. 61 2 6125 9825  Email janine.oflynn@anu.edu.au  
If you have any concerns regarding the way the research was conducted you can also contact the ANU 
Human Research Ethics Committee: Human Ethics Officer Human Research Ethics Committee, The 
Australian National University Tel. 61 2 2 6125 7945  Email: human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au   
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QUESTIONS 
1. How would you describe the current situation with regard to the implementation of 
the National Compact announced by the Prime Minister on 17 March 2010? (For 
example: has progress exceeded or fallen short of expectations? Respondents will be asked 
to identify any relevant public documents.) 
2. What role does your (department/agency/organisation) play in relation to the 
development/implementation of the National Compact? (For example: does the 
organisation lead with respect to carriage of the policy? does the organisation participate in 
formal deliberative, decision-making or advisory structures?) 
3. What do you consider to have been the major challenges to date in bringing the 
National Compact to the current situation (as described in Q1)? (For example: were 
resources sufficient? was the level of knowledge/expertise adequate or appropriate? was 
there a clear assignment of roles and responsibilities? was communication effective? was it 
difficult to gain the trust/cooperation of participants?) 
4. Please describe the principle organisational participants and their respective roles and 
contributions to the development and implementation of the National Compact? (For 
example: what roles do they play with regard to policy development, provision of advice, 
policy implementation, program administration, monitoring or advisory functions? 
Respondents might be asked to draw a ‘mud-map’ describing the approximate relationship 
between participants and/or key policy domains.) 
a. What challenges, if any, have you encountered in getting ‘buy-in’ from other 
players in this policy space? 
5. What aspects of the policy development process and implementation framework for 
the National Compact are working/have not worked well? (i.e. is the policy process or 
implementation framework delivering the desired outcomes?) 
a. To what do you attribute these successes? 
6. What aspects of the policy development process and implementation framework for 
the National Compact are not working /have not worked as well as one would like? 
(i.e. in what respects is the process or policy framework failing to deliver the desired 
outcomes?) 
a. To what do you attribute these shortcomings? 
b. If given the opportunity to do things differently, what might you change? 
7. To what extent has the policy development process and implementation framework for 
the National Compact taken account of similar initiatives in other national or sub-
national jurisdictions? (For example, the UK Compacts, Canada’s Accord, or similar 
policy instruments in Australian states and territories?) 
8. Do you expect the National Compact to make a material difference to the effectiveness 
of the government – not-for-profit sector relationship in Australia? 
a. Can you offer some reasons for your answer? 
9. What do you see as the principal challenges or risks to the successful implementation 
of the National Compact? 
a. What would success ‘look like?’ 
END OF INTERVIEW 
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SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR SELECTED STATE/TERRITORY 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT PEAK BODIES 
Title: The National Compact: An examination an Australian initiative to re-
set the terms of engagement between government and the not-for-profit 
sector 
Respondents:  nominated representatives of selected state/territory government 
agencies and not-for-profit peak bodies 
Preamble: The object of this research is to assess the processes leading to and the prospects for 
a National Compact between the Commonwealth Government and the not-for-profit 
sector. Australia presents a unique case amongst countries that have implemented 
national compacts or accords in that sub-national governments here preceded the 
national government in pursuing similar policy instruments for cooperation. 
Consequently, any examination of the national government’s efforts ought to take 
into account the comparative experience of state and territory governments. The 
following questions are intended to elicit information about the experience in 
(state/territory) with such policy instruments. 
Interview: The interviews will follow a semi-structured approach, using eight broad questions 
to guide general conversation.  
Confidentiality: Participation in this interview is purely voluntary and there will be no adverse 
consequences if you decide not to participate. You may withdraw from participation 
and, if you choose to withdraw, any information you provide will not be used. The 
results of this research will be reported in a doctoral thesis and may be published in 
academic journals or books. The names of individuals or their position titles will not 
be reported in connection with any of the information collected during interviews, 
unless they have explicitly consented to be identified. Transcripts/summaries of 
responses will be provided to participants for further comment or correction as soon 
as possible after the interview. Once published, the results of this research will be 
made available upon request. The interview instrument has not been designed to 
elicit any information that is personal, confidential, sensitive or potentially 
incriminating in nature. It is important to stress that you may refuse to answer any 
given question without consequence. Should you have any further concerns about 
confidentiality and anonymity, please raise the issue prior to, or during the course of 
the interview so that assurances can be made that specific information is not 
reported or published. 
Contact names and phone numbers  
If you have any questions, comments or complaints about this research, please do not hesitate to contact:  
John Butcher, School of Politics and International Relations, Research School of Social Sciences, The 
Australian National University, Australian Capital Territory, 0200. Tel. 0438 630 561 Email. 
john.butcher@anu.edu.au  
Professor John Wanna, School of Politics and International Relations, Research School of Social 
Sciences, The Australian National University, Australian Capital Territory, 0200.  Tel. 61 2 6125 2134 
Email john.wanna@anu.edu.au  
Dr Janine O’Flynn, Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University, 
Australian Capital Territory, 0200.  Tel. 61 2 6125 9825  Email janine.oflynn@anu.edu.au  
If you have any concerns regarding the way the research was conducted you can also contact the ANU 
Human Research Ethics Committee: Human Ethics Officer Human Research Ethics Committee, The 
Australian National University Tel. 61 2 2 6125 7945  Email: human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au  
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QUESTIONS 
1. Could you briefly outline for me the current situation in (state/territory) with regard 
to formal policy instruments supporting government – not-for-profit sector 
engagement and/or cooperation? (For example: what instruments are in place? what 
processes or frameworks are in place/being developed/or in prospect for the purposes of 
supporting government – not-for-profit sector engagement? Respondents will be asked to 
identify any relevant public documents.) 
2. Could you briefly outline the history of efforts in (state/territory) with regard to the 
development of policy frameworks for government – not-for-profit sector engagement 
and/or cooperation? (For example: when did work begin on the current policy framework? 
what events or foundation documents/studies or initiatives gave impetus to the current 
policy? what policy frameworks/initiatives preceded the current policy settings?) 
3. What role does your (department/agency/organisation) play at present in relation to 
the policy framework for government – not-for-profit sector cooperation? (For 
example: does the organisation lead with respect to carriage of the policy? does the 
organisation participate in formal deliberative, decision-making or advisory structures?) 
4. Please describe the principle organisational participants and their respective roles and 
contributions to the policy framework for cooperation? (For example: what roles do 
they play with regard to policy development, provision of advice, policy implementation, 
program administration, monitoring or advisory functions? Respondents might be asked to 
draw a ‘mud-map’ describing the approximate relationship between participants and/or key 
policy domains.) 
a. What challenges, if any, have you encountered in getting ‘buy-in’ from 
other players in this policy space? 
5. What aspects of the policy process/framework in (state/territory) are working/have not 
worked well? (i.e. is the process or policy framework delivering the desired outcomes?) 
a. To what do you attribute these successes? 
6. What aspects of the policy process/framework in (state/territory) are not working 
/have not worked as well as one would like? (i.e. in what respects is the process or policy 
framework failing to deliver the desired outcomes?) 
a. To what do you attribute these shortcomings? 
b. If given the opportunity to do things differently, what might you change? 
7. Are you aware of what has occurred/is occurring in this policy space in other states 
and territories? 
a. How do you feel the policy framework for government – not-for-profit 
sector cooperation in (state/territory) compares to what has occurred/is 
occurring in other jurisdictions? 
8. What implications do you see, if any, for the policy framework for government – not-
for-profit sector cooperation in this state/territory of the National Compact announced 
by the Prime Minister in March 2010? 
a. How well does the state/territory policy framework align with the 
framework being developed by the Commonwealth? 
b. What lessons might the state/territory experience offer the Commonwealth 
as work continues on the Compact implementation? 
END OF INTERVIEW 
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SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR SELECTED NEW ZEALAND 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT PEAK BODIES 
 
Title: The National Compact: An examination an Australian initiative to re-
set the terms of engagement between government and the not-for-profit 
sector 
Respondents:  nominated representatives of selected New Zealand government 
agencies and not-for-profit peak bodies 
Preamble: The object of this research is to assess the processes leading to and the prospects for 
a National Compact between the Commonwealth Government and the not-for-profit 
sector. To some degree the Australian Government has modelled this initiative on 
the approaches taken by national governments in the UK and Canada. The following 
questions are intended to elicit information about New Zealand’s experience with 
policy and/or strategies intended to encourage engagement and collaboration 
between government and the not-for-profit sector. Of particular interest for this 
research is the apparent decision by New Zealand governments to not pursue a 
Compact model. 
Interview: The interviews will follow a semi-structured approach, using nine broad questions to 
guide general conversation.  
Confidentiality: Participation in this interview is purely voluntary and there will be no adverse 
consequences if you decide not to participate. You may withdraw from participation 
and, if you choose to withdraw, any information you provide will not be used. The 
results of this research will be reported in a doctoral thesis and may be published in 
academic journals or books. The names of individuals or their position titles will not 
be reported in connection with any of the information collected during interviews, 
unless they have explicitly consented to be identified. Transcripts/summaries of 
responses will be provided to participants for further comment or correction as soon 
as possible after the interview. Once published, the results of this research will be 
made available upon request. The interview instrument has not been designed to 
elicit any information that is personal, confidential, sensitive or potentially 
incriminating in nature. It is important to stress that you may refuse to answer any 
given question without consequence. Should you have any further concerns about 
confidentiality and anonymity, please raise the issue prior to, or during the course of 
the interview so that assurances can be made that specific information is not 
reported or published. 
Contact names and phone numbers  
If you have any questions, comments or complaints about this research, please do not hesitate to contact:  
John Butcher, School of Politics and International Relations, Research School of Social Sciences, The 
Australian National University, Australian Capital Territory, 0200. Tel. 0438 630 561 Email. 
john.butcher@anu.edu.au  
Professor John Wanna, School of Politics and International Relations, Research School of Social 
Sciences, The Australian National University, Australian Capital Territory, 0200.  Tel. 61 2 6125 2134 
Email john.wanna@anu.edu.au  
Dr Janine O’Flynn, Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University, 
Australian Capital Territory, 0200.  Tel. 61 2 6125 9825  Email janine.oflynn@anu.edu.au  
If you have any concerns regarding the way the research was conducted you can also contact the ANU 
Human Research Ethics Committee: Human Ethics Officer Human Research Ethics Committee, The 
Australian National University Tel. 61 2 2 6125 7945  Email: human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au 
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QUESTIONS 
1. Could you briefly outline for me the current situation in New Zealand with regard to 
the policy and/or administrative framework supporting government – not-for-profit 
sector engagement and/or cooperation? (For example: what instruments/structures are in 
place? what processes or frameworks are in place/being developed/or in prospect for the 
purposes of supporting government – not-for-profit sector engagement? Respondents will 
be asked to identify any relevant public documents.) 
2. Could you briefly outline the history of New Zealand’s efforts with regard to the 
development of policy frameworks for government – not-for-profit sector engagement 
and/or cooperation? (For example: to what extent has active consideration been given to 
the potential for a Compact or similar policy instrument?) 
3. What role does your (department/agency/organisation) play at present in relation to 
the policy framework governing government – not-for-profit sector cooperation? (For 
example: does the organisation lead with respect to carriage of the policy? does the 
organisation participate in formal deliberative, decision-making or advisory structures?) 
4. Please describe the principle stakeholders in this policy space and their respective 
roles and contributions to the policy discourse around the issue of government – not-
for-profit cooperation? (For example: what roles do they play with regard to policy 
development, provision of advice, policy implementation, program administration, 
monitoring or advisory functions? Respondents might be asked to draw a ‘mud-map’ 
describing the approximate relationship between participants and/or key policy domains.) 
5. What aspects of the policy process/framework currently in place in New Zealand are 
working/have not worked well? (i.e. is the process or policy framework delivering the 
desired outcomes?) 
a. To what do you attribute these successes? 
6. What aspects of the policy process/framework currently in place in New Zealand are 
not working /have not worked as well as one would like? (i.e. in what respects is the 
process or policy framework failing to deliver the desired outcomes?) 
a. To what do you attribute these shortcomings? 
7. What challenges does New Zealand face in relation to the relationship between 
government and the not-for-profit sector? (For example: problems with asymmetry of 
information? the standing of the not-for-profit sector in formal policy discourses? capacity 
and capability deficits in public sector and not-for-profit sector organisations? managing 
and reporting performance in relation to purchase-of-service contracting?) 
8. How would you characterise the level of awareness in government and the not-for-
profit sector about the Australian National Compact? 
a. Have you observed any evidence of support for a Compact in New 
Zealand? (Respondents will be asked to nominate the sources and strength of 
support). 
9. Do you believe that a Compact or similar policy instrument offer any advantages for 
government – not –for-profit relationships in New Zealand? 
END OF INTERVIEW 
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Appendix 2 – English Compact & Canadian 
Accord  
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Figure A2.1 – 1998 Compact on relations between the government and the voluntary and 
community sector in England 
The original 1998 Compact enunciated the following broad principles: 
• Voluntary action is an essential component of democratic society. 
• An independent and diverse voluntary and community sector is fundamental to the well-being of 
society. 
• In the development and delivery of public policy and services, the Government and the voluntary and 
community sector have distinct but complementary roles. 
• There is added value in working in partnership towards common aims and objectives. Meaningful 
consultation builds relationships, improves policy development and enhances the design and delivery 
of services and programs.  
• The Government and the voluntary and community sector have different forms of accountability and 
are answerable to a different range of stakeholders. But common to both is the need for integrity, 
objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. 
• Voluntary and community organisations are entitled to campaign within the law in order to advance 
their aims. 
• The Government plays a significant role, among other things, as a funder of some voluntary and 
community organisations. Funding can be an important element of the relationship between 
Government and the voluntary and community sector. 
• Both Government and the voluntary and community sector acknowledge the importance of promoting 
equality of opportunity for all people, regardless of race, age, disability, gender, sexual orientation or 
religion (Home Office, 1998). 
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Figure A2.2 – Codes of Good Practice 
The original English Compact was complemented by the publication of five Codes of Good Practice 
providing practical guidance in relation to: 
1. Community Groups (2000) – the Code promoted recognition of the diversity and contribution of the 
community sector; set out the policies, consultative arrangements and support needed for the 
community sector to play an effective role in building local communities and improve access to the 
national Compact and Local Compacts (Commission for the Compact, 2003). 
2. Consultation and Policy Appraisal (2000) – The Code  provided guidance in relation to practical 
aspects of  effective community consultation to enable voluntary and community organisations to 
make an effective contribution to the development and implementation of policy (Home Office, 2000). 
3. Funding (2000) – The Code offered guidance on a comprehensive range of practical matters, 
including: core costs, matched funding, contracts for partnership-based initiatives, fair access to 
funding, voluntary and community sector infrastructure, the application process, joint funding bids, the 
assessment and notification process, feedback on grant applications, payment procedures and 
financial reporting and accounting and audit requirements (Home Office, 2005a). 
4. Volunteering (2000) – The Code set out good practices in relation to volunteering with the aim of 
enabling wider involvement in voluntary activity. It addressed issues such as investing in and 
promoting volunteering and community involvement; barriers to volunteering; strengthening 
volunteering infrastructure; and managing volunteers (Home Office, 2005b).  
5. Black and Minority Ethnic Voluntary and Community Organisations (2001) – The Code 
addressed ‘the exclusion experienced by the BME [black and minority ethnic] voluntary and 
community sector’ and set out principles and practices that enable improved policy and 
implementation outcomes for black and minority ethnic communities (Commission for the Compact, 
2001). 
Some of the Codes were revised in 2005 and were reprinted in 2008. However, they now appear to have 
been superseded by the most recent iteration of the Compact (HM Government, 2010). Although the 
documents no longer appear on the Home Office website, they still form part of the corpus of policy 
guidance documents used by some local governments in England. The Code on Consultation and Policy 
Appraisal was replaced in 2012 with a three-page guidance on Consultation Principles (Cabinet Office 
(UK), 2012).  
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Figure A2.3 – Local Authority Compacts 
In addition to the Codes of Good Practice, the NCVO published a set of Local Compact Guidelines in 2000 
with the aim of promoting and supporting the development of Compacts between voluntary organisations 
and local authorities (NCVO, 2000). The development of local compacts was ‘joined-up’ to other Labour 
initiatives, such as the ‘modernising local government initiative’ which saw a role for the NFP sector in 
facilitating community planning, an ‘active citizens’ initiative aimed at developing a participative culture at 
the local government level, and to tackling problems of social exclusion (McLaughlin and Osborne, 
2003:11). HM Treasury identified the extension of the Compact to the local sphere as essential, invoking 
the principle of subsidiarity (HM Treasury, 2002).  
The first local compact was signed in Dorset in 1999 and by 2006, 363 local compacts had been signed 
(although it should be noted that reorganisations of local government have resulted in a reduction in the 
number of local government authorities from 388 in 1998 to 353 in 2011) (Zimmeck and Rochester, 2011). 
By 2010 the Commission for the Compact claimed on its website that ‘100% of local areas in England are 
committed to better partnership working between local government, local public bodies and local voluntary 
and community organisations through Local Compacts’.  
A recent study by Zimmeck and Rochester (2011) estimates the national coverage of local compacts at 
around 92% after accounting for local government consolidations. Even so, the impact of local compacts is 
hard to gauge and it is difficult to ascertain the proportion of reported compacts that are ‘alive and kicking’ 
(Zimmeck and Rochester, 2011:10-12). 
A separate comparative case study of selected local government authorities prepared in 2010 for the 
Commission found that the ‘level of recognition of the Compact varied widely both within and across 
authorities’ and that benefits flowing from local compacts ‘varied according to the type of authority, the 
level of engagement with the [voluntary and community sector] and the maturity of partnership working in 
the area’ (Thornton and Jenkins, 2010:15). The report concluded that: 
Although implementing the Compact involves some investment in staff time and other 
resources, the great majority of local authorities reported that the benefits far outweighed 
the costs (Thornton and Jenkins, 2010:24). 
McLaughlin and Osborne (2003:12) noted that replicating the a newly structured collaborative arrangement 
between government and the sector at the local level posed ‘significant new challenges’. There was an 
early realisation that a ‘pro forma’ compact could not simply be cascaded downwards to the local level and 
a recognition that local compacts could have a much wider remit than originally thought (McLaughlin and 
Osborne, 2003:13-14). At the time of writing (2003) McLaughlin and Osborne had observed little evidence 
of that the principle of ‘co-governance’ founded on mutual trust had been embedded at the local level 
(McLaughlin and Osborne, 2003:21). They warned against the risks to the sector posed by the ‘three Is’: 
an incapacity to act independently; incorporation into the local state; and isomorphic pressures leading to a 
loss of sector identity (McLaughlin and Osborne, 2003:23). 
Although Zimmeck and Rochester (2011) note that the most recent iteration of the national Compact 
(2010) does not mention local compacts, they are relatively optimistic about local compact activity and 
suggest that there are areas where relations between local authorities and voluntary and community sector 
organisations have been improved as a result. They do express concern, however, that the ‘de-
prioritisation’ of the national Compact as a ‘flagship policy’ will ‘trickle down into the local arena’ (Zimmeck 
and Rochester, 2011:22). 
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Figure A2.4 – Between the rhetoric and the reality 
In 2008 the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee set out to ‘scrutinise the 
desirability and achievability of the Government’s vision for third sector involvement in public service 
delivery.’ The Committee had a broad remit, not solely concerned with the operation of the Compact and 
the institutions created to give effect to it. Nevertheless, the Committee’s report does contain a number of 
findings and observations about systemic issues in the service commissioning environment that are of 
long-standing concern to the sector and which had not been addressed by the Compact – some of which 
contravened express or implied Compact provisions. Among these were: 
• the persistence of the practice of government commissioning agencies seeking to ‘claw-back’ 
surpluses from NFP sector service providers contrary to the Compact Code on Funding and 
Procurement to which central and local government funders are expected to adhere; 
• the persistence and prevalence of short term (i.e. one year) contracts and the extreme uncertainty 
they entail for funded organisations; 
• a lack of commitment to the principle of full cost recovery in a competitive market context – 
commissioning agencies still view contracts through ‘grant spectacles’; 
• promoting the formation of NFP sector consortia in the face of evidence of onerous costs to 
consortium partners and the potential loss of protections conferred by the Compact; 
• a failure of capacity-building initiatives to create a level playing field, especially for smaller 
organisations unable to compete for contracts. 
(Source: House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2008a) 
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Figure A2.5 – The English Compact: Review, Refresh and Renew 
The performance of the 1998 English Compact has been reviewed annually since 2000 and its institutional 
architecture has been incrementally augmented along the way. In 2009 the government announced a 
review of the Compact and its Codes ‘to bring it up-to-date with policy development and public service 
reform’. The review would be led by the Commission for the Compact supported by the Office of the Third 
Sector and Compact Voice (House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2008b:11). The 
resignation of Tony Blair in favour of Gordon Brown in 2007, coupled with the need to refurbish the ‘New 
Labour’ brand ahead of the 2010 election created a policy window favourable to refreshing the Compact 
(see Bentley, 2007). The official rationale was given in the introduction to the paper prepared for the 
consultation process: 
There is a consensus that a refresh of the Compact is needed to bring the documents up 
to date while preserving the sound and enduring principles on which the Compact was 
founded. The refreshed Compact must look and feel relevant to public bodies and third 
sector organisations of all sorts. It must be free from duplication or repetition. It must be 
clearer as to what organisations have to do to implement it and to fulfil their commitments 
under it (Commission for the Compact, 2009:8). 
The refreshed Compact – signed on behalf of government by then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown and, on 
behalf of the third sector, by Simon Blake Chair of Compact Voice – was published in December 2009 and 
retained ‘all the key points of the original’ while taking into account ‘recent developments in law, policy and 
practice’ (Commission for the Compact, 2009:8-9).  
Sector leaders welcomed the refreshed Compact, however, the political landscape changed dramatically 
following the formation of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government in May 2010. At that 
time, the Commission for the Compact foreshadowed the likelihood of changes to the Compact and its 
supporting architecture to reflect the policy and legislative agenda of the incoming government 
(Commission for the Compact, 2010:20). The Commission reiterated the new Government’s ‘strong 
commitment to maintaining the Compact as a basis for government and voluntary sector partnership 
working’ and observed that ‘we do not think there is any appetite, either in Government or in the voluntary 
sector, for another substantial revision of the text of the national agreement following the refresh of 2009’ 
(Commission for the Compact, 2010:20-21). 
In September 2010, Compact Voice – ‘The voice of the voluntary sector on the Compact’ - announced ‘the 
beginning of a new phase in the development of the Compact’ in which it would work with the new 
government ‘towards a new Compact agreement with a ”renewed” Compact document and greater 
accountability mechanisms’ (Compact Voice, 2010). Compact Voice acknowledged that: 
[S]ome may be concerned about potential changes to the Compact and frustrated that it is 
being renewed so soon after the last update. However we feel that it is in the best interests 
of the sector to undertake this renewal (Compact Voice, 2010).  
Soon after the election the Cameron government announced its intention to reduce the number of non-
departmental bodies it claimed had mushroomed under Labour. The resulting ‘cull of the quangos’ swept 
up the Commission for the Compact, which ceased to operate in March 2011 (Taylor, 2012). The renewed 
Compact, now sub-titled ‘The Coalition Government and civil society organisations working effectively in 
partnership for the benefit of communities and citizens in England’ appears to be much more 
instrumentalist in nature (Zimmeck and Rochester, 2011, Taylor, 2012). It is expressly linked to the 
Cameron government’s Big Society policy agenda and much more narrowly concerned with the role of the 
NFP sector as a provider of statutory public services (citing NAO, 2012, Taylor, 2012). 
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Figure A2.6  – Big Society 
Big Society encompasses reforms based on decentralisation, streamlining government, devolution to local 
government, encouraging social entrepreneurship, and promoting individual and community empowerment 
(Norman, 2010).  
Proponents of the Big Society defend it as ‘smarter government’ while detractors see it as a thinly veiled 
‘return to Thatcherism’ (Hasan and Macintyre, 2010).  
In late 2011, the Minister for Civil Society, Nick Hurd, published an ‘Open Letter to Civil Society’ outlining 
the government’s ‘strategic framework’ for restoring trust and conferring power and responsibility on 
citizens ‘to improve our own lives, the communities we share and public services we use’.  
The framework is situated within a ‘Big Society vision’ founded on the proposition that ‘we have given too 
much power and responsibility to Government and have too little to show for it’ (Hurd, 2011). The 
framework intends to enable ‘long term culture change’ and consists of three strands:  
1. Transferring power to communities, chiefly through the mechanism of the Localism Act 2011 to ‘shift 
power from central government back into the hands of individuals, communities and councils’;  
2. Modernising public services in ways that ‘give power to those who have been overlooked and 
underserved’ (HM Government, 2011) by promoting choice and control, encouraging decentralisation 
and diversity of providers, ensuring fair access to and accountability of public services; and 
3. A suite of initiatives and programs aimed at encouraging social action and building social capital, 
including measures to cut red tape, promote social investment (including the creation of Big Society 
Capital), and the development of social impact bonds  (Hurd, 2011). 
Hurd also drew attention to the importance of reconciling opportunities for reform with the ‘urgent need to 
reduce Government borrowing’ (Hurd, 2011). And, while noting that cuts in government funding have 
resulted in ‘real frustration and difficulty for the significant minority of charities and social enterprises who 
rely heavily on public funding’, Hurd nevertheless cautioned that ‘[a] sector which receives £13 billion of 
taxpayers money a year cannot be immune from the painful but necessary process of reducing 
Government expenditure’ (Hurd, 2011).  
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Figure A2.7 – Excerpts from the 2008 Conservative Party Green Paper, ‘A Stronger 
Society’ 
Enforcing the Compact  
If proof were needed of the weakness of government policy and of the Office of the Third Sector in 
particular, then one need look no further than the Compact.  
This agreement between the voluntary sector and the various branches of government is supposed to 
guarantee fair play on issues such as full cost recovery and operational independence. However, as is 
almost universally acknowledged across the sector, the Compact is great in theory and toothless in 
practice.  
The Compact is supposedly a guarantor of the promises made by the Government to the sector – 
particularly those made in the 2002 Treasury Review, which include commitments on full cost recovery 
and multi-year funding. However, as reported by the National Audit Office, these promises have not been 
kept.  
The Compact is a voluntary agreement. As such it stands in stark contrast to the contract-based controls 
to which the voluntary sector has been increasingly subject. Various public sector bodies, including 
Whitehall departments, can thus breach the Compact with impunity.  
Recent innovations like the Commission for the Compact have no powers of enforcement and in the 
course of 2007 both the original Compact Commissioner and his Chief Executive resigned.  
The next Conservative Government will look to strengthen the Compact, working with the voluntary sector 
to do so. In particular, we want to strengthen the right of voluntary organisations to be treated on the same 
terms as the private sector, with the same right to earn a competitive return on their investment. A 
strengthened Compact will, in addition, reflect the various other commitments set out in this green paper, 
including longer contract terms; commissioning on the basis of outcomes rather than intrusive control of 
process; and the use of contracts instead grants only where justified.  
We will also enforce the strengthened Compact. There is no point having an agreement if it is not 
respected. On reported breaches, we will abide by the decision of the Compact Commissioner and consult 
the sector on whether further measures should be taken to entrench the Compact.  
A Compact gold standard  
It is clearly best for all concerned that breaches do not occur in the first place. Various preventative 
approaches have been described earlier in this green paper – for instance the use of model grant 
agreements and model contracts for the commissioning of services.  
We are committed to rolling out these preventative measures across central government, but an equal 
commitment to decentralisation means that we cannot order local authorities to do likewise.  
In partnership with local government and the voluntary sector we will develop a Compact Gold Standard: a 
package of practical measures – such as model contracts – aimed at designing Compact compliance into 
the everyday workings of the public sector.  
It will be up to individual local authorities to decide whether or not to adopt the Gold Standard; however a 
Conservative Government would certainly recommend it. Furthermore, we will lead by example, 
implementing the Standard across all central departments and agencies.  
Of course, where prevention fails and Compact breaches occur, the same enforcement regime will apply 
across the entire public sector. As a final measure we will ensure that official audits of local authority 
performance take compliance with the Compact fully into account.   
(Source: Conservative Party, 2008:75-77) 
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Figure A2.8 – 2012 National Audit Office Report: ‘Central government’s implementation 
of the national Compact’ 
The current UK government views the civil society as a key partner in delivering its planned reforms in 
public service delivery and the Coalition Agreement between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
parties emphasises the role of the civil society in helping government to address social and economic 
issues. Following the renewal of the Compact in December 2010, the government tasked the National 
Audit Office to examine the implementation of the national Compact. The NAO reviewed nine departments 
representing 98 per cent of an estimated £1.9 billion in central government expenditure with the ‘civil 
society’ sector.  
The NAO considers that the Compact is important in helping to encourage effective partnerships between 
central government and the civil society. Following the Compact principles can help departments to deliver 
better outcomes and achieve value for money in their relationships with civil society organisations.  
The NAO found that departments are supportive of the Compact and there are good examples of it being 
applied and embedded, for example, in formal guidance on procurement. However, the report also 
observed that departments faced systemic challenges in identifying and monitoring Compact compliance 
and, overall, did not have arrangements to gain a broad level of assurance about Compact 
implementation.  
The NAO found that ‘complaints received’ is the main indicator of concerns with departments’ observance 
of the Compact and concluded that that there is scope for improvement. Funding is the most common 
reason for notifying potential non-compliance with the Compact. Although the number of complaints is 
relatively small relative to the number of transactions undertaken, the NAO suggests that Compact 
compliance might not be as embedded as departments believe.  
The NAO also found that leadership within departments on Compact issues is not always visible. Despite 
the appointment of senior departmental officers responsible for promoting the Compact, some of these 
‘champions’ did not know who their counterparts in other departments were and neither did stakeholders in 
the civil society sector.  
A number of departments were unable to provide meaningful assurance on Compact implementation in 
their 2012-13 Business Plans despite requirements to do so and departments lacked a systematic 
approach for identifying and disseminating good practice in the operation of the Compact. 
Moreover, the NAO found that responsibility for promoting Compact compliance, increasing awareness 
and disseminating good practice lacks clarity. The precise role of the Office for Civil Society is unclear and 
there is no central body that identifies and disseminates good practice on the Compact’s implementation 
nor is information on alleged non-compliance is centrally analysed to identify priority areas for 
improvement.  
While noting a need for improvements in departments with regard to monitoring, leadership, sharing good 
practice and consultation, the NAO considers that there is little evidence that the implementation of the 
Compact in central government is fundamentally flawed. 
The NAO also considers that there is scope for the Office for Civil Society to do more to promote Compact 
compliance, increase awareness, and disseminate good practice. 
(Source: NAO, 2012)  
  
  447 
Figure A2.9 – Current status of the Canadian Accord and the institutional frameworks 
established for its implementation 
An Accord between the Government of Canada and the Voluntary Sector (VS) was signed by both the 
federal government and sector representatives in 2001. The accord was followed with the release of the 
Codes of Good Practice on Funding and Code on Good Practice on Policy Dialogue in 2002.  
The accord and codes were jointly developed, and while not legal documents, they are designed to guide 
the evolution of the relationship by identifying the common values, principles and commitments governing 
the relationship between the federal government and the voluntary sector. 
The Government of Canada continues to maintain its commitment to the principles set out in the Accord ‘to 
strengthen the sector’s capacity and to improve the legal and regulatory framework governing the sector.’ 
1. An Accord does not expire. The Government of Canada still supports principles set out in an 
Accord. 
2. [the] Joint Steering Committee (JSC) no longer exists and Volunteer Sector Initiative (VSI) ended 
in 2005. 
3. Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) continues to be the federal 
interlocutor and policy lead for the not-for-profit (NFP) sector in Canada. HRSDC is raising 
awareness of the value of the sector as a partner in developing policy [and] delivering services 
with all federal departments. 
The Government of Canada continues to support its commitment to this sector by: 
• Ensuring funding processes are streamlined, accountable and focused on results, specifically, the 
Government established the Independent Blue Ribbon Panel on grants and contributions and will 
act on its recommendations to streamline funding and ensure accountability and results. 
• Eliminating capital gains tax on donations of publicly-listed securities (federal Budget 2006) and 
stimulating giving by exempting donations of publicly listed securities to private foundations from 
capital gains (federal Budget 2007).  
• Supporting an increase in knowledge and understanding of the sector: Through a number of 
federal departments and agencies, the Government of Canada supports the ongoing work to 
develop relevant, timely and accurate data on the voluntary sector’s contribution to the economy 
and its role in the lives of individual Canadians and communities.  
• Working to increase sustainability and self-sufficiency of sector organizations: Under a three year 
initiative that ended in 2009, the Voluntary Sector Strategy (VSS) guided the federal 
government’s collaboration with the sector to foster social innovation and entrepreneurship to 
achieve greater sustainability and self-sufficiency over the long term. 
Source: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada/Ressources humaines et Développement des 
compétences Canada, email response to question dated 6 January 2010. 
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Figure A2.10 – Lessons Learned from the VSI 
Improving Sector Government Relationships  
• Collaboration between the voluntary sector and the government can produce benefits but 
requires significant amounts of time and energy.  
• There are limits to the areas and extent to which collaboration can take place.  
• It is imperative that there is clarity regarding the issues that are on the table and the roles and 
responsibilities of each party.  
• The work of the Joint Tables was conducted with unclear and unrealistic objectives.  
• There were some slight improvements in the relationship between the voluntary sector and the 
federal government, however they tended to be short-lived and were adversely affected by issues 
such as expectations around accountability, high turnover in staff and change in priorities in the 
federal government.  
• It would be important for any initiative following in the wake of the VSI to avoid the ‘goal overload’ 
by restricting the objectives and mandate.  
• The engagement of the whole sector, as large and heterogeneous as it is, was unrealistic.  
• An important consideration for these types of initiatives is to clarify whether the government views 
the Sector as a provider of goods and services or as the builder of civil society and social capital 
in shaping a similar initiative in the future.  
• During the VSI, staff turnover of government representatives was considered to be high.  
Communications  
• The value added for those in the voluntary sector included improvements in the relationship with 
the government, the development of tools and resources for their use, and the creation of a 
united and strengthened voice for the Sector.  
• Awareness of the VSI, and its key products, An Accord between the Government of Canada and 
the Voluntary Sector, The Code of Good Practice on Policy Dialogue, and The Code of Good 
Practice on Funding, was modest among those surveyed in the voluntary sector.  
Role of the Sector  
• Improvements in program and service delivery by the federal government reflected the increased 
awareness of the need to involve groups in influencing the development of policy and programs 
along with more consultation and awareness of the role the Sector can play in identifying 
priorities.  
Building Sector Capacity  
• The most visible and sustainable outputs of the VSI were in aspects of the Initiative which were 
institutionalized (HR Council and Satellite Account)  
• While the satellite account is an invaluable addition to the knowledge base of the voluntary 
sector, there are still gaps and inconsistencies for certain measures.  
• The most noteworthy example is volunteering; which is a difficult concept to define and there is 
no reliable survey that reports levels of volunteering in a consistent way.  
Policy Development  
• Policy development is the focus of a relatively small number of large organizations within the 
Sector. Most organizations cannot afford the significant outlay in time and resources that policy 
participation requires.  
• Sector organisations are more focused on the delivery of services rather than direct involvement 
in policy development.  
• The process around funding allocation for SIDPD resulted in low engagement of the whole sector, 
lack of a clear reporting and accountability framework, and the lack of a strategy to facilitate 
knowledge transfers.  
Evaluation Lessons Learned  
• It was necessary that the evaluation be incorporated into the Initiative at the outset in order for an 
evaluation of this type and scale to be successful.  
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• Program goals and objectives were not linked in advance, nor were there clearly specified and 
quantifiable impacts to be achieved.  
• Establishing causality as directly attributable to the VSI was challenging, given the inability to 
control for activities in the external environment.  
• There were obstacles for the specific high-quality evaluation studies that served as the lines of 
evidence for this synthesis. The reader is directed to the specific reports for a further description 
of their challenges. 
(Canada, 2009:viii-ix) 
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Appendix 3 – Compacts in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland 
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Figure A3.2 – The Scottish Compact Implementation Strategy 2003-2006 
The Implementation Strategy delivered in 2004 by the Compact Review Group, set out a series of actions, 
completion dates and expected outcomes in relation to: 
• Strategic aims and vision – The 1998 Scottish Compact set out strategic aims for developing the 
relationship between the Executive and the voluntary sector supported by Good Practice Guides that 
‘outline commitments and practical actions that should be taken to secure those aims’. The text was 
subsequently revised in order to achieve a ‘renewed commitment to achieving an open and 
participative working relationship between the Executive and the voluntary sector in Scotland’ and to 
better reflect devolved political and administrative arrangements (Scottish Executive 2004: 9). The 
revised Compact would aim to adopt ‘Compact principles and practice ... as part of the accepted 
everyday culture within the Executive and the voluntary sector’ through ‘require regular profiling, 
promotion of benefits and the sharing of best practice’ (Scottish Executive 2004a: 9).  
• Leadership – It was recognised that effective implementation requires all parties with a link to the 
voluntary sector to have ‘ownership’ of the Compact principles and processes. This would be 
supported by launching the revised Compact ‘as a high profile, national initiative’ in order to 
‘demonstrate the commitment of the Executive and of voluntary sector leaders to Compact principles 
and to secure its application across the board’ (Scottish Executive 2004a: 10). 
• Mainstreaming – The Implementation Strategy acknowledges the need to mainstream the application 
of Compact principles through the systematic integration of voluntary issues into ‘the everyday work of 
policy makers’ with the involvement of ‘voluntary sector representatives, specialists and other external 
partners’. Mainstreaming involves building awareness of government policy priorities, as well as 
providing avenues for the voluntary sector to make substantive contributions across policy areas 
‘alongside other stakeholder interests, to the formulation, design and delivery of policy, legislation and 
services’ (Scottish Executive 2004a: 11). 
• Raising awareness and promoting best practice – The Strategy set out a number of specific actions 
focused on capacity building and promoting best practice with particular emphasis on raising 
awareness within smaller voluntary organisations ‘who tend to be less engaged with the Compact 
than others’ (Scottish Executive 2004: 12). The Strategy noted the potential importance of local 
compacts in ‘developing effective relationships at a local level across Scotland’ and concluded that 
‘local Compacts could be effective in promoting Compact principles at levels which national 
campaigns would find difficult to reach’ (Scottish Executive 2004a: 13). The Strategy also noted the 
emergence of community planning partnerships at the local authority level in Scotland in which the 
voluntary sector is recognised as an important partner in the community planning process. 
• Communication – The Strategy set out a variety of mechanisms to ensure more effective 
communication between government and the voluntary sector through bilateral discussions at both the 
political and official levels in order to provide the basis for a strong working relationship. It also 
endorsed actions to develop, pilot and evaluate a ‘compliance system for the recording and potential 
resolution of grievances related to non-compliance with Compact principles’ (Scottish Executive 
2004a: 16). 
• Resources – The Strategy accepted that Compact implementation would require a significant 
commitment of resources by government and the voluntary sector, and suggested that priority be 
given to: on-going promotion and implementation of the Scottish Compact and good practice 
guidance; reaching key target audiences at all levels throughout the Executive and local government 
in Scotland and throughout a large, complex and disparate voluntary sector; targeting awareness 
raising activities at those parts of the voluntary sector/organisations that currently lack awareness of 
the Compact principles and commitments (e.g. smaller organisations); and continuous comprehensive 
monitoring and cyclical review of Compact implementation (Scottish Executive, 2004:17-18). 
  
 
 
 455 
Figure A3.3 – Enterprising Third Sector Action Plan 2008-2011 
The Action Plan consists of seven main objectives, each having a number of sub-objectives together with 
detailed commitments for action:  
1. Opening markets to an enterprising third sector 
• Working with public sector purchasers to recognise the benefits of contracting with an 
enterprising third sector including their contribution to delivering national outcomes 
• Working with the third sector to make organisations better able to compete for and win contracts 
• Developing social-to-social business 
• Encouraging collaboration with the private sector 
2. Investing more intelligently 
• Direct investment in an enterprising third sector  
• Measuring social return  
• Collaboration between funders and development of new funds  
• Finance training for the third sector 
3. Promoting social entrepreneurship 
• Providing funding to support social entrepreneurs  
• Promoting social entrepreneurship in schools and colleges 
4. Investing in skills, learning and leadership across the third sector 
• Funding for skills  
• Developing the learning infrastructure  
• Improving governance 
5. Providing support for business growth 
• Creating an effective supply of business development support  
• Mentoring for an enterprising third sector 
6. Raising the profile of enterprise in the third sector 
• Supporting third sector infrastructure  
• Awards  
• International exchange and learning 
7. Developing the evidence base 
• Demonstrating the value of the third sector  
• Increasing our knowledge of the third sector in Scotland 
A progress report on actions to the end of 2009 has been compiled and is available on-line (Scottish 
Government, 2010). 
(Source: Scottish Government, 2008:5) 
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Figure A3.4 – Government of Wales Act 2006 (section 74) 
Voluntary sector scheme  
(1) The Welsh Ministers must make a scheme (“the voluntary sector scheme”) setting out how they 
propose, in the exercise of their functions, to promote the interests of relevant voluntary 
organisations. 
(2) In this section “relevant voluntary organisations” means bodies (other than local authorities or 
other public bodies) whose activities— 
(a) are carried on otherwise than for profit, and 
(b) directly or indirectly benefit the whole or any part of Wales (whether or not they also benefit 
any other area). 
(3) In determining the provision to be included in the voluntary sector scheme, the Welsh Ministers 
must consider how they intend to exercise such of their functions as relate to matters affecting, or 
of concern to, relevant voluntary organisations. 
(4) The voluntary sector scheme must specify— 
(a) how the Welsh Ministers propose to provide assistance to relevant voluntary organisations 
(whether by grants, loans, guarantees or any other means), 
(b) how the Welsh Ministers propose to monitor the use made of any assistance provided by 
them to relevant voluntary organisations, and 
(c) how the Welsh Ministers propose to consult relevant voluntary organisations about the 
exercise of such of their functions as relate to matters affecting, or of concern to, such 
organisations. 
(5) The Welsh Ministers— 
(a) must keep the voluntary sector scheme under review, and 
(b) may from time to time remake or revise it. 
(6) Before making, remaking or revising the voluntary sector scheme, the Welsh Ministers must 
consult such relevant voluntary organisations as they consider appropriate. 
(7) The Welsh Ministers must publish the voluntary sector scheme when they make it and whenever 
they remake it; and, if they revise the scheme without remaking it, they must publish either the 
revisions or the scheme as revised (as they consider appropriate). 
(8) If the Welsh Ministers publish a scheme or revisions under subsection (7) they must lay a copy of 
the scheme or revisions before the Assembly. 
(9) After each financial year the Welsh Ministers must— 
(a) publish a report of how the proposals set out in the voluntary sector scheme were 
implemented in that financial year, and 
(b) lay a copy of the report before the Assembly. 
Source: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/32/section/74 
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Figure A3.5 – The Welsh Voluntary Sector Scheme 
The VSS does not look like other compacts, although it shares some features such as enunciations of 
principles underpinning the government-sector relationship and shared values. Reflecting its statutory 
basis, the Scheme is much more detailed and, in places, prescriptive. The document runs to 22 pages set 
out in six chapters that address the following: 
• Chapter 1 is an Introduction that sets out the statutory basis of the Scheme. 
• Chapter 2 sets out the general principles of Assembly–voluntary sector relations, including statements 
about shared values and a Code of Practice for funding the Voluntary Sector. 
• Chapter 3 addresses the principal mechanisms governing how the Assembly proposes to work in 
partnership with the voluntary sector, including: 
o a functional definition of ‘partnership’, 
o formal arrangements to promote dialogue and co-operation (for example, each Assembly 
Minister is required to ‘meet with representatives of the relevant networks of voluntary 
organisations covering their areas of responsibility at least twice in any one calendar year’, 
with at least one such meeting to be ‘be tied in with the Assembly Government’s Budget 
Planning Round’), 
o the form, composition and terms of reference for a Voluntary Sector Partnership Council.1 
o expectations in relation to information and understanding, including the collection and 
production of information and the identification of opportunities for joint training, holding joint 
events, and opportunities for secondment, and 
o proofing policies by taking into consideration ‘the implications for the voluntary sector of new 
policies, or changes in policy’ and seeking ‘as far as possible to avoid or to ameliorate any 
undesirable impact on the voluntary sector and to identify and encourage opportunities for 
voluntary sector organisations’. 
• Chapter 4 sets out the government’s commitments in relation to consultation with the voluntary sector 
and the manner in which consultation might occur. 
• Chapter 5 enunciates the Assembly’s policy on volunteering, and  
• Chapter 6 describes how the Assembly will promote community development with an emphasis on 
tackling disadvantage and deep-rooted social exclusion, by ‘cutting across traditional functional 
boundaries where necessary’.  
(National Assembly for Wales, 2000) 
  
                                                
1 The Voluntary Sector Partnership Council, established in 2000, was recast in 2007 as the Third 
Sector Partnership Council. The Council is chaired by the Minister for Local Government and 
Communities (as the Welsh Minister Responsible) and includes twenty-five representatives, 
appointed from the third sector, representing distinct strategic areas of interest. The Council 
exists to facilitate consultation with relevant third sector organisations and public sector bodies 
on the implementation, operation and review of the VSS; and to consider, and make 
recommendation, on issues that ‘relate to the functions and responsibilities of the Welsh 
Government that affect, or are of concern to, the Third Sector’ (source: Welsh Government, 
2011). 
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Figure A3.6 – Northern Ireland Concordat, Commitment Programme 
• To formally present to the NI Executive and Assembly a yearly report from the Joint Forum through 
the DSD Minister on issues impacting on the Voluntary and Community Sector. 
• To review the Terms of Reference and Membership of the Joint Forum, which includes the Voluntary 
and Community Sector Panel and the Inter-Departmental Group, to reflect this new agreement and 
emerging public sector structures and responsibilities. 
• To engage with senior representatives from the NI public service on a six monthly basis to review key 
policy issues arising from implementation of the Concordat commitments following submissions 
received from Joint Forum. 
• To agree and develop best practice guides which impact upon the relationship, for dissemination 
across Government and the Voluntary and Community Sector. 
• To explore the use of alternative funding structures between Government and the Voluntary and 
Community Sector including, for example, the use of grant-in-aid, memoranda of understanding and 
service level agreements. 
• To work together to implement an outcome-focussed approach to funding. 
• To work together to remove duplication of services, systems or overheads where this exists 
• To maximise opportunities for Voluntary and Community Sector participation in procurement 
processes 
• To develop proposals for embedding Full Cost Recovery within contractual arrangements between 
public sector and voluntary and community sector organisations. 
• To provide opportunities for the Voluntary and Community Sector to influence and examine the impact 
of government policy. 
• To investigate the potential for community asset management and ownership in NI. 
• To explore and develop processes whereby Concordat non-compliance can be addressed. 
(Source: Department for Social Development, 2011:8-9) 
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Appendix 4 – Productivity Commission report 
2010 
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Figure A4.1 – Productivity Commission Report on the Contribution of the Not-for-Profit 
Sector 
In March 2009, Assistant Treasurer, Chris Bowen, requested wrote the Productivity Commission to 
‘undertake a research study on the contributions of the not for profit sector with a focus on improving the 
measurement of its contributions and on removing obstacles to maximising its contributions to society’. In 
framing this request, the Minister observed that: 
The Government is committed to finding the best solutions to problems of social 
exclusion by ensuring the not for profit, private and government sectors work together 
effectively, and by using evidence-based programs and policies. In this context, 
measurement of the contributions of community organisations, and identification of ways 
to enhance those contributions, are important. 
Further, the Government acknowledges the changing relationships between government, 
business and community organisations and wants to explore their impacts and future 
opportunities for optimising such relationships to further the well-being of society. 
The terms of reference for the study were as follows:  
• assess measures of the sector’s contribution to Australian society and how these can be used to 
improve government policy and programs and to optimise the sector’s contributions 
• identify unnecessary impediments to the efficient and effective operation of NFPs and measures to 
improve their productivity 
• consider ways in which the delivery and outcomes of government–funded services by NFPs could be 
improved 
• examine recent changes in the relationships between government, business and community 
organisations and whether there is scope to enhance these relationships so as to improve outcomes 
delivered by the sector 
• examine the impact of the taxation system on the ability of NFPs to raise funds and the extent to 
which the tax treatment of the sector affects competitive neutrality (Productivity Commission, 2010:iv-
v). 
During 2009 the Commission conducted 155 informal discussions with organisations and government 
departments, convened 10 round tables with various groups and received 319 written submissions 
(Productivity Commission, 2010:389). Meetings were held in capital cities and included one meeting in 
New Zealand.  
In 2010 the Commission published its final report containing a number of key findings and proposed 
recommendations. The report canvassed three broad areas: the sector’s contribution to the community; 
factors affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the sector; and government funding and related service 
delivery arrangements with the sector (Productivity Commission, 2010:8).  
The report also acknowledged that the development of a national compact had been underway since 
2008. While noting the tendency of similar instruments in state and territory jurisdictions to focus on not-
for-profits involved in the delivery of government-funded services, the report confirmed the federal 
government’s intention for the national compact to be inclusive of the whole of the sector (Productivity 
Commission, 2010:375). 
The report found ‘a need for wide-ranging reforms and a reduction in compliance costs faced by the not-
for-profit sector’. The Commission also proposed a 'one-stop shop' for Commonwealth-based regulation in 
order to ‘consolidate regulatory oversight, and enhance public transparency’ (Productivity Commission, 
2010). This recommendation provided the basis for the establishment for the ACNC. 
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Appendix 5 – State and territory policy 
vignettes 
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  465 
 
Cross-sector Policy Frameworks in Australian States 
and Territories 
Each of the following vignettes – with the exception of Vignette A5.82 – 
draws upon a review of available primary documents and secondary 
literature, together with the content of interviews with elite policy 
actors in each jurisdiction between late 2010 and late 2011.  
Each sets out a brief narrative account of the nature of the framework 
proposed for each state and territory and sets that account against the 
backdrop of the recent political history and the framing of problems the 
frameworks were intended to address in each jurisdiction. The 
observations of key policy actors interviewed for this study are woven 
throughout to give the reader a sense of the people working and making 
decisions in these policy spaces.  
These narrative accounts serve to contextualise the ‘policy 
conversation’ around partnership frameworks in a way that helps the 
reader to understand how the conversation differs from one jurisdiction 
to another and how it has changed over time.  
                                                
2 Because attempts in the Northern Territory to develop a policy framework document had been 
aborted prior to the commencement of this research and because attempts to elicit information 
from government and NFP sector officials were unsuccessful, it was decided not to undertake 
fieldwork in the capital city, Darwin. Nevertheless, the meagre documentary record is sufficient 
to allow us to draw some rudimentary observations about the course of events in that 
jurisdiction. 
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Vignette A5.1 – Australian Capital Territory: the social laboratory 
The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) has a population of approximately 367,000, the majority 
of which live in Canberra, the national capital. Self-government was granted to the ACT in 1988 
and the ACT’s Legislative Assembly exercises the normal functions of a state legislature as well 
as local government functions. The Assembly’s 17 members are elected using a Hare Clark 
proportional representative electoral system and from the time of it’s first election in 1989 
minority governments have been the norm in the ACT, apart from 2004-08 when Labor (which 
previously headed a minority government elected in 2001) formed the territory’s first majority 
government. Following elections in 2008 and 2012 Labor has governed in coalition with the ACT 
Greens. 
The ACT has been described as a ‘social laboratory’ – often in association with Labor 
governments (Fischer, 1984). The ACT that led the way with Australia’s first compact in 2001 
(ACT, 2001) – just months before the launch of the Canadian Accord. This was not a Labor 
initiative, however. Rather, the first ACT compact commenced under a minority Liberal 
government led by Chief Minister Gary Humphries (2000-01).  
In 2000 Humphries succeeded the previous Chief Minister Kate Carnell (1995-2000) following 
the latter’s resignation in the face of a threatened ‘no-confidence motion’ after a series of high 
profile public scandals (Singleton, 2001). That the Liberal government chose to pursue a 
compact was possibly motivated by a desire to ease long-standing tensions with the community 
sector ahead of the 2001 election (personal communication, 1 April 2011). 
The 2001 compact continued to guide government policy after the election of a Labor minority 
government in 2001. It was re-published in a revised edition in 2003 and was eventually 
replaced in 2004 with a re-badged and re-branded version of the previous government’s 
compact. The new Social Compact (ACT, 2004) contained few material changes to the core 
provisions of the original. This is perhaps unsurprising given that in framing its pre-election 
Budget, the previous Liberal government, emphasised social spending in an attempt to outflank 
the centre-left Labor Party (Singleton, 2001:587-88). 
The impetus for the original compacts (Liberal and Labor) came from the Chief Minister’s 
Department (CMD). Both the Social Compact and an associated community sector funding 
policy were ‘co-designed’ by the public sector officials and government’s community sector 
partners (personal communication, 6 April 2011, 31 April 2011). However, a Functional 
Expenditure Review undertaken in 2006 saw the policy lead transfer to the Department of 
Disability, Housing and Community Services (DDHCS) which, by virtue of its share of contract 
and grants funding, was seen to have greater ‘direct ownership of contracting policy’ (personal 
communication, 31 April 2011). 
Initially the Social Compact stimulated interest in the NFP policy space and was seen to make a 
difference (personal communication, 31 April 2011). Although the sector acknowledged the 
Social Compact’s ‘good intentions’, it also expressed concern about a range of perceived 
problems with its operation (ACTCOSS, 2008). Personnel changes, administrative re-
organisations, and emerging processes also took a toll and the influence and visibility of the 
Social Compact waned (personal communication, 31 April 2011).  
In 2011 a Joint Community-Government Reference Group (established in 2004 to oversight the 
Social Compact and the community sector funding policy) undertook a review of the Social 
Compact. One official observed that as a small jurisdiction in which ministers and senior 
executives are quite accessible, ‘we’re well-placed to get it right and to connect and 
communicate effectively with our community partners’ (personal communication, 6 April 2011).  
A refreshed Social Compact was launched in June 2012 (ACT, 2012). The Social Compact is 
intended to complement the Canberra Plan, the Canberra Social Plan and policy governing 
community engagement. Officials acknowledge the on-going challenge of maintaining the 
relevance of policy frameworks, particularly as the principles and behaviours they engender 
become woven into practice (personal communication, 6 April 2011). One official looks forward 
to the day when policy frameworks mandating respect, equity and acceptance of diversity are 
regarded as anachronistic because these attitudes and behaviours have become ingrained 
(personal communication, 31 April 2011). 
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Vignette A5.2 – South Australia: Stronger Together, or the weakest link?  
South Australia’s (SA) key relationship framework document, Stronger Together (2009) forms 
one part of a suite of policy documents and institutional arrangements that, in the words of a key 
policy actor from the NFP sector: ‘probably don’t hang together as neatly and as easily as we 
would necessarily like them to’ (personal communication, 6 July 2011a). Although portrayed in 
some quarters as an example of a well-functioning framework agreement (Baulderstone, 2006), 
the South Australian example is also offered as a cautionary tale of a framework agreement 
hampered by weak institutional arrangements and a low level of executive commitment 
(ACOSS, 2008). 
Stronger Together and its predecessor document, Common Ground (South Australia, 2004), 
were initiatives of the former SA Departments of Families and Communities, and Health. 
Although the NFP sector participated in drafting both agreements, the sector harboured ‘a level 
of cynicism about the capacity of the agreement to change the nature of the relationship in a 
really fundamental way’ (personal communication, 6 July 2011a). Interviews with elite policy 
actors in the NFP sector, line agencies of government and central agencies reveal important 
‘disconnects’ in the way the parties think about the effectiveness of the framework document 
and the overall health of the relationship between government and the sector. 
There is a view, widely shared in the sector, that framework documents such as Stronger 
Together serve symbolic as opposed to practical purposes: ‘over the years government has 
wanted some instruments that can be paraded in a public context’ (personal communication, 6 
July 2011a). One key NFP policy actor admitted being ‘very sceptical and cynical about any real 
intention on the part of the government to behave in manner that would be consistent with the 
Stronger Together agreement’ (personal communication, 6 July 2011a). Barriers in gaining 
access to the responsible minister coupled with a bureaucracy with little latitude to negotiate the 
parameters of public policy, serves to diminish Stronger Together as a mechanism for 
promoting robust policy discussion (personal communication, 6 July 2011a). 
Conversely, officials in the SA government line agency primarily responsible for the 
administration of the agreement consider that, on the whole, peak organisations are ‘very 
happy’ with Stronger Together: ‘there’s a great sense of ownership around it … it gets referred 
to regularly within the Peaks Forum as a guide … it holds a certain amount of power’ (personal 
communication, 7 July 2011). One official suggested that there was a ‘healthy tension’ in the 
cross-sector relationship, pointing out that attempts by public sector agencies to partner 
effectively with peak organisations are sometimes made difficult by matters beyond their direct 
control (such as resourcing) while peak organisations sometimes ‘respectfully decline’ to work 
with line agencies ‘because they’re mad with the government’ (personal communication, 7 July 
2011). 
The relationship between government and the sector in South Australia has been observed to 
vary ‘from sub-sector to sub-sector, and from personality to personality’ (personal 
communication, 6 July 2011a) and was described by one senior central agency official as 
‘patchy’. The same official conceded that ‘some agencies and individuals within agencies are 
doing very well and in other circumstances that’s not the case’, adding: ‘It would be unfair to say 
there’s a poor relationship across the board – it would wrong to say that – nor could you say 
there are no issues at all’ (personal communication, 21 July 2011). It is noteworthy that strong 
cross-sector relationships appear to exist in policy domains not covered by Stronger Together, 
such as the arts (personal communication, 6 July 2011b). 
South Australian central agencies exercise no oversight of cross-sector relationship frameworks 
an executive government leadership is demonstrably lacking. Although line agency officials 
suggested that some level of central agency coordination might be welcome, the suggestion 
was dismissed by one central agency official who observed, ‘those days are gone’ (personal 
communication, 21 July 2011). 
There was broad agreement amongst the policy actors interviewed for this study that in smaller 
jurisdictions, such as South Australia, relationships between individuals often exerts greater 
influence on the shape of the cross-sector discourse than official processes or institutional 
frameworks – both within and across domain boundaries, and between sector representatives 
and particular officials and/or ministers. This observation is echoed in other ‘small’ jurisdictions 
such as the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania.  
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Vignette A5.3 – Victoria: horses for courses 
Reform to ‘rationalise’ the public sector reached its apotheosis in Victoria under the Liberal-
National Coalition government led by Premier Jeff Kennett (1992-99) who ‘eagerly embraced 
the neoliberal agenda of the economic policy think-tanks’ (Economou, 2006:370). In 1992 the 
Coalition defeated a third term Labor government mired in political crises. Asset sales, spending 
cuts, administrative consolidation and outsourcing formed the core of the new government’s 
strategy, leading to Victoria being dubbed ‘the contract state’ (Alford and O'Neill, 1994). In the 
process the Victorian NFP sector, which has a long history of community engagement, was 
marginalised as a policy partner (personal communication, 15 April 2011, 18 April 2011, 
Webster and Atkins, 2011). The effect was a sector that was less collegial, faced greater 
uncertainty, and reported higher transaction costs and overheads flowing from the new 
contracting regime (personal communication, 18 April 2011). Even so, contracting did leverage 
‘service change’ and ‘fresh thinking’ (personal communication, 18 April 2011). 
The 1999 state election saw the Labor Party form a minority government. Premier Steve Bracks 
described his government as ‘financially conservative and socially progressive’ (Costar and 
Hayward, 2005:111). Labor made substantial investments in health, education and regional 
development and ‘did much to restore civility to public life after the divisiveness and sheer self-
indulgence of Kennett’s reign’ (Dyrenfurth and Bongiorno, 2011). The Bracks government 
emphasised ‘inclusivity’ (Hayward, 2006) and advocated a ‘partnership approach’ to human 
services delivery (PAEC, 2002) and went on to win elections with working majorities in 2002 
and 2006. A 2002 report found several problems associated with the complexity of service 
agreements for community, welfare and health services and pointed to work then occurring in 
overseas and Australian jurisdictions around the issue of formal partnership frameworks (PAEC, 
2002).  
The Victorian community sector first advocated a compact as early as 2000 and most recently 
in 2006 (VCOSS). Calls for a compact gained little traction, however the Premier’s department 
offered strong support for achieving a better alignment between the Department of Human 
Services (DHS) processes and the way community organisations work (personal 
communication, 18 April 2011). This led in 2002 to a Partnership Agreement between DHS, the 
Victorian Council of Social Service (VCOSS) and the Victorian Health Care Association. The 
Partnership Agreement has been renewed periodically. Now in the form of a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU), the framework celebrates a strong, positive relationship based on trust, 
respect and collaboration and understanding (DHS, 2009). However, its primary focus is 
streamlining funding arrangements and improving consistency (personal communication, 15 
April 2011). Although parts of the sector have ‘grumbled’ from time to time, positive results have 
generated broad confidence in the DHS’s – and the government’s – commitment to the process 
(personal communication, 15 April 2011). 
A compact is no longer a priority for the Victorian NFP sector whose interests run more to 
practical matters such as pricing, funding and contracting arrangements, red tape reduction, 
data collection and workforce issues (personal communication, 15 April 2011). Reviews of NFP 
regulation (Victoria, 2007a) and performance (Victoria, 2007b) contributed to the establishment 
in 2008 of an Office for the Community Sector (OCS) within the Department of Planning and 
Community Development. The OCS works with agencies and the sector to reduce compliance 
burdens, cut red tape, and strengthen sector capacity (personal communication, 18 April 2011). 
It has no role with respect to partnership agreements. The Bracks government also instituted a 
fixed price index mechanism that has worked ‘remarkably well’ over the last decade (personal 
communication, 18 April 2011). 
The ‘Victorian model’ of sector-specific frameworks begun under Labor has continued under the 
Liberal/National Coalition government (personal communication, 18 April 2011): a trend 
confirmed in 2010 with a separate Partnership Agreement in the early childhood development 
domain (Victoria, 2010). The current government, elected with a slim majority in 2010, has 
sought to distance itself from the Kennett legacy (personal communication, 15 April 2011). The 
‘Black Saturday’ bushfires of 2009 and the floods of 2011 highlighted the constraints under 
which community services operate and the government is keen reduce administrative burdens 
and ‘do everything they can to make it easier for those organisations to deliver’ (personal 
communication, 18 April 2011)  
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Vignette A5.4 – Western Australia: taking the road less travelled 
The relationship between government and the NFP sector in Western Australia (WA) has been 
evolving over a long time. In 2004 the state Labor government initiated an Industry Plan for the 
non-government human services sector with three broad objectives: improving the relationship 
between government and the sector; ensuring the viability and sustainability of non-government 
human services; and building sector capacity (Western Australia, 2004). The plan was 
complemented by: a policy statement on funding and purchasing community services 
(Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2002); and a indexation policy for non-government human 
services (Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2004). Both measures were strongly influenced 
by an earlier WA Auditor-General report that found significant shortcomings with the contracting 
regime used to procure services from NFP service providers (Auditor-General, 2000). 
Once considered a possible precursor to a compact, the Industry Plan faltered owing to a lack 
of central agency leadership (personal communication, 5 July 2011), inconsistent 
implementation (personal communication, 5 July 2011) and a failure to enforce the application 
of policy guidance by line agencies (personal communication, 4 July 2011, 5 July 2011). Said 
one central agency official: ‘There had been great policies launched in the past but then 
implementation had failed. Line agencies had gone back to “bad behaviours”. We’ve had 
standard templates and approaches but everyone had butchered them along the way’ (personal 
communication, 5 July 2011). 
In 2008 the newly elected Liberal-National government established the Economic Audit 
Committee (EAC) to conduct a wide-ranging audit of the efficiency and effectiveness of state 
government functions, including how government partners with the NFP sector to deliver 
community services (EAC, 2009). Wishing to respond to the opportunities presented by an 
economic boom created by the state’s mining industry, the new government initiated a change 
agenda built around a narrative of delivering better outcomes for Western Australians (personal 
communication, 5 July 2011). This provided a ‘platform for engagement’ between government 
and the sector (personal communication, 4 July 2011). A Partnership Forum comprised of public 
and NFP sector leaders, chaired by the former Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department, Dr 
Peter Shergold, was established in mid-2010 to address issues relating to: social innovation; the 
resolution of long-standing problems with contracting; and historic failures to fund the full cost of 
services delivered by the NFP sector (personal communication, 5 July 2011). 
The Delivering Community Services in Partnership Policy, launched in July 2011, is the 
centrepiece of a suite of administrative and financial measures aimed at re-building 
government’s relationship with the sector and placing the sector on a more sustainable footing 
(Western Australia, 2011). Although it is not a bilateral agreement, the Policy was extensively 
co-produced by government officials and sector leaders. As one close observer remarked: 
‘WACOSS has been almost joined at the hip with [the Department of] Premier and Cabinet 
throughout this process and I think that has raised some concerns actually, as regards its 
potential to been seen as supping with the devil’ (personal communication, 5 July 2011).  
There is a broad consensus amongst sector representatives and public sector officials that 
Shergold played a critical role by building trust and understanding amongst the participants in 
the process. Even more important has been the ‘hands-on’ role played by Premier Barnett, 
which has given added impetus and authority to the change agenda: ‘To have a First Minister 
that is driving this across government is quite important … eighteen months in and he’s still 
engaged in [the] process’ (personal communication, 5 July 2011).  
In its 2011/12 Budget the state government committed $604 million over four years to help 
redress the gap between the level of funding provided in state contracts and the actual cost of 
service delivery and an additional $400 million for new services. One senior official suggested 
that there was genuine surprise in some quarters at the size of the spend: ‘Only through actions 
can you demonstrate genuine listening and partnership’ (personal communication, 5 July 2011). 
An on-going challenge will be to sustain the momentum of change and the capacity of the 
sector to remain engaged in the policy and implementation process (personal communication, 4 
July 2011).  
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Vignette A5.5 – Tasmania: the long conversation 
The 2012 Tasmanian Partnership Agreement between the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS), the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPaC) and the community sector 
represented the culmination of an on-again/off-again conversation about a formal relationship 
framework begun in 1996 (personal communication, 3 October 2011b, Tasmanian Government, 
2012). According to one official, the fact that the cross-sector relationship is mediated by a line 
agency is ‘entirely problematic because it reduces the sector relationship essentially to a service 
delivery role,’ thereby reinforcing the emphasis on contracting and procurement (personal 
communication, 4 October 2011b). 
The extent of outsourced service provision in Tasmania has increased over time. With a 
population of 512,000 and a total land area of 68,401 square kilometres, Tasmania exhibits 
strong formal and informal connections both within the NFP sector and between the sector and 
government. The community sector is closely-knit and there is a ‘strong relationship’ between 
the sector and government, based on ‘a process of strong consultation in the way [government] 
forms its policies and the way it does its business’ (personal communication, 3 October 2011a). 
Tasmania’s small size also serves to accentuate differences in the size and market-share of 
NFP service providers, ranging from those with a part-time executive officer supported by 
volunteers through to large employing organisations – a prime example being Anglicare, which 
delivers services ‘across absolutely every conceivable part of the community sector’ (personal 
communication, 3 October 2011a). 
Personal relationships between state and non-state policy actors are also important: ‘We hold a 
lot of store in the development of personal relationships’, says one sector informant (personal 
communication, 3 October 2011a). ‘Everybody does know everybody’, said a senior official 
(personal communication, 3 October 2011b). A downside is that cross-sector relationships are 
so often ‘person dependent’: ‘a champion or a leader … moves on and then things go splat’ 
(personal communication, 4 October 2011a). Tasmanian ministers are highly accessible to the 
sector, and the Hare Clark electoral system make political compromise virtually unavoidable 
(the Labor Party governs in Tasmania with the support of the Tasmanian Greens, two of whom 
are ministers in the government).  
Partnership is an important theme in the state’s political ecology: over recent years the 
Tasmanian government has entered into a number of partnership agreements with local 
councils and institutions such as the University of Tasmania. Social inclusion, social enterprise 
and place-based approaches have figured strongly as organising perspectives in Tasmanian 
social policy (personal communication, 4 October 2011b). It can also be said that Tasmanian 
approaches reflect to some degree a diffusion of policy and praxis from the mainland, most 
noticeably from Victoria (personal communication, 3 October 2011b, 4 October 2011b, a). 
At one time promoted within government as an indicator of success in forging effective cross-
sector relationships (OCS, 2009), by 2009 cross-sector discussions ‘ran out of steam’ (personal 
communication, 3 October 2011b) – largely owing to personnel and structural changes in the 
DHHS (personal communication, 3 October 2011a, 4 October 2011b). In 2010, Peter Shergold 
was enlisted to help re-start the conversation around a framework agreement (personal 
communication, 3 October 2011b). Although initiated by the government, one official observed, 
‘I don’t think the sector needed to be dragged kicking and screaming’ (personal communication, 
4 October 2011b). The agreement ‘very quickly became a joint enterprise’ and, despite ‘the 
normal suspicions that you would expect from the sector’, key policy actors have reported high 
levels of good-will (personal communication, 4 October 2011b). 
A sector leader commented that ‘there is a lot of hope resting on a partnership agreement’ 
despite lingering cynicism within the sector (personal communication, 4 October 2011a). The 
sector appears to accept the practical necessity for the policy lead to reside with the DHHS, 
nevertheless it is hoped that avenues will be found to eventually extend the footprint of the 
agreement to policy domains beyond traditional community services (personal communication, 
4 October 2011a). In the meantime, practical issues of workforce recruitment, retention and 
replacement are of primary concern (personal communication, 3 October 2011b).  
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Vignette A5.6 – New South Wales: a long road to nowhere in particular 
In New South Wales (NSW) the conversation leading to a formal policy framework around the 
government-sector relationship commenced the mid-1990s (personal communication, 13 
September 2011). As Australia’s largest state, government agencies’ operational and financial 
exposure to the NFP sector is enormous and has grown steadily as third party contracting grew 
in importance as a staple service delivery strategy. 
The desire for a formalised relationship was driven policies favouring greater competition in the 
procurement of public services (personal communication, 17 November 2010) (personal 
communication, 13 September 2011). A difficult relationship between the sector and a state 
Coalition government (1988-95) was succeeded by an equally problematic relationship with a 
national Coalition government (1996-2007). The idea of a compact was largely ‘sector driven’, 
and a former Director of the New South Wales Council of Social Service (NCOSS), Gary Moore, 
played an early leading role (personal communication, 17 November 2010, 18 November 
2010b). Alarmed at the ‘unfettered market change’ that defined the mid-late 1990s, the sector 
(and Moore in particular) looked to the proposed English Compact for inspiration (personal 
communication, 13 September 2011).  
A window of opportunity for change opened in NSW with the election of a Labor government in 
1995. The new Labor Premier, Bob Carr, was receptive to the sector’s proposal for a formal 
relationship framework, although there is a lingering view in the sector that Carr was less 
interested in fundamental change than he was in political branding in the lead-up to the 1999 
state election (personal communication, 13 September 2011, 17 November 2010, Casey et al., 
2008a, Edgar and Lockie, 2010). Negotiations on a compact commenced in 2001 and were 
conducted on behalf of the sector by the Forum of Non-Government Agencies (FONGA) – a 
coalition of peak and service provider organisations – and on behalf of government by the NSW 
Premier’s Department.  
It is noteworthy that the compact was being actively developed during a turbulent period of 
significant change in the modus operandi of the public and NFP sectors (personal 
communication, 17 November 2010). To some extent, the parties looked to the compact to 
resolve problems it was not designed to address: for example, the bureaucracy looked to the 
compact to drive rationalisation within the sector, while the sector looked to the compact to 
resolve competitive pressures and tensions amongst provider organisations (personal 
communication, 17 November 2010). The compact was sometimes used in an adversarial way 
to confront and criticise government. One official remarked that parts of the sector see 
government agencies ‘as the big bag of money in the room’ while failing to reflect on their own 
obligations under the compact (personal communication, 18 November 2010a). 
Working Together for New South Wales was launched in 2006 by Premier Carr just months 
before he resigned from politics. Working Together came to be regarded by the sector as 
narrowly instrumental and overly focussed on funding agreements (personal communication, 17 
November 2010). Although originally intended to apply across government, the bureaucracy 
concluded this was not feasible owing to cultural, operational and institutional differences 
between human services sub-sectors (personal communication, 18 November 2010b). Weak 
institutional design, machinery-of-government changes, turn-over of personnel, inconsistent 
representation and the loss of corporate memory all helped to undermine the legitimacy and 
relevance of the compact (personal communication, 17 November 2010). 
Although there is no clear consensus on this point, it is possible that successive leadership 
changes in NSW contributed to the progressive marginalisation of Working Together. The long 
gestation of the compact (1999-2006), coupled with personnel changes, also contributed to a 
loss of interest once it became policy (personal communication, 13 September 2011). With 
Carr’s departure, suggested one observer, ‘you almost immediately saw the Compact being put 
in the bottom drawer’ (personal communication, 17 November 2010). Working Together was 
virtually a ‘dead letter’ by the time of the Coalition victory at the 2011 state general election. The 
state government has not revisited the idea of a formal relationship framework although called 
upon to do so by the sector (NCOSS, 2011). Government continues to liaise with the sector on 
new policy initiatives such as ‘social benefit bonds’ (The Treasury (NSW), 2012) and FONGA 
for its part elected in 2011 to emulate its Queensland Counterpart by largely appropriating the 
Community Services Charter developed by the Futures Forum (FONGA, 2011).  
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Vignette A5.7 – Queensland: so near and yet so far 
In Queensland, a decade of state Labor government went by without any significant moves by 
either government or the NFP sector towards a formal relationship framework. An early ‘top-
down’ policy overture in this direction, Engaging Queensland (DPC, 2003), focussed primarily 
on supporting volunteering as opposed to engaging the non-government sector in issues of 
policy or funding generally. 
In August 2007 the Futures Forum, a coalition of peak and service provider organisations, 
launched a Queensland Community Services Sector Charter, the purpose of which was to ‘to 
define and communicate to other sectors of society (Government, business and community) 
what the community services sector is, and to raise awareness of its vital role and invaluable 
contribution to society’ (Futures Forum, 2007). The Futures Forum was a response both to 
tensions in the government-sector relationship and those inherent in a diverse and fragmented 
sector (personal communication, 20 December 2010a).  
In September 2007, the charismatic and populist Premier, Peter Beattie, retired in favour of his 
deputy, Anna Bligh. The Charter and leadership change coincided with a report by the 
Queensland Auditor General that found an excessive focus on compliance in state agencies’ 
management of funding to non-government organisations (QAO, 2007) and an internal review 
of the Department of Communities (DoC). The latter resulted in the publication of the 
Framework for Investment in Human Services (Queensland, 2007) – ‘the absolute precursor to 
the Queensland Compact’ (personal communication, 22 November 2010).  
These events provided the impetus for action on government-NFP sector relations. Through the 
Framework five major human services agencies, together with the Treasury, sought to establish 
clear and agreed funding processes. Said one official, this was about ‘government getting its 
house in order’ (personal communication, 22 November 2010). The Charter added weight to 
efforts to address observed problems with the relationship, and the Futures Forum became the 
key interlocutor with government. A Joint Working Group was formed to oversee consultations 
about a compact and an associated ‘action plan’ – the rationale being that a compact without an 
action plan is ‘happy words and not a whole lot else’ (personal communication, 22 November 
2010). 
The 2008 Queensland Compact became a touchstone for the National Compact. A Compact 
Governance Committee (CGC) was created (with a membership drawn from government and 
the sector) to which the Premier, whose personal political support was critical (personal 
communication, 20 December 2010a, b, 22 November 2010), appointed an ‘Independent Chair’. 
The CGC provided a ‘safe and reliable forum for discussion’ in which ‘hard conversations’ could 
occur and consensus reached about reform priorities (personal communication, 20 December 
2010b). 
Although extolled in some quarters as ‘best practice’ (personal communication, 20 December 
2010b), scepticism persisted amongst service providers who believed the compact constrained 
their capacity to maximise their position. The dominant view, however, was one of cautious 
optimism: ‘We knew, as it progressed, it was going to be a less than perfect vehicle but we felt, 
hey, it’s going to be better than anything we’ve got, and there’s no basis for these conversations 
at the moment, so why don’t we have a go?’ (personal communication, 20 December 2010a).  
The CGC saw its role as moving a range of issues from being ‘intractable’ to ‘just plain hard’ 
(personal communication, 20 December 2010b). The action plan developed to further the 
compact focused on concrete measures, process reforms and culture change. The CGC, with 
secretariat support from DoC, gave the action plan a strong regional focus and reported 
annually against achievements.  
A landslide defeat of the incumbent Labor government in the 2012 general election threw the 
compact into abeyance. The new government chose not to release an independent review of 
the compact, the CGC was suspended and its independent chair was not re-appointed. The 
new Liberal National Party government has focused on expenditure reductions and has re-
imposed ‘gag clauses’ in service procurement contracts. The sector has responded cautiously 
to the seismic changes in the political landscape, seeking clarity and preserving lines of 
communication with the government. It now appears that the LNP government is considering a 
new compact to replace the original (Futures Forum, 2012). 
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Vignette A5.8 – Northern Territory: a relationship framework stillborn 
The Northern Territory (NT) does not, at present, have a formal policy framework for cross-
sector cooperation. In 2005, the former Labor government led by Chief Minister Clare Martin 
(2001-07) engaged the firm RPR Consulting3 to assist with the development of a partnership 
framework between the NT government and the community sector. The consultant’s final report, 
New Foundations, recommended the adoption of a Common Cause Charter as a framework for 
future relationships between the government and community sectors. It also recommended the 
formation of a joint taskforce to steer the implementation of the proposed charter as well as the 
creation of a number of ‘peak councils’ (DCM, 2004?). By 2008, however, and despite initial 
good intentions, the taskforce had ceased to operate, leading to cynicism within the community 
sector (Casey et al., 2008b:17, NTCOSS, 2008). 
Leadership change was a possible factor in the apparent abandonment of the process for 
developing a formal framework document in the NT. Then Chief Minister Clare Martin (2001-07) 
was both the first female and the first Labor first minister in the NT. Labor under Martin held a 
one-seat majority after the 2001 election and increased her majority in a landslide win at the 
2005 election. The win might have provided added impetus for Martin’s push for a new 
settlement with the sector.  
In June 2007 the federal government led by John Howard, relying upon constitutional powers to 
override NT government jurisdiction in Aboriginal communities, announced the Northern 
Territory Emergency Response (NTER) in response to the alarming prevalence of child sexual 
abuse in Aboriginal communities. The NT government's cooperation in the federal government's 
NTER was highly contentious. This was a show of political resolve on the part of the federal 
government in an election year. Although there was strident criticism of the NTER from a 
number of quarters, the federal government was on safe political ground: there was no political 
skin to be lost protecting Aboriginal children or in overriding a Labor government portrayed as 
failing to act in their behalf. Martin was surprised and seemingly unsettled by the move. The NT 
government was obliged to acquiesce and Martin’s and Labor’s credibility with the community 
sector was undermined.  
Martin resigned suddenly in November 2007, citing the NTER as a factor (Martin was 
subsequently appointed as the Chair of the Australian Council of Social Service). At the 2008 
NT election, Labor was returned with a one-seat majority under Martin’s successor, Paul 
Henderson. The defection of a Labor MLA to the Country Liberal Party in 2009 led to a minority 
Labor government dependent upon the support of one independent MLA. Labor lost the 2012 
general election to the CLP, in part owing to a swing against it in Indigenous communities that 
comprise around 30% of the NT population of 233,000.  
It is likely that the NTER helped to push Common Cause off the policy agenda – and keep it off. 
By 2011 there were signs of a possible re-opening of the policy window – possibly influenced by 
the example of the National Compact. The former Chief Minister affirmed that ‘building stronger 
relationships and creating opportunities to improve systems and support for non government 
organisations’ and ‘reducing red tape’ would be a priority of his government (Henderson, 2011). 
In the area of child and family services, the NT Labor government called for: 'The development 
of new partnerships with the non-government sector’ (NT Government, 2011?). In mid-2012 
Labor initiated a ‘conversation’ with Territorians about a ‘social participation framework’ that 
would clarify the respective roles of ‘individuals, community groups, businesses, government 
agencies and non government organisations’ (Department of the Chief Minister, 2012). The 
current status of this initiative is unknown. 
‘Hot button' social issues such as child protection, compulsory income management, substance 
abuse, domestic violence and youth justice dominate in the Territory. These issues 
disproportionately affect Indigenous communities, and policy responses must therefore take into 
account vast distances, small populations and geographically dispersed communities with 
complex needs. Political ructions in the territory have also offered distractions, such as when 
Chief Minister Terry Mills was controversially replaced as leader after only seven months in 
office while on an overseas trip. 
                                                
3 RPR Consulting was one of two consulting firms engaged by the ACT Government to assist in 
the development of the Territory’s first compact in 2001 (ACT, 2000). 
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Appendix 6 – Australian National Compact 
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Figure A6.1 – Text of the National Compact Working Together 
Prime Minister’s Message 
The National Compact promotes a better way of 
working between the Government and the not-for-
profit sector. It recognises that there is a role for 
everyone to play in strengthening our nation and 
offers us the chance to forge meaningful and 
collaborative relationships based on greater trust, 
insight and unity. We must harness the talent of all 
our people and move forward together to address 
challenges facing Australian communities. There 
are over 600,000 not-for-profit organisations 
serving our community. I strongly encourage 
organisations who have not yet signed up to the 
National Compact to get behind this joint initiative to 
help give life to the National Compact’s principles 
and help it reach its enormous and valuable 
potential. Together we can achieve great things for 
our nation’s future.  
The Hon Julia Gillard MP 
Message from The Minister for Social Inclusion 
The National Compact: working together is a 
framework for building a better relationship between 
the Australian Government and the not-for-profit 
sector. The Government recognises the invaluable 
role that not-for-profit organisations play in 
enriching Australian communities and is committed 
to building better relationships based on 
collaboration and respect. This partnership will 
ensure that we work together to sustain a strong, 
productive and innovative sector which is essential 
in supporting our society, particularly the most 
vulnerable and disadvantaged. I believe in the 
value and potential of the National Compact to 
provide a foundation for action to improve working 
relationships, strengthen sector viability, and 
develop and deliver better policy and programs. I 
am delighted to offer my support.  
The Hon Mark Butler MP  
Foreword 
The Australian Government (the Government) 
believes a strong, vibrant, independent and 
innovative not-for-profit sector is essential to 
underpin a productive and inclusive Australia. Our 
social inclusion agenda also has at its core a 
commitment to create communities where all 
Australians can participate, learn, engage and have 
a voice. The National Compact: working together 
outlines how the Government and not-for-profit 
organisations will work together in new ways based 
on partnership and respect. It is the culmination of 
extensive consultation between the Government 
and the not-for-profit sector. The National Compact: 
working together recognises the vital contribution of 
the not-for-profit sector to Australian communities, 
especially in supporting the most vulnerable in our 
society. It is through not-for-profit organisations that 
governments and communities are able to work 
together to support and strengthen our democracy.  
 
Not-for-profit organisations contribute to good 
public policy, enrich our culture, protect our 
environment and promote health and wellbeing as 
well as advocate on behalf of Australian 
communities including marginalised groups. The 
National Compact: working together reflects the 
commitment of all parties to find innovative and 
better ways of working together. This collaborative 
relationship will allow us to work on the challenges 
we face, build a stronger not-for-profit sector in 
Australia and through this, drive innovation, 
wellbeing and sustainability in our communities.  
Context 
The National Compact has been developed by the 
Australian Government in consultation with 
Australia’s not-for-profit sector – the broad range of 
not-for-profit organisations that exist to provide 
services, advance causes, share enthusiasm, 
preserve traditions or worship together. The 
National Compact is an agreement setting out how 
the Government and the not-for-profit sector want 
to work together to achieve their shared vision. The 
National Compact is a starting point for a stronger, 
more productive relationship. As the relationship 
matures over time, the not-for-profit sector and the 
Government may need to refine this document to 
reflect their new ways of working together 
Shared vision 
The Australian Government and the not-for-profit 
sector will work together to improve social, cultural, 
civic, economic and environmental outcomes, 
building on the strengths of individuals and 
communities. This collaboration will contribute to 
improved community wellbeing and a more 
inclusive Australian society with better quality of life 
for all. Purpose and status The National Compact 
represents a commitment by the Australian 
Government and the not-for-profit sector to 
genuinely collaborate to achieve this shared vision. 
The National Compact’s shared principles provide a 
foundation for action to improve working 
relationships, strengthen not-for-profit sector 
viability and develop and deliver better policy and 
programs. National Compact signatories from the 
not-for-profit sector agree to work with all Australian 
Government agencies to achieve these goals.  
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Shared principles 
The Australian Government and the not-for-profit 
sector will work together according to these 
principles to achieve their shared vision: 
• We believe a strong, independent not-for-profit 
sector is vital for a fair, inclusive society. 
• We acknowledge and value the immense 
contribution the not-for-profit sector and its 
volunteers make to Australian life. We aspire to 
a relationship between the Government and 
the not-for-profit sector based on mutual 
respect and trust. 
• We agree that authentic consultation, 
constructive advocacy and genuine 
collaboration between the not-for-profit sector 
and the Government will lead to better policies, 
programs and services for our communities.  
• We believe the great diversity within Australia’s 
not-for-profit sector is a significant strength, 
enabling it to understand and respond to the 
needs and aspirations of the nation’s varied 
communities, in collaboration with those 
communities.  
• We commit to enduring engagement with 
marginalised and disadvantaged Australians, in 
particular, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people and their communities.  
• We recognise the value of our multicultural 
society and we will plan, design and deliver 
culturally responsive services.  
• We share a desire to improve life in Australia 
through social, cultural, civic, economic and 
environmental activity. To achieve this we need 
to plan, learn and improve together, building on 
existing strengths and making thoughtful 
decisions using sound evidence.  
• We share a drive to respond to the needs and 
aspirations of communities through effective, 
pragmatic use of available resources.  
• We recognise concerted effort is needed to 
develop an innovative, appropriately resourced 
and sustainable not-for-profit sector.  
• We acknowledge the need to develop 
measurable outcomes and invest in 
accountability mechanisms to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of our joint endeavours. 
National Compact 
Shared aspirations 
The National Compact is a starting point towards a 
stronger, more productive relationship between the 
Australian Government and the not-for-profit sector. 
We will work together to achieve the following 
goals. We will know that we have achieved the 
National Compact’s purpose when we can see real 
evidence of these aspirations in all our interactions. 
Aspirations for our relationship 
We all will: 
• understand and value the not-for-profit sector’s 
contribution;  
• work together respectfully, based on mutual 
understanding;  
• communicate openly with each other;  
• support networks and mechanisms that 
strengthen our ability to work together; and  
• develop new skills to work more effectively 
together. 
Aspirations for engagement and consultation 
We all will: 
• develop and implement codes of engagement 
together;  
• find ways for people who are vulnerable and 
excluded to have a direct, strong voice in policy 
and planning processes;  
• protect the freedom of not-for-profit 
organisations to contribute to public debate 
without impacting on their funding or status; 
and  
• work in real partnership with Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander and multicultural 
community organisations. 
Aspirations for achieving better results 
We all will: 
• improve our focus on achieving outcomes for 
individuals and communities;  
• better coordinate policy, programs and 
services to improve these outcomes;  
• share relevant information and data to help us 
all plan and evaluate our efforts;  
• improve funding and procurement 
arrangements;  
• reduce red tape and streamline reporting;  
• implement consistent, simple financial 
arrangements across government;  
• continue to improve management and 
efficiency of service and program delivery; and  
• achieve more transparent, accountable 
decision making and program delivery. 
Aspirations for a more sustainable not-for-profit 
sector 
We all will: 
• foster research and innovation;  
• work together to strengthen the capacity of the 
not-for-profit sector;  
• collaborate on workforce strategies to improve 
attraction, retention, development and 
recognition of paid workers and volunteers in 
the not-for-profit sector; and  
• investigate and support opportunities for 
diverse funding sources and partnerships. 
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 Priorities for action 
Implementing the National Compact principles will 
require coordinated engagement across 
Government and collaboration with the not-for-profit 
sector to implement the eight priorities outlined 
below: 
1. Document and promote the value and 
contribution of the not-for-profit sector.  
2. Protect the not-for-profit sector’s right to 
advocacy irrespective of any funding 
relationship that might exist.  
3. Recognise not-for-profit sector diversity in 
consultation processes and sector development 
initiatives.  
4. Improve information sharing, including greater 
access to publicly-funded research and data.  
5. Reduce red tape and streamline reporting.  
6. Simplify and improve consistency of financial 
arrangements including across state and 
federal jurisdictions.  
7. Act to improve paid and unpaid workforce 
issues. 
8. Improve funding and procurement processes. 
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Appendix 7 – New Zealand NFP sector reform 
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Figure A7.1 – Key NFP Policy Initiatives 1999-2009 
 
Creation of the Community and Voluntary Sector portfolio (1999) 
The Labour-led government established the Community and Voluntary Sector Portfolio early in 
its first term. Steve Maharey, a senior and influential member of New Zealand labour’s left and a 
committed ‘Blairite’, was the inaugural Minister. Several people have held the portfolio since: 
Tariana Turia (Labour 2002-04), Rick Barker (Labour 2004-05), Luamanuvao Laban (Labour 
2005-07), Ruth Dyson (Labour 2007-08), Tariana Turia (Māori Party 2008-11) and Jo Goodhew 
(National Party 2011-present). Of those who have served in this portfolio, Maharey and Turia 
have had the greatest impact to date.  
 
Office for the Community and Voluntary Sector (OCVS) (September 2003-2012) 
The foundations for this initiative were laid by Steve Maharey and seen through by Tariana 
Turia. The purpose of the OCVS is ‘to strengthen the relationship between government and the 
community sector’. The OCVS provides ‘cross-sectoral policy development and advice’ and acts 
‘as a contact point for community, voluntary and tangata whenua organisations at the national 
level’. The work program of the OCVS consists of five inter-related streams of activity: 
• supporting work to build the capacity of the sector 
• building knowledge of the community and voluntary sector through on-going research  
• providing other government agencies with policy advice on overcoming policy barriers and 
addressing issues of concern to the community and voluntary sector 
• actively supporting the development and promotion of good practice by government 
agencies when engaging with the sector 
• encouraging participation and promoting volunteering in line with the Government Policy on 
Volunteering (source, OCVS, 2012). 
Located initially within Ministry of Social Development (MSD), the OCVS functioned as a semi-
autonomous agency in its early years, but over time came to be regarded more as a business 
unit within the MSD. Following a review by the State Services Commission, it was announced in 
November 2010 that the OCVS would operate from the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) 
from February 2011. It was claimed the move would simplify access to government and enable 
community groups to ‘deal with one department not two, with a single work programme’ (Guy 
and Turia, 2010). During the 2011-12 financial year the OCVS ceased to exist as a separate 
office. Its functions of were integrated with the existing policy capacity of the DIA (for example, 
its policy functions are now part of the department’s Policy Group and its operational functions 
are now part of the Community Operations team). 
 
Pathway to Partnership (2007) 
In 2008 the Labour-led government committed to a four-year strategy, Pathway for Partnership, 
‘aimed at strengthening community based family, child and youth focused services’ (Ministry of 
Social Development, 2008). Funds would be introduced progressively with an extra NZ$52 
million available in 2008/09 building to NZ$192.8 million in 2011/12. The Minute of the Cabinet 
decision allocating funds to the strategy noted: 
• that New Zealand’s high incidence of child abuse and neglect, family violence and criminal 
offending, and the need for expensive, remedial and statutory services, will not reduce 
unless there is a robust and well-funded NGO sector that can get quality services and early 
support to families, children and young people; 
• that NGO services are increasingly struggling to provide quality services to families and 
children because most are funded at levels significantly below the cost of delivering the 
service, and their funding has been insufficient to address volume and/or cost increases; 
and 
• that New Zealand has a large number of small NGO social services providers exacerbated 
by a previous market-based funding model which atomised the sector and created problems 
of high provider overheads, lack of innovation, some duplication of services, and a program 
rather than outcomes focus (Cabinet Business Committee, 2008). 
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Pathway to Partnership was ‘reshaped’ by the National-led government in 2009 by redirecting 
NZ$104 million to support a short-term, time limited Community Response Fund, ‘targeted at 
those groups facing increased demand for services, or severe financial difficulty due to the 
recession’ (Bennett, 2009b, Ministry of Social Development, 2009).  
 
High Trust Contracting (2009) 
In 2009 the New Zealand government announced its intention to trial a ‘High Trust Model’ of 
funding and contracting and, in so doing, ‘radically’ reshape its approach to contracting for 
‘services to social sector groups’. 
Said the Minister for Social Development and Employment, Paula Bennett: 
I've heard horror stories about providers with multiple contracts, which have had 
to go through a ridiculous number of audits each year - all while continuing to 
deliver a trusted service. In many cases they are burdened with days and days 
of admin for contracts with just one agency - imagine how hard it is for those 
groups trying to work with multiple agencies (Bennett, 2009a). 
Under the new contracting model multiple contracts would be combined into a single, contract 
with simplified reporting requirements, thereby cutting down on ‘unnecessary bureaucracy’. 
This funding model lets high-performing social service providers get on what 
they do best - delivering effective services to communities - instead of getting 
bogged down ticking the boxes and filing endless paperwork for the sake of it 
(Bennett, 2010)  
The High Trust model was trialled initially with service providers to the Ministry for Social 
Development and subsequently extended to ‘whole of government’ providers with ‘multiple 
government funders such as the Ministries of Health, Social Development, Education and 
Justice, Housing New Zealand and New Zealand Police’ with the aim of placing greater weight 
on ‘the results actually being achieved for clients and families’ and reducing the preoccupation 
with compliance and reporting.  
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Figure A7.2 – Key NFP Policy Guidance 2002-2010 
 
Government Policy on Volunteering (December 2002)  
The policy expressly recognises the contribution, importance and extent of volunteering in the 
community and, importance, states that whilst volunteers are an essential part of civil society, 
they should not replace paid workers. Through the policy, the government commits itself to 
ensure ‘good practice in volunteer programmes which government directly manages’, 
encourage ‘community and voluntary organisations to develop and maintain good practice in 
supporting and involving their volunteers’ and to reduce ‘barriers associated with volunteering in 
legislation, policy and practice’. As well, the government undertook to: ‘take into account the 
needs of volunteers and their organisations, and the costs associated with volunteering, when 
developing policies and delivering services’; and to ‘have policies in place that support the 
private volunteering activities of staff while ensuring that public servants continue to fulfil their 
professional obligations’ (OCVS, 2002). 
 
Principles to underpin management by public entities of funding to non-government 
organisations (June 2006) 
This ‘good practice guide’ observes ‘a broadening of the base of service delivery’ as a 
consequence of public sector reforms over the past 20 years, noting that ‘NGOs are now 
frequently involved in delivering public services, influencing policy design and implementation, 
or performing a facilitative role to ensure that government objectives are met’ (OAG, 2006:5). 
The guide observes that, in providing independent assurance in relation to the use of public 
resources, ‘[a] different set of risks arise when a public entity funds another organisation to 
deliver services on its behalf’ (OAG, 2006:6). The guide seeks to complement existing guidance 
about NGO funding arrangements in order to ‘further enhance public entities’ existing practices’ 
(OAG, 2006:3). The guide enunciates a number of principles that ought to inform funding 
arrangements between public entities and non-government organisations: lawfulness; 
accountability; openness (transparency; value for money; and fairness and integrity (OAG, 
2006:6-7). 
 
Building Better Government Engagement (BBGE) (2008-09) 
Following a Community-Government Forum convened by the OCVS in 2007 the government 
set up a BBGE reference group comprising people from community and government agencies 
with particular interest and expertise in community engagement. The purpose of the group was 
to advise the Office OCVS on ‘ways to enhance central government engagement with citizens 
and communities’ (BBGE, 2009). Following the change of government, the reference group 
released a discussion paper in December 2008 and followed with a three-month period of 
consultation. The final report published in July 2009 made a number of recommendations aimed 
at addressing what the reference group identified as the ‘core issue’, being: 
Central government agencies are not yet sufficiently committed to, and skilled at, collaborating 
with citizens and community organisations in order to jointly tackle societal problems (BBGE, 
2009). 
In addition to feedback from consultations, the reference group also took into account the 
findings of a series of case studies focusing on organisational responses to embed good 
practice engagement, and effective engagement processes. The final report recommended 
actions in relation to a range of matters, including government commitment, culture change, 
accountability, capacity-building within government, building collaboration and communication 
and engagement with Iwi/Māori. In September 2009, Tariana Turia announced the 
government’s commitment to ‘strengthening its community relationships … through an 
agreement with the sector’ that would include ‘a programme of action to strengthen government 
engagement with citizens and communities’ (Turia, 2009).  
In August 2009, Turia sought approval from the Cabinet Social Policy Committee for a whole-of-
government response to the range of cross-cutting concerns outlined in the BBGE final report 
and a separate report by ANGOA assessing the previous government’s Statement of 
Government Intentions (ANGOA, 2009). In particular, Turia recommended that the Committee 
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agree to enter into discussions with the sector concerning a relationship agreement to replace 
the 2001 Statement of Government Intentions (Cabinet Social Policy Committee, 2009). 
Building Better Government Engagement has been credited by some in the NFP sector with 
empowering policy actors in government agencies to pursue more positive and constructive 
modes of engagement at the coalface (personal communication, 13 December 2010). 
 
Guidelines for Contracting with Non-Government Organisations for Services Sought by 
the Crown (April 2009) 
These guidelines were first issued by the New Zealand government in 2001. They were 
subsequently reviewed and updated in 2009 in consultation with ‘a sample of non- Government 
organisations (NGOs), Government departments and other agencies’. The guidelines are 
‘intended to encourage the use of better contracting practices by all departments and Crown 
entities involved in negotiating arrangements with NGOs for the provision of services that 
support the Government’s objectives’ and are described as ‘just one of a range of Government 
initiatives aimed at promoting better relationships between Government agencies and the 
community and voluntary sector’ (The Treasury, 2009).  
 
Code of Funding Practice (2010) 
The Code of Funding Practice helps government funders and non-profit organisations work 
together when using public funds to benefit communities. This Good Practice Funding section 
helps you implement the Code of Funding Practice. It offers guidance on how to meet the seven 
core codes and 22 key criteria in different situations. Most parts of the Code will apply to all 
funding arrangements, but will require different emphasis to suit the funding purpose and type of 
funding arrangement being used. The Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector 
launched the Code of Funding Practice on 1 October 2010 (OCVS, 2010).  
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Figure A7.3 – Statement of Government Intentions for an Improved Community – 
Government Relationship 
 
DECEMBER 2001 
Vision 
Strong and respectful relationships between government 
and community, voluntary and iwi/Ma-ori organisations. 
Government recognises that community, voluntary and 
Iwi/Māori organisations play a unique and vital role in New 
Zealand society. 
An independent and vibrant community sector is essential 
to a healthy civil society. Government and the community 
sector depend on each other to achieve shared goals of 
social participation, social equity and strengthened 
communities. 
The Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party 
delivered a strong message that government relationships 
with the community sector need to improve if these goals 
are to be realised. 
Government will be an active partner in building a 
relationship based on honesty, trust and integrity – tika 
and pono; compassion and caring – aroha and 
manaakitanga; and recognition of diversity. 
Principles 
Government is committed to developing relationships with 
community, voluntary and iwi/Ma-ori organisations that: 
• enable mutual interests to be achieved through co-
operation –  
• respect the independence of community, voluntary 
and Iwi/Māori organisations  
• recognise and respect the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi  
• demonstrate effective two-way communication  
• involve leadership within the community sector and 
from government ministers  
• acknowledge and support the positive role played by 
umbrella, national and strategic collective bodies  
• embrace innovation and creativity  
• respect and recognise cultural diversity  
• are founded on public accountability and appropriately 
flexible good practice. 
 
Government commitments 
Culture of government  
Government expects public servants to treat all New 
Zealanders with dignity and respect. This requires 
leadership from public service chief executives and senior 
managers to ensure that all staff have a good 
understanding of the values, governance arrangements 
and working realities of the community, voluntary and 
Iwi/Māori organisations with whom they interact. 
 “Whole of government” approach 
Government recognises that community, voluntary and 
Iwi/Māori organisations interact across the range of 
government ministries and departments. Government 
agencies will give priority to working together, breaking 
down ‘silos’ and establishing co-ordinated, inter-sectoral 
policies and programmes. 
Treaty of Waitangi  
Government expects its departments and ministries to 
recognise and apply the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. Public servants need to be well informed about, 
and responsive to, Treaty matters. Government agencies 
will continue to develop and improve public servants’ 
understanding of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, 
its relevance to the agency in which they work and its 
application to their own roles. 
Participation in decision-making 
Government values the contribution of community, 
voluntary and Iwi/Māori organisations to good policy 
making and delivery of effective services. Government 
agencies and the community sector will work together to 
develop and improve consultation processes through 
sharing good practice, guidelines, workshops and training. 
Government funding to community organisations  
Government acknowledges the valuable contribution 
made by community, voluntary and Iwi/Māori 
organisations to the achievement of shared social, 
cultural, environmental and economic goals. Government 
agencies will, together with the community sector, 
undertake a programme of work to address concerns 
about funding arrangements, effectiveness, compliance 
costs and related matters. 
Strengthening the community sector  
New Zealand’s social, cultural, environmental and 
economic well-being requires a healthy and strong 
community sector. Government will work alongside 
community, voluntary and Iwi/Māori organisations to 
support and strengthen the community sector. 
Implementation 
Government is committed to creating a genuine 
partnership with community, voluntary and Iwi/Māori 
organisations. Building strong and respectful relationships 
with the community sector will take time and will require 
hard work, reflection and active engagement. 
Government sees a future where the state performs its 
role as a facilitator of a strong civil society based on 
respectful relationships between government and 
community, voluntary and Iwi/Māori organisations. 
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Figure A7.4 – Kia Tūtahi Standing Together: The Relationship Accord between the 
Communities of Aotearoa New Zealand and the Government of New Zealand (May 2011) 
wawata - vision 
The communities of Aotearoa New Zealand and the 
Government of New Zealand working together for a fair, 
inclusive and flourishing society. 
kaupapa- purpose 
Communities and government are increasingly working 
together to navigate the cultural, social, environmental and 
economic challenges for our society. In this context, the 
Relationship Accord supports the building of strong 
relationships between communities and government, with 
benefits accessible to all, so that we can jointly achieve our 
vision. 
tuapapa-foundations 
The work of communities and government together is integral 
to the fabric of our society. At the heart of our relationship, are 
the aspirations and wellbeing of whanau and individuals within 
our communities. 
We, as communities and government: 
• acknowledge the special relationship between the Crown 
and tangata whenua through Te Tiriti o Waitangi 
• acknowledge our history and the past work achieved by 
communities and government to strengthen relationships 
• respect and value the many cultures and diversity of the 
communities of Aotearoa New Zealand 
• respect and value the contribution of tangata whenua, 
community and voluntary sector organisations; whether 
large or small, structured or informal 
• respect and value the contributions of everyone who 
dedicates their time and energy voluntarily for the benefit 
of their communities 
• recognise the role of government in setting policy and 
managing public resources and the importance of 
communities contributing to the development of policy. 
tikanga- principles 
We, as communities and government, agree to build our 
relationship on a set of principles that form the basis for 
committed actions. 
We will respect Te Tiriti o Waitangi. 
• We recognise Te Tiriti o Waitangi as the foundation 
document of Aotearoa New Zealand. 
• We respect all commitments that parties make under Te 
Tiriti o Waitangi. 
• We will weave Te Tiriti through the work we do. 
We have a collective responsibility to hear and respond to the 
voices of all. 
• We will reach out to those who are not usually included 
and respond to the diversity in our communities. 
• We will take account of the people whose daily lives are 
affected by our work. 
• We will work to enable communities to determine their 
own destinies for the betterment of all. 
• We will increase opportunities for people to 
participate and flourish in their communities. 
• We will champion the principles and intent of this 
Relationship Accord. 
We will act in good faith. 
• We will do what we say we will do and put in 
place ways of making this clear to everyone. 
• We will work cooperatively to resolve issues 
arising between us. 
• We will act in the spirit of generosity towards 
each other. 
• We will share our knowledge, celebrate success 
and learn from our experiences. 
Our work together will be built on trust and mutual 
respect. 
• We will be honest and open. 
• We will develop and promote effective 
communication. 
• We will be responsive to each other's guidance 
and advice. 
• We will respect the different roles and 
responsibilities we have. 
nga mahinga -putting the principles into 
practice 
The success of the Relationship Accord will depend 
on how we put the principles into practice. We start 
from a strong base of more than a decade of work to 
strengthen relationships between communities and 
government and deliver better results for the people of 
Aotearoa New Zealand. 
We will commit to implementing this Relationship 
Accord to achieve the following outcomes. 
• The principles of the Relationship Accord are 
widely understood and modelled through 
consistent good practice. 
• Communities and government are in genuine 
and purposeful engagement on matters of 
mutual interest and importance. 
• Productive relationships between communities 
and government lead to decisions that reflect 
mutual interests. 
• Communities and government jointly resolve 
longstanding matters of concern, such as, 
participation in decision-making around policy 
and service delivery issues, and funding 
arrangements. 
• Communities and government have the 
resources to support working together better. 
• Communities and government jointly review 
progress and share learning. 
We will draw on the skills and knowledge within 
communities and government to resolve any 
differences and put in place strategies to give effect to 
the principles in the Relationship Accord. 
Signed by the Government of New Zealand 
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Appendix 8 – Recognition of the Advocacy 
Function 
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pa
ct
 1
99
8 
R
ec
og
ni
se
s 
th
at
 ‘t
ha
t v
ol
un
ta
ry
 a
nd
 c
om
m
un
ity
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 h
av
e 
an
 o
bl
ig
at
io
n 
to
 re
pr
es
en
t t
he
 
in
te
re
st
s 
of
 th
ei
r c
on
st
itu
en
ts
’ a
nd
 fu
rth
er
 s
ta
te
s 
th
at
 ‘T
he
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t r
ec
og
ni
se
s 
th
at
 v
ol
un
ta
ry
 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
ns
 h
av
e 
an
 o
bl
ig
at
io
n 
to
 re
pr
es
en
t t
he
 in
te
re
st
s 
of
 th
ei
r c
on
st
itu
en
ts
 a
nd
 th
e 
pe
op
le
 a
nd
 
co
m
m
un
iti
es
 th
ey
 w
or
k 
w
ith
. T
he
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t a
ck
no
w
le
dg
es
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
' r
ig
ht
 to
 c
am
pa
ig
n 
on
 b
eh
al
f 
of
 th
es
e 
in
te
re
st
s 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 fr
am
ew
or
k.
’ 
A
ls
o 
im
po
se
s 
a 
re
ci
pr
oc
al
 re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
on
 th
e 
N
FP
 s
ec
to
r, 
vi
z.
 ‘W
he
re
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 c
la
im
 a
 le
ad
in
g 
ro
le
 in
 re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
th
ey
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 p
re
pa
re
d 
to
 re
sp
on
d 
in
 re
as
on
ab
le
 ti
m
e 
to
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 o
n 
re
le
va
nt
 s
ub
je
ct
s,
 c
om
m
en
su
ra
te
 w
ith
 th
ei
r a
va
ila
bl
e 
re
so
ur
ce
s.
’ 
W
el
sh
 T
hi
rd
 S
ec
to
r 
S
ch
em
e 
20
04
 
Th
e 
N
at
io
na
l A
ss
em
bl
y 
re
co
gn
is
es
 ‘t
ha
t t
he
 v
ol
un
ta
ry
 s
ec
to
r h
as
 a
n 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
to
 re
pr
es
en
t t
he
 in
te
re
st
s 
of
 it
s 
co
ns
tit
ue
nt
s’
 . 
W
hi
ls
t r
ec
og
ni
si
ng
 th
at
 ‘ 
di
ffe
re
nt
 p
ar
ts
 o
f t
he
 s
ec
to
r h
av
e 
di
ffe
rin
g 
ab
ili
tie
s 
to
 
en
ga
ge
 w
ith
 it
. [
go
ve
rn
m
en
t]’
, t
he
 S
ch
em
e 
fu
rth
er
 s
ta
te
s 
th
at
, ‘
fa
ilu
re
 o
f a
n 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
to
 re
sp
on
d 
to
 a
 
pa
rti
cu
la
r c
on
su
lta
tio
n 
w
ill
 n
ot
 b
e 
re
ga
rd
ed
 a
s 
be
in
g 
du
e 
to
 a
 la
ck
 o
f i
nt
er
es
t’.
 
W
el
sh
 T
hi
rd
 S
ec
to
r 
S
ch
em
e 
20
14
 
W
hi
ls
t s
ta
tin
g 
th
at
 ‘T
he
 W
el
sh
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t e
xp
ec
ts
 th
e 
Th
ird
 S
ec
to
r t
o 
re
co
gn
is
e 
th
e 
pr
im
ac
y 
of
 W
el
sh
 
M
in
is
te
rs
 in
 fo
rm
ul
at
in
g 
po
lic
y 
an
d 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n’
, i
t a
ls
o 
re
co
gn
is
es
 th
at
 ‘t
he
 T
hi
rd
 S
ec
to
r h
as
 a
n 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
to
 re
pr
es
en
t t
he
 in
te
re
st
s 
of
 it
s 
co
ns
tit
ue
nt
s’
. 
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 No
rth
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
 
C
om
pa
ct
 1
99
8 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t ‘
re
co
gn
is
es
, r
es
pe
ct
s 
an
d 
su
pp
or
ts
 th
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 o
f t
he
 s
ec
to
r a
nd
 it
s 
rig
ht
 to
 
ca
m
pa
ig
n 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
la
w
, t
o 
co
m
m
en
t o
n 
an
d,
 w
he
re
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
, t
o 
ch
al
le
ng
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t p
ol
ic
y’
. T
he
 
C
om
pa
ct
 fu
rth
er
 s
ta
te
s 
th
at
 th
e 
(c
en
tra
l) 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t, 
‘re
co
gn
is
es
, r
es
pe
ct
s 
an
d 
su
pp
or
ts
 th
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 o
f t
he
 s
ec
to
r a
nd
 it
s 
rig
ht
 to
 c
am
pa
ig
n 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
la
w
, t
o 
co
m
m
en
t o
n 
an
d,
 w
he
re
 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
, t
o 
ch
al
le
ng
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t p
ol
ic
y.
’ I
n 
re
la
tio
n 
to
 ‘r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n’
, t
he
 C
om
pa
ct
 s
ta
te
s 
th
at
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t w
ill
: ‘
’re
sp
ec
t t
he
 ri
gh
t o
f t
he
 v
ol
un
ta
ry
 a
nd
 c
om
m
un
ity
 s
ec
to
r t
o 
co
m
m
en
t o
n,
 to
 
ch
al
le
ng
e 
an
d 
to
 s
ee
k 
to
 in
flu
en
ce
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t p
ol
ic
ie
s’
; ‘
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 th
at
 a
dv
oc
ac
y 
an
d 
ca
m
pa
ig
ni
ng
 o
n 
be
ha
lf 
of
 
in
di
vi
du
al
s,
 g
ro
up
s 
an
d 
ca
us
es
 is
 a
 d
is
tin
ct
iv
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
 o
f t
he
 v
ol
un
ta
ry
 a
nd
 c
om
m
un
ity
 s
ec
to
r’;
 a
nd
 
‘re
co
gn
is
e 
th
at
 th
e 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
an
d 
co
m
m
un
ity
 s
ec
to
r h
as
 a
 v
ita
l r
ol
e 
in
 id
en
tif
yi
ng
 a
nd
 in
 a
dd
re
ss
in
g 
is
su
es
 o
f s
oc
ia
l j
us
tic
e 
an
d 
eq
ua
lit
y’
. I
n 
ad
di
tio
n,
 th
e 
se
ct
or
 w
ill
: ‘
 
ad
vi
se
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
n 
is
su
es
 o
f 
co
nc
er
n,
 d
ra
w
in
g 
on
 re
al
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
ga
th
er
ed
 th
ou
gh
 th
e 
w
or
k 
of
 in
di
vi
du
al
 v
ol
un
ta
ry
 a
nd
 c
om
m
un
ity
 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
ns
, v
ol
un
te
er
s 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
e 
us
er
s’
 a
nd
 ‘a
dv
oc
at
e 
an
d 
ca
m
pa
ig
n 
to
 s
ee
k 
ch
an
ge
 a
s 
a 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 n
ee
d’
.  
N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
 
C
on
co
rd
at
 2
01
2 
Th
e 
pa
rtn
er
sh
ip
 ‘r
ec
og
ni
se
s,
 re
sp
ec
ts
 a
nd
 s
up
po
rts
 th
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 o
f t
he
 s
ec
to
r a
nd
 it
s 
rig
ht
 to
 
ca
m
pa
ig
n 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
la
w
, t
o 
co
m
m
en
t o
n 
an
d,
 w
he
re
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
, t
o 
ch
al
le
ng
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t p
ol
ic
y’
. 
U
nd
er
 ‘s
ha
re
d 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
’ t
he
 C
on
co
rd
at
 o
bl
ig
es
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t t
o:
 ‘ 
re
sp
ec
t t
he
 ri
gh
t o
f t
he
 V
ol
un
ta
ry
 a
nd
 
C
om
m
un
ity
 S
ec
to
r t
o 
co
m
m
en
t o
n,
 to
 c
ha
lle
ng
e 
an
d 
to
 s
ee
k 
to
 in
flu
en
ce
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t p
ol
ic
ie
s’
; 
‘u
nd
er
st
an
d 
th
at
 a
dv
oc
ac
y 
an
d 
ca
m
pa
ig
ni
ng
 o
n 
be
ha
lf 
of
 in
di
vi
du
al
s,
 g
ro
up
s 
an
d 
ca
us
es
 is
 a
 d
is
tin
ct
iv
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
 o
f t
he
 v
ol
un
ta
ry
 a
nd
 c
om
m
un
ity
 s
ec
to
r’;
 a
nd
 ‘r
ec
og
ni
se
 th
at
 th
e 
V
ol
un
ta
ry
 a
nd
 C
om
m
un
ity
 
S
ec
to
r h
as
 a
 v
ita
l r
ol
e 
in
 id
en
tif
yi
ng
 a
nd
 in
 a
dd
re
ss
in
g 
is
su
es
 o
f s
oc
ia
l j
us
tic
e 
an
d 
eq
ua
lit
y,
 a
nd
 in
 
pr
ot
ec
tin
g 
an
d 
pr
om
ot
in
g 
th
e 
va
lu
e 
of
 o
ur
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
t’.
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  Fi
gu
re
 A
8.
3 
– 
R
ef
er
en
ce
s 
to
 th
e 
N
FP
 S
ec
to
r’s
 A
dv
oc
ac
y 
R
ol
e 
–F
ra
m
ew
or
k 
D
oc
um
en
ts
 in
 A
us
tr
al
ia
n 
St
at
es
 &
 
Te
rr
ito
rie
s 
A
us
tr
al
ia
n 
Su
b-
N
at
io
na
l F
ra
m
ew
or
k 
D
oc
um
en
ts
 
A
C
T 
S
oc
ia
l C
om
pa
ct
 
20
04
 
A
ck
no
w
le
dg
es
 th
at
 c
om
m
un
ity
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 ‘w
ill
 a
t t
im
es
 n
ec
es
sa
ril
y 
di
sa
gr
ee
 w
ith
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t a
bo
ut
 
th
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
pr
io
rit
y 
th
at
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 g
iv
en
 to
 d
iff
er
en
t i
ss
ue
s 
or
 h
ow
 c
om
m
un
ity
 n
ee
ds
 a
re
 b
es
t 
ad
dr
es
se
d’
 a
nd
 th
at
, ‘
Th
ey
 m
ay
 b
e 
st
rid
en
t o
n 
be
ha
lf 
of
 th
ei
r c
on
st
itu
en
cy
 o
r c
om
m
un
ity
 in
 th
ei
r 
op
po
si
tio
n 
to
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t d
ec
is
io
ns
 o
f p
ol
ic
y’
.  
Th
e 
C
om
pa
ct
 a
ls
o 
ac
kn
ow
le
dg
es
 th
at
 th
e 
co
m
m
un
ity
 
se
ct
or
 ‘p
ro
vi
de
s 
ad
vo
ca
cy
 w
ith
 a
nd
 o
n 
be
ha
lf 
of
 p
eo
pl
e 
w
ho
 fo
r d
iff
er
en
t r
ea
so
ns
 h
av
e 
lit
tle
 s
ay
 o
r 
po
w
er
 in
 th
e 
co
m
m
un
ity
’. 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t u
nd
er
ta
ke
s 
to
: ‘
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 a
nd
 re
co
gn
is
e 
th
e 
ro
le
 th
at
 p
ea
k 
bo
di
es
 a
nd
 re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
e 
gr
ou
ps
 p
la
y 
in
 a
dv
oc
at
in
g 
is
su
es
 o
n 
be
ha
lf 
of
 th
ei
r c
on
st
itu
en
ci
es
’; 
‘re
sp
ec
t 
th
e 
rig
ht
 o
f c
om
m
un
ity
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 g
ro
up
s 
to
 w
or
k 
th
ro
ug
h 
po
lit
ic
al
 c
ha
nn
el
s,
 a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
w
ith
 
st
af
f o
f g
ov
er
nm
en
t a
ge
nc
ie
s’
; ‘
re
sp
ec
t t
he
 ri
gh
t o
f c
om
m
un
ity
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 to
 c
om
m
en
t o
n 
an
d 
ch
al
le
ng
e 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t’s
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
an
d 
pr
og
ra
m
s’
. 
A
C
T 
S
oc
ia
l C
om
pa
ct
 
20
12
 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t u
nd
er
ta
ke
s 
to
 ‘R
es
pe
ct
 th
e 
rig
ht
 o
f c
om
m
un
ity
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 to
 c
om
m
en
t o
n 
an
d 
ch
al
le
ng
e 
th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t’s
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
an
d 
pr
og
ra
m
s 
by
 w
or
ki
ng
 th
ro
ug
h 
po
lit
ic
al
 c
ha
nn
el
s,
 a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
w
ith
 s
ta
ff 
of
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t a
ge
nc
ie
s.
’ 
N
S
W
 W
or
ki
ng
 T
og
et
he
r 
fo
r N
S
W
  2
00
6 
S
ta
te
s 
th
at
 ‘N
on
-g
ov
er
nm
en
t o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 a
re
 a
ls
o 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t b
od
ie
s 
th
at
 a
re
 fr
ee
 to
 p
ur
su
e 
th
ei
r 
go
al
s,
 w
hi
ch
 m
ay
 in
vo
lv
e 
ad
vo
ca
tin
g 
fo
r c
ha
ng
es
 in
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t p
ol
ic
ie
s 
an
d 
pr
io
rit
ie
s.
 In
 th
is
 s
en
se
, 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 h
ea
lth
y 
te
ns
io
n 
in
he
re
nt
 in
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
no
n-
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
se
ct
or
. T
hi
s 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
fo
rm
ul
at
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
th
at
 a
n 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t, 
di
ve
rs
e 
no
n-
go
ve
rn
m
en
t s
ec
to
r i
s 
an
 e
ss
en
tia
l c
om
po
ne
nt
 o
f a
 d
em
oc
ra
tic
, s
oc
ia
lly
-in
cl
us
iv
e 
so
ci
et
y’
. G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
ac
ce
pt
s 
th
at
 it
 is
 th
e 
ro
le
 o
f n
on
-g
ov
er
nm
en
t o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 to
 ‘[
ad
vo
ca
te
] i
n 
th
e 
in
te
re
st
s 
of
 
di
sa
dv
an
ta
ge
d 
pe
op
le
 a
nd
 c
om
m
un
iti
es
 a
cr
os
s 
N
S
W
 ‘ 
an
d 
th
at
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t w
ill
 ‘r
ec
og
ni
se
 th
e 
in
te
re
st
 
of
 n
on
-g
ov
er
nm
en
t o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 to
 p
ur
su
e 
th
ei
r o
w
n 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
na
l g
oa
ls
, b
ut
 e
xp
ec
t t
ha
t t
he
 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
f a
ny
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t f
un
di
ng
 re
ce
iv
ed
 w
ill
 b
e 
fu
lly
 m
et
 b
y 
th
e 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n’
, a
nd
 a
cc
ep
ts
 th
at
  
no
n-
go
ve
rn
m
en
t o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 w
ill
 ‘p
ur
su
e 
po
lic
y 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t, 
pr
og
ra
m
 d
es
ig
n 
an
d 
ad
vo
ca
cy
 th
ro
ug
h 
va
rio
us
 m
ea
ns
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n 
w
ith
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t a
ge
nc
ie
s’
. 
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 SA
 C
om
m
on
 G
ro
un
d 
20
04
 
A
m
on
g 
‘s
ha
re
d 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
’, 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ct
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
th
at
: ‘
A
n 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t, 
di
ve
rs
e 
an
d 
vi
go
ro
us
 
C
om
m
un
ity
 S
ec
to
r i
s 
es
se
nt
ia
l t
o 
th
e 
w
el
lb
ei
ng
 o
f s
oc
ie
ty
 a
nd
 d
em
oc
ra
cy
 a
nd
 th
er
ef
or
e 
th
e 
C
om
m
un
ity
 S
ec
to
r m
us
t r
ep
re
se
nt
 th
e 
in
te
re
st
s 
of
 S
ou
th
 A
us
tra
lia
ns
 th
ro
ug
h 
lo
bb
yi
ng
 a
nd
 w
he
re
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
, r
es
po
ns
ib
ly
 a
nd
 im
pa
rti
al
ly
 c
rit
ic
is
in
g 
th
e 
ac
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t, 
M
in
is
te
rs
 a
nd
 th
e 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
ts
.’ 
W
hi
ls
t n
ot
in
g 
an
 o
bl
ig
at
io
n 
of
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
de
pa
rtm
en
ts
 to
  ‘
en
su
re
 th
e 
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y 
fo
r t
he
 u
se
 o
f p
ub
lic
 fu
nd
s 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
ith
 th
e 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 
of
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t’ 
it 
go
es
 o
n 
to
 s
ay
 th
at
 ‘ 
Th
is
 d
oe
s 
no
t r
es
tri
ct
 th
e 
rig
ht
 o
f C
om
m
un
ity
 S
ec
to
r P
ea
ks
 
to
 c
rit
ic
is
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t’.
 T
he
 s
uc
ce
ss
 o
f t
he
 p
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
 w
ill
 b
e 
ju
dg
ed
 in
 p
ar
t b
y 
its
 a
bi
lit
y 
‘to
 d
ea
l 
w
ith
 ro
bu
st
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
an
d 
pu
bl
ic
 d
eb
at
e 
ab
ou
t p
ol
ic
y,
 s
er
vi
ce
 d
el
iv
er
y 
an
d 
G
ov
er
na
nc
e’
. 
S
A
 S
tro
ng
er
 T
og
et
he
r 2
00
9 
Th
e 
ag
re
em
en
t e
ns
hr
in
es
 ‘t
he
 ri
gh
t o
f t
he
 H
ea
lth
 a
nd
 C
om
m
un
ity
 S
er
vi
ce
s 
S
ec
to
r t
o 
co
nt
rib
ut
e 
to
 
an
d 
pr
ov
id
e 
an
al
ys
is
 o
f g
ov
er
nm
en
t p
ol
ic
y’
.  
G
ov
er
nm
en
t w
ill
 re
co
gn
iz
e 
‘th
e 
va
lu
e 
an
d 
le
gi
tim
ac
y 
of
 p
ea
k 
bo
di
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
st
re
ng
th
 o
f t
he
ir 
co
ns
tit
ue
nc
y’
 a
nd
 a
cc
ep
t t
ha
t i
t i
s 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
f t
he
 N
FP
 
se
ct
or
 to
 a
dv
oc
at
e 
‘in
 th
e 
be
st
 in
te
re
st
s 
of
 v
ul
ne
ra
bl
e 
an
d 
di
sa
dv
an
ta
ge
d 
gr
ou
ps
 a
cr
os
s 
So
ut
h 
A
us
tra
lia
’. 
Q
ue
en
sl
an
d 
C
om
pa
ct
 2
00
8 
A
m
on
g 
its
 p
rin
ci
pl
es
, t
he
 c
om
pa
ct
 s
ta
te
s,
 in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 ‘I
nd
ep
en
de
nc
e 
an
d 
au
to
no
m
y’
 th
at
 ‘w
e 
re
co
gn
is
e 
ea
ch
 s
ec
to
r’s
 le
ga
l a
nd
 s
ta
tu
to
ry
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
, a
nd
 v
al
ue
 th
e 
co
m
m
un
ity
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
se
ct
or
’s
 
ro
le
 in
 s
tim
ul
at
in
g 
pu
bl
ic
 d
eb
at
e 
an
d 
ch
al
le
ng
in
g 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t p
ol
ic
y.
’ 
TA
S
 P
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
20
12
 
‘T
he
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t i
s 
ba
se
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